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Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

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THE MYSTERY OF JUSTICE.

BY MAURICE MAETERLINCK.

I.

IN a former essay I referred to Napoleon's three crowning acts of injustice: the three celebrated crimes that were so fatal to his own fortune. The first was the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, condemned by order, without trial or proof, and executed in the trenches of Vincennes: an assassination that sowed insatiable hatred and vengeance around the path of the erring dictator. Then, the detestable intrigues whereby he lured the too trustful, easy-going Bourbons to Bayonne, that he might rob them of their hereditary crown; and the horrible war that ensued, a war that not only cost the lives of three hundred thousand men, but that swallowed up all the morality, energy, prestige of the Empire, and brought eclipse to its hitherto prosperous destiny. And lastly, the frightful, unpardonable Russian campaign, which culminated in disaster to his fortune among the ice of the Beresina and the snowbound Polish steppes. I remarked at the time:

"There were innumerable causes for these prodigious catastrophes; but, when we have slowly picked our way through all the more or less unforeseen circumstances and accidents, marked the gradual change in Napoleon's character, the acts of violence, impru-

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dence and folly of which this man of genius was guilty; when we have seen how deliberately he brought disaster to his smiling fortune—may we not almost imagine that we behold, erect at the very fountain-head of calamity, the silent shadow of misunderstood human Justice? Human Justice, with nothing of the supernatural, nothing very mysterious, but built up of many thousand very real little incidents, many thousand falsehoods, many thousand little acts of wrongdoing and consequent retaliation; human Justice, and not a power that suddenly, at some tragic moment, leaped forth like Minerva of old, fully armed, from the formidable, despotic brow of Destiny. In all this, there is but one thing of mystery, and that is the eternal presence of human Justice; but we are aware that the nature of man is very mysterious. Let this mystery for the present detain us. It is the most certain of all, it is the profoundest, it is the most helpful, it is the only one that will never paralyze our energy for good. And though this patient, vigilant shadow be not as clearly defined in every life as it was in Napoleon's, though Justice be not always as active or as undeniable, we shall none the less do wisely to study a case like this whenever opportunity offers. It will at least give rise to doubt and stimulate inquiry; and these things are of greater worth than the idle, short-sighted denial or affirmation that we so often permit ourselves; for in all questions of this kind it is less important to prove than to arouse attention, to create a certain grave, courageous respect for all that yet remains unexplained in the actions of men, in their subjection to what appear to be general laws, and in the results that ensue."

II.

Let us now consider how this great mystery of Justice does truly and effectively work itself out in man. The heart of him who is guilty of an unjust act becomes the scene of ineffaceable drama, the supreme drama of human nature, which grows the more dangerous, and the deadlier, in the degree that the man is greater and of wider knowledge.

A Napoleon will say to himself, at such troubled moments, that the morality of a great life cannot be as simple as that of an ordinary one, and that an active, powerful will has rights denied to the will that is feeble and sluggish. He will hold that he may the more legitimately sweep aside certain conscientious scruples, inasmuch as his disregard for these is not due to ignorance or weakness, but to the fact that he views them from a standpoint higher than that of the majority of men; and, further, that his aim is grand and glorious, and this passing, deliberate callousness of his, therefore, truly a victory won by his force and his intellect, since there can be no danger in doing wrong when it is done by one who knows that he does it and why. These arguments, however, cannot destroy what is deepest in our nature. An

act of injustice must always shatter the confidence that a man had in himself and in his destiny; at a given moment, and that generally of the gravest, he ceases to rely upon himself alone; and this will never be forgotten, nor will he henceforth ever again be wholly himself. He has confused and probably corrupted his fortune by the introduction of strange forces. He has lost the exact sense of his personality and his power. He no longer clearly distinguishes between what is his own and due to himself, and what he is constantly borrowing from the pernicious collaborators whom his weakness has summoned. He has ceased to be the general who has none but disciplined soldiers in the army of his thoughts; he becomes the usurping chief around whom are only accomplices. His is no longer the dignity of the man who scorns the glory at which his heart must smile sadly, as an unhappy lover smiles at the woman who has deceived him.

The man who is truly strong examines with eager care the praise and advantages that his actions have won for him, and silently rejects whatever exceeds a certain line that he has traced in his consciousness. And the stronger he is, the more nearly will this line approach the one that has already been drawn by the secret truth that lies at the bottom of all things. An act of injustice is almost always a confession of weakness, and there need be but very few such confessions to reveal to the enemy the most vulnerable spot of the soul. To commit an unjust deed that we may gain some small measure of glory, or that we may save the little we have, is to confess to ourselves that we do not merit what we desire or what we possess, and that the part we have sought to play is beyond our powers of loyal fulfilment. To this part, however, we none the less cling most anxiously, and thus do errors, phantoms and illusions make their entrance into our lives.

And at last, after a few falsehoods, a few acts of deceit, of treachery, of culpable self-indulgence, the survey of our past life can only discourage, whereas we need that it should sustain us. In this past alone do we truly know ourselves; this only in our moments of doubt can come to us and say: "Since you have been able to do this thing, it shall lie in your power to do that thing also. When that danger confronted you, when you writhed in that terrible grief, you had faith in yourself and you conquered. To-day, the circumstances are the same. Do you but preserve

your faith in yourself, and your star will be constant." But what answer shall we make when our past can only whisper: "Your success hitherto has been solely due to injustice and falsehood, wherefore it behooves you once again to deceive and to lie." It can afford no man satisfaction to let his eyes rest on ancient acts of disloyalty, weakness or treachery; and all the events of bygone days which we cannot contemplate calmly and peacefully, deriving therefrom satisfaction and hopeful strength, trouble and limit the horizon which the days that are not yet are forming far away. It is only a prolonged survey of the past that gives to the eye the strength it needs to look into the future.

III.

No, it was not the inherent Justice of things that punished Napoleon for his three great acts of injustice, or that will punish us, in a manner less startling perhaps, but not less painful. Nor was it an incorruptible, irresponsible Justice, "reaching to the vault of the sky," and forever steadfastly pursuing its own immovable course. Punishment befalls us for the reason that the entire moral being of man, his mind and his character are incapable of living and acting except in Justice. Leaving that, we leave our natural element; we are transplanted, as it were, to a planet of which we know nothing, where the ground slips from under our feet and all disconcerts us; for, while the humblest intellect feels itself at home in Justice, and can readily foretell the consequences of every just act, the most profound and penetrating mind loses its way hopelessly in the injustice that itself has created, and can form no conception of the results that shall ensue. The man of genius who renounces the equity dear to the humblest peasant will find all paths strange to him, and these will be stranger still should he overstep the limit his own sense of Justice imposes; for the Justice that soars aloft, keeping pace with the intellect, establishes new boundaries around all it discovers, besides strengthening and rendering more insurmountable still the ancient barriers of instinct. The moment we cross the primitive frontier of equity all things seem to fail us; one falsehood gives birth to a hundred, and treachery returns by a thousand channels. If Justice be in us, we may march along boldly, for there are certain things to which the basest cannot be false; but if injustice possess us, we must beware of the justest of men,

since there are things to which it is impossible they should be faithful. As our physical organism was devised for existence in the atmosphere of our globe, so is our moral organism devised for existence in Justice. Every faculty craves for it, and is more intimately concerned with it than with light or heat, or the laws of gravitation; and to throw ourselves into injustice is to plunge headlong into the hostile and the unknown. All that is in us has been placed there with a view to Justice; all things tend thither and urge us towards it; whereas, when we harbor injustice, we are battling against our own strength; and, at the hour of inevitable punishment, when, prostrate, weeping and penitent, we recognize that events in revolt, the sky, the universe, the invisible, are all justly in league against us, then may we truly say, not that these are or ever have been just, but that we, notwithstanding ourselves, have contrived to remain just even in injustice.

IV.

We say that nature is absolutely indifferent to our morality, and that were this morality to command us to kill our neighbor, or to do him the utmost possible harm, Nature would aid us in this no less than in our endeavor to comfort or serve him. She would seem to reward us as often for having made him suffer as for our acts of goodness towards him. Does this give us the right to conclude that Nature has no morality—using the word in its most limited sense as meaning the logical, inevitable subordination of things to the accomplishment of a general mission? That is a question to which it were wise not to reply too hastily. We know nothing of Nature's aim, or whether she have an aim. We know nothing of her consciousness, or whether she have a consciousness; of her thoughts, or whether she think at all. It is with her deeds and her manner of doing that we are solely concerned. And in these we find the same contradiction between our morality and Nature's mode of action as exists between our conscience and the instincts that Nature has planted within us. For this conscience, although in ultimate analysis due to her also, has nevertheless been shaped by ourselves; and opposes, as it advances step by step with human morality, an ever stronger resistance to the desires of our instinct. Were we only to listen to these desires, we should be acting in all things as Nature acts; for she, be wars never so inexcusable, injustice or cruelty never so

flagrant, is forever proclaiming the right of the stronger, the victory of the least scrupulous and best equipped. Our one object would be our own personal triumph, and we should pay not the slightest heed to the rights or sufferings of our victims, to their innocence or beauty, their moral or intellectual superiority. But, in that case, why should Nature have placed within us a conscience and a sense of Justice which have prevented us from desiring those things that she desires? Or is it we ourselves who have placed them there? Are we capable of deriving from within us something that is not in Nature, capable of giving abnormal development to a force at war with her force? And if we possess this power, has not Nature her own reasons for permitting us to possess it? Why should these two irreconcilable tendencies, incessantly at strife, and each alternately victorious, exist only in us, and nowhere else in the world? Would the one have been too dangerous without the other? Would it have passed beyond its goal perhaps? Would the desire for conquest, unchecked by a sense of Justice, have led to annihilation, as a sense of Justice without the desire for conquest might have led to inertia? But which of these two tendencies is the more natural and necessary; which is the narrower and which the vaster? Which is provisional and which eternal? Who shall tell us which one we should combat and which encourage? Should we conform to the law that is incontestably the more general, or should our heart cling to the one that is often quite exceptional? Can circumstances exist that give us the right to act in accordance with the apparent ideal of life? Is it our duty to have regard to the morality of the species or race, which seems irresistible to us, and stands forth as a clear revelation of one of Nature's obscure, unknown intentions; or is it essential that the individual should maintain and develop within him a morality entirely opposed to that of the race or species whereof he forms a part?

V.

Here indeed, in another form, we are once more confronted by the question which lies at the root of evolutionary morality, and is perhaps scientifically unsolvable. Reject the word as it may, evolutionary morality is based on the Justice of Nature, that saddles each individual with the good and evil consequences of his own nature and his own actions. And when, on the other hand,

this evolutionary morality seeks to justify actions which, although intrinsically unjust, are essential for the prosperity of the race, it falls back on what it reluctantly terms Nature's indifference or injustice. Two unknown aims are here, that of humanity and that of Nature; apparently irreconcilable, wrapped as they are in a mystery that may some day perhaps pass away. In point of fact, all these questions resolve themselves into one, which is the gravest by far of our contemporary morality. The race would appear to be becoming conscious—prematurely it may be, and perhaps disastrously—not, we will say, of its rights, for that problem is still in suspense, but of the fact that morality does not enter into certain actions which go to make history.

This disquieting consciousness would seem to be slowly invading individual life. Thrice, and almost in the course of one year, have we seen this question leap forth and assume vast proportions: America's crushing defeat of Spain (though here the issues were confused, for Spain had too long been heaping blunder on blunder, thereby complicating the problem); the case of an innocent man sacrificed to the preponderating interests of his country; and the iniquitous war of the Transvaal. The phenomenon, however, is not absolutely new. Man has always endeavored to justify his injustice; and when human justice offered him no excuse or pretext, he found in the will of the gods a law superior to the justice of man. But our excuse or pretext of to-day threatens our morality the more, inasmuch as it is based on a law, or at least a habit, of Nature, far more real, incontestable and universal than the will of an ephemeral and local god.

Which will prevail in the end, justice or force? Does force contain an unknown justice that will absorb our human justice; or is the feeling which seems to resist blind force actually no more than a devious emanation from that force; does it tend to the same good, and is it only the point of deviation that escapes us? This is not a question that we can answer, since we ourselves form part of the mystery we seek to solve; the reply can only come from one who should gaze down upon us from the heights of another world, who should know the aims of the universe and the destiny of man. In the meanwhile, if we say Nature is right, we say that the instinct of Justice, which she has placed in us, and which therefore also is Nature, is wrong, whereas if we approve this instinct, our approval is necessarily derived from the very object that we are calling in question.

VI.

That is true. But it is no less true that the desire to sum up the world in a syllogism is one of the oldest and vainest habits of men. In the region of the unknown and unknowable, logic-chopping has its perils; and here it would seem that almost all our doubts flow from another hazardous syllogism. We tell ourselves, boldly at times, but more often in a whisper, that we are Nature's children, and bound, therefore, in all things to conform to her laws and abide by her example. And since Nature regards Justice with indifference, since she has another aim, which is the sustaining, the renewing, the incessant development of life, it follows that—. So far we have not formulated the conclusion, or, at least, it has not yet dared openly to force its way into our morality; but, although its influence has hitherto only been remotely felt in that familiar sphere which includes our family, our friends and our own immediate surroundings, it is slowly penetrating into that vast and desolate region to which we relegate our unknown, unseen neighbor—him who for us has no name. It is already to be found at the root of many of our actions; it has entered our politics, our industry, our commerce, indeed, it affects almost all we do from the moment we emerge from the narrow circle of our domestic hearth—the only place, for the majority of mankind, where a little veritable Justice still obtains, a little benevolence, a little love. It will call itself economic or social law, evolution, competition, struggle for life; it will masquerade under a thousand names, forever perpetrating the self-same wrong.

And yet there can be nothing less legitimate than such a conclusion. Apart from the fact that we might with equal justification reverse the syllogism, and cause it to declare that there must be a certain justice in Nature, since we, her children, are just, we need only consider it as it stands to realize how doubtful and contestable is one at least of its two premises. Nature does not appear to be just in her dealings with mankind; but we have absolutely no means of judging whether she is just as regards herself. The fact that she pays no heed to the morality of our actions does not warrant the inference that she has no morality, or that our morality is the only one there can be. We are entitled to say that she is indifferent whether our intentions be good or evil, but

we have no right to conclude therefrom that she is destitute of all morality or equity, for that would be tantamount to affirming that there are no more mysteries or secrets, and that we know all the laws of the universe, its origin and its end. Her mode of action is different from our own, but, I say it once more, we know nothing of what her reason may be for acting in that different manner; and we have no right to imitate what appear to us to be cruel and iniquitous actions so long as we have no precise knowledge of the profound and salutary reasons that may underlie them. What is the aim of Nature? Whither do the worlds tend that stretch across Eternity? Where does conscience begin, and is its only form that which it assumes in ourselves? At what point do physical laws become moral laws? Is life unintelligent? Have we sounded all the depths of Nature, and is it only in our cerebro-spinal system that she becomes mind? Finally, what is Justice when viewed from other heights? Is the intention necessarily at its centre, and can no regions exist where intention no longer shall count? We should have to answer these questions, and many others, before we can decide whether Nature is just in her dealings with masses whose vastness corresponds with her own. She disposes of a future, a space, whereof we have no idea, wherein there exists, it may be, a Justice proportioned to her duration, her extent and her aim, even as our instinct of Justice is proportioned to the duration and narrow circle of our own life. She may for centuries commit a wrong that she has centuries in which to repair; but we, with our few days before us, lack the quality to imitate what our eye cannot embrace, understand or follow. Look away from the passing hour, and what standard have we whereby to judge her? For instance, even apart from the immensity that surrounds us, considering only the imperceptible speck that we are in the worlds, we are wholly ignorant of all that concerns a possible life beyond the tomb; and forget that, in the present state of our knowledge, nothing authorizes us to deny the existence of a sort of more or less conscious, responsible after-life; nor would such an after-life necessarily be subject to the decisions of an external will. He were very rash indeed who should assert that nothing survives in us, or in others, of the struggles of our will and the acquirements of our brain. It may be—and serious experiments, though they have proved nothing, do yet allow us to rank this among scien-

tific possibilities—it may be that a part of our personality, our nervous force, may resist dissolution. How vast a future would then be thrown open to the laws that unite cause and effect, and that must always end by creating Justice when they come into touch with the human soul, and have centuries ahead of them! Before we declare that Nature is not just, let us at least remember that she is logical; and should we determine to be unjust, the difficulty still will be that we must also be logical; and, when logic comes into contact with our thoughts and feelings, our intentions and passions, what is there that differentiates it from Justice?

VII.

Let us not too hastily form a conclusion; there is so much that still is uncertain. Should we seek to imitate what we term the injustice of Nature, we should run the risk of imitating and fostering only the injustice that is in ourselves. When we say that Nature is unjust, we are in effect complaining of her indifference to our little virtues, our little intentions, our little deeds of heroism; and it is our vanity far more than our sense of equity that considers itself aggrieved. Our morality is proportioned to our stature and our narrow destiny, and we have no right to forsake it because it is not on the scale of the immensity and the infinite destiny of the universe.

And, further, should it even be proved that Nature is unjust on all points, the other question remains intact—whether the command be laid upon man to follow Nature in her injustice. Here we shall do well to let our own conscience speak, rather than listen to a voice so formidable that we hear not a word it utters, and are not even certain whether words there be. Reason and instinct tell us that it is well to follow the counsels of Nature, but they warn us not to follow these counsels when they clash with another instinct within us, and one not less profound: the instinct of what is just and what unjust. And if instincts do indeed draw very near to the truth of Nature, and must be respected by us in the degree of the force that is in them, this one is perhaps the strongest of all, for it has struggled alone against all the others combined, and still persists within us. Nor is this the hour to reject it. Until other certitudes reach us, it behooves us, who are men, to continue just in the human plan and in the human sphere. Let us not venture into the abyss

whence races and peoples to come may, perhaps, find the issue, but into which man, in so far as he is man, must not seek to penetrate. The injustice of Nature ends by becoming Justice for the race; she has time before her, she can wait, her injustice is of her girth. But for us it is too overwhelming, and our days are too few. Let us be satisfied that force should reign in the universe, but equity in our heart. Though the race be irresistibly, and perhaps justly, unjust, though even the crowd appear possessed of rights denied to the isolated man, and commit, on occasions, great, inevitable and salutary crimes, it is still the duty of each individual of the race, of every man in the crowd, to remain just, while ever adding to and sustaining the conscience within him. Nor shall we be entitled to abandon this duty till all the reasons of the great apparent injustice be known to us; for those that are given us now, preservation of the species, reproduction and selection of the stronger, of the abler, of the "fitter," are not sufficient to warrant so frightful a change. Let each one try by all means to become the strongest, the most skilful, the ablest at handling the difficulties of the life he cannot transform; but, so far, the qualities that shall enable him to conquer, that shall give the fullest play to his moral power and intelligence, and shall make him truly the happiest, most skilful, the strongest and "fittest"—these qualities are precisely the ones that are the most human, the most honorable and the most just.

MAURICE MAETERLINCK.

POLITICAL ASPECT OF CUBA'S ECONOMIC DISTRESS.

BY JOSIAH QUINCY.

THE close connection under modern conditions between economics and politics has rarely been more strikingly illustrated than by the present phase of the Cuban question. For three years our representatives have been dealing with the Island from a political standpoint, assuming that good government would bring with it the stability and prosperity essential to make Cuban independence even a hopeful experiment. They have only recently discovered that economic conditions and relations are of more fundamental importance than administrative improvements—that tariffs made at Washington have an even more vital connection with the future of Cuba than constitutions framed at Havana. The thoroughness with which this simple truth has at length been grasped by our executive authorities, and the commendable zeal which they are now showing in inculcating it, may partially excuse their tardiness in arriving at it.

But the consequences of this delay are surely serious enough; for the question of tariff concessions to Cuba has become one of extreme urgency before there is any Cuban government to deal with on a basis of reciprocity, yet when the inauguration of such a government is so near as to afford a plausible excuse for a fatal delay. The coincidence between the establishment of the nominal political independence of Cuba, and the discovery of her very real commercial dependence upon us, is certainly an unfortunate one. It would seem as if a reasonable degree of foresight might have avoided it, and that a Cuban government should have been instituted either sooner or later—not at the very moment of an economic crisis.

The excellent and authoritative article by Mr. E. A. Atkins in

the last number of the REVIEW, under the alarming but accurate title "Cuba's Imminent Bankruptcy," leaves nothing to be said as to the economic side of the historic Cuban problem in its newest form. But a brief discussion of the present situation from the political standpoint, and especially from the point of view which the present writer believes that the Democratic party should take, may be of timely interest as a complement to the treatment of the commercial issue. For, if economic considerations determine what Congress ought to do, political forces and arguments are more apt to decide what it will do.

The attitude and language of Secretary Root in meeting the crisis certainly leave nothing to be desired. It is fortunate, alike for Cuba and for our own country, that at this critical stage of their relations a man of his breadth of mind and courage has official charge of these relations and of their presentation to Congress. President Roosevelt fully shares the convictions of his Secretary of War, and evidently proposes to throw the whole weight of his Administration into the scale to avert the impending commercial ruin of Cuba. This, again, is most fortunate, and will bring about some relief, if any influence can do so. On the other hand, there is clearly a very powerful combination of interests, both in Congress and on the outside, to prevent any change whatever in the present tariff, and particularly to block any action in the direction of reciprocity. Moreover, the political influence of the growers of sugar beets and the manufacturers of beet sugar—to say nothing of the Louisiana growers of sugar cane—has increased very greatly in recent years, with the growth of that industry and its establishment in many States; and this special interest alone—which, from a selfish standpoint, has every reason to offer a determined opposition to the free entry of Cuban sugar—may well prove potent enough to prevent any action, even of a temporary character. On the whole, the outlook for the Cuban sugar planter is very doubtful, if not discouraging.

But, as anything beyond temporary relief at the best is apparently out of the question pending the establishment of the Cuban government, we may well look ahead to the real issue which underlies the whole situation—the issue which may have to be ignored officially on both sides for a short time longer, but which is none the less the *cruz* of the whole matter. As the economic question in Cuba, dependent upon her external rela-

tions, is now seen to be of even greater importance than the political question of her internal government, so this economic issue is, in turn, swallowed up in—because it is included by—the larger political question of the annexation of the Island to the United States. With her incorporation into this country with the full rights of a State or of an organized Territory—including, of course, the right of freedom of trade within the limits of the Union—the economic question would be settled for Cuba, completely and finally; any other settlement must be partial and temporary. Whether or not the alliterative alternative between annexation and anarchy is a true statement of the only choice which the situation offers, there can be little doubt that every important consideration points to the former outcome as the best one now possible, both for the Cubans and for ourselves.

The present situation at Washington indicates that it may be necessary, a little later, for Cuba to play her last card, by asking for annexation, before she can win the rich economic stakes for which she is contending. Peace, plenty and happiness are the real objects sought by her people; her form of government, whether independent in the fullest sense or only within the wide limits allowed to a State of our Union—whether flying its own flag or under the stars and stripes—is only a means to these ends. If they can better be attained—and this can hardly admit of doubt—by the freedom of trade with this country which annexation, and nothing short of annexation, will bring—by the confidence which this will give to capital and the stimulus which it will offer to immigration—then Cuba should be wise and enlightened enough to grasp the substance of prosperity and liberty as an autonomous State, rather than cling to the shadow of national independence at the sacrifice of all her material interests. The only question is whether she will be governed by sense or by sentiment—by the reasonable judgment which has won for the English-speaking peoples their commanding position in the world, or by the impracticable idealism which has too often been the bane of the Latin races.

But it is said by some that the so-called Teller resolution precludes this country from annexing Cuba, with or without the consent of the people of the Island. The writer has always believed, with ex-Secretary Olney, to quote from a magazine article from his pen published in March, 1900, that this resolu-

tion, "ill-advised and futile at the time of its passage, if now influential at all, is simply prejudicing the interests of Cuba and the United States alike; no such resolution can refute the logic of the undisputed facts, or should be allowed to impede the natural march of events." That it is an embarrassing element in a delicate situation cannot be denied; that it is not and cannot be allowed to be the decisive factor is equally clear. The Congress that passed this resolution—which cannot have the binding force either of a constitutional amendment or of a treaty, though often treated as if it had the highest political sanctity—had no power to fix the future action of this country by an expression of pious intention.

Without such a resolution we should not deal unjustly or harshly by the Cubans, or annex them without their own consent; in spite of it we are not bound to exclude any policy which may be found for the best interest both of the people of the Island and of ourselves. If annexation is the outcome indicated by every dictate of statesmanship and of mutual interest, the dead hand of the Fifty-fifth Congress cannot hold us back from it. Moreover, the declaration by Congress of an assumed national intention "to leave the government and future of the Island to its people" after its pacification, cannot preclude them, as they were in no way bound by its terms, from seeking their economic salvation through political union with us; and it surely ought not to prevent us from granting them what is probably the essential condition of permanent pacification.

Further, if the Teller resolution ever had any binding force, it has been superseded by subsequent action taken by us and acquiesced in by the Cubans; and even if their acquiescence was given only under political duress, it is now one of the facts of the situation. This resolution disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control" over the Island except for its pacification; yet, under the provisions of the so-called Platt amendment, we are to exercise important rights of sovereignty, large jurisdiction, and very real control over the Island. The free Cuba dreamed of by her revolutionary leaders—an independent and sovereign international state—has been definitely abandoned, and we are to have instead a Cuba of limited powers, under an American protectorate, none the less real in fact because nowhere called by that name.

Our control over Cuban finance and sanitation under the provisions of the Platt amendment is practically whatever we choose to make it; our rights of intervention are of the broadest character, and we are to have all necessary naval and coaling stations. In short, our recognized relation to Cuba is to be very similar to the actual relation of Great Britain to Egypt. Cuba is to have, in several important respects, less than the rights of self-government possessed by a State of the Union; and our rights of control, which would be exercised by the President alone if Congress were not in session, leave her without the constitutional safeguards which protect the rights of our States from federal encroachment. Her flag will be but the emblem of autonomy; for independent nationality and full sovereignty she will not possess.

How, then, is political union, so desirable both from a Cuban and from an American standpoint, to come about? It can now come only after the establishment of a Cuban government; and it is, doubtless, desirable from a sentimental standpoint that such a government should be inaugurated, however short its life may be, as well as necessary from a practical standpoint that all due forms of negotiation should be gone through before the consummation is reached. We should do everything in our power to regard the sensibilities of the weaker party in effecting this union, and to respect that sentiment in favor of a free Cuba for which her sons have sacrificed so much. We should allow Cuba to reach the conclusion that annexation is best for her in her own time and in her own way, provided that the law and order for which we shall still be responsible be maintained in the meantime. But if we, from our side, and regarding our own interests, believe that voluntary annexation is the only satisfactory and permanent solution of the problem which has vexed our statesmanship for generations, there is no reason why we should grant as a permanent and free gift, to a quasi-independent Cuba, those commercial advantages which would constitute one of her chief inducements for seeking political incorporation with us.

In this matter we should distinguish clearly between our temporary duties to a dependent Cuba, under our military control, and our future obligations toward a Cuba with her own government. This year's crop of sugar cane will be gathered and ground substantially, if not wholly, under our rule; we are still responsible for the situation, and every consideration

of national honor calls upon us to relieve Cuba by remitting at least a large part, better the whole, of our tariff duties upon the present crop. If we fail to do so, and commercial disaster comes to Cuba in consequence, it will justly bring reproach, if not disgrace, upon our name. But when a Cuban government is once fairly established, and the people of the Island have had time to negotiate with us, through such a government, upon all questions affecting their economic and political status—when we have divested ourselves of the position of trustees for them, and can deal with them more or less at arms' length and as an independent contracting party—then the situation will be quite different. We can then set what political price we please upon the privilege of free access to our markets. Therefore, the writer, although a supporter of the principle of free trade, can see no reason why those who believe in the manifest advantages of Cuban annexation should surrender in advance, especially when our fixed national policy is protectionist, the most potent influence for bringing Cuban opinion to support political union.

If, after breaking by force of arms the political tie between Cuba and Spain, we should deny to the Island, so closely united to us geographically and so dependent upon us commercially, the privilege of political union with us—which we have already substantially accorded to Porto Rico, upon considerations by no means as strong—we should, indeed, be acting an ungenerous and odious part. That such a union may bring with it new problems and difficulties, even dangers, goes without saying, and we need not, therefore, too strongly condemn the conservative who shrinks from such a step. But nations cannot escape the reasonable consequences of their acts, any more than individuals; when we went to war with Spain we made Cuba our temporary ward at once, our permanent political partner whenever she was ready and willing to assume that character.

Doubtless, the beet sugar interests, and such others as may fear the effects of free competition with Cuban products, will be as strongly opposed to annexation as to reciprocity or reduced duties, and it cannot come without a contest. But the moment Cuba offers us annexation, she will appeal to a national sentiment so strong that no special interests can stand against it. They may succeed in defeating the economic proposal of reciprocity. They could not even long delay the acceptance of complete

political union; for that will appeal alike to the sense of justice and the reasonable patriotic ambition of the average American, and nothing can stand against the union of these sentiments.

The historic attitude of the Democratic party toward territorial expansion is thoroughly in harmony with the voluntary annexation of Cuba to this country, and its present opposition to imperialism is not in the least inconsistent with favoring such a policy. The platform of the last Democratic National Convention favors our national expansion "by every peaceful and legitimate means," and no one proposes that Cuba shall enter the Union otherwise. It declares expressly that the party "is not opposed to territorial expansion when it takes in desirable territory, which can be erected into States in the United States, and whose people are willing and fit to become American citizens." Cuba is certainly for many reasons most desirable and important territory to bring under American control, and large enough and near enough to be erected into one or more States. There is no reason to doubt that her people are as fit to become American citizens, after some preliminary political training and education, as are some millions of those who have already been incorporated into our citizenship; and, further, there is the certainty that annexation would lead to large immigration into Cuba.

The colonial imperialism to which the Democratic party is "unalterably opposed," is, in the words of the platform, that which is involved in "the seizing or purchasing of distant islands, to be governed outside the Constitution, and whose people can never become citizens." This is the case of the Philippine Islands, as to which the writer is a radical anti-imperialist and anti-annexationist; it is not the case of Cuba, which is practically contiguous territory and so situated as to be directly within the sphere of our influence and interests. If she cannot be governed by us otherwise than as the Philippines are governed, outside the Constitution, then, indeed, it might be better for us to leave the Island a political derelict. But there is no reason why Cuba cannot enter the Union in due season, as Louisiana, Florida and Texas entered the sisterhood of States. The Platt amendment provides for the application to a quasi-independent Cuba of a large measure of the irresponsible imperialism which we object to in the Philippines; annexation will regularize a political union which must exist to a considerable extent in fact, and will bring

it under the established limitations of the Constitution and of our fixed practice under it upon this continent.

Moreover, annexation is in harmony with the economic creed of the Democratic party, because it is the only practicable method for securing fully and permanently the enormous advantages of free commercial intercourse between Cuba and this country. Reciprocity is, indeed, better than nothing; but it is at best the partial enjoyment of benefits which should be fully realized. With the freedom of trade with this continent which Cuba would secure by political union with us, her possibilities for the production of wealth, in which we would so largely share, are great almost beyond conception. The incorporation of tropical territory within our national limits is all that is needed to round out our enormous and varied agricultural capacities. Cuba would be worth more to us in a year than the Philippines in a generation.

The rule of Spain in Cuba was a glaring anachronism for generations before it came to an end. The wonder is that it endured so long; in going over the record of our relations with the Island one cannot but be struck with the patience and forbearance shown by our government, in spite of the full recognition by many of our leading statesmen of the manifest destiny which would one day unite Cuba with America. John Quincy Adams in 1823, when Secretary of State, prophesied annexation within fifty years. "From a multitude of considerations," he wrote, "Cuba has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, the nature of its productions and of its wants, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of the Union together." These words require no change to make them applicable to the conditions of to-day. The limit of time allowed by Mr. Adams has been exceeded by nearly a generation and the destiny of Cuba is not even yet quite fulfilled; but it is getting nearer and more manifest. With a patience equal to that which we always exhibited toward Spain, with added consideration and sympathy born of our own sacrifices for Cuban liberty, we will wait for the Cubans themselves to offer us freely that political union, even more advantageous to them than to us, toward which the history of a hundred years has been tending.

JOSIAH QUINCY.

A NEGLECTED FACTOR IN OUR COMMERCIAL EXPANSION.

BY ALBERT HALSTEAD.

THE enterprise and energy of the American consuls are largely responsible for the recent remarkably rapid development of our foreign commerce. Although not exclusively instrumental in that desirable growth, their work is one of its most notable causes. American inventive genius, the enlargement of our productive capacity, which effected a surplus of manufactured articles, and promptness in the execution of orders, have been important influences. The awakening of American manufacturers to the necessity of cultivating a foreign market, as well as the quality, beauty, practicability and novelty of our products, were other primary causes. Without the co-operation of our consuls, this successful invasion of foreign fields would have been less rapid than it has been.

The American manufacturer is alert and enterprising, usually in advance of his foreign competitor. He has done much to secure foreign trade, but the consul has pointed the way and often suggested the means. It is unfortunate that the part of the consul in this commercial development has not, as yet, been fully appreciated. But foreign officials and business interests already understand how great an aid to the marvellous commercial expansion of the United States the American consuls have been. The facility with which the average consul adapts himself to his work is there remarked, and surprise is expressed at the unreasonable fault-finding of critics in the United States. These do not convince, and they offer no practical remedy for the conditions against which they inveigh. They form their judgments from a few isolated instances, or because of some personal grievance they condemn the entire system. The system is not per-

fect, but it is far superior to any similar service in the world. It is to be regretted, too, that our manufacturers and exporters have not accepted, as generally as they might have done with advantage, the advice officially given them by our consuls. Fortunately, however, there is a greater tendency among us to recognize the good work of the service, and to pay closer attention to its suggestions and recommendations.

In 1874, Congress provided for a Bureau of Statistics in the Department of State, whose duty it should be to prepare the volume of "Commercial Relations" issued annually by that department, as well as other information of a trade or commercial character. The monthly "Commercial Relations," or consular reports, were first issued in October, 1880. Before that, with the possible exception of short abstracts furnished occasionally to the press, the only means of giving publicity to the consular reports was through the annual volume of "Commercial Relations." The consequent delay naturally neutralized, to a large degree, the good that would have resulted from the immediate publication of consular communications. A large number of valuable reports were thus left altogether unpublished, and many others were necessarily curtailed to keep the annual volume within reasonable limits.

Appreciating the good results of the consuls' efforts for the enlargement of our commerce in their several districts, and desiring to give the country the most complete and direct benefits of their labors, Congress, at the suggestion of the Department of State, provided "for printing and distributing more frequently the publications by the Department of State of the consular and other reports." This was in response to the wishes of the leading commercial communities of the United States, as expressed through their Chambers of Commerce, which bore testimony to the excellence of the reports and the advantages which would accrue from their more frequent publication. A circular instruction was then issued by the Department of State on July 1st, 1880, to the various consular agents, setting forth the scope of the proposed publications. Among other things the circular indicated was, that "this action of Congress enlarges the field of your usefulness, and your accomplished labors are a guarantee that you will respond to the expectations of the commercial and manufacturing communities of the country, and thus prove that

you fully appreciate the very high compliment embraced in this national indorsement of your efforts for the enlargement of our commerce." Consular officers were requested to prepare and forward to the department reports upon all subjects calculated to advance the commercial and industrial welfare of the United States. They were cautioned that while giving themselves the broadest field for the work thus assigned, their "principal efforts must be directed to the introduction of American trade and the enlargement thereof in your several districts." They were told that the information desired should be explicit and comprehensive, that our merchants, manufacturers, agriculturists and exporters might fully understand the peculiarities and requirements of the several markets, as well as the best methods of reaching them; they were to leave as little as possible to surmise and speculation. The frequency of the proposed publications was to depend altogether upon the volume and value of the reports received. No place, where the United States was officially represented, was thought to be so insignificant as to be unworthy of commercial cultivation.

This was the first serious and practical thought on the subject. The Department of State had not before found it profitable to demand, nor had our consuls any incentive to prepare and forward, reports except those required for the annual volume of "Commercial Relations," there being no provision for their publication and distribution. It is different to-day. These publications are daily lessons to American manufacturers, replete with valuable information that should be studied and assimilated.

The Bureau of Statistics was superseded, in June, 1898, by the present Bureau of Foreign Commerce, the name authorized by Congress in enlarging its functions. The bureau sprang at once into greater usefulness as an auxiliary to the commercial activity of the nation. The change was largely brought about by departmental officials, who understood the importance of the material received daily from consuls, and the benefit that would result to our agriculture, commerce and manufactures should prompt publication and distribution be effected. Then followed the issuance of a daily bulletin of the more important and valuable dispatches, treating extensively of trade conditions. The result has more than justified the most sanguine expectations of the several officials concerned. The bureau's publications now consist of the

daily, monthly and special reports, to say nothing of the volume of "Commercial Relations" which is still annually issued. The "Advance Sheets," or daily issue of these consular reports, with a general circulation of many thousands, are to-day more largely sought after by the trade interests of the United States and of other countries than any other publication of the kind. Their wide circulation, aided by newspaper recognition of them as news, enhances their usefulness. It places all interests to which they relate in immediate touch with some important commercial fact. Our trade bodies, exporting firms and others bear witness to the value of this government enterprise.

Consular reports cover a multitude of subjects. They describe new methods of manufacture. They tell of the enterprises and plans of foreign manufacturers, and of the changes in tariff regulations. They call attention to the tastes, habits and prejudices of the peoples who may become our customers. They report criticisms of American products and the reasons for the unpopularity of certain articles. They suggest necessary changes of style, or in methods of packing, to make American merchandise more salable. They discuss foreign commercial customs and, in fact, cover every possible phase of the foreign markets that can guide or instruct. The consul seldom, if ever, touches upon the politics of the country in which he is stationed, save as it may affect the market for American goods, and even then with the greatest caution. He is actually forbidden to deal with political affairs affecting his territory, for this would destroy his usefulness more quickly than anything else.

A consul who is in touch with affairs at home, acquainted with the capacity of domestic manufacturers to meet certain foreign needs, will make a report on some special product. He will show the price it brings abroad, and suggest that a similar article, but of better quality, can be manufactured in the United States, shipped, pay tariff charges and sell more cheaply than that made in the country in which he is resident. This is an immediate notice to the domestic manufacturer of an opportunity to introduce his goods abroad, and it is frequently accepted. A new market for our products has often thus been established.

The consular service performs another important function. It warns our producers of foreign imitations or frauds upon the real American article. It has proved, for example, that Russians,

in order to procure a market for their own oil, have placed it in American tin cans and sold it as a native product. It has also shown, on several occasions, how our styles were copied in Germany, and how the imitations have been foisted upon the public as genuine American manufactures.

No American consul can exact a commission or compensation for any information he furnishes to a citizen at home. His reward is the consciousness that he has done his duty and promoted or protected his country's commerce. No consul whose salary exceeds \$1,000 can engage in trade abroad.

Another phase of the consul's work, and of his usefulness to his fellow citizen who is seeking to cultivate foreign trade, can be shown. A manufacturer will want information as to opportunities for the sale of some commodity in a particular foreign district. He will write to our consul there. While the latter may be glad to oblige him, perhaps a more satisfactory way is to apply directly to the Department of State, stating precisely what information is desired and asking co-operation in securing it. Many valuable consular reports have been inspired in this way. The department uniformly stands ready to second any efforts of American citizens engaged in a particular enterprise to procure information from abroad. While the department necessarily reserves the right to publish the information, it is first furnished to the individual at whose instance the inquiry was made. If an inquisitive manufacturer interrogates a consul directly, the latter ordinarily replies through the department, that it may make the information general. The consul may regard the letter of inquiry as private, but any report goes through the department. Thousands of such inquiries are made annually of the Department of State, or of the consuls direct, so that each American consul becomes, to an extent, a general information bureau for his own countrymen. The knowledge thus gained often encourages a manufacturer to make a trial exportation, or warns him to avoid an experiment that would but entail a loss.

It was early discovered in our fight for foreign trade that the American exporter or manufacturer was unable to compete with his foreign rival, because he lacked the latter's knowledge and experience. Appreciating this, our consuls have for some years made a point of frequently cautioning American manufacturers and exporters that, when seeking trade with a foreign country,

they must realize that they are dealing with a different people, whose commercial habits, needs, ideas and prejudices vary greatly from those of our own people, and should be studied and understood. They have impressed upon our manufacturers and exporters the essential fact that they must adapt themselves to foreign commercial customs. For example, they must not demand immediate payment when goods are received. Much less must they insist upon being paid before the goods have been delivered, for too often such a practice clashes with the usage at the point of destination. The exporter is simply over-anxious to be protected from loss through bad debts. That is well enough in dealing with men of doubtful financial standing, but really insulting when the purchaser has an established reputation. We have also, too frequently, refused to give long credits, as our foreign competitors do readily. The difficulty has been, as our consuls have often explained, that the American exporter has neglected to acquaint himself with the financial standing of the merchants with whom he hopes to do business. Our exporters have succeeded in collecting for the first bill, but have not encouraged their purchasers to renew their orders, when payment on delivery has been demanded. Such errors could have been avoided by studying foreign trade habits, and the manufacturer would have been reasonably sure of securing payment.

These points have been emphasized by the consular reports, and brought to the attention of our people with surprising frequency. Yet only the other day, to show how hard it is to teach every exporter his duty to himself, a consular officer in Germany found it necessary to repeat that demands for immediate payment and refusals to extend credits were interfering with the enlargement of our commerce in his section of Germany. Despite discouragements and the feeling, which very often exists, that efforts to instruct our exporters are almost useless, the consuls persevere and are gradually accomplishing much good.

American manufacturers have been averse to making their goods especially for the foreign markets they sought, evidently thinking that if their styles suited Americans, foreigners should be satisfied with them. Fortunately, all this is changing, thanks to the constant teachings of our consuls, and our manufacturers are learning to take pains to cultivate foreign trade by conforming to foreign tastes.

The question of packing goods is another that has brought forth many excellent and instructive consular reports. It is the old story of meeting foreign prejudices, and of packing goods so as to stand the wear and tear of shipment, as well as to be readily handled. These reports have told of objections raised to American packages, which are so frequently unsuited to the uses for which they are employed. As an illustration, it may be stated that it has been necessary to advise exporters not to pack merchandise that must be transported across a country where carrying facilities are primitive, in packages of larger size than is absolutely needful. Then it has been shown that the same kind of packing will not do for perishable goods as for machinery; that, unless great care is taken in this particular, loss is sure to come through breakages, as well as from the disappointment of purchasers in getting damaged goods. One enterprising consul went so far, recently, as to interview foreign importers, exporters, case-makers and stevedores in his district as to the best method of packing every conceivable kind of merchandise, and his report is a guide book to packing, invaluable not only to exporters but to every American shipper. In discussing the packing question, this consul made the point that: "The manufacturer or exporter who wins a reputation for the best packing of articles has a direct advantage in the foreign trade, prices and quality of goods being satisfactory." That applies equally to the domestic trade.

In still another way have our consuls been most useful to the exporters and manufacturers at home. They have repeatedly insisted that it is best to employ commercial travellers to create a demand for American products abroad. These travelling agents should be Americans and be conversant with the language of the countries in which they are working. They must be prepared to demonstrate the value and utility of the article they offer for sale. Should they be selling machinery, they must know how to put it up and operate it. Ignorance of this or of any detail may be fatal. Such progress has been made in capturing the foreign markets that our people engaged in such an enterprise expect to do everything with a rush, not appreciating that patience is necessary, that the demand must first be carefully cultivated. The commercial travellers must plough and plant the foreign fields before expecting a crop, nor must their employers be disappointed if the first crop is not a large one.

In the matter of foreign agencies, our consuls have again been very useful in promoting American trade. A United States consul in England, a little while ago, demonstrated that it was a serious mistake to give the agency for the sale of American goods to an Englishman, because the latter often found it more profitable to have the American styles imitated from the samples sent him, and to sell these counterfeits as of American manufacture, rather than to push the genuine American articles. This showed how advisable it is to send trained, enterprising and experienced Americans to open and manage agencies. It is solely to their interest to push the American goods. Patriotism and national pride keep them out of the temptation to sell foreign imitations. In several European countries, depots or agencies have been established for the exposition of American goods. These are not limited to one manufacturer's output, but are, as it were, miniature exhibitions of American products of all kinds, similar to those that many American cities have been wont to hold periodically. While these European expositions of American commodities are not and cannot be under the immediate control of the consuls, they have been established at the suggestion of officers of the service, and have proved a most valuable factor in the introduction of our manufactured and agricultural products. Nothing is so helpful in such cases as an actual exhibit. Such are found in England, Germany, Russia and Venezuela, and doubtless will sooner or later be duplicated in other countries.

It has been possible to give only a few instances of the lessons given by the American consuls to the American manufacturers and exporters. In a thousand ways they stimulate American trade by keeping our own people well informed. Wherever brought in competition with that of other manufacturing countries, notably Great Britain and Germany, our leading competitors, whose consular corps have been held up to us as examples, our consular system has been abundantly able to prove its superiority. The "Advance Sheets of Consular Reports" are eagerly sought by foreign governments. Only quite recently, provision was made, or rather proposed, by the German government to engraft into its system a bureau similar to our own Bureau of Foreign Commerce. In fact, the work of our consuls and its splendid results have caused the German government to require its consuls to pursue somewhat similar tactics, and this within the past few

months. The British government is likewise adopting some of our consular methods. The trade papers of Great Britain and of Germany still comment upon the effectiveness of the American consular system, upon its great helpfulness to American trade, and they criticise their own consuls for lacking in the inquisitiveness and energy of the Americans.

The consuls of the United States also make reports that are of the greatest value to the Department of State. These, while not designed to give diplomatic information, show conditions of which, for diplomatic reasons, it is well to have the Department of State informed. Thus, an American consul who is alive to the condition of his country and the wants of its people, can always be depended upon to keep the Department of State in touch with events occurring in his district, be they commercial or diplomatic. His usefulness in these respects is enhanced by the accuracy of his reports. In many instances, these are of very great moment and of practical utility as privileged and confidential communications. Within the past few months, for example, the consuls have disclosed the increasing activity of the German government and of German commercial interests in South and Central America. They have shown the evidently growing interest of the German nation in Brazil, the steady investment there of German capital, which now aggregates more than a billion dollars, and the increase in the number of German colonists in that section, where the establishment of German schools is also proposed. They have made apparent the determination of the German government that its colonists shall not become affiliated with the countries in which they settle, but shall be, first and last, sons of the Fatherland, whose welfare is their greatest interest; ready instruments, if need be, in the Germanization of the Southern and Central parts of this hemisphere, regardless of our Monroe Doctrine, should the situation arise when Germany thought she could disregard our policy. This information coming to the Department of State piecemeal, and through confidential reports, has served as a warning. It has made the department more watchful and observant of the dangers of the future in our hemisphere. It directly concerns our diplomacy and indirectly affects our foreign commercial situation, by instructing our exporters as to the immense German invasion of territory that should be almost exclusively in control of the

Americans. This is one, and a very significant, indication of the importance of the consular service in diplomacy. It manifests the aggressiveness of the German people as our commercial competitor. It shows the consul's usefulness as a source of news, observing and reporting events abroad and offering opportunities to combat foreign plans diplomatically; to check, in their inception, moves that might be harmful and injurious to the peace and, perhaps, to the safety of the Republic.

It will be readily conceded that the American consular service, even though defects may be found to exist in it, must, if honestly measured by the results attained within the past few years, become a well recognized factor in American commercial expansion. The consular officer, whatever may be said of his method of appointment, is usually a "hustler" at home; he becomes aggressive and zealous within reasonable and proper bounds abroad, jealous of his own reputation and report; and he is always intelligent in comprehending and ever ready to promote the needs of American trade. He is, in a word, the advance guard of his fellow-countrymen's commercial interests.

ALBERT HALSTEAD.

CONSOLIDATED LABOR.

BY CARROLL D. WRIGHT, UNITED STATES COMMISSIONER OF LABOR.

HOWEVER men may differ, not only as to the propriety but the legality of labor organization, all recognize the great fact that labor is organizing and that trades unions and similar bodies, which virtually mean the consolidation or focusing of energy, are here as permanent institutions and will grow more numerous and more powerful as industrial development goes on. It is rare to meet a man not connected with the work of organized labor who does not in some degree approve of it. He may deprecate methods and insist that labor organizations encroach upon the rights and responsibilities of employers, but the underlying principle of labor organization is recognized.

It must be conceded at the outset that the long contest between laborers and capitalists—for it must be evident that there is no contest between labor and capital—in seeking specific legislation has proved inadequate; so the lessons of this period, which is particularly the period of legislation, need to be well remembered by employers and employees. Hostile, revengeful and retaliatory legislation injures every interest, benefits nobody, and cannot long be enforced. The great questions relative to organized labor, therefore, are: Is it not wise to fully recognize such organizations by law, to admit their necessity as labor guides and protectors, to conserve their usefulness, to increase their responsibility, and to prevent their follies and aggressions, by conferring upon them privileges enjoyed by corporations, with like proper restrictions and regulations? Corporations have undoubtedly benefited the country and brought its resources to our doors, and it will not be a very great surprise to close observers of industrial conditions if the next quarter or half century brings the advancement of labor to a position of like

power and responsibility. Does not wisdom demand that each shall be encouraged to prosper legitimately and grow into harmonious relations of equal standing and responsibility before the law, in everything that relates to industrial and commercial supremacy? This advancement involves nothing hostile to the true interests and rights of both employers and employees.

These underlying questions can best be answered by a brief analysis of the attitude of the public and of law toward labor unions, and of the attitude of labor unions toward various elements of industrial society; and these attitudes should be examined with reference not only to the present conditions but in some respects to the past.

It is significant that all classes, business men, clergymen, students, employers as well as employees, are desirous of studying these questions. That fact indicates a serious determination to ascertain true relations and to be governed accordingly.

Historically, labor organization, in some form, is very old. We need not at this time go into the instances that occur in history even from ancient times, but we may content ourselves with the fact that the trade union, as it is now understood and as Sidney Webb defines it, is an association of wage-earners with a purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment, and that in this form and for these purposes it has existed in England for about two centuries. It did not spring into existence full grown, but it grew as industry developed. Many writers have insisted that the modern trade union is the legitimate successor of the guilds which existed in the Middle Ages in various parts of Europe; but this view cannot be supported when we understand the true purpose of the trade guilds and other associations in which journeymen and masters formed important constituent elements. It will be obvious at once that any association in which the employers determined how the funds should be used, and what officers should be appointed, can bear little or no analogy to modern trades unions. So the journeymen fraternities of the Middle Ages, followed by the guilds, do not furnish satisfactory origin for modern organizations.

Students have sometimes insisted that the craft guilds, as distinguished from the medieval associations of the wage-earners, were the real predecessors of modern unions, but even that contention rests upon no substantial evidence; for the chief element of

the guild form of organization in every instance and at every period of its growth was the master craftsman, who owned the instruments of production and controlled the selling of the products. The old guilds were more commercial in their nature, while the fundamental object of the trade union is the protection of the standard of life, and involves organized resistance to any and all movements or innovations which in any way tend to the lowering of the standard of living of wage-earners. To be sure, the old guilds fostered skill and did an immense work in the development of industry, but they were not organized primarily, as I have said, for the upbuilding of the condition of wage-receivers.

There is little or no evidence of the existence of the modern trade union, so far as recorded facts are concerned, prior to the year 1700. The evidence relating to the rise of organization in any particular trade shows the trade union coming up not from any particular institution, but from opportunities for the meeting together of wage-earners employed in like trades. It was the individuality of interests as represented by the union of those employed in the same trade. This very principle distinguishes trade-unionism from some other forms of organization, like the Knights of Labor, which undertook to consolidate all labor without reference to the individuality of occupations.

It is often contended that the trade union was the product of the factory system of labor, but this contention cannot be sustained, for the earliest combinations of wage-receivers existed at least half a century prior to the existence of the factory system, and they were found to embrace trades afterwards that were carried on entirely under the old domestic or hand system. So it must be concluded that the modern trade union came into existence as the result of intelligence—of a desire on the part of wage-earners to improve their condition, to elevate their standard of living, and to become participators in the things which could be secured only through reasonable prosperity.

On the other hand, it is often contended that modern trade-unionism was the result of strong protests against some form of industrial oppression resulting from lack of employment. I cannot accept this view. The conditions of industry during the constructive period of trades unions do not warrant it; certainly, the first half of the eighteenth century cannot be denominated a period of industrial distress. During that period harvests were good, generally, and the price of food unusually low.

It is perfectly evident, when the philosophy of industrial development is studied closely, that trade-unionism, with or without the factory system, with or without the marvellous development of machinery, with or without industrial distress or industrial prosperity, would have developed as a part of the development of social conditions.

It represented a struggle for improvement, and thus an aspiration—for struggle is always aspiration.

When the factory system came into existence as a permanent element in industry, then began the struggle of trades unions for existence. There had been combination laws and other laws restricting association in many ways; and so, as it entered the nineteenth century, history found trade-unionists considered as rebels and revolutionists and subject to many forms of legal persecution. These things occurred during the first quarter of last century, and when the second quarter opened trades unions were often tolerated, but with what has been denominated a ludicrously timid and vacillating legislative policy. Until the beginning of the last quarter of last century they were subjected to legal disabilities, considered organizations of suspicion, and brought under parliamentary investigation and occasional persecution.

One of these investigations resulted in a really dramatic revulsion of public opinion. It occurred at a time when the supposed abuses and dangers of labor unions roused a sentiment in favor of returning to the drastic legislative repression of earlier years. There was a decidedly unfriendly and even an uncharitable public opinion, but this opinion was suddenly changed by the very evidence by which parliamentary committees had expected to show the need of demanded repression. The real aims and purposes of labor organizations were brought to the attention of the average English citizen, who then realized for the first time that, in spite of legislative repression, legal disabilities, and unjust suspicion, the most intelligent and industrious artisans of the country were making heroic efforts to aid in the upward struggle and to enable their class to meet the great exigencies resulting from sickness, accident, old age disability, irregularity of employment, non-employment, death, and the destitution of widows and orphans. The hostile investigation unexpectedly proved that ninety per cent. of all the millions collected and disbursed by trades unions had been expended for the most beneficent purposes, and that only

the small margin of ten per cent. had been used as defense funds in industrial warfare and trade disputes.

The great facts that were brought out showed most conclusively that trade-unionism stood for something more than organized conspiracy against trade and for industrial warfare. Legislators caught the spirit, and realized that the unions primarily devoted their energies to individual development rather than to instigating sedition and advocating economic heterodoxy. Capitalists admitted that the very forces which they had endeavored to crush were engaged in efforts of mutual self-help. Academic men conceded that organized labor really had some legitimate function in human affairs. So, after a long and tedious contest against great odds, covering nearly a century of time, consolidated labor was able to throw off legal disabilities and take its place among modern institutions as a recognized force in public welfare, and there it must remain.

The methods, however, need not only to be understood, they need to be improved, changed, and regulated; and the new understanding must involve the freeing of public opinion from the idea which makes combinations, either of labor or of capital, objects of distrust, evils to be throttled, diseases to be eradicated from the economic system. This new understanding involves also the recognition of the truth that unregulated competition is the law of death, and not of life; that it means everywhere the survival of the unfit—the unfit employer, the unfit employee, the unfit type of industrial organization. The new understanding must learn also that combination is the inevitable result of efforts to escape suicidal conditions of unregulated competition of all forms, whether it be the destructive competition of producers combating against each other in the dark for custom, or the hungry competition of workmen combating against each other in the dark for the custom of employers—the opportunity to earn the daily bread of life for self and wife and child. Combination is a new machine, and, like the machine, brings vastly greater economic and social opportunities, powers, responsibilities and duties, but it brings corresponding dangers of misused power and neglected duties and organized selfishness.*

All these reflections relative to consolidated labor in England

*Cf. "The Organization of Labor," by Rev. Edward Cummings. "Christian Register," Oct. 10, 1901.

apply to conditions in the United States. In our own as well as in the old country, the history of consolidated labor constitutes an integral part of our industrial development, and its growth to the present time represents an influential feature of industrial achievement. The relation of labor organizations to strikes, their advocacy of all educational methods, their conservative action, at times offset the radicalism which has often led them into injudicious action. During the years between 1825 and the present time their history is a progressive one, and in detail would bring into prominence almost every industry in the country. Out of the earlier combinations there have grown some great associations or organizations, developing power and bringing to the attention of the country conditions which need reform and relations which call for the highest ethical influence to secure their proper adjustment.

Among American trade-unionists there are three types of unions recognized—the local, the national, and the international. The typical local union is made up only of members who live and work in one town or one restricted locality, and its business is conducted by a vote of all the members meeting in one place. The national and international unions really constitute but a single type, though the formal distinction between them is carefully preserved in all trade-union references. The typical national union aims to bring under one control the workers of its trade in the United States, while the international union, so called, draws into its constituency the locals of the United States, Canada and sometimes Mexico. All national and international unions have for their constituents local unions, which possess more or less autonomy and which take part in some way in the government of the general body. Most of the national trades unions are affiliated in one great federal organization, known as the American Federation of Labor. The railway brotherhoods, so called, keep their separate organizations without affiliating with any other body. There are some other independent unions, while the Knights of Labor is a body entirely distinct from them all and with a different organic law.

The membership of unions it is difficult to ascertain. The law requiring registration in Great Britain enables the English government to state with fair accuracy the strength of the unions in that country. In 1899, according to the latest report available,

there were 1,802,518 members, while in the United States, with double England's population, the estimated membership of labor organizations on July 1st last was 1,400,000. When it is taken into consideration that there are at the present time nearly 18,000,000 persons (men, women and children) in the United States working as wage-earners, as distinguished from persons receiving salary, income, etc., the percentage of membership is not large, being not more than eight per cent. of the whole body of wage-earners; but in many trades the members are organized sometimes up to ninety per cent. of the total number engaged.

The objects of most trades unions are well represented in the declaration of the American Federation of Labor, which demands eight hours as a day's work, favors the national and State incorporation of trades unions, the obligatory education of children and the prohibition of their employment under the age of fourteen, and the enactment of uniform apprentice laws, and opposes all contract convict labor and the truck system for payment of wages. It also demands a first lien on property for wages, insists upon the abrogation of all so-called conspiracy laws, urges the prohibition of the importation of foreign labor, and favors the adoption of employers' liability acts.

Trade-unionism, as stated, represents the interests of specific trades. The principle which underlies the tenets of the Knights of Labor ignores specific vocations and seeks to harmonize all individual or separate interests in the interests of the whole, the declared aim of the order being to secure to the workers of society the fullest enjoyment of the wealth they create and leisure for development of their intellectual, moral, and social faculties; and they declare themselves ready to join in any movement which will enable them to share in the gains and honor of advancing civilization. Their specific demands are the establishment of the referendum in the making of laws; the exclusion of lands, including all natural sources of wealth, from speculative traffic; the abrogation of all laws that do not bear equally upon capitalists and laborers; and the passage of legislation providing for sanitary regulation in all productive industries. They also demand proper protection against accidents in factories, the incorporation of labor organizations, the enactment of laws providing for weekly payment of wages. They also ask that mechanics and laborers should have a first lien in protection of wages, and are opposed

to the contract system on all public works and to the hiring out of convict labor. They favor industrial arbitration, compulsory attendance at school, the furnishing of textbooks by the State, and a graduated tax on incomes and inheritances. They go so far as to make declaration relative to financial systems, are in favor of postal savings banks, and adopt the state socialistic platform relative to the government ownership of telegraphs, telephones and railroads. The American Federation of Labor has also made some declaration in this direction. While these two great forms of organized labor exist in this country, they are remarkably close together in their objects.

All labor organizations are in favor of some form of benefits for their members, even to the extent of some system of insurance. They are also in favor almost universally of the adoption of what is known as the "union label" on products. They contend that the adoption of the union label would insure to consumers goods produced under proper sanitary and economic conditions. Of course, they have found difficulty in carrying out this claim, but they contend that ultimately the label will be the guaranty of union goods.

In carrying out their charitable and beneficent aims they have in some cases collected enormous funds. Perhaps one of the best illustrations of this is found in the experience of the Cigarmakers' International Union, whose latest report shows that it represents 414 local bodies, with a membership of nearly 34,000 as against 2,729 twenty-two years ago. In the last twenty-one years benefits have been paid amounting to the enormous sum of \$4,737,550. Of this sum, \$838,046 was paid for strike benefits, \$1,453,050 for sick benefits, \$794,075 for death benefits, \$735,267 for travelling, and \$917,112 to those out of work; and the order now has a balance of \$314,806 in its treasury. Other orders have shown a like record, notably the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, the Typographical Union, etc.

Such being the general objects, growth, and condition of trades unions, it is well to consider their attitude towards certain important phases of industrial life. Their objects are peaceful and moral and do not invite antagonism and but little criticism; but when it comes to action, then men differ not only as to the value of the work of consolidated labor, but also as to the legitimacy of its purpose.

The attitude towards strikes is a most important one. Almost invariably labor organizations declare themselves not in sympathy with the strike method of enforcing their demands. They insist upon the right to strike, and the courts sustain this right. It is the almost universal attitude of courts in this and other countries that if one man can leave his employment, two or more men may do so, and that there can be no restriction upon this privilege. The courts hold, however, that intimidation and violence must not accompany strikes, and that the strikers themselves in indulging in these things are amenable to criminal law.

Strikes were considered in the early part of last century as conspiracies in restraint of trade and against the principles of common law. Unions are almost invariably in favor of some method of conciliation—the establishment of private joint committees of employers and employees to consider and deal with all grievances; and the instances of the success of this method, both in the old country and in this, are such as to stimulate all organizations, whether of labor or of capital, to adopt the principle. The trouble so far has been that employers have not been as well organized for this particular purpose as have labor unions.

The real influence of labor organizations in the strikes that have occurred in this country can easily be measured. During the twenty years closing December 31st, 1900, there had occurred in this country 22,793 strikes, involving 117,509 establishments. Of these, 50.77 per cent. succeeded, 13.04 per cent. succeeded partly, and 36.19 per cent. failed. Of the whole number stated, 14,457, or 63 per cent. of all, were ordered by organizations. Of the strikes ordered by organizations, 52.86 per cent. succeeded, while 13.60 per cent. partially succeeded and 33.54 per cent., or about one-third, of all such strikes failed. These statistics are very significant, and indicate most clearly the influence of labor organizations in their attitude to strikes, whenever they undertake practically to enforce their demands.

The losses which have occurred during the past twenty years ought to convince consolidated labor that certain great economic truths should be studied and comprehended. The wage loss was \$257,863,478, besides which the orders paid out in assistance to striking employees \$16,174,793. The employers lost \$122,731,121, the total money loss being \$396,769,392.

Dr. Talcott Williams, in a recent article on the late steel

strike, has stated one of the great mistakes of labor very graphically. He says:

"Unfortunately for all, capital no less than labor, and, worst of all, for the public interest, labor leaders, outside of one well-managed railroad union, never understand that labor can stand a short doubt or delay easier than capital, with its multifarious contracts and responsibilities, so that the latter dreads most a brief interruption; but that when the blow is struck and contracts and business adjusted to it, capital can stand long delay far easier than labor."

This, on the whole, is true, and the truth of it is coming home to the managers of labor organizations.

I believe that strikes as a method of securing recognition will go out of fashion, and that the method of reasoning, as applied through the principles of private or joint conciliation committees, will take their place. The most intelligent captains of industry are thoroughly alive to this view, and I believe that they have an opportunity, in connection with organized labor, to accomplish a vast deal of good and to secure more rapidly the very things most ardently desired by working men.

There is in the organic laws of consolidated labor a very serious omission, and that is of some direct provision for the punishment or disqualification of a member who commits or instigates violence towards persons or property during strikes. This omission deserves severe criticism. Until labor organizations take up this question vigorously and endeavor by all their influence to control their own members effectually, they are certain to lose sympathy in their contentions, and in a large degree to be defeated, even at times when their cause may appear to be just and in the public estimation deserves success.

Consolidated labor has of late years undertaken to secure recognition through a system known as collective bargaining, the adoption of sliding scales being a feature of this work. The recognition of a trade union, in a popular sense, comprehends something entirely different from what is meant by consolidated labor itself. In the former case it is understood to mean simply a recognition on the part of employers of the existence of the unions and dealings with their officers, comprehending, of course, an indorsement of their general, social, and ethical purposes; but on the part of the unions themselves recognition means something more than this, even in many cases to taking part in the establishment of rules, the regulation of wages, and the limitation or

restriction of output. So the insistence upon recognition involves the economic question of collective bargaining, and it must be admitted that, in reason, collective bargaining is a far better method of adjusting prices and wages than the helter-skelter individual method usually in vogue. The adoption of sliding scales practically originated with labor unions, and some of them have carried out their views with great skill and patriotism.

Employers resent the collective bargaining idea at times, as was shown by a case in Fall River a few years ago, where a question arose between the spinners' union and some of the employers. The union made certain demands or requests, and the manager of the mill involved answered that he would deal with the individual members of the union and not with any committee. The union officers therefore withdrew. Later on, the manager of the mill wished to bring things to a settlement. So he sent for the committee and stated that he was then willing to confer with it, but the chairman answered that he could not deal with any representative of the stockholders, but would deal with the stockholders individually. Now, one answer was just as reasonable as the other. Both were thoroughly unreasonable.

The true attitude, or the attitude which more generally prevails among manufacturers especially, was voiced by Mr. Morgan during the recent steel strike, in a conference between the officers of the United States Steel Company and the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers. Mr. Morgan is authoritatively reported to have said that he was not hostile to organized labor; that he looked upon it with favor—that is, he preferred the well-organized and administered trade union as the medium through which to arrange questions of wages and other conditions of employment, to the chaotic and unreliable results when workmen act as individuals. He asked the association, however, not to attempt to drive him further than it was possible for him to go, at the same time giving his assurance that in the course of time, perhaps two years, the company would be ready to sign sliding scales for all its constituent plants. When this attitude becomes general, and manufacturers recognize the true value of collective bargaining, the result will show the economic significance of the first attempts of labor unions to secure adjustments, so far as wages were concerned, without strikes.

The attitude of consolidated labor toward capital is best repre-

sented by the views of unions relative to socialism. The chief element which is inducing the wage-receiver to become a state socialist, he is rarely if ever a social democrat, is machinery. Unions themselves are not socialistic organizations, although their members here and there may to some extent be members of the Socialist Labor Party, which believes in State socialism but not in social democracy. There have been during the past ten or twelve years some very sharp contests in the general meetings of the representatives of trades unions of this country and of England between socialist and anti-socialist elements. On the whole, socialism has been defeated in these contests, but here and there, and among working men individually, the socialistic trend is clearly perceivable, and it grows out of machinery, which is at the bottom of the movement. The working man does not oppose machinery as such, for he recognizes that through it his wages have been increased, his productive power greatly enhanced, his comforts broadened, and his work-day greatly reduced. Nevertheless, he believes, with many economists, that, so far, the benefits arising from the application of power machinery have not been equitably divided. He is willing capital should have a large share in these benefits, but he thinks he ought to have a greater share than he now receives; and this belief leads him to the conclusion that he will not get the full benefits of the application of invention until society shall become the owner of inventions and of the machinery under them. Labor unions and federations, while not being socialistic organizations, as I have stated, have nevertheless declared in some cases in favor of the public ownership of telegraphs, telephones, and railroads; and they join in a measure in the academic demand for extension in the municipal ownership of quasi-public utilities.

Probably the most serious question that consolidated labor has to consider to-day is the attitude of law, not only as expressed in statutes but in the decisions of courts. When the Chicago strike was broken down, labor leaders did not hesitate to say that the strike was not broken by the police, nor the military power, nor the railroads, but by the courts. They complained of the expanded use of the injunction warning persons to refrain from doing things which if done would be crimes under statutory law and punishable accordingly. They insist that should they be accused of any violence they should be allowed trial, as crimi-

nals or as breakers of the law, by a jury in the ordinary way, when they can have, under the bills of rights as they exist in this country, the privilege of facing accusers and bringing forward evidence in their defense. Many eminent jurists feel that the expanded use of injunctions in late years is not in accordance with strictest equity; that this use is a restoration of the practices which existed in England some five hundred years ago, but which were abandoned as a menace to the public welfare. Undoubtedly, there is an increasing hesitancy on the part of courts to grant writs of injunction in cases of strikes; but the menace to the existence of trades unions is one very greatly feared by them all. So far, however, the expansion of organization has not been crippled by the use of the injunction.

Now comes a new phase of the whole question of the relation of law to consolidated labor, in the decision of courts relative to the liability of strikers in what is known as picketing. In our own country there are various decisions covering this ground. The real question is whether strikers should be enjoined against maintaining a patrol, or any form of picket, to prevent non-union men from entering the works of an establishment under strike, or from preventing the employer from carrying on his business, unless he should do certain things which have been demanded of him. There is no question whatever in the decisions where picketing is accompanied by intimidation or force. Then picketing is held everywhere to be illegal and criminal. But there are some decisions now that have been rendered in this country and in Europe, in which the courts have declared that picketing itself is a menace, hence an intimidation, and therefore illegal. English courts have gone a step further, and declared that the union ordering the picket can be sued for damages.

The latest decision is what is known as the Taff Vale Railway case, where, on account of a difference between the company and some of its employees, a strike was ordered by the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, and the strikers picketed the station at Cardiff. An injunction was granted against two officers of the society restraining them from watching and besetting the station, on the ground that such actions were in violation of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act. The company also made application for an injunction against the society itself. This application was opposed with great vigor by the society, on the

ground that it was neither a corporation nor an individual, and could not be sued in a quasi-corporate or any other capacity, and that an action of tort could not lie against it. The justice sitting in the case, in September, 1900, granted the injunction, and although he conceded that a trade union is neither a corporation, nor an individual, nor a partnership between a number of individuals, he maintained that a trade union is a corporate body, and as such qualified to sue or to be sued.

It can easily be imagined that such a decision, far-reaching in its nature, caused the greatest consternation among the trades unions; for, if the position of the justice was sound and the higher courts sustained the position, trade-unionism, it was feared, instead of being an element of strength, would be disintegrated and prove a decided weakness. Under the decision trades unions were practically responsible for the acts of their individual members, and having this responsibility, they became liable in civil action for any damages which might occur as the result of an injury done by a single member.

The Court of Appeals of England, in November, 1900, reversed this position, taking the ground that no action was maintainable against the society, and that the name of the society itself must be stricken out of the injunction and the injunction itself dissolved. The plaintiffs, however—that is, the railway company—were allowed to appeal to the House of Lords, the final court of appeal. Decision was rendered by the House of Lords on July 22d last, overruling the Court of Appeals and sustaining the lower court in the position that a union was a legal entity capable of suing and being sued. The Lord Chancellor, in his motion for the allowance of the appeal, stated:

"In this case I am content to adopt the judgment of Mr. Justice Farwell (the justice granting the injunction), with which I entirely agree, and I cannot find any satisfactory answer to that judgment in the judgment of the Court of Appeals which overruled it. If the Legislature has created a thing which can own property, which can employ servants, and which can inflict injury, it must be taken, I think, to have impliedly given power to make it suable in the courts of law for injuries purposely done by its authority and procurement."

The gist of this is that anybody that can inflict an injury can be held responsible in damages for the results of that injury; and this is the new doctrine, which will hold until legislative action either defines it, or abrogates it, and which will undoubt-

edly be followed in this country in the near future. As the result of the decision of the House of Lords, the railway company at once entered suit against the Amalgamated Society for £20,000 damages. This suit is still pending.

The British trade-union congress, in its session at Swansea a few weeks ago, took up the whole question. What the conclusion of the consideration of it was has not yet appeared, but there are two sides already forming among trade-unionists themselves. Some of them take the ground that a decision holding the unions responsible for the action of their members will destroy unionism absolutely, while others, more far-seeing, more thorough students of history and economic conditions, do not hesitate to claim that the decision will ultimately work to the advantage of the unions, by compelling employers, for their own protection, to deal with the unions as such, and to ignore non-union men.

This brings to mind what was said about the omission of trades unions to incorporate in their organic laws some means of disciplining members who commit overt acts during the progress of strikes. Unions have been weak in this. They order a strike. The men individually claim that they are not responsible for the strike, as it was ordered by the union. Some of the men commit acts of violence. The union says: "We ordered the strike, but we are not responsible for the acts of individual men." The doctrine underlying the decision of the House of Lords would remedy all this trouble, and place the unions upon the strong and enduring basis of entities in the eyes of the law. Furthermore, it would lead directly to their incorporation as business concerns. The Knights of Labor, American Federation of Labor, and other labor bodies concretely representing consolidated labor, have declared in favor of incorporation. Little incorporation has ever taken place, however. There are a few incorporated labor bodies in the State of New York. Some States provide by special mention for the incorporation of trades unions, but in every State a trade union can incorporate the same as any other body.

Labor leaders, however, are apprehensive of the results of incorporation, for precisely the same reason that they have been greatly disturbed by the recent decision of the House of Lords. They admit freely the general benefits of incorporation, but fear the effect upon the funds in their keeping. Their capital consists

of their contributions or assessments, and this capital could be attached under an action of contract or tort, which it is feared would lead directly to disruption. They also fear that whenever a union for any cause should be brought into court and judgment secured against it, the charter might be revoked.

They also have some fear on the question of injunctions under incorporation, the special ground of their fear being that an unfair judge might cause a great deal of difficulty. This fear, however, it seems to me, is a groundless one, for our courts are on the whole honorable, and in their capacity as administrators of the law pure and incorruptible.

The great advantages of securing charters would be that the unions would have a standing in court; they would have a better standing in public estimation, and they would be more likely to select the ablest men for leaders. As legal persons they could enforce their contracts against employers, while they would be responsible for breach of contract on their own part. They have been debarred heretofore from appearing in court by representatives, and have thus lost a great advantage which would have been of the utmost importance to them. Incorporation, responsibility, and the dignity which comes from these, answer in large degree the questions asked at the beginning of this article—that is, it would be wise to fully recognize unions by the law, to admit their necessity as labor guides and protectors, to conserve their usefulness, to increase their responsibility, and to prevent their follies and aggressions by conferring upon them the privileges enjoyed by all business corporations, but with like restrictions and regulations.

This is not now popular doctrine with the trades unions; but, as a true friend of organized labor, I believe the modern tendency, as shown in the attitude of law in recent times, will make of them what they really hope to become—powerful economic factors, capable under the law, and capable through their responsibilities of dealing with that other powerful factor of industry, capital itself. There should be no conflict: there must be joint and reciprocal action.

CARROLL D. WRIGHT.

THE INADEQUATE POWERS OF THE INTER-STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

BY EDWARD P. BACON.

THE existing Interstate Commerce Act has proved futile in remedying the abuses in the transportation service of the country which it was designed to correct, the Commission created by it having been rendered impotent by decisions of the Federal Courts which have been made during the past few years. The Supreme Court has gone to the extent of declaring that the law confers upon the Commission no authority to proceed further, when in any case, after a full hearing of all parties in interest, it finds that rates or regulations are unreasonable or unjust, than to so declare, and to order the carrier to "cease and desist" from charging such rates or enforcing such regulations; and that the Commission has no authority to declare what in its judgment would be reasonable and just rates or regulations in the case in question, or to require such changes to be made in them as would bring them into conformity with the provisions of the act. It will be readily seen that the carrier may comply with the order to "cease and desist" by making such slight change as its officers may see fit, and that the public is without practical redress from any extortion or discrimination which a carrier may arbitrarily choose to practice, except the remedy at common law, with its interminable delays and intolerable expensiveness, from the hardship of resorting to which it was the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act to relieve the public.

That the course suggested as being open to the carrier is not merely hypothetical is demonstrated by the action of defendant carriers in a case that has come under the immediate observation of the writer. The Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission against a num-

ber of railway companies engaged, severally and jointly, in carrying grain from points in Iowa, Minnesota and South Dakota to Milwaukee and Minneapolis respectively, alleging that the rates charged to Milwaukee were disproportionately large as compared with those charged to Minneapolis. The Commission held:

"That in many instances, and in varying degrees at different points, the differentials in grain rates to Milwaukee, above rates in force to Minneapolis, give Minneapolis undue and unreasonable preference and advantage, and subject Milwaukee to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage. That just and reasonable differentials in such rates would be obtained by applying the interstate distance tariff* to the short line mileage from the several points of shipment to Minneapolis and Milwaukee. That just and reasonable rates to Milwaukee would be made by adding such differentials to rates from time to time in force to Minneapolis, and any higher rates to Milwaukee would be relatively unreasonable and unjust to that city."

The application of this ruling would have effected a reduction in rates on grain from the various shipping points to Milwaukee varying from one cent to three cents per one hundred pounds, and would have afforded substantial relief. The difference in the value of grain in Minneapolis and Milwaukee was, and is now, almost exactly the same as the difference in freight that would have been produced by the application of this ruling, and hence the grain would have netted substantially the same price at the point of shipment whether shipped to one market or the other, which would have placed the two markets on a practical equality in relation to the shipment of grain from the territory in question. The defendant railway companies, however, prepared and put into effect tariffs by which the rates to Milwaukee were reduced from one-half cent to one and a half cents only per one hundred pounds, being in nearly every instance just one-half the reduction required. This was not a case in which "half a loaf is better than no bread," for the reason that, if the reduction made was insufficient to place the two markets on an equality, the grain would continue to seek the favored market. Hence, the reduction made by the companies afforded no relief whatever, and the purpose of the Commission was entirely thwarted.

On petition from the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce, the Commission cited the defendants to show cause why they should not comply fully with its ruling, and the defendants simply set up the defense that they were unable to agree among themselves

* In use by two of the principal defendant carriers.

upon any greater reduction in the rates to Milwaukee. The case was reviewed at this hearing, and the Commission reaffirmed its decision and ruling. The defendant company most largely concerned in the traffic thereupon prepared a new tariff covering the territory in question, which it submitted to a conference of the several companies interested, and by which the rates would have been brought into substantial conformity with the ruling of the Commission. Most of the companies signified their concurrence in the tariff and their readiness to adopt it; but two companies that were closely allied with each other and whose capital stock was held largely in common, one of which was more directly interested in Minneapolis than in Milwaukee business, refused to concur. In accordance, therefore, with railway procedure, which requires the acquiescence of all interested lines in any proposed change of rates, the tariff failed of adoption, and the injustice in rates denounced by the Commission still exists, with no available means of redress. The Chamber of Commerce applied to the Commission to enforce its order through the courts, but was informed by the Commission that under the decision of the Supreme Court it was powerless to do so.

A striking instance showing the necessity of the Commission's being empowered to prescribe the necessary change to be made in rates to bring them into conformity with the provisions of the act, when existing rates are found, upon a full hearing of all parties in interest, to be unreasonable or unjust, arose in a case brought before the State Railroad Commissioner of Wisconsin about two years ago by the Wisconsin Cheese Makers' Association, an association representing over 1,700 cheese manufactories in that State. Although the case related to interstate traffic, the Commissioner was desirous of affording such relief as he might be able to secure by the exercise of his influence. It represented a large interest, the production of cheese in the State of Wisconsin being one-fourth of the entire production of the United States. It was shown that the rates of freight on cheese from points in Wisconsin to Chicago were actually one-third greater than from points in the dairy region of the State of New York, the distance from the latter being nearly three times as great as from the former. The cheese-makers of Wisconsin were thus compelled to compete, in their natural home market, with the product of a distant Eastern State at a serious disadvantage in freight; and

not only were coals "brought to Newcastle," but an embargo was placed upon shipments from the natural source of supply. To give the exact figures, the rates from points in Wisconsin, 210 to 220 miles distant from Chicago, were 40 cents per 100 pounds, and from points in New York, 550 to 580 miles distant from Chicago, 30 cents per 100 pounds. The Commissioner held several interviews with the railway officials on the subject, and received encouragement to hope for a satisfactory adjustment of rates, but after months of delay he was formally notified that no change would be made. Presumably, the railway officials attempted to effect an "adjustment" by procuring an advance in the rates from New York, in which they were unsuccessful. The Cheese-Makers' Association was advised to make complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission, but in view of the limitations set upon the authority of the Commission by the decision of the Supreme Court, the Association was discouraged from undertaking any further proceedings, and the injustice has continued to exist to the present time.

The authority which the amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, pending in the last Congress, were intended to confer, has been designedly misrepresented by railway officials and attorneys, and characterized as an "arbitrary power to fix rates." They have succeeded to a considerable extent in instilling this false idea into the public mind, and even into the minds of some of the editorial writers of the press, who have not taken the pains to examine the bill and ascertain for themselves what its provisions were. There was nothing contained in it which could possibly be construed as conferring power upon the Commission to fix rates primarily, nor to pass upon them in any way prior to their going into effect. The power to order changes in the rates when found to be unreasonable or unjust, which the bill proposed to confer upon the Commission, could be exercised only after a full hearing of all parties in interest, and was restricted to such changes as might be necessary to bring the carrier complained of into conformity with the specific provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act in the particular case under investigation.

A further change needed in the law to give it effectiveness is to make the decisions and rulings of the Commission immediately operative, and to continue so until suspended or overruled by the courts on appeal by the carriers. This may seem at first thought

to be objectionable on account of being contrary to ordinary legal procedure; but the relations between carriers and the public are totally different from those existing between parties to general commercial transactions, and special methods are essential for the maintenance of equity and justice in connection with them. Freight charges are paid to carriers mainly by persons or corporations who have no direct interest in them, and become a part of the cost of the merchandise or commodities dealt in by them. The consumer finally pays the freight in the price of the merchandise or commodities he uses, with an added amount representing the profit which has been charged by the several dealers through whose hands they have passed. Or, as in the case of agricultural products, the freight rate from the locality of production to the most available market is deducted from the value in that market to determine its local value, whether or not the particular product is actually the subject of transportation. Hence, any extortion that may be practiced in the collection of freight charges by the carrier does not usually work injury to the person or corporation that primarily pays the charges; and the consumer who actually bears the cost of the freight has no cause of action and is without redress. The carrier cannot give bonds to indemnify the sufferer, in case of resisting the decision of the Commission and holding it in suspense during a long period of litigation, for the reason that the real sufferer is unknown. The ends of justice, therefore, can be subserved only by pursuing a summary course. The Commission, consisting of men who have for the most part acquired experience and skill in matters pertaining to the cost and value of transportation service, and are, in fact, a body of experts in their department, who constitute an impartial tribunal for the fair and equitable adjustment of questions of this nature between carriers and the public, can certainly be regarded as capable of rendering judgment therein, after a full hearing of all parties in interest, that will stand the test of judicial examination. At all events, occasional errors would work but trifling hardship to the carrier if immediately operative, as compared with the continuous plundering of the public which is entailed by the prolonged litigation conducted by carriers in contesting the decisions and rulings of the Commission, as the law now stands.

Under the proposed amendments to the Interstate Commerce

Act which were before the last Congress, the rights of the carriers were fully protected by the provision that the carrier might, within thirty days from the service of an order of the Commission, begin proceedings in a Circuit Court of the United States to have such order and the findings on which it is based reviewed, and that the court might, if upon an inspection of the record it plainly appeared that the order proceeded upon some error of law, or was unjust and unreasonable on the facts, suspend the operation of the order during the pendency of the proceedings in review, or until further order of the court; and that if, upon hearing, the court should be of opinion that the order of the Commission was not a lawful, just and reasonable one, it should vacate the order. Either party was to have permission to appeal from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court.

Some confusion has arisen in the public mind on account of the tendency to regard the Interstate Commerce Commission as a quasi-judicial body, owing to the fact, probably, that its proceedings are conducted in judicial form. The functions of the Commission are purely administrative, corresponding to those of a department of the Government, such as, for example, the Treasury Department, which makes its rulings, after a full hearing of all parties in interest, as to disputed points relating to the imposing and collecting of customs duties, which rulings become immediately operative and so remain until set aside by the courts.

As the law now stands, it is wholly optional with the carrier whether or not he shall observe the decisions and rulings of the Commission; and, as a matter of fact, during the past few years they have been generally disregarded. At a hearing before the Interstate Commerce Committee of the Senate on the Cullom Bill, in April, 1900, in reply to a question put by a member of the committee, the attorney of one of the more important railway companies of the country stated that the company which he represented had never complied with an order of the Commission without contesting its validity in the courts. In case of non-observance of any order of the Commission, it can be enforced only by the Commission, or the person or company injured, applying to a circuit court of the United States for a writ of injunction or other proper process enjoining obedience thereto, and either party may appeal the case to the Supreme Court. Through the ingenuity of railway attorneys in devising means of delaying and

obstructing proceedings, the determination of such cases is often delayed for years, numerous cases having been kept in the courts for periods varying from five to seven years.

There is no element in the economic world that is so pervasive as the cost of transportation. It constitutes an integral part of the cost of every article of food and clothing used by every man, woman and child, and of all materials that enter into the construction and furnishing of a habitation for man, and the heating and lighting of such habitation; and, in fact, of everything that is employed for the sustenance and comfort and gratification of man. To the man who ultimately meets it in the price of what he consumes, it comes as mysteriously as the wind which "bloweth where it listeth, and none can tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth." It is collected as silently and as unconsciously to the actual payor as the customs duties of the Government, the levying of which is the subject of deliberate and sharply contested legislation, over which the entire country is thrown into a paroxysm every few years. But the levying of freight charges, which for railway traffic alone aggregate annually five times as much as the customs duties, is left wholly to the irresponsible and self-interested action of railway officials, without any practical governmental supervision, and with no restraint whatever except that imposed by the natural law which determines "what the traffic will bear." The figures furnished by the statistical bureau of the Treasury Department of the United States show that the import duties collected during the three years from 1898 to 1900, inclusive, aggregated \$581,001,542, and the freight earnings of the railroads of the country for the same period, according to the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission, aggregated \$2,843,038,287.

As is well known, a process of amalgamation, or unification of interest, has been going on for some years past between competing lines of railway, which has during the last two years assumed enormous proportions, and competition is fast becoming extinguished. During the period last mentioned a large proportion of the railway mileage of the country, variously estimated by different authorities as aggregating from 101,000 to 112,000 miles, constituting not less than three-fifths of the entire railway mileage of the United States, has been brought under the absolute control of five great capitalists, and the process is still going

rapidly forward. This constitutes a power for extorting money from the public the exercise of which, however fair-minded may be the individuals in whose hands it is now vested, it is certainly unwise to permit without throwing around it such safeguards for the protection of the public, by governmental authority, as shall effectually prevent its abuse; otherwise it is appalling to contemplate the results that may ensue.

We have a striking presage of these results in the joint action of the railroads using what is termed the "Official Classification" of articles of freight, comprising all the railroads in the territory lying east of the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio and Potomac rivers. By that action, which went into effect on January 1st, 1900, a large number of articles were transferred from a lower to a higher class, by which means they were subjected to higher rates, including many articles of the most common use. According to a report issued by the Agricultural Department of the Government on April 1st, 1900, no less than 592 articles were so raised in classification, and consequently in rates charged for their transportation. For example, sugar, coffee, soap and starch, in carload lots, were raised from sixth to fifth class, involving an advance in the rate for transportation, in the case of a shipment from New York to Chicago, of twenty per cent. On a large number of articles the change in classification involved an advance in rates of from fifty to one hundred per cent., and in some instances even more. Many articles, when shipped in less than carload quantities, were transferred from a lower to a higher class, while the same articles shipped in carload lots remained in the same class as before, which resulted in an excess of from thirty-three to eighty per cent. being charged for transportation of the same articles when shipped in less than carload quantities over the rate in full carload lots; and in some cases the excess was from one hundred to one hundred and fifty per cent. The actual difference in cost to the carrier for receiving, billing and delivering freight in less than carload quantities over the cost in full carload lots does not average over one per cent. The difference in cost of hauling, owing to the cars not always being loaded to their full capacity in combining lots of less than carload quantities, may be from one to two per cent. more. Making the most liberal allowance for the entire difference in cost arising from the difference in circumstances and conditions relating to the two kinds of ship-

ments, it is the belief of the writer, from a careful observation for many years of the details of freight traffic by railroad with which he has been brought into continuous and close contact, that there is no justification for a greater difference than five per cent., at the most, in rates charged for less than carload quantities over those charged for full carload lots of the same articles, excepting in the case of articles shipped "in bulk" whose identity must be preserved. Any greater difference than this is an unjust discrimination in favor of the dealer whose trade enables him to order goods in carload quantities. The effect of this is, as will readily be seen, to destroy the business of interior distributing points and concentrate trade at great commercial centres.

Some idea of the effect of so extensive a change in classification of freight articles may be gathered by taking the single article of sugar as an example. In the annual "Report of the Statistics of Railways in the United States," issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the year ending June 30th, 1900, the tonnage of sugar transported by the railroads of the country during the year, originating on the line of the companies reporting, is given as 2,050,558 tons. The advance in rate, produced by transferring this article from sixth to fifth class, in the case of shipments from New York to Chicago, was one dollar per ton, the previous rate having been in force for a period of fourteen years. It is fair to assume that this represents the average advance in the rate charged on the aggregate tonnage of sugar shipped to all points throughout the country, taking into consideration the fact that rates of freight between New York and Chicago are relatively much lower than those charged between Chicago and points farther west, and also than those charged on shipments to intermediate points on the route or for shorter distances to other destinations. This would indicate that the increased amount of money paid by the people of the country, as a whole, for the transportation of sugar during one year, resulting from the change made in the classification of this article, was over two million dollars. And this is only one of 592 articles that were similarly affected by the change made in classification, some to a much greater and others to a somewhat less extent. The same advance was produced in the rate charged for the transportation of coffee, starch and soap and numerous other commodities of common use, the aggregate yearly tonnage of

which is enormous. The previously existing rate on coffee and starch had been in force for a period of twelve years and that on soap for eight years. An advance of fourteen per cent. was produced in the rate on cotton piece goods, the previous rate on which had been in force thirteen years.

Similar changes were made in the "Southern Classification" in use on the railroads situated in the territory lying east of the Mississippi River and south of the Ohio and Potomac rivers, and also in the "Western Classification" in use in the territory lying west of the Mississippi River, by means of which, together with the changes made in the "official classification" above mentioned, a general advance was produced in rates of freight throughout the entire country. It has always been regarded as evidence that a freight rate is remunerative when it has been continued in force a long time. It is a well-known fact that, during the periods mentioned while the previously existing rates were in effect, most of the railroads of the country which were not overcapitalized, and were located where they were needed, were paying good dividends continuously. The only pretext assigned for the indirect advance in rates effected by the changes in classification referred to was the increase in operating expenses consequent upon the advance in cost of labor and material. That this was more than compensated for by the increase in traffic is shown by the fact, stated in the annual report of the Interstate Commerce Commission submitted to Congress on January 4th, 1901, that the percentage of operating expenses to earnings of all the railroads of the country for the year ending June 30th, 1900, was less than for the preceding year, and less than the average for the preceding period extending back to 1890; and that the net earnings per mile for the year ending June 30th, 1900, were greater than for the preceding year, and greater than the average for the preceding period back to 1890.

The Commission states in that report that, "in every part of this country, carriers have by concerted action, without any notice to shippers, and indeed against the vehement protest of shippers, advanced their rates upon a large portion of the merchandise carried under class rates an average of one-fourth," and justly remarks that, "when hundreds of shippers complain that a public servant has perpetrated a wrong upon the public in the discharge of a public duty, there should be some public

tribunal before which inquiry can be had and by which redress can be administered."

If consumers, who ultimately bear the cost of transportation in the price of everything they use, or producers, the local value of whose products is determined by deducting from their value at the place of consumption the cost of transportation thereto, are to be protected from the rapacity of the common carriers of the country, it must be accomplished by a body organized by the Government for the purpose, with due authority to administer equal justice between the two opposite interests. The necessity of administering justice in relation to these interests by a different method from that pursued in contentions arising between parties to ordinary commercial transactions lies in the fact that the conditions surrounding the two classes of cases are not analogous. The rate charged for transportation is not the subject of negotiation and contract between the two interested parties, but is determined by the will of the carrier and enforced upon the shipper. The party by whom it is primarily paid is a middle-man, who has no direct interest in it; and the consumers, between whom it is distributed and upon whom it finally falls, have no cause of action for recovery in case the charge is extortionate or unjust. Their only protection lies in the proper exercise of governmental authority in the prevention of such a charge at the outset. If the legislative branch of the Government fails to protect the public by primarily prescribing the rate that shall be charged, which the present writer would by no means advocate, it should certainly empower a competent body of men, appointed for the purpose, to exercise a careful supervision over rates fixed by the carriers, and to make summary changes therein when they are found upon proper investigation to be unreasonable or unjust.

That existing railway rates are higher than is necessary to afford a suitable return on the capital invested in railway property is apparent from the fact that the net earnings of the railways of the country, as shown in the annual report of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the Statistics of Railways, for the year ending June 30th, 1900, the last fiscal year for which returns have as yet been compiled, after paying interest on their funded debt, and dividends on their stock aggregating \$118,-624,409, produced a surplus of \$142,754,358, an amount actually over twenty per cent. greater than the sum paid out in dividends.

The Commission states that there were paid out of the surplus the sum of \$25,500,035 for permanent improvements, the sum of \$29,596,390 for "miscellaneous deductions," whatever that may mean, leaving the sum of \$87,657,933 to be carried to surplus account. By what right the railway corporations of the country levy a tax upon the public for funds with which to make permanent improvements which add to the value of their property, and in addition thereto pile up a surplus to further enhance the value of their stock, the present writer is unable to determine. The entire surplus first above mentioned, over one hundred and forty-two million dollars, was wrongfully wrung from the pockets of the people during the year.

There is a prevalent impression that there has been a continuous decline, for a number of years past, in rates of freight throughout the country, which is due probably to the fact that the average rate per ton-mile for the aggregate tonnage transported has shown a steady reduction from year to year, having fallen from 1.01 cent in 1885 to .72 cent in 1900. This, however, has been the result of a larger relative increase in the movement of coarse freights, from year to year, which pay the lowest rates, than of merchandise and agricultural products, which pay much higher rates, and also of a steady increase in the average distance to which freight of all kinds is being transported, the rates charged for long distances being, and rightfully so to a reasonable extent, proportionately lower than for shorter distances.

The desired legislation has been characterized by representatives of the railway interest as "dangerous," in which they are joined by a small section of the shipping interest of the country, the latter being presumably incited thereto by the former under the apprehension of their being deprived, in consequence of such legislation, of the benefit of preferential rates and advantages, which they are now enjoying, over the shippers of the country at large. That it is dangerous to the class of shippers referred to will not be denied, and also to such railway corporations as desire to be free from any restriction in granting favors and advantages to certain individuals and companies engaged in commercial and manufacturing enterprises, and also to such localities as the officials of such railway corporations may deem it to be to their advantage to favor. It is admitted that it is dangerous also to such railway corporations as desire immunity from governmental

supervision and freedom to enforce upon the country such rates as their own selfish interests may dictate, without regard to equity or to the relative rights of the respective communities which they serve, or those of other communities in active competition therewith in business. But that they are dangerous to the rightful interests of railway corporations in general, or to the commercial interests of the public at large, is emphatically denied.

That the vested rights of railway corporations, and their immunity from the operation of legislative action that would be unjust to their rightful interests, are amply protected by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, has been definitely settled by recent decisions of the federal courts, notably by the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on March 7th, 1898, in what is known as the Nebraska Railroad Commission case, entitled "*Smyth vs. Oliver Ames et al.*" The opinion of the court, delivered by Justice Harlan, declares:

"It is settled that a State enactment, or regulations made under the authority of a State enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of persons or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earning such compensation as under all circumstances is just to it and to the public, would deprive such carrier of its property without due process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws, and would therefore be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. A railroad is a public highway, and none the less so because constructed and maintained through the agency of a corporation deriving its existence and powers from the State. Such a corporation was created for public purposes. It performs a function of the State. Its authority to exercise the right of eminent domain and to charge tolls was given primarily for the benefit of the public. It is, therefore, under governmental control—subject, of course, to the constitutional guarantees for the protection of its property. A corporation maintaining a public highway, although it owns the property it employs for accomplishing public objects, must be held to have accepted its rights, privileges and franchises subject to the condition that the government creating it, or the government within whose limits it conducts its business, may by legislation protect the people against the exaction of unreasonable charges for the services rendered by it; but it is equally true that the corporation performing such public services, and the people financially interested in its business and affairs, have rights that may not be invaded by legislative enactment in disregard of the fundamental guarantees for the protection of property."

The principle enunciated in this decision regarding the constitutional limitations of legislation by a State is, of course, equally applicable to Congressional enactment.

EDWARD P. BACON.

AMERICA'S INFERIOR POSITION IN THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD.

BY CARL SNYDER.

It cannot be said that America has produced no great men of science. It was the discoveries of Franklin that gave an impetus to the early study of electricity. The work of Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford, was done chiefly in Europe; but he was born in Massachusetts. In a sense, Joseph Henry was the co-discoverer with Faraday of electrical induction, from which the dynamo and the greater part of our vast electrical industries have sprung. Cope, Leidy and Marsh were potent factors in establishing the truth of evolution. To whomsoever one may care to ascribe the discovery of anaesthesia—Morton, Wells or Long—they were all Americans. Draper was the first to photograph the stars. The calculations of Professor Newton, of Yale, first drew attention to the importance of meteorites; they may yet give us a clew to the origin of worlds.

The number of men of parts is to-day greater than ever; they are to be found in every field. Simon Newcomb is, with Lord Kelvin, the sole English-speaking associate of the French Academy. The achievements of Professor Willard Gibbs are better known in Europe than in our country; and the same is true of the mathematical work of G. W. Hill. Professor Langley's bolometer and the marvellous things he has done with it are a vital part of modern physics; the like may be said of the ingenious contrivances of Rowland and Michaelson. Such astronomers as Pickering, Burnham and Keeler put America in the front rank in astronomy. I might lengthily extend the list.

We have had, we have, men who have done genuine and distinguished work; the list is distinguished and worthy. Yet it is all too brief. Despite many notable figures, despite much

notable achievement, America's position in the world of science is inferior. The count of our universities and colleges of the first rank outnumbers that of England or France two or three to one. Germany alone has more. The sums expended upon them are proportionately greater; Germany alone is as liberal as we. Even eliminating the recent outpouring of subscriptions, the endowments of our chief institutions of learning compare more than favorably with those of any other country, centuries older though they may be. Neither the state nor our rich men have been niggardly. Stephen Girard was born a century before Mr. Rockefeller. And the number of our students has always been large. We have lacked neither place, means nor material. Nor, it would appear, has the quality of gray matter been lacking. In the field of applied science, no other nation has a prouder record. We do not forget that it was Fulton who ran the first successful steamboat; that, had not Napoleon been possessed of a contemptuous stupidity, in refusing Fulton's offer, the Corsican might have invaded England and rewritten some pages of history. Morse may not have been the sole inventor of the electromagnetic telegraph; but if any one man is entitled to that honor, surely it is he. His system superseded all others. Graham Bell is a Scotchman, it is true; but he is a typical American "for a' that." All his work on the telephone, and his lesser known work with the phonograph, the radiophone and the like, were done in this country. His only competitor in the invention of the telephone was Elisha Gray, of pathetic memory. These are but instances from a crowd.

Why, then, has the United States so slight a share in the marvellous scientific advance of the century? Why, even in the face of a fine roll of names, can it be said with truth that our position is inferior? I shall try to illustrate.

Pasteur's memorable discovery that the fermentation of beer was due solely to the presence of minute organisms, microbes, was made early in the sixties. That was forty years ago. Step by step the ideas of Pasteur grew and broadened. Applied to the disease of the vines, then to dying silk worms, then to sheep cholera, they are estimated, before his death, to have saved to France alone a sum greater than the cost of the Prussian war, with the colossal indemnity demanded by Bismarck thrown in. Pasteur's own researches culminated in the germ theory of con-

tagions. A young English surgeon, now Lord Lister, applied his idea to the method of surgical operations; this step was enormous. To-day, operations are common that were unheard of thirty or forty years ago; unknown diseases, such as appendicitis, have been discovered and a radical cure has been found for them. Germans, like Behring and Koch, Japanese, like Kitasato, a crowd of disciples and followers of the Master, as he is known in France, have extended Pasteur's ideas to the treatment of diphtheria, lockjaw, anthrax and many other scourges. Thanks to him, hydrophobia has been robbed of its terrors. At last, medicine begins dimly to emerge from quackery and empiricism, and bids fair in time to become a true science. All this belongs to the present day, most of it to the last decade or so, yet in all this brilliant list of discoveries and applications no American name is to be found, even though we have a larger number of medical schools, medical professors and medical students than any other country in the world.

In another field. To-day, ocean travellers, two hundred miles from land, talk with friends by a telegraph that crosses space with invisible feet. Marconi's admirable triumphs are merely the culmination of a long train of patient researches on the part of many workers in many lands. Clerk Maxwell, the English physicist, had predicted the common nature of electricity and light before our Civil War came to an end. Seeking to verify this surmise, Hertz, aided and advised by his patron, the veteran von Helmholtz, made his epochal discoveries at Carlsruhe. All the world knew of it thirteen years ago.

A host of experimenters were instantly in the field. The delicate coherer which made wireless telegraphy possible was the independent discovery of Professor Branly, of the Catholic University of Paris, and Professor Oliver Lodge, of Liverpool. Notable contributions have been made by the Italian Professor Righi, by the Germans, Professor Slaby, Count Arco, Professor Braun, by Professor Preece, of England, and Professor Bose, of Calcutta in India, to name but a few. It is to be noted that Marconi, like Morse, was an untrained amateur. It was a free field; no American entered. Not with all the stimulating examples of Edison, Tesla, Elihu Thompson was there one Yankee genius stirred to the task.

Another instance. We have become the first steel makers on

earth. Every schoolboy knows the importance of the slightest admixtures in this industry; that one per cent. of carbon means one kind of steel; two per cent., another; four per cent., something wholly different. Within a few years the fantastic "art" of metallurgy has been transformed from a collection of housewives' receipts to a science. To-day we may make a gold that will melt in a candle flame, another that will cut glass. A mixture of metals, like lead, tin and bismuth which melt at three hundred to five hundred degrees, dissolves in boiling water. A scant trace of one substance introduced in another gives the latter unheard of qualities. Two metals like gold and iron, simply placed in contact, slowly interpenetrate and mix with each other, as if they were so much water and wine. An up-to-date, matter-of-fact text book of the science reads like the prescriptions of the old alchemists. Our ideas of the solid world about us have been irradiated with a new light.

I have before me the latest volume on metallurgy, even-handedly summing up twenty years of marvellous work. From almost a dictionary of names, Belgian, Netherlandish, German, English, French, Russian, I can find but two Americans, Professor Gibbs, whose contribution was most indirect, and Professor Howe. Not even a science upon which rests a billion-dollar trust seems to arouse the interest of one original, inventive American mind.

Mention of the old alchemists will recall to some readers the amazing results recently brought to view by Professor J. J. Thomson, of Cambridge University. Nowadays, every one has come to know a little at least of the high vacuum Crookes tubes, and the velvet glow that comes from them when the tubes are electrified, which gives rise to the Roentgen rays of familiar use. Sir William Crookes long ago showed that this glow is made up of streams of minute missiles. Bombarding a fluorescent screen, they produce the Roentgen light. Putting two and two and three and three together in the most ingenious way, Professor Thomson has been able to measure both the mass and speed of these flying particles, to count them, tell the measure of the electrical charge that each bears—a charge that is enormous. The Cambridge Professor has shown that these bits of matter are certainly a thousand times smaller than the smallest and lightest atom known to chemists; from whatever source they come,

they are all alike, identical in every way. Is this primal matter at last? Is here the stuff from which all known substances are compounded? May we look forward to the time when we may build up any substance—gold for example—from the elements of any other? Have we realized the philosopher's stone?

However this may turn out, it is certain that these Cathode rays, or "corpuscles," as Professor Thomson calls them, are destined to play a leading part in all future conceptions alike of chemistry and physics. From their first recognition by a German, Hittorf, in 1868, there has been a long line of investigators, whose results fill bulky volumes. If, as now seems not improbable, this should turn out to be the most far-reaching discovery of the century, the historian of the future will be rather puzzled to explain why, among scores of names and observations, not one name, not one observation has been contributed by the nation which boasts itself the best educated, the most progressive and enlightened of all. The tribute of America is conspicuous by its absence.

But slight significance could lie in such a detail of the facts were the cases exceptional. In sketching out this none too flattering picture, I have picked the instances merely as they have occurred to me; not for the purposes of an indictment. Take an instance or two more.

Within the last quarter of a century—that is, within a period during which the United States have been easily abreast of the other nations and tribes—an immense work has been done in trying to unravel the mechanism of the brain. We may never solve the mystery of thinking, conscious matter. But we are certainly in sight of a working theory as to how the substances in the myriad cells of the brain perform their work. The possibility of attaining to such an intimate knowledge of the mind dawned with the discovery by the Italian, Golgi, of new staining reactions. Fascinating to the last degree are the pictures of the brain revealed by the microscope, in the hands of a multitude of workers. The cosmopolitan character of science was never more admirably illustrated. The Spanish neurologist, Ramon y Cajal, vies with Bethe of Germany, Van Gehuchten of Belgium, Forel of Switzerland, Waldeyer of Austria. A whole library could be filled with monographs, memoirs, journals and great books on this single subject. Scarce any land beneath the sun is unrepres-

sented, save America. In all this wealth of literature you search in vain for a reference to one American's work.

Another illustration takes us farther afield. Scarce any science has taken on so prodigious a development in later years as chemistry. As a science, it dates from Lavoisier, the French farmer of the taxes whose head fell in the Terror. The pivot of modern chemistry is the atom imagined by John Dalton, a learned Quaker of Manchester, whose book appeared in 1808. So vast a field does this science now cover that hardly any man is master of more than a part. A German chemical dictionary, Beilstein's, dealing with but a single branch, organic chemistry, treats of 50,000 distinct compounds. There are half a dozen other important branches, each with its own huge literature—with special journals, even. It is almost a world by itself. Primacy here has shifted about from one country to another throughout the century, and chiefs and leaders have come from every point of the compass. Obscure lands, like Sweden, Norway, Russia, have been often at the fore. Yet the history of this wonderful science could be written in full detail without mention of perhaps more than a single American name. It will better indicate the state of the work in this country to note that the work of this single American, Professor Willard Gibbs, was unrecognized, was unknown, until it had been dug from the Connecticut archives by a Dutch chemist, after it had lain buried for nearly twenty years.

Perhaps in the minds of some, obsessed with the notion that a new country necessarily means a new people, and that the gentler nurture of the intelligence which we call the sciences and the arts had small show in America until recent years, it will be judged that I have had here under view a time too long. It will not be difficult to find a science that belongs wholly to recent years, where, therefore, our own country has had an equal chance with any other. Take a special province of chemistry that has become of great commercial importance within a very few years: Electrochemistry.

Whatever scattered processes might have existed prior to 1885, the science itself was then a thin and meagre affair. All that was known might have been acquired in an hour or two of close application. Though Clausius in Germany and Williamson in England made tentative efforts at a consistent scientific theory about the middle of the century, the discoveries of Faraday in

the thirties represented the sole progress from the conceptions of Grotthaus, which date from 1805, and are still to be found in many American text-books in current use. The moot question was one that had the greatest importance to chemistry in general and particularly to the chemical explanation of life-processes: What happens when a substance is dissolved in water or other liquid?

Almost every one knows that pure water does not conduct electricity. The end of a wire circuit, dipped in the water, lets through no current. A lump of table salt or a spoonful of sulphuric acid not merely makes the water a conductor but gives rise of itself to an electric current. This was the essence of the discoveries of Galvani and Volta. A lump of sugar, so dissolved, has no such effect.

The explanation of these phenomena, and the practical founding of a new science as well, was the joint work of Van't Hoff, a Dutchman; Arrhenius, a Swede; Ostwald, a Polish German; Raoult, a Frenchman. Extended by eager investigators in every direction, the new theories have worked a genuine revolution in chemistry itself; they have given rise to a number of new industries, which, if we add to them the aluminium and calcium carbide industries, born of the electric furnace, are already worth millions of dollars to America alone; millions more to Europe. The new theories, moreover, seem to throw a flood of light on the most puzzling problems of life. Thanks to them, we are on the way now to a connected account of all vital actions, whether of digestion or reproduction, growth or death, on a simple mechanical or chemical basis. Our bodies and our brains consist very largely of water; the blood carries in solution all the materials which maintain life, so that if we have a complete theory of solutions, we shall have a complete theory of life. We may be able to answer without embarrassment the old, old question, What is life?

The astonishing development of this province of knowledge, within a space of time so brief, a development thoroughly international in character, is a striking example of that admirable organization of modern society which permits a degree of co-operation and an ease of communication, coupled with the stimulus of friendly rivalry, which would have been impossible a few centuries ago. Nowhere is this splendid solidarity, this intelli-

gent "community of interest" so much in evidence as in this especial field; nowhere is the remarkable isolation of the United States from the rest of the scientific world more clearly illustrated. A list which would include the names of even the lesser builders of this imposing fabric would hardly include that of one American.

It would be easy to multiply examples. Here is the far-reaching theory of the ether, explaining or at least offering the only existing explanation of the phenomena of light, heat, electricity and magnetism, of the Marconi telegraph and X-ray photography. Whether it stand, or whether a simpler and better theory shall replace it later, it is assuredly the most brilliant example we possess of the fruitful union of scientific experiment and the scientific imagination. Wise men from among many peoples have come bearing their gifts; but, in the long line from Kelvin and Helmholtz to Lorenz and Poincaré, you discover no faces out of the desert of the western continent.

It is pretty much the same story wherever we turn. What is the cause? Why is it that this people, now marching to the industrial conquest of the earth, has done so little, comparatively, in the realms of science? I leave the answer to others who may love large generalizations more. My purpose was rather to indicate a condition than to propose a remedy. It is certain we do not lack for colleges and institutions of "higher culture." The sums which our Croesuses scatter with lavish hand are the wonderment of Europe. We are a clever people, undoubtedly; this we have no need to be told; our newspapers and orators do not miss an opportunity of telling us so. We have done big things; and it is, perhaps, just for that reason, just because of the rich prizes of business, that the Faradays and Claude Bernards are not to be found among us.

A few weeks ago France did honor to one of the century's notable men, her great chemist, M. Berthelot. The President of the Republic was there to preside; it was a national affair. I suppose M. Berthelot may be accounted the greatest experimental genius since Faraday; the list of his discoveries, the range of his work, the fertility of his resources have been amazing; and it is the boast of his countrymen that he never took out a patent. One of his eulogists said that his work had been done for mankind. He has long been a Senator of France; he was for a time

Minister of Foreign Affairs; yet it is told of him that visitors in winter are invited to his bedroom when they call, a fire there meaning a slight economy of coals! It is a little difficult to assimilate such a character to American ideas of success, yet even our Midases may feel dimly the greatness of such simplicity as that.

The life of M. Berthelot recalls that of Pasteur, or again that of the great physiologist, Claude Bernard. They, like Faraday, might each have had millions; they declined prizes that it needed but a lifted hand to grasp. They labored for the race, and perhaps some day we shall come to honor them as much as we now instinctively honor a slayer of men or a millionaire. The work of Berthelot, like that of Bernard, has been done chiefly at the College de France; that of Faraday was done at the Royal Institution of London. Every one knows of the Pasteur Institute, though not many know how widely its activity has been extended and the multitude of novel things done there in recent years.

We lack in America anything just like these three institutions, as we lack anything like the German University system, which gives German professors so wide a latitude of time for original experimental work. It may be that one cause of our inferiority in a scientific way lies in this want.

Each of these celebrated seats has a history that is unique. The Pasteur Institute was founded as a national memorial to the illustrious man whose name it bears. That restless, tireless genius had saved France millions of treasure and thousands of lives. The silk industry, the wine industry, medicine, surgery, the dairy, stock raising, the most intimate sources of national wealth, well-being and happiness even, had felt the impress of his mighty hand. Scorning the rich rewards which might have been his, had he chosen to put his discoveries under the seal of letters patent, Pasteur deserved well of his people. They understood it; they honored him, as few men of science have ever been honored while they were alive. But medals and decorations did not suffice. So, when one of the great newspapers opened a subscription for a splendid memorial, for an institution wherein Pasteur and his disciples might carry on their work under the most favorable conditions, the response was instantaneous and touching. There was hardly a humble home in France which was *not*, in some way, indebted to Pasteur, and there was hardly

a humble home in France from which a slender subscription did not come. The Institute was the result.

Thanks to the munificence of the Baroness Hirsch, a new building has been recently completed, devoted wholly to biological chemistry and doubling the capacity of the institution. Workers come there now from every part of the earth. Show that you have a work to do, and all the resources of the most perfectly equipped laboratory, all the aids of modern technical and scientific instruments—grown exceeding complicated now and expensive—are at your disposal.

It would be strange if such an institution did not yield rich fruit, and under the guidance of the present Director, M. Duclaux, aided by men of splendid talent, like Roux, Chamberlain, Metchnikoff, Gabriel Bertrand, Mazé and many others, a great work is being done. The whole theory of fermentation, and the wide rôle of the various ferments in every phase of animal and vegetable life, as well as in many industries, is being worked out. So far do its labors extend that very recently, under Metchnikoff and his especial aids, the senility of the cells and the causes of old age are being investigated. Perhaps we may look forward to the day when we shall find agents able to counteract the growing years. Science has many dreams, and the everlasting fountain of Ponce de Leon is assuredly one.

The main body of the work of the Pasteur Institute has now grown too severely technical to admit of brief description; it is enough to say that nowhere else, perhaps, has so close an approach been made to the solution of the most intimate problems of hygiene, of health and of life.

Is it needful to add that we have no institution in America comparable to the Pasteur Institute, no great working laboratory where the investigator may go with his hopes and his plans, and work upon them advantageously and in peace?

France has yet another institution of a slightly different character, yet contributing to the same end, the unimpeded pursuit of experimental science. That is the *College de France*. Founded in the days of the splendor, and originally devoted chiefly to theology and philosophy, it has within the century taken on more and more the stamp of a research institution. There the work of Magendie and his great pupil, Claude Bernard, was done. There Renan sat and taught. There M. Berthelot has pursued

uninterruptedly his fertile and fruitful career. Each of its professors is expected to give, once or twice a year, a series of lectures; and these have come to be more and more a summing up and synthesis of the most recent work in each especial field. These lectures are free to all; you may go or stay, or drop in now and then as your leisure and inclination decree. There are no entrance examinations, no fees to pay. If you care to enroll yourself regularly and attend a given number of series, a diploma is at your disposal. Whether you take it or no, a liberal education is yours for the asking, or rather for the attending. Within the wide leisure of these classic halls you may gather the latest results from every domain of human knowledge.

The labor of the series of lectures entails no great drain upon the time of the occupants of the various chairs; it serves rather as an excellent drill and as an incentive to clear popular exposition of special studies. For the rest, the professors are free to pursue their tasks and their dreams, with never an account to give either to the public or to the state. Is it any wonder that under such a system some of the finest research of the century has been done there? Scarce any single institution of the world can show so proud a roll of memorable names and of achievements that mark an epoch. If there is anything in America which may be likened to the College de France, it is, perhaps, the Smithsonian Institution at Washington. Much notable work has been done there; America has no more distinguished *savant* than its secretary, Professor Langley; and yet it would be admittedly unfair to compare for a moment the work of the two. The Smithsonian has no such resources, no such equipment, and, it may be added, no such far-reaching aims.

It is to be noted in passing that almost all of the courses of the chief university of France, the Sorbonne, are equally open to the public, with neither formality nor price. There, for the trouble of entering its walls, at almost any time you may hear the chief luminaries of French science and French letters; you may listen to the elegant periods of M. Faguet, or, under the grace of M. Moisson's facile discourse, feel the most recondite subjects take on the allures of romance. So far as I know, this is true of no American university.

Paris has yet a fourth institution very close of kin to the Pasteur and the College. A couple of miles to the east of the

University stands the old Jardin des Plantes, made famous by the genius of Cuvier. There a large number of professorships, touching all the various departments of scientific instruction, are set aside for original minds who seem to have a work in the scientific world to do. They are "blue ribbon" posts, and afford independence, leisure and stimulus for that patient, unremitting, undiscouraged toil which is at once the condition and the source of the best scientific work. There Professor Becquerel made his astonishing discoveries of substances which give off light and energy without apparent drain, inexhaustible and unceasing, seeming even to contradict the fundamental law of natural phenomena, the conservation of energy. There Maquenne was the first to produce calcium carbide, from which comes acetylene and a new industry; there he now pursues his work upon the chemistry and constitution of the sugars. I cite only two names from a score or more.

Without naming the École Normale, where St. Claire Deville spent his active life, or the School of Arts and Manufactures, or the College of Pharmacy, where both Berthelot and Moisson gained their reputations, nor a number of other minor institutions, here are three great seats of learning, chiefly devoted to experiment and research. This in a single city! Need there be any marvel that France should possess a roll of great names so resounding that, as I have indicated, the comparatively meagre roll which the United States may produce seems inconsiderable indeed?

London has a similarly admirable example to offer. The amount of genuinely scientific work which England has done, from the days of Boyle and Hooke and Newton, has been noteworthy enough in itself; it has been astonishing, when the singular indifference to science alike of the English Universities and of the English people themselves, taken broadly, is considered. Although it was at Oxford that Sir Robert Boyle laid the foundations of chemistry, the contributions of the old English university to the advancement of knowledge have been humiliatingly small. Cambridge, within the last forty years, has done a very distinguished work; and the same may be said of the Scotch universities.

But the stronghold of English science within the last century has distinctly been the Royal Institution in Albemarle Street.

From thence have the most brilliant discoveries in England come. There the singularly varied mind of Dr. Thomas Young elaborated the undulatory theory of light, and deciphered the hieroglyphs from the tombs of the Ptolemies. There the flashing genius of Sir Humphry Davy devised the first electric light, and set the man in the street talking of the latest marvels of chemistry. There the whole life work of Faraday was done. There the picturesque imagination of Tyndall made the hardest subjects of physics as fascinating as a tale of Cathay. There Professor Dewar and Lord Rayleigh have made their striking discoveries of new elements, and opened up new realms for investigation.

The Royal Institution was founded by an American. Benjamin Thompson, later Count Rumford, was born in one of the villages near Boston. His precocious genius and dominating ways aroused enmity against him; and when the war of the Revolution broke out and he started to raise a company of militia, he was literally driven over to the British side. He fled to England to become, at twenty-four, Under-Secretary of State, and at twenty-seven a member of the Royal Society. Knighted, his restless love of adventure took him to the Continent, drifting toward one of the eastern wars. Entering the service of the King of Bavaria, he was made Count Rumford for his genius as an administrator. He was virtually prime minister; and, for a time, when the King had fled, it was he who ruled. In a single day, he banished mendicity from the most beggar-ridden nation in Europe. When he returned to England, just a century ago, he conceived the plan of a great institution whose chief object should be the diffusion of knowledge and of the benefits of science among the people.

The result was the Royal Institution. It has scarcely held to the ideals of its founder. Its chief features are its courses of lectures. Each year, the most notable men of England and the Continent are drawn upon to sketch in an entertaining way the latest steps of the sciences. Travellers and inventors come, too; there are courses for young folk; there is a splendid library, and no club in London is more inviting. The membership fee is £10 a year, and the list is large. No wonder, for a tolerably assiduous attendance affords an opportunity to listen to and to make the acquaintance of the most famous and most interesting men of the time.

There are but three professorships. Like those of the College de France, their duties are light and the opportunities for research are wide. The system is ideal; yet, considering the number of chairs, it is simply a marvel that a single institution in a single century could show such a roster of great names, such an array of genuine achievements. It would be hardly too much to say that, during this hundred years of its existence, the Royal Institution alone has done more for English science than all of the English universities put together. This is certainly true with regard to British industry, for it was here that the discoveries of Faraday were made.

The German university system and the independence and leisure which it affords German professors is too well known to need sketching here. It is pleasing to note that something of this same spirit and of this same system is coming into vogue with our American universities. Of this, much good may come. But there is room—nay, if the United States wish to hold the same position in the world of science as they are so proud to hold industrially, commercially and perhaps in a social and literary way as well, there is a very articulate need, for institutions like those of Paris, and like the Royal Institution which an American refugee founded, with such large results, in London.

It would require but the co-operation of those who are broadly interested in scientific progress, and who have a desire to keep abreast of the swiftly advancing knowledge of their day, to achieve the beginnings of a great institution which should be at once a scientific club, a forum where the chief notables alike of Europe and America might be gathered and heard, and a seat of scientific research. I should like to see, I should like to assist in, the founding of such an institution in the chief city of the New World.

CARL SNYDER.

FILIPINO VIEWS OF AMERICAN RULE.

BY DR. T. H. PARDO DE TAVERA, BENITO LEGARDA AND JOSE
RUIZ DE LUZURIAGA, THE NATIVE MEMBERS OF THE
UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE COMMISSION.

A frank expression regarding the influence of American rule in the Philippine Islands has been obtained for the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW from the three eminent Filipinos who have been acting since September 1st, under the appointment of the President of the United States, as members of the United States Philippine Commission. Each of these gentlemen was asked by the representative of the REVIEW at Manila to give written answers to four questions regarding the effects of American control. Their answers show that many good results have followed American government in the Philippines, but they are entirely frank in their references to the ravages of the insurrection and the many things which remain to be done before the Islands will enter upon a career of enduring prosperity.

The four questions were:

"Has the presence of the United States in the Philippine Islands resulted in the improvement of the political and economic conditions as compared with those existing under Spanish rule?

"What good results have followed the presence of the United States in the Islands?

"What ought the United States to do in the Islands to promote the commercial progress of the people of the Philippines?

"What form of government ought to be established in the Islands by the Congress of the United States?"

I.

THE principal benefit resulting from American sovereignty in the Philippine Islands has been the liberation of the Filipinos from the sad and hated political intervention of the Friars. The system employed by Spain to assure her domination in the country by means of the religious orders is well known. Americans are not able to understand what the Friar really is, because they regard him purely from the religious point of view, and in the Philippines the religious side in the Friar is one of the very least importance. To understand his rôle in these Islands, it is

necessary to recall the part which he played in Spain in the time of that terrible King, Philip II., when the Inquisition and the intolerance of the monks controlled with iron hand all the social, economic and political machinery of the Spanish state. The responsibility for all the acts of injustice and the errors committed by Spain in the Philippines have been attributed to the Friar; and although he was only the tool of the government the Filipino people consider him primarily accountable for all their misfortunes.

The separation of the church and state is not yet understood here in all its breadth and meaning, but it responds to a necessity, and is therefore received as an invaluable benefit by the people. Thanks to it, the Friar does not intervene as he used to do in municipal affairs nor in those of the provinces; and he can no longer threaten the people with his omnipotence, because the government neither wishes nor has a right to appeal to him under any pretext or excuse.

The centralizing policy of Spain was evil for us. Men who were ignorant of our necessities, our customs, and our situation, and who had no reason to occupy themselves with such details, legislated for our country in Madrid. It is known that it was said that the "Philippines were for Spain and for Spain alone." The convenience of the mother country was always sought, and by the side of that no attention was paid to the necessities of the colonies. Now, although the Filipinos do not legislate in their own country, we have succeeded in having legislation carried on among ourselves. The legislators hear our voice, know the country, and there has never been a return to the unjust and cruel theory by which we were formerly governed: "The Philippines are for the sovereign nation and for the sovereign nation alone." On the contrary, the promises of the lamented President, Mr. McKinley, are being fulfilled—that America comes to the Philippines to aid them, to sustain them and to give to them the principles of liberty and free government which rule the United States and make it great.

Municipal organization is another of the great benefits which we all recognize. The complete autonomy which the municipalities now have could not be—I do not say "proposed"—but not even conceived of or hinted at under the former régime.

The rôle of the present Civil Governor cannot be compared

with the one which the former Governor General, surrounded with attributes and vested with arbitrary powers, exercised here. Then the Governor interfered in everything; he was the legislative, executive and judicial power at one and the same time, intervening even in affairs of the most personal character. The system of absolutely separating the judicial, legislative and executive powers is so new to the Filipinos that at each step we pause with doubts and consultations, not only on the part of the people at large, but even on the part of those Filipinos who now occupy positions in the executive department. It is also novel in the extreme to think of the supreme executive power of the archipelago having a civil character; because, accustomed as we are to the traditional rule of military power, aided and reinforced by an organized priesthood, it is not easy now to understand how civil power holds sway, with the power of the priesthood completely annulled and the military power converted into a part of the simple administrative machinery of the state.

The law of *habeas corpus*, the power to assemble, the freedom of speech and of the press, the abrogation of obligatory military service and of the execrable system which but recently lent itself to so many outrageous abuses, and the abolition of banishment, imprisonment and military executions on account of political beliefs, are real benefits which American sovereignty has brought about in the Philippines.

The economic situation of the Philippines was lamentable. I had some notion of it, but when I traversed a great part of the archipelago, accompanying the Commission on its trip to organize provincial governments, I had the sad opportunity of convincing myself of the lamentable economic state of the Islands. There are no ports; no rivers with clean entrances and channels available for commerce; there are no wharves; the roads are deficient, and there are only six or eight lighthouses in the Islands. The public buildings are few and bad; I do not refer to those which were destroyed in the war, for even if these still existed they would not supply the deficiency. The only existing hospital was that of San Juan de Dios de Manila, sustained by public charity. Hardly any schools were to be found, and the most frequent public edifices met with were the prisons, over whose entrances by a lamentably bad interpretation of Christian charity had been inscribed the words: "He hates the crime and sympathizes with

the criminal." Such a sentence appears to have been inscribed for making martyrs of those who under the weight of an odious crime suffered—victims of fatality—human punishment. The best public buildings which are found on all sides are those dedicated to religious purposes, though many, to be sure, are burned and destroyed.

The government has to create everything. The city of Manila has been the first to reap the benefits of the new government, as it had from the very first moment of American occupation an organized sanitary department which was of prime necessity. As yet there has not been time to do more, because everything has to be literally created and formed anew; but we already have two magnificent iron markets, the streets are well ordered, contracts for the harbor works of Manila have been made, a bridge has been constructed in the Plaza de Santa Cruz, and very shortly they will commence to dredge the river Pasig, which is not available for ships drawing more than three feet of water. In the provinces, roads are being built and wooden bridges are being constructed to replace those of cane built about three centuries ago, and a land tax has been established; in brief, there has been organized an economic life whose skeleton, whose foundation, did not formerly exist here.

A strict accounting system in the administration has resulted in the taxes producing to-day double what they did in the best epoch of the former administration without, as yet, any increase having been made in the rate of taxation. The same thing has happened in the customs service, and the Insular Treasury contains a surplus of ten million pesos, an unprecedented condition in this country.

Such are the good results which have followed the presence here of the United States; but, as a result of the war, agriculture has been wiped out and the public wealth has diminished to such an extent that movable and immovable property has been reduced to ashes. Compensation is to be found in the fact that the Filipinos are convinced that the era of justice has begun. There is no longer a government of privileged characters, nor is the law now obeyed by the poor alone. Bribery, too, has been made the cause for sending more than one person to prison.

This does not mean that all the Americans who have come here have paid heed to justice and practiced the virtues which

their nation honors, but the public authorities have laid a heavy hand on those whose misconduct has contributed to a great extent to the prolongation of the war.

An epidemic among the cattle has destroyed a great number of carabaos, and they are animals for which no substitute can be found in the labors of our fields; and since our commerce depends essentially on the agricultural products of our soil, agricultural losses have been enormously increased thereby.

It is also to be noted with satisfaction that the government has paid punctually for those works which it has undertaken, and it is no longer the case that wages are withheld, on any or no pretext, from those who have been legally employed for the benefit of the government.

Commerce and agriculture will be greatly stimulated by the creation of trust companies and mortgage loan companies, with branches in the principal capitals of the Provinces. The construction of roads, the deepening of the river channels, the building of wharves and harbors, and the creation of means of communication—of which there are none to-day—will give a powerful impulse to the country, and the result thereof will soon be seen. The expense of public administration makes the creation of taxes unavoidable; but it would seem to be a mistake to hasten the imposition of direct taxes which will cause the Filipinos to sell, of necessity, their property holdings to persons or societies with sufficient means to be able to exploit them, just at this time. Doubtless the public wealth would not lose by such a change of ownership, but individuals would suffer. The rich persons or societies who should acquire the holdings would erect their prosperity upon the ruin of the former owners.

It would be very beneficial if Filipino products could enter free of duty into the United States, which country would thus become the great market for our exports.

We supporters of the Federal Party aspire to see the Filipinos constitute themselves some day into a State like those which form the Union. Until we are in a condition to obtain this final desire, we hope that, gradually and in accordance with the capacity and situation of our people, the government of the Philippines may go on acquiring a state of autonomy more and more nearly complete, approaching the definite form of its final development. If we had not had so prolonged a war, there is no doubt that it would

have been necessary to organize a government like that which has been given to Porto Rico and to Hawaii. We understand that the war has created for us a different situation, and although we desire to-day to have the benefits of self-government established in these Islands, I believe that the condition in which we find ourselves placed would not justify it.

For the present, it seems to me that Congress should approve the provisional form of government established here, maintaining it during one, two, or perhaps three years in such a way that, when partisan feelings have been calmed, when a certain lack of confidence between Americans and Filipinos has disappeared, the time will have arrived for giving us a territorial government.

To-day the Filipinos desire, as the most important measure of the American government, that there be conceded to us a chamber of representatives of the people, chosen by election. Nothing could be more just; but is it, indeed, opportune? We cannot and do not forget that the Isle of Samar, that of Cebu, that of Bohol, Batangas and other provinces, although they do not constitute, to be sure, a great part of our territory, are to-day in open rebellion against the United States. Those provinces would not be able to send representatives, if it were attempted now to establish a Congress by popular vote. Furthermore, in those places which are pacified, I do not know to what extent it would be practicable to hold an election, in view of the circumstances in regard to political and partisan education which exist to-day. It would be sad, indeed, if a chamber formulated at this time by popular election should prove a fiasco.

I fear greatly that such a chamber would prove unavailing at this time, and that the government would find itself compelled to suppress it—an act which would not only wound the *amour propre* of the Filipinos, but might retard the time for establishing a real territorial government without the restrictions which present conditions would impose.

I believe that to-day full satisfaction would be given to the just desires of the Filipinos, if Congress, upon approving the form of government which we actually have, should decide that our Archipelago should send to Washington, in the character of representatives, fully informed as to the needs of the Filipinos, two delegates chosen by vote. This could be accomplished by each province selecting a commissioner, and these commissioners

once assembled would choose the delegates to represent them at Washington.

It is certain that my opinion will not to-day receive the approval of the majority; but I will not forget that, though the policy I advocated three years ago was then generally considered absurd, it is as generally accepted to-day as just, rational and patriotic.

T. H. PARDO DE TAVERA.

II.

The political conditions of the Archipelago, notwithstanding that we are now in a period of transition, have changed considerably for the better, when compared with the tyrannical colonial system of Spain. The autonomy now enjoyed by the *pueblos* organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code, promulgated by the United States Philippine Commission, could not be more liberal; never have the Filipinos enjoyed such equal rights, neither under Spanish rule nor during the time of the short-lived Malolos government. The right of suffrage as exercised to-day is an entirely new thing to the Filipinos. So also is the exercise of all of the individual rights which they enjoy under the American flag, and it is only those who obstinately refuse to see what is taking place under their very eyes, those incorrigible obstructionists who oppose all civilization and progress and systematically find fault with every measure that the American government has purposed to carry out in these Islands, who will deny the rapid advance that has been achieved here in so short a time—not by restricting liberty, but by extending it; not by limiting public instruction nor by supporting religious fanaticism, but by fostering everywhere public education, purifying and strengthening religious convictions, and requiring respect towards all forms of worship.

All of the above mentioned advantages, coupled with the added value which necessarily pertains to all rights guaranteed by a strong and stable government, we in this Archipelago have enjoyed since the day that it pleased Providence to plant the American flag on our soil. Even though many Filipinos cannot for the present appreciate these advantages for the reason that the ravages of the war, now happily drawing to a close, and which was cruel and bloody in some of the districts of the Archipelago, are still too obvious, it is hoped that in time these evils will be

forgotten and they will then be convinced of the sincerity of the American government.

The customs tariff recently promulgated completely satisfies for the present the aspirations of Philippine industry and commerce. Great benefits would accrue from the establishment of mortgage loan banks, which would facilitate the development of the great sources of wealth which are to-day completely at the mercy of usury; but it would be well to remember that in order to accomplish this successfully, it will be necessary so to modify the existing laws as to guarantee property titles, so that they would become unquestionable before the law. Equal benefits would result from the building of good roads and railways, which would furnish transportation for the people and for the products of this rich soil and its industries. They would increase production and open up immense fields and rich lands, which are to-day untilled on account of the lack of means of transportation. The same thing may be said of the regulation of the sale and the development of public lands, which would encourage a large immigration of American laborers and farmers, who would teach the Filipinos the inadequacy of their primitive system of agriculture. This would indeed be a step in the right direction for the Archipelago. Other benefits would be gained by the establishment of experimental agricultural stations similar to those in the United States.

The change proposed by the government in the monetary system and the adoption of the gold standard, now universally established in the commercial centers of the world, as well as the issue of a special coinage for this Archipelago, at a fixed ratio to that of the United States, would place commerce on a safer basis. The regulation of the granting of concessions for the working of the mines of all kinds with which this country is blessed, would give us an opportunity of freeing ourselves from the large importations of coal and other minerals which to-day makes us tributary to other countries.

Although there are powerful reasons for believing that a more autonomous government would be very beneficial to the moral and material reconstruction of this Archipelago, they are no less weighty than those held by people who are of the opinion that the *status quo* of the existing provisional government ought to prevail for the period of two years. This time is considered indispensa-

ble to allow the Filipinos to become conversant with their individual rights and their use, and to become familiar with the right of suffrage, which, as has been said before, is an entirely new thing to them. The most powerful argument to be found in favor of the latter view is based on the results of the municipal elections in some provinces, where the voters, instead of considering the common good, have allowed themselves to be influenced by the dominant *casiquism* or by the party passions and puerile reactionism which not long ago incited the war. There is no doubt that the Filipino people must purge themselves of these vices inherited from their former rulers and which are today deeply rooted in them, before they can fully enter upon the exercise of their rights. When this has been brought about, it will be well to remember that sudden changes are seldom beneficial and that a gradual development is always more advantageous.

The hope of the Filipino people would be to have a Legislative Chamber of Representatives who were elected from each province, though such elections should be limited and restricted, in that the electors would have to combine the qualifications of fitness and capability as well as the elected; and these conditions should be made also to apply to the powers of the Chamber, to the extent that its acts might be set aside whenever the executive government thought that measure necessary for the common good.

It would also be well to allow a delegation, composed of several persons elected from within the Chamber, to represent it in an informative character in Congress at Washington, so that the Filipinos might have an opportunity of learning and later exercising political functions; but this, I believe, will only be possible when all of the provinces are able to be represented in the Chamber. In short, I believe all of this will be possible only when the hostility which still exists against the constituted power shall have ceased.

BENITO LEGARDA.

III.

Taking up the subjects in the order placed in the interrogatory, I begin by stating that the presence of United States government in these Islands has undoubtedly produced immense changes for the better in the political conditions of the Filipino people. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, as the Filipinos have rid themselves from the theocratic yoke and placed themselves

under the eminently liberal administration of the United States, by which they have been enabled to secure those liberties and rights which they could never have attained under the Spanish sovereignty.

With regard to the economical situation, it can at once be affirmed that so far as Manila and other cities of the Archipelago are concerned, where large numbers of Americans are gathered, belonging to the army and the Civil Government, the situation has improved to a remarkable extent; but it must not be inferred from this fact that the country, taken as a whole, is prosperous. It is true that imports to Manila have considerably increased, and that for this reason stores of all kinds, from those handling staple articles to those dealing in luxuries, have multiplied. It is also true that city real estate and rentals have greatly increased in value. Judging from the business done in Manila, it might appear that the whole country was relatively as well off, the prosperous state of the capital being but a faithful reflection of the general welfare of the Archipelago. But it must be borne in mind, on the other hand, that agriculture has suffered a mortal blow in all of those provinces where the war was actively carried on, and that little by little production has been falling off every year until to-day it is at its minimum—not only because of the war, but also on account of the ravages of the locusts and the rinderpest, which have practically paralyzed it. The plantations, farms and cultivated lands do not now produce enough for local consumption; indeed, they fall far short of the requirements of the inhabitants. This anomalous situation has now resulted in an adverse trade balance so ruinous to the Filipinos that they have been compelled to pay with their savings for the value of imported merchandise consumed for the past three years. They have had no domestic products to export, excepting small quantities of abaca and copra, the value of which has not been sufficient to counterbalance their losses.

As a result of the authority of the United States in these Islands, we have to acknowledge the great benefits that peace and all its wholesome and profitable conditions have brought to the provinces as well as to the *pueblos* under civil rule, where, aside from the advantages of the municipal autonomy and the provincial régime, the administration of justice is speedy and upright. Moreover, schools have been so organized that the Americaniza-

tion of this country will be an accomplished fact within a few years if all elements join, as it is to be hoped they will, for the purpose of accomplishing this meritorious work in favor of the culture and welfare of these peoples.

In order to attain commercial progress in these Islands, which to my mind is most essential in these critical times, it is necessary to place our commerce under the strongest protection, so that it may be raised from the state of prostration which now prevails, after suffering the effects of a titanic struggle against the evils of war and the ravages of the locusts and the rinderpest. The war has deprived it of laborers; the locusts have annually destroyed the plantations; and, lastly, the rinderpest has carried off the caraboas necessary for the cultivation of the land. The best remedy, then, which at present can be applied, is the establishment of mortgage loan banks in those provinces where agriculture is best developed. As an experiment, and one which I am sure would be crowned with success, I would suggest the establishment of a bank of that kind at Bacolod, capital of the province of Occidental Negros, which is the most productive sugar-growing district in the Archipelago, but which has unfortunately lost all of its caraboas through the rinderpest. This province has at present enough ground planted in cane to yield a crop of one and a half million picos of sugar for the next harvest (one pico is equal to $137\frac{1}{2}$ pounds). The establishment of mortgage loan banks would not be so difficult if the Insular Government would lend its assistance to the realization of this useful and vital requirement.

As for the rest, agriculture being the principal source of all wealth, it is evident that, if by the establishment of mortgage banks relief is granted to the agriculturists who to-day find themselves in a state of prostration, the increase in the products of the soil which this will bring about will in itself be sufficient to send commerce along the road of progress—especially so if at the same time adequate means of transportation are obtained, along with a sensible system of taxation which shall in no way be burdensome to the taxpayer.

In my opinion, it is very difficult to answer at present the question with respect to the system of government that Congress ought to provide for us. However, taking into account the aspirations of the majority of men who are more or less interested in

the political future of this country, my answer can be condensed as follows: That it might perhaps be well to establish here a form of government similar to that of Hawaii or Porto Rico. Since the conditions here, however, are somewhat different to those which prevailed in those islands when their governments were established by the United States, it is clear that our case must have a different solution. Aside from the agitation which still influences the minds of most of the people, it is well to remember that the province of Batangas and the Islands of Samar, Mindoro, Cebú and Bohol are yet in open warfare against the government of the United States.

So long as this abnormal condition exists, it does not appear to me that it would be prudent and politic to introduce any change in the established government of these Islands. Only when hostilities shall have completely ceased, when the popular mind is less perturbed, ought there to be thought of forming a popular Chamber of Representatives, elected by suffrage under an election law which, by its wise restrictions, shall offer a safe guarantee that such representatives shall be wisely chosen. With this Chamber of Representatives the Civil Commission as at present organized would co-operate, constituting a Council of Government to the Executive Power of the Governor and the secretaries of the departments, the latter having the powers of a Senate. Such a form of government, I believe, would satisfy the Filipino people until such time as they were capable of forming, as a Territory, a part of the Great Republic of the United States.

JOSÉ RUIZ DE LUZURIAGA.

THE SUGAR QUESTION IN EUROPE.

BY YVES GUYOT.

IN the following article, I give the situation of the sugar question in Europe at the moment of the reunion, at Brussels, in the middle of December, of the International Sugar Conference.

I.

The entire sugar industry in Europe is subject to a system of bounties.

In industry the term bounty is applied either to an abatement of taxation, or to a direct remuneration allowed on a definite production.

Sugar legislation in all European countries has these aims in common—to stimulate the production of sugar, to limit the domestic consumption of sugar, to encourage foreign consumption.

These results are attained by indirect bounties, avowed, as in France, or disguised, as in Belgium and Russia; by direct bounties, as in Germany, in Austria-Hungary, and, since the law of 1897, in France.

There are two different taxes: First, the tax on beetroot; second, the tax on the product of the beetroot.

All the legislation on this subject is characterized by instability. I shall indicate rapidly its variations in the last twenty years, its actual character and its effect upon production, internal consumption and commerce.

FRANCE.

The system of bounties upon manufactured sugar was introduced in France, in the middle of the seventeenth century, by a decree dated September 28th, 1648. Abolished by the law of March 15th, 1791, they were re-established by the law of the 8th Floréal, Year XI. Since the law of March 11th, 1819, there has been constant sugar legislation. This legislation has at-

tempted to reconcile two opposing interests: that of colonial sugars and that of beetroot sugars. The government itself recognized that the problem was insoluble when, January 11th, 1843, it proposed to buy up the beetroot sugar industry for a consideration of 40,000,000 francs, and to prohibit any future manufacture. Had this proposition been adopted, it would have saved much time to our political assemblies and many parliamentary intrigues, and many hundred millions to the taxpayers and to French consumers.

Bounties on the production and exportation of sugar are of two kinds: those instituted in France by the law of 1884 are indirect bounties, and those which were established by the law of April 7th, 1897, are direct bounties on exportation.

This is the principle: the tax is assessed upon less than the actual product; the sugar produced in excess of this estimate is exempt from duty; the difference between the sugar taxed and the sugar produced constitutes the bounty. The law of July 29th, 1884, established a compromise by which the quantity of taxable sugar was estimated in a definite ratio to the weight of beetroot employed. This proportion was 6 kilogrammes of refined sugar to 100 kilogrammes of beetroot.

All production above this amount was exempt from taxation, syrups and molasses as well as sugars; nevertheless the law itself considered that the estimate of the product was too low, and raised it for the season of 1887-88 to 6.250 kilogrammes; for that of 1888-89 to 6.750 kilogrammes, and for that of 1890-91 to 7 kilogrammes.

Almost immediately the proportion of excess rose to 31.21 per cent. of the production. The tax was devoured by the bounty.

The law of 1884 was modified by the laws of 1887 and 1888. At last the law of April 7th, 1897, drew up the present system.

The legal product is fixed at 7.750 kilog. of sugar to 100 kilog. of beetroot. When the actual product of each factory does not exceed 10.500 kilog. of refined sugar to 100 kilog. of beetroot the entire excess is given the benefit of the reduced taxation established by the law of August 5th, 1890; that is to say, it is taxed at the rate of 30 francs. Above 10.500 kilog., one-half is liable only to a tax of 30 francs; the other half is liable to a tax of 60 francs. In the season of 1899-1900, the quantity of sugar which benefited by the reduced tariff was 249,644,526 kil.,

being 28.72 per cent. The total allowance of the premium at the rate of 30 fr. for every 100 kil. of sugar under reduced taxation amounted to 74,893,358 fr.—i. e., fr.8.62 for every 100 kil. of refined sugar produced.

Direct Bounties on Exportation.—The law of April 7th, 1897, established in favor of sugar direct bounties on exportation and reductions in proportion to distance. To obtain the necessary funds it established a uniform duty on the refining process at the rate of 4 francs to the 100 kilogrammes and a tax of 1 franc on manufacture.

It exempts exported sugars from these taxes, and, according to the class to which sugars belong, it gives an export bounty of 3.50 francs, of 4 francs and of 4.50 francs. But article 12 specifies that in case the expenditures of a season exceed the proceeds of the taxation destined to meet them, the rate of bounty for the next season will be reduced by the amount necessary to reimburse the Treasury for its advance. The object of this law is to discriminate in favor of the refineries of the ports.

Raw sugars destined for exportation, transported from a French port on the North Sea or the Channel, to be worked up in a French port on the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, receive a bounty of 2 francs.

AUSTRIA AND GERMANY.

To a greater or less extent all the other countries have copied the legislation and practice of Austria in late years.

In Austria, by the law of August 21st, 1888, bounties on production were replaced by bounties on exportation, varying from 1.50 francs to 2.30 francs. Altogether the sum total of bounties could not exceed 5,000,000 florins. This rate was raised to 9,000,000 florins by the law of July 7th, 1896; a royal decree of July 17th, 1899, raised the bounties to 1 florin .60 and 2 florins .30, but retains the limit of 9,000,000.

The duty on domestic consumption, fixed at 11 florins in 1888, was raised to 13 florins in 1896 and to 19 florins in 1899.

In Germany the law of May 27th, 1896, now in force, is characterized by three essential points: the tax on manufacture, the limitation of the total production of factories, and the bounty on exportation, which has been named the war bounty.

The tax on manufacture is fixed as follows: For the season's yield (per season) of 40,000 bags or under, .10 mark (.125 franc)

per bag (100 kilogrammes); above 40,000 bags up to 50,000, .125 mark (.156 $\frac{1}{4}$ franc) per bag; over 50,000 bags up to 60,000, .15 mark (.187 $\frac{1}{2}$ franc) per bag, and so on, increasing the tax by .025 mark (.031 $\frac{1}{4}$ franc) per bag for each additional 10,000 bags. The tax is payable when the sugar leaves the factory.

Every year a quota of production is fixed for each factory. On the quantity produced in excess of this figure, the tax on manufacture is raised to a rate the same as that of the bounty on exportation or on the exportation of raw sugar.

The rate of bounty allowed on exportation is: A. on raw sugars of at least 90 per cent. of saccharine matter, and refined sugars of under 98 per cent., 2.50 marks (fr.3.12 $\frac{1}{2}$); B. on loaf sugars of at least 99 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., 3.55m. (fr.4.43 $\frac{3}{4}$). All other sugars of at least 98 per cent., 3m. (fr.3.75).

The duty on consumption has been raised from 18m. (fr.22.50) to 20m. (fr.25).

The sugar industry in both Austria and Germany is characterized by the existence of a "Trust."

The Austrian Trust, like all combinations of the sort, relies upon the existence of a high protective tariff. The Custom House imposes a duty of 11 florins (22 crowns), say, francs 22.55, per 100 kilogrammes, upon foreign sugars, and Austria has no colonies to send her cane sugar.

The manufacturers of Austrian sugar have unanimously agreed with the refiners not to sell any sugar for domestic consumption. On their part, the refiners have guaranteed the price of 15 florins (30 crowns) per hundred kilogrammes to the manufacturers of sugar, for all raw sugar for internal consumption.

The total surplus accruing from the manufacture of sugar is divided among the manufacturers in proportion to their respective production, calculated upon their average production of a certain number of years.

It is very easy to calculate the profit resulting from the Trust, and fix its division between the refiners and the manufacturers.

In fact, from the prices quoted at Trieste we have the value of sugar in the international market, what it would be in the interior of the country if there were no agreement between the producers, adding the tax to the bounty on exportation.

Thus, according to the official statements of prices quoted in crowns (the crown is worth half a florin), we note the price at

Trieste (price of export).....	Cr. 27.75
Bounty on exportation.....	4.60
Duty on consumption.....	38.00

Total.....Cr. 70.35

Therefore if the Trust did not exist, the price in the domestic market would be 70.35 crowns.

Now, according to the same official quotations at Prague or Vienna, the price of refined sugar is 84.25 crowns, which leaves about 14.50 francs to be divided under certain conditions between the manufacturers and the refiners.

The price of raw sugar which serves as the base of the calculation is not the average price for the year, but the average price for the months from November to April.

Naturally production varies from year to year, but we may count upon a total of a million tons.

The consumption has been estimated at 320,000 tons of refined sugar: there is an agreement between the manufacturers and refiners to add 10 per cent. to this amount to represent the consumption of raw sugar: thus for 320,000 tons of refined sugar this would give 352,000 tons of raw sugar.

On this total there accrued to the manufacturers, for the year 1899-1900, 16,825,000 francs, in round numbers 20,000,000 francs, on a total profit which is at least 46,400,000 francs.

This sum of 16,825,000 francs divided among all the producers represents for the manufacturer a surplus of fr. 1.68 to each bag of sugar produced.

For the refiners the surplus on 100 kilogrammes of refined sugar delivered to the home consumer will be fr. 9.25 if the entire surplus is applied to the average exportation of 500,000 tons of refined sugar exported. That would constitute a supplementary bounty of fr. 4.50.

The Austrian refiner would seem then to reap the principal advantage from the arrangement concluded; but it is only fair to remark that the situation would be much altered if the price of raw sugars in the international market should fall much, and that in that case the share in the profits of the manufacturer would increase proportionately.

In its principal features, the German Trust, which has been in existence only since June 1st, 1900, is a reproduction of the Austrian Trust.

THE RUSSIAN SYSTEM.

Since August 1st, 1881, the tax on native sugars is collected on the quantities actually produced. Since September 1-13, 1894, sugars of all kinds produced by the sugar houses are subject to a tax of 1 ruble (fr. 2.66) and 75 copeks per pood (kil. 16.38).

Raw sugars are subject to a tax of 3 rubles, or \$2.316, and refined sugars to a tax of 4 rubles (\$3.088).

Since the ukase of July 2d, 1895, the ministry determine each year the probable internal consumption of sugar. The quantity decided upon is divided among the different factories in proportion to their average production, and of the sugar produced in excess of the amount fixed, a deduction having been made of 60,000 poods to each factory, which are subject to the tax on the necessities of life, the remainder, which can not be sold in the domestic market, is charged with a tax of 3.75 rubles to the pood, while the price varies from 4.80 rubles in summer to 4.60 rubles in winter, an average of 4.70 rubles: deducting the tax of R. 1.75, there remains R. 2.95 to the pood, or 48 francs to the 100 kilos.

There remains, then, after deducting the tax, a net price of R. 1.20, or of fr. 3.20 the pood, say fr. 19.54 the 100 kilos, a price lower than the market price in Russia and than the price in London.

Exportation is then obligatory, and M. d'Aulnis de Bourouill has admirably explained the character of the bounty on exportation of the Russian system. No manufacturer knows in advance the number of poods which he can sell in the interior in excess of the fixed quantity of 60,000 poods allowed to each factory: this quantity will be determined by the total production of each establishment compared with that of others. It is then for the interest of each manufacturer to increase his production, for the price of sugar, after the tax has been deducted, at 48fr. the quintal, assures him a large profit, and at the same time customs duties protect him against external competition. While the purpose of the legislation was to limit the production of sugar, its effect has been to stimulate it, since the manufacturer can sell at a loss in the foreign market, as he is compensated by his gain in the domestic market.

For a factory with an average production of 175,000 poods, the situation is as follows:

Available for the domestic market.....	134,015
Obligatory reserve.....	11,300
For exportation.....	27,685

Total. 173,000

If it triples its production, it obtains the following results:

Available for the domestic market.....	332,646
Obligatory reserve.....	45,900
For exportation.....	140,454

Total..... 519,000

The net price of sugar (tax deducted) in Russia being 2.95 rubles the pood, and the cost 2.20 rubles, the profit is 75 copeks to the pood. For exportation the price delivered at Odessa is 1R. 73 copeks; the loss on exportation amounts to 47 copeks the pood. From this we have the following results:

In the domestic market the difference between 134,015 and 332,646 poods, 198,631 poods, sold at a profit of 75 copeks, represents a gain of 148,973 rubles.

In exportation, the difference between 27,685 poods and 140,454 poods, 112,769 poods, sold at a loss of 47 copeks, represents an aggregate loss of 53,001 rubles.

This gives an excess profit of 95,972 rubles.

The law allows factories to exchange among themselves their obligations to the domestic market, so that a factory situated at Odessa may export its entire product and send its certificates to factories in the interior.

II.

The French law of 1884 had two objects: to increase the production and to improve the quality of the beetroot; to develop largely the manufacture of sugar. It has achieved its object. It has even been too successful.

In 1884-1885 the production of refined sugar in France was 273,000 tons; in 1889-1890 it reached 700,000 tons; in 1898-1899 737,000; in 1899-1900, 863,027 tons; in 1900-1901, 1,023,898.

The quantity of sugar benefited by the reduced tariff represented in 1900-1901 28.72 per cent. of the total production. The average profit, reckoned at the rate of 30 francs to the hundred kilos., or the quantity liable to the reduced tax, amounted to fr. 8.62 on each ton of refined sugar, including 14 per cent. represented by molasses used in distilleries, in agriculture, and sent to the foreign market.

Although the production of sugar in France has trebled, consumption, if we compare it with the total of the population, has remained almost stationary. From 416,632 tons of raw sugar to a population of 37,800,000 in 1884-85, say, Ks. 11.02 per head, it fell to 343,000 tons in 1888; it was in 1899 497,349, and in 1900 490,000 for 38,600,000 people.

Comparing the price of £13 9s. per cwt. for loaves in London—which is fr. 34.20 exactly per 100 kilog.—with the price of 103fr. for loaves in Paris, we arrive at the following figures:

1. World's quotation in London.....	Fr. 34.20
2. Consumption duty	60.
3. Refining tax	4.
4. Export premium	3.11
5. Supervision tax	0.04
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Total	101.35

If the grocer buys at 103 fr. he has to add the following charges:

Price quoted for loaves.....	Fr. 103.
Carriage (minimum)	0.30
Exchange	4.
<hr/>	
	107.36

He sells at 110 francs, and thus the consumer pays fr. 1.10 per kilog. when he ought to pay only fr. 0.41, including the profit of the retail grocer.

The sugar industry has developed in Germany only since 1874. It has risen from 300,000 tons to 1,261,000 tons in 1889-1890, a period when it represented 35.4 per cent. of the total European production, and to 1,770,000 tons in 1899-1900; but its relative importance has been reduced to 33 per cent., which proves the increased production of sugar in all countries.

The consumption of raw sugar, which was 375,000 tons in 1884-1885, rose in 1898-1899 to 766,419 tons.

Austria, whose production in 1874 was less than 300,000 tons, rose in 1889-1890 to 740,000 tons, and in 1899-1900 to 1,100,000 tons, representing 20 per cent. of the entire production. Its consumption, which was 188,445 tons in 1884-1885, has more than doubled, 379,856 tons.

Russia, which produced 448,000 tons in 1889-1890, has doubled her production with 900,000 tons in 1899-1900.

Belgium has attained to a production of 209,000 tons in 1889-1890, 270,000 tons in 1899-1900; and she consumes 68,985 tons.

This year the probable production in Russia will be 51,200,000 poods. With the stock from the last season, it is 56,500,000 poods. The consumption has risen to 36 millions.

When we consider the consumption of the different countries in relation to their production we find that neither France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, nor Holland consumes half of its production. Exportation is then a necessity to them. In 1898-1899 Germany exported 500,691 tons of raw sugar and 456,611 tons of refined sugar; Austria-Hungary 136,948 tons of raw sugar and 514,904 tons of refined.

In 1900, France exported the following quantities, stated in detail:

From French colonies.....	35,023
Native raw sugar.....	362,000
Refined sugar.....	163,271
Imperfectly refined.....	14,972
Products of sugar waste.....	8,284

England absorbed 330,000 tons of our raw sugar; 163,271 tons of our refined sugar; about 85 per cent. of our entire export.

In 1898 England consumed 1,439,000; in 1899, 1,447,000; in 1900, 1,488,000 tons.

The situation of the sugar industry in Europe becomes more threatening as its outlets close, and as the production of sugar constantly increases. In 1899-1900 Egypt produced 100,000 tons; Italy, which in 1897 had only four factories, has now 29, producing 20,000 tons, one-fourth of the consumption. Roumania produced 25,000 tons; it is calculated that Spain will produce 160,000 tons, or twice its own consumption.

Doubtless the cost of production in these countries will not allow them to enter the universal market, but their production closes the outlets of the old exporting countries.

According to the estimate of "*Prager Zuckermarkt*," the production of beetroot in Germany was, in the season of 1900-1901, 1,970,000 tons; in Austria, 1,090,000; in France, 1,150,000. The official estimate of the 15th of February announces an estimated production of 936,000 tons of refined sugar, against 781,000 tons at the same date last year.

For a long time the manufacturers of the Continent have supposed that they would always be protected from countervailing

duties. The supplementary duty established in the United States on August 27th, 1894, and the law of July, 1897, have begun to undeceive them, and the Indian tariff act of 1899 has continued the process. Sir Nevile Lubbock, President of the London Chamber of Commerce, said at the reunion on December 20th, 1899, to which they intended to invite me, "We demand a countervailing duty to protect the countries that reject the system of bounties against the combination of the countries which retain it."

Lord Cranborne declares that the English Government, having secured its liberty of action at the Brussels conference, can impose a countervailing duty on sugar if it chooses.

From one day to the next, England can wipe out the sugar industry of the Continent. Far-seeing friends of the sugar industry, like M. Dureau, Editor of "*Le Journal des Fabricants de Sucre*," recognize and appreciate this fact.

According to the report given by *Le Siècle* of the dinner of the London Chamber of Commerce, on December 20th, he said: "In principle we are in accord with M. Yves Guyot: the system of bounties is absurd, and its general abolition would certainly be desirable for the producers as well as for the consumers." In 1900 France has given 74,893,000 francs in indirect bounties to 339 sugar manufacturers, plus 21,287,000 francs in direct bounties and deductions, altogether about 96,180,000 francs.

In 1884 the number of factories was 449; in 1899-1900 their number had decreased to 344. In 1884 there were employed 43,896 men; in 1899-1900 there were only 42,812 men.

In 1900 our exports of sugar amounted to 61 per cent. of our production and importation, that is, a quantity greater than was consumed at home. While in 1900 we exported 159,000,000 francs worth of sugar, we paid nearly 100,000,000 in bounties, rebates and taxes.

The system of bounties subjects industry to all the uncertainties which affect political assemblies. An industry dependent on bounties is subject to danger from legislative changes not only in its own country, but in others.

Bounties stimulate production, encourage foreign consumption, establish industries founded on privileges, always threatened by crises. The sugar industry in Europe is the most striking demonstration of this. We hope the Brussels conference will end this absurd system.

YVES GUYOT.

IRELAND'S INDUSTRIAL REVIVAL.

BY MICHAEL J. MAGEE, MEMBER OF THE IRISH BOARD OF
AGRICULTURE.

THE following article tells the story of a nation's industrial decline and fall; also of a movement for the revival of a nation's prosperity, which, judged by either its avowed objects or its accomplished results, possesses the strongest claims upon the sympathy and good will of the greatest industrial nation of the world.

The awakening of a spirit of manly independence and self-reliance, the development of the country's resources, the revival and promotion of trade and industry, the preservation and retention of the people on the land given them by God, the unification of all creeds and classes for the benefit of the community, and the abolition of sectarian ill-feeling—such are the main characteristics of the new industrial movement in Ireland.

The reader will observe that no mention of politics occurs in this table of aims. That is because, since the question relates solely to industrial and commercial concerns, an identity of interest exists among all sections of the people that necessarily excludes the introduction of political and controversial subjects in every shape and form.

To understand thoroughly the present position and needs of Ireland as a commercial country, it will be necessary to recall a few facts which have not, until recently, been brought prominently under the notice of the public, and which in consequence have not been invested with their due significance.

The Irish question should be divided into two phases—the political and the economical.

The various developments of Irish politics have commanded the close attention of the world at large; the material condition and the economic necessities of the Irish people have received but scant consideration, even from some of her staunchest champions.

At the same time, it is of the greatest importance to recognize

the fact that the possibility of separate consideration of the economical, as distinguished from the political, aspect of Irish affairs, has only arisen within what may be termed, from a historical standpoint, a comparatively recent date.

At the commencement of the nineteenth century, the extirpation of Irish industries was part of the policy of the British Government, due to the fear of Irish competition entertained by English merchants.

The following propositions may be accepted as representing facts authenticated by the testimony of witnesses who certainly cannot be accused of excessive sympathy or undue partiality for the Irish people.

(1.) Ireland, with her excellent natural resources, was at one time a formidable rival to Great Britain in commerce and manufactures. In the language of the report of the Recess Committee, "In every branch of industry, including the smelting of iron, was this competition manifested." "The maintenance of such a rivalry shows that the Irish people once exhibited a high capacity for industrial enterprise, and the Recess Committee believes that that capacity may again be brought into productive activity."

(2.) Legislation was purposely framed by the British Parliament to stamp out this competition and to suppress industries. Again to quote the Recess Committee: "This legislation really left Ireland no chance. It struck at all her industries, not excepting agriculture. It forced the population into entire dependence on the land and reduced the country to an economic condition involving periodical famines. It is not to be wondered at that we at length came to have a population devoid of the industrial spirit. As Lord Dufferin has put it, 'even the traditions of commercial enterprise have perished through desuetude.' Mr. Arthur Balfour, speaking at Alnwick on July 19th, 1895, said that he had learned while he was in Ireland that many of the ills of the country arose from its poverty, and that this poverty was in part the work of England and Scotland."

In support of the contentions above set forth, the following extracts from various authorities may be quoted concerning the restrictive legislation enacted at the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries:

"The mere rumors of a rise of industry in Ireland created a panic in the commercial circles in England.*

* Froude, "English in Ireland." Vol. I., p. 443.

"The commercial leaders were possessed of a terror of Irish rivalry which could not be exorcised."*

"The Navigation Laws prohibited the importation of Irish cattle into England as a public and common nuisance. Irish beef, pork, bacon, butter and cheese were likewise excluded. The growth of our great woollen trade was the result of these agricultural restrictions, the people, by the advice of the Duke of Ormonde, who introduced Walloon families to teach them weaving, turning their attention to sheep.

"This trade having in turn been destroyed, the undertaking of Parliament to encourage the linen trade as a compensation was not kept. The Irish glass trade was ruined by the 19th of George II. Irish cottons were crushed by an import duty of 25 per cent. At one time Ireland was making sails for the entire British navy. This trade was put an end to by imposing duties on sail cloth made of Irish hemp.

"Irish beer, malt, hats, gunpowder, coals, bar iron, ironware and other products were likewise the subject of legislative restrictions. The removal in 1800 of the bounties and protective duties by which the Irish Parliament sought to revive industries between the years 1782 and 1798, exposing these infant industries to the competition of the great capital and long established skill and ability of England, and the civil war of 1798, completed our industrial ruin."

"From Queen Elizabeth's reign until within a few years of the Union, the various commercial confraternities of Great Britain never for a moment relaxed their relentless grip on the trades of Ireland. One by one, each of our nascent industries was either strangled in its birth or handed over, gagged and bound, to the jealous custody of the rival interests in England, until, at last, every fountain of wealth was hermetically sealed. What has been the consequence of such a system pursued with relentless pertinacity for over 250 years? This: that, debarred from every other trade and industry, the entire nation flung itself back on 'the land' with a pitiless impulse, as when a river whose current is suddenly impeded rolls back and drowns the valley it once fertilized."†

Until 1782, "annual shiploads of families poured themselves out of Belfast and Londonderry, going mostly to America with resentment in their hearts."‡

Here let us pause. At this point, the story of Ireland's industrial ruin assumes an aspect of close connection with the expansion and grandeur of the American people. How many Presidents, Governors of States, Judges, Generals and prominent men in every rank of life, in the history of the Great Republic, are descendants of those Irish families that annually "poured themselves out of Belfast and Londonderry going to America with resentment in their hearts!"

We must now consider Ireland a purely agricultural country,

* Froude, "English in Ireland," Vol. I., p. 446.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

not only on account of her soil and climate, but also because of the destruction of her other industries. It naturally follows that the prosperity of the country at large depends on the condition of the agricultural community.

Agriculture being practically the sole industrial pursuit left to the country, let us see how the Irish peasant is prepared to contend with his Continental rivals in the markets of the world.

The important question of land tenure, although beyond the scope of this article, cannot be ignored in discussing a question of Irish economics.

By the provisions of the Land Act of 1881 and other Acts, a tenant can apply to the Land Court to "fix his rent." The judicial rent so determined by the Land Court is subject to revision every fifteen years; improvements made by the tenant are supposed to be his own property, and he enjoys fixity of tenure as long as he pays the judicial rent. Questions of law, and of the fairness of the constitution and of the decisions of the Land Courts, are, however, continually arising; and, undoubtedly, the solution of the difficulty is the abolition of the system of dual ownership and the establishment of "peasant proprietorship."

As a matter of fact, the Government, by virtue of the Land Purchase Act of 1885, advances the purchase money to the tenant in the event of the landlord and tenant mutually agreeing to sell and buy respectively, the tenant being required to repay the Government by forty-nine yearly installments, with a low rate of interest.

Agriculture, like all other sciences and pursuits, has advanced with the times; education in modern systems is essential for its proper development; organization and business methods are imperative if its pursuit is to be made lucrative.

No more striking exemplification of the utility and necessity of progressive and scientifically directed effort can be found than in the industrial advancement of Denmark, Ireland's principal rival in the produce markets of Europe.

The population of Denmark is 2,200,000. At the end of the last century it was one of the poorest countries in Europe. To-day, it is one of the richest, and its progress in wealth is almost entirely the result of its progress in agriculture.

The three essential factors in the agricultural progress of Denmark are (1.) the highly trained intelligence, resourcefulness,

adaptability, energy and enterprise of the Danish farmer; (2.) the power which is given the Danish farmers by organization; (3.) the effectiveness with which the Government is enabled, chiefly through organization among the farmers, to come to the assistance of their industry with expert advice, technical instruction, and material support.

Unquestionably, the most potent of these factors in Danish prosperity is the second, the power gained by organization, inasmuch as Danish farmers are banded together in various co-operative, voluntary associations or "trusts" for the promotion and development of their common industries. Statistics prove this conclusively. The value of the butter they exported to the United Kingdom in 1893 was \$24,529,165. In 1899 they exported butter to the United Kingdom to the value of \$38,767,180, an increase in six years of \$14,238,015. From 1898 to 1899 there was an increase in the value of butter exported from Denmark of \$2,778,000; an increase in the value of bacon exported of \$1,250,000; and an increase in the value of eggs exported of \$975,000. The annual export of bacon from Denmark is about 200,000,000 pounds in weight.

Irish products once supplied the demand for the above mentioned articles.

Denmark, France, Holland, Belgium, as well as all other civilized countries, possess elaborate Departments of State for Agriculture and Industries, and a remarkable feature of the operations of these various departments is the close association they keep with the voluntary societies of the farmers; in some instances, indeed, the state aid to agriculture is administered through the voluntary associations.

How did Ireland stand prior to 1888? Ireland possessed no Department of State for Agriculture and Industries; there was no organization among farmers for trading purposes; no combination among them for opening up better markets; there were no incentives and no opportunities for raising a superior grade of farm produce; no systems of improvement; no methods of turning farm produce into money save its disposal at the nearest market for whatever price it would fetch. As a trader, the Irish farmer stood isolated, friendless and alone. Day after day, week after week, year after year, he struggled along without advice or help, tilling his land according to the customs of his fathers, dis-

posing of his farming produce in bad markets for bad prices, fighting the battle of life in a "lone hand" fight.

How could the individual Irish farmer—to say nothing of the handicap imposed upon him by the land tenure system—compete with the powerful, organized, educated and state-aided combinations of French, Danish and Belgian agriculturists? The natural results followed; Ireland's trade withered almost entirely from off the face of the earth and her population dwindled by millions. And the awful emigration drain of the nation's life blood still continues; 42,890 people left Ireland in the year 1900!

The years 1888-1889 saw the introduction and establishment of a great movement for the education, organization and improvement of the farming classes, and for the revival of other industries in Ireland. The Right Honorable Horace Curzon Plunkett had made a systematic study of the economic, educational and trading advantages possessed by other countries, and consequently became impressed with a sense of the urgent necessity that existed for equipping his fellow countrymen with qualifications and methods that would enable them to compete, at least on terms of equality, with their trade rivals.

In the year 1889, Mr. Plunkett founded the Irish Agricultural Organization Society, commonly called the I. A. O. S., for the purpose of introducing the principles of organization and co-operation among Irish farmers.

The I. A. O. S. has now about 500 societies established throughout Ireland, with about 50,000 members representing all creeds and classes of the farming population. The principal functions of its staff are: Organizing voluntary associations among the farmers, such as co-operative creameries, agricultural, poultry, flax and home industry societies, agricultural banks, etc.; guiding and assisting with expert advice the operations of such societies; providing courses of lectures; supplying technical instruction; securing superior marketing facilities; disseminating useful information; creating village libraries; conducting agricultural experiments; and, generally, promoting the interests and raising the status, social and economic, of the farmers of Ireland in every possible manner.

The dairy societies, or, as they are called, co-operative creameries, number 252; the butter sales of these creameries for 1900 amounted to \$3,519,130.

Co-operation as applied to the butter trade means that a body of farmers, with the assistance of the I. A. O. S., form themselves into an association or company, secure a suitable building, furnish it with the very best modern machinery for pasteurizing the milk and making the butter, employ trained butter-makers, supply the milk fresh every morning, control the management of the creamery by a committee chosen by themselves of the best business men among them and, finally, share all the profits of their trading transactions.

As an indication of the wonderful success of the Irish co-operative creamery system, the following extracts are quoted from a newspaper article describing the great English Agricultural Show held at the Agricultural Hall, Islington, in October last:

"The exhibits of the Irish co-operative dairies have practically swept the board.

"One of the greatest authorities in England says: 'Three years ago, Irish butter was scarcely fit to eat. To-day, it has attained such a standard and, owing to the methods employed, is so uniform in flavor and type that it can easily compete with the most popular Danish product.' "

So confident are the Irish co-operative people of the excellence of their butter that a \$2,500 challenge has just been issued for a trial test between Irish and Danish butter.

A very important feature of the work of the I. A. O. S. is the establishment of agricultural banks on the plan first introduced into Germany by Dr. Raffeisen in 1849. The system of the agricultural bank may be described shortly as follows: A body of farmers form themselves into a society, and, on their joint security, borrow money from the newly established Department of Agriculture, or from some banking company, at four or five per cent. With the money thus secured, the Committee makes loans to approved applicants at five or six per cent. interest for *productive* purposes only. Until this system was introduced, the poor Irish farmer in need of a little money was obliged to apply to some "gombeen" man, as country money lenders are called, or to some "loan bank," and almost invariably was obliged to pay about thirty per cent. interest on the loan.

All co-operative societies are managed by committees of men who reside in the locality, aided by the best expert advice from the I. A. O. S.

In addition to the material benefits conferred by these so-

cieties, their operations have a great educational effect in all communities where they are established. Farmers learn superior methods and develop business instincts; but, above all the other desirable features possessed by these voluntary associations, undoubtedly their greatest claim for sympathy and admiration is their practical fostering of the great principle of self-help which is their foundation and mainspring.

One of the strictest rules of the co-operative societies is that neither religious nor political affairs shall be introduced, or even adverted to, in connection with the business transacted, and the result of this salutary regulation is to be found in the disappearance of bigotry and intolerance wherever co-operative principles are introduced. Catholics and Protestants work together earnestly and harmoniously for the benefit of the community; and many creameries, especially in the North of Ireland, have been started and organized by the shoulder-to-shoulder exertions of the Catholic priest and the Presbyterian minister.

In the year 1895, Mr. Horace Plunkett organized and convened a committee, consisting of leading Irishmen of all political and religious parties, for the purpose of investigating the economic needs of the country, of ascertaining the superior advantages possessed by other countries, and endeavoring to secure similar advantages for the Irish people by means of the establishment of a state-aided Department of Agriculture and Industries. The investigating body thus constituted was called the Recess Committee, and the result of its labors was the production of a report which is the standard authority on the economic position of Ireland at the present time.

The demand for governmental aid in the effort to develop the resources of Ireland was not long in eliciting a favorable response; indeed, the policy of Mr. A. J. Balfour and of Mr. Gerald Balfour has been, on social and economic questions, a policy of progress and material improvement.

The Agriculture and Technical Instruction Act (Ireland), 1899, established a state Department for Agriculture and Industries, and provided about \$1,000,000 a year for those objects. The expenditure of this money is controlled by two boards, principally consisting of elected representatives, the Board of Agriculture and the Board of Technical Instruction.

A Council of Agriculture, consisting of two representatives

from every county council in Ireland, with additional members nominated by the Department, is also constituted for the purpose of discussing all matters of public interest in connection with any of the purposes of the Act, and advising the Department.

It would be impossible to enumerate all the duties and functions performed by the Department. Among many others we may mention the following schemes already put in operation by the Agricultural Board: The improvement of the breeding of horses, cattle and live stock; the prevention and cure of disease; the proper transit of live stock and farm produce on trains and steamships; the revival and extension of the flax trade; the introduction of superior agricultural education; the collection and publication of statistics; the development of the butter, cheese and bee-keeping industries; the prevention of the ravages of injurious insects; the introduction of better-class seeds and the testing and analysis of same; the dissemination of information by pamphlets, etc.

The establishment of technical schools in the urban districts throughout the country is occupying the attention of the Board of Technical Instruction.

The interests of the sea fisheries are under the control of the Board of Agriculture, and include the construction of piers, the supply of fishing boats and gear, and the encouragement of any industries connected with fishing.

The officials of the Department are always ready and desirous to receive suggestions and assistance of every kind in any of their efforts to introduce improvement.

The adoption of the provisions of the Agriculture and Technical Instruction Act throughout Ireland rests with the local authorities; many of the county councils are adopting systems of employment of itinerant instructors on agricultural subjects, combined with the establishment of experimental plots. Itinerant instructors on the breeding and rearing of poultry are also at work throughout the country. All the county councils of Ireland, save two, have taken advantage of improvement schemes for the breeding of horses, cattle and live stock promulgated by the Department of Agriculture.

The application of the benefits of the Agriculture and Technical Instruction Act is limited by one restriction, but that restriction is in itself the embodiment of a noble principle, the principle of self-help; the Department cannot, except under ex-

ceptional circumstances, apply any of the funds at its disposal for the purposes of the act, to any scheme that is not locally supported. Self-help is the genesis of the voluntary association system, the "condition precedent" to the reception of state aid.

Such is the story of the commercial and industrial downfall of Ireland and its causes, of the revival movement and its methods. We have considered the changing of the old order and the reincarnation of a spirit of manly effort and of progress among her people; we have learned of England's efforts to atone for the cruel wrong done by the extinction of Ireland's industries, and of the provision made for the industrial regeneration of the country; we see convincing proofs that the farmers of Ireland possess intelligence, resourcefulness, adaptability, energy and enterprise when these latent faculties are trained and scientifically developed.

The new movement is founded on common sense and, in its progressive aspect, is in perfect accord with the exigencies of existence in the twentieth century. The difficulties and obstacles that still obstruct the course of progress are great. Ireland's trade rivals have had a long start in the possession of superior methods and educational systems. The measure of success already attained under the new order of things, however, is a forecast of future triumphs.

We may look forward to a day at no very distant date, when Ireland, without negation or abatement of political demands, but with commerce increased, industries revived and trade developed, may take her proper place in the markets of the world with honor to herself and material prosperity among her people.

MICHAEL J. MAGEE.

NEED OF A PERMANENT CENSUS OFFICE.

BY WILLIAM R. MERRIAM, DIRECTOR OF THE TWELFTH CENSUS.

THE writer was placed in charge of the work of the Twelfth Census by President McKinley in March, 1899. The property he inherited from the Eleventh Census consisted of an old typewriter, much out of repair, a horse of doubtful age, a wagon practically useless, an old cart, a few scattered papers and records, a large number—something over 128,000—of census reports which had never been placed in the hands of the public, and a few odds and ends of office furniture. This was the sum total of the visible official remains of the Eleventh Census Bureau; all that was left of the plant after the expenditure of more than eleven million dollars. No one could be reasonably charged with blame in the matter. It was simply the result of a system. It was the old story of an emergency work.

The Director of the Twelfth Census was expected, in the fifteen months' time allowed before the date set for the enumeration, to organize completely and train thoroughly the force required to carry into effect the provisions of the act creating the Office. With practically no data to guide him, and assisted by few of the employees who had worked under Superintendent Porter, he was expected to prepare all the necessary blanks; to secure suitable quarters; to examine a host of applicants from whom he was to select a competent clerical force of three thousand six hundred people; to suggest names to the President for three hundred supervisors; to designate suitable persons to take the census in Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands; to choose over fifty-five thousand enumerators, making such examination of the applicants by means of test schedules as was deemed desirable to prove their competency; to ascertain the qualification of, and appoint, twenty-five hundred special agents to collect industrial statistics; and, above all things, to select experts of acknowledged character,

ability and experience to command this vast force properly; to instruct these individuals in their work; and, finally, to accomplish the mandate of Congress that the nine quarto volumes constituting four principal reports upon population, manufactures, agriculture and vital statistics should be in the hands of the American people by the first day of July, 1902. This undertaking would have been much easier had the Director been able to draw on a force of men of experience in statistical work. Fortunately, he was able to obtain the services of a few of the experts employed in the Eleventh Census. Without their aid it is doubtful whether compliance with the law would have been possible.

It is no easy task to find a man in the full vigor of life who is trained as an expert in statistical lines, and who, at the same time, possesses the executive ability to utilize efficiently the large clerical force necessary to perform the enormous amount of work required within a limited time. The Chief Statistician for Population, Mr. W. C. Hunt, possesses not only a thorough knowledge of statistical work, but also administrative powers of a high order, which enable him to employ profitably two thousand men and women. The Chief Statistician for Agriculture, Mr. L. G. Powers, was expected to organize a force of about thirteen hundred people, required to examine the schedules for 5,750,000 farms, and classify these farms according to size, crops grown and their value, conditions under which they were held—whether owned or rented—the financial results of each farm, live-stock, and other information.

The work of the Twelfth Census is sufficiently well advanced to indicate that the requirements of Congress, so far as the date of the completion of the principal reports is concerned, will be complied with. This will enable the officials of the Census Office to place in the hands of the public the nine volumes on Population, Manufactures, Agriculture and Vital Statistics about three and one-half years earlier than heretofore.

The use of the Hollerith electrical tabulating machines has enabled the Director to finish his task in the time allotted. This would not have been possible if it had been necessary to do the work by hand.

It may be interesting to know that the number of cards which have been run through these electrical tabulating machines is the equivalent of one card run through 672,800,000 times. This

will give a faint idea of the vast amount of labor involved in the different branches of this stupendous statistical undertaking.

The clerical force was appointed and organized with a view to finishing the task well within the prescribed period, but had the writer and his statisticians possessed the experience which has come to them as a result of the last two years' labors, a very large saving could have been effected, not only in time, but also in the number of people employed. There were absolutely no records in the office to indicate the period that would be required for any portion of the work, or the probable cost. This lack of records has greatly hampered the statistical work of the Censús Office. It may be stated, however, that a complete history of every important transaction relating to the Twelfth Census has been prepared and placed in the library of the Census Office for use in the future, so that the official responsible for the work of the Thirteenth Census will have the benefit of the experience of those who had charge of the Twelfth.

The writer has referred to the "assets" turned over to him at the organization of the Twelfth Census Office; that calls to mind the fact that the furniture and fixtures of the present Office, including a modern printing office, are worth \$100,000. These would be practically lost in the event of the disruption of the present organization. The near approach of the completion of the principal reports, and of the consequent disintegration of the force, has furnished occasion for renewing the demand that the Census Office be made permanent. To close this office would be very much like destroying a cotton mill when there has been an overproduction of cloth. No sane person would think of razing the building, discharging the experts and dissipating the records of a commercial institution, simply because there was a temporary lack of demand for the particular article produced; and yet this is what has occurred decennially in the census bureau. It has been necessary to rebuild the whole structure at great cost and with much effort, a large part of which at least would have been unnecessary had the organization been continuous.

The idea of a permanent census bureau is not a new one. The establishment of a permanent office was first advocated in 1888 by General Francis A. Walker, Superintendent of the Ninth and Tenth Censuses. Speaking of his own experience and of the difficulty of collecting and digesting the data, he said:

"What is eminently to be desired in the interests of our statistical service is that the census should be confined to an enumeration of population, coupled only with one other class of statistics, to be hereafter mentioned, such an enumeration to be conducted once in ten years, as now, or better, once in five years, as befits so great and rapidly growing a people; while the remaining statistical inquiries now connected with the census, and even many others required to meet the increasing demand for exact knowledge, should be set on foot and conducted in proper succession, by the same bureau of the Government, during the intervals of the decennial or quinquennial censuses. Such a system would dispense with the necessity for suddenly raising and suddenly disbanding a large office; would retain permanently in service a considerable force of trained clerks, enabling them to acquire skill, insight, and rapidity of working by continuous experience; and would thus at once diminish the cost and increase the value of the results obtained."

From the time when General Walker began the discussion, it has not ceased to be a question of public interest and one which has been more or less agitated in Congress. Hon. Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor, in the *Popular Science Monthly* for November, 1891, expressed his substantial agreement with the views of his predecessor, in the language quoted below:

"The very worst form [feature] of the present system is the temporary nature of the service. . . . The first step toward correction lies in the direction of the establishment of a permanent census office, under which there ought to be a constant force of trained and experienced statistical clerks, and the collection of facts [should be] distributed over the ten years, instead of being crowded into a few months. . . . This would involve the employment constantly of a much reduced office force, and a field force, except for the enumeration of the population, gradually becoming more and more skillful. The expense during the whole ten years would be somewhat larger than is now involved, but the results would be of such infinitely greater value, that the increased expense would not be a matter for a moment's consideration."

Superintendent Porter, who, in the judgment of the writer, accomplished very satisfactory results in the Eleventh Census, considering the many difficulties which surrounded him, prepared a very voluminous report upon the subject of a permanent census office, and went so far as to draft a bill embodying the essential provisions. Mr. Porter referred particularly to the lack of sufficient time for preparation for the task. He advocated certain other reforms which, had they been adopted, undoubtedly would have proved useful. In Mr. Porter's report were embodied expressions of opinion from eminent statisticians in this country and

in Europe, officers of commercial organizations, State commissioners of agriculture, officers of State agricultural and horticultural societies, directors of agricultural experiment stations, commissioners of State labor bureaus, officers of boards of health and educational and benevolent institutions and from bishops and prominent churchmen, favoring the permanency of the Census Office.

General Walker thought that a permanent establishment would prove economical in the way of "preventing errors and getting more for your money," and he expressed the conviction that the chiefs and expert special agents need opportunity for more careful reflection in order to perfect the service, and that this is one of the most weighty arguments in favor of the proposed change. The writer is thoroughly in accord with General Walker's view. The work of preparation is simply one of a hurried physical performance, the limited time allowing the experts no opportunity for consideration of improved methods. There is no time to think, but merely to work. I quote General Walker again:

"When the next census is in preparation, two or three years should be allowed for the men to be getting their sheets up, or putting their heads together, looking over the results of past work, seeing where they have made mistakes, because no man ever worked without making mistakes, and there never was a man who would not do a certain work twenty or thirty per cent better the second time." The facts contained in the schedules "can be combined in almost infinite relations, and to statisticians and economists it is often true that the statistics which attract least popular interest are the most significant and instructive. A comparatively small trained force could work on that kind of material to an extent impossible where you have only half-trained clerks."

The Commissioner of Labor, Hon. Carroll D. Wright, said:

"No man, I do not care how great he is, how great a statistician or how great an administrator, can take a census creditably to himself or to the Federal Government under the present system. It can not be done." "Our regular army is small, but it is the skeleton of a great organization. It should be so with the census office. The constant bringing in of raw men for statistical work does more damage to statistical accuracy and to the science of statistics than any one element."

Some years ago the Census Committee of the House of Representatives took testimony as to the advisability of a permanent census bureau, and in February, 1893, filed a report of which the following is an extract. It states the necessities of the case

in succinct form and shows the situation just as it exists at the present time:

"Your committee is of the opinion that the field of operation of the census office is so broad, and such a wide range of subjects are now embraced by the several branches of inquiry, that it is impossible to do them full justice with any organization possible under existing law. To accomplish the work now undertaken by the decennial census requires a force so large as to be unwieldy, and which it is impossible to form of proper material. Were the bureau so organized that its work would be continuous, the force required would be comparatively small, and competent statisticians and specialists could be secured for the service. It is also of opinion that the amount of money needed to carry on such a continuous bureau, distributing its work through the ten-year periods, would be materially less than the amount which would be necessary to take the census under the present system; and that, in addition, the work of collection and compilation of the returns would be more accurately and satisfactorily performed, and the results obtained would be of greater value."

As I write, the faces of five Superintendents look down upon me. They include all but one of those who have had charge of the census work during the past five decades. Mr. Kennedy was the first Superintendent, in 1850, and Mr. Carroll D. Wright was the last, in 1893. The average period of service of each man was less than four and a half years. It can be well said that no one Superintendent was permitted to serve long enough to gain sufficient experience to be of real service in directing the work of the bureau. Our plan, so far as continuity in office is concerned, is quite different from that of foreign countries. Seven statisticians in as many countries in Europe have been conspicuous in statistical and census work for periods varying from sixteen to forty-two years. Austria, England, the German Empire, Hungary and Italy have the services of men of long years of experience in statistical work. The average length of service for the chief statisticians residing in the countries indicated above has been about twenty-four years—a result quite different from that of our own system, so far as continuance in office is concerned. Indeed, since the present office was organized we have lost a number of valued experts owing to the uncertainty of the continuance of the office. Two of our expert statisticians have withdrawn to accept permanent positions elsewhere. Other important officers, out of pure devotion to the work, after almost insistent pressure on the part of the Director, have declined invitations to accept more remunerative positions. It is unnecessary to state that these

frequent changes in officers occupying high places create a feeling of uncertainty and impair the general efficiency. In a bureau charged with expending a yearly average of \$1,500,000, and \$9,000,000 a year as a maximum, it would be extravagant to cast to the winds the experience of the executive heads after the Government has paid so dearly for it.

• The conversion of the Census Office into a permanent branch of governmental service would insure the retention of the most capable and efficient members of the force, as a skeleton organization and a nucleus for future operations. It would provide a career, moreover, for those who desire to follow statistical work as a life vocation. As a matter of fact, the study of statistics, as a branch of learning in the great collegiate institutions of the country, has been taken up only within the last few years. The many young men who have devoted themselves more especially to the consideration of statistical inquiries would be afforded ample opportunity for the prosecution of their chosen life-work, which is now denied them because of the uncertainty of service. The Government would undoubtedly be the gainer by the employment of young men who have had technical training. In 1800 no country possessed an organization for collecting information on the subject of agriculture, manufactures or vital statistics. In fact, none of our foreign brothers had made any provision for a count of population at regular intervals. By the end of the century all the great civilized countries had provided for regular investigations into matters pertaining to national life and activity. These investigations have reached their highest perfection in our own land. The founders of the Republic evidently had no conception of what a census would mean at the beginning of the twentieth century. From a mere enumeration of population for the purpose of Congressional apportionment it has become a great national work, a photograph of the national characteristics, showing the industrial progress, sociological conditions and wonderful resources of soil, as well as other facts incident to a high order of civilization. The proper presentation of this great mass of information necessarily requires a trained force, and, as the years go by, the necessity will become greater in this regard.

• After practical experience in the work of the Census Office, Prof. W. F. Willcox, of Cornell University, a Chief Statistician of the Twelfth Census, declares in a recent report that it is only

through a permanent census office that the Government and country can profit adequately by the experience of the organizing and directing heads; and that only through a permanent census office can the necessary system of voluntary co-operation with State, county and city offices and private organizations be developed and maintained.

"Only a permanent census," writes Mr. Horace Wadlin, Chief of the Labor Bureau of the State of Massachusetts, "can possibly insure a trained force of expert statisticians." If the century just completed "was the statistical century *par excellence*," as Sir Robert Giffen declares, its successor will far surpass it, not only in labor, caused by increasing population, but by the extent and variety of the statistics demanded. The question, therefore, of a permanent census office has ceased to be academic and theoretical, as it was when it was first proposed by General Walker, and is now practical and pressing. Each decade presents problems of more magnitude than its predecessors; there are more people to count, more industries to report, more farms to inventory, and more diseases and deaths to chronicle. In 1910 we may confidently expect to enroll one hundred millions of souls. This will include Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines and Porto Rico. To count all of Uncle Sam's children, not only in North America but in the islands of the sea, will require an enormous force, and great skill and wide experience to direct it.

The early censuses were tabulated by hand, but thirty years ago it became clearly evident that a point would soon be reached when it would be impossible to tabulate the returns of a census by such rudimentary methods within the limits of a decade. This point was reached and mechanical tabulation became a necessity. So, in the more general subject of census organization, it also became evident that there must be a point where vast population, extent of territory and diversity of subjects considered, would make it impossible to comply with the law, through the instrumentality of a hastily organized and temporary census office. In the opinion of those best informed that point is close at hand, and the attempt to complete the Thirteenth Census under existing conditions, within the time allotted by the present act, may well cause hesitation on the part of any man, however well equipped he may be or highly endowed with vigor.

WILLIAM R. MERRIAM.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH-AMERICAN SHORE.

BY P. T. M'GRATH, EDITOR OF THE "EVENING HERALD," ST. JOHN'S,
NEWFOUNDLAND.

It will probably occasion no little surprise to American readers to learn that the famous "French Shore" of Newfoundland is really an American shore as well, and that an adjustment of the dispute concerning the coast line possesses a direct and vital interest for the people of the United States. The international entanglement identified with this "French Shore" is taking on an acute phase just now, through the lapsing at New Year of the *modus vivendi* governing the fishery on the coast, which arrangement the Colonial Ministry is unwilling to renew, throwing the responsibility for further action upon the British and French Governments, which are at present engaged in an endeavor to compass a settlement of the whole difficulty that has now existed for nearly two hundred years.

The right to participate in the fisheries on the Western fore-shore of Newfoundland is enjoyed by three nations, Great Britain, France and the United States—a condition of things which is without a parallel in the world to-day. The rights possessed by France extend around to a portion of the northeast coast, passing out through the Straits of Belle Isle and down to Cape John; and, in a similar manner, the United States exercises the right of fishing on the southwest shore, from Cape Ray east to Ramea. The extraordinary and anomalous position is thus presented that Great Britain has to share the fisheries on the northeast coast with one great Power, and on the southwest coast with another, while on the west coast, considered by itself, both of them compete with her.

It may tend towards a more intelligent grasp of the situation

if the rights of the respective Powers are briefly detailed, in their chronological order.

The island of Newfoundland was discovered by Cabot in 1497, while on a voyage from England. It was annexed by Sir Humphrey Gilbert for the British Crown in 1583, was gradually settled by emigrants from Devonshire, and was governed as a dependency from early in the seventeenth century. A noted fishing region even in those days, its rugged shores were braved by the hardy seafarers from the West of England, and the value of its products was recognized in the rude chronicles of the Elizabethan period, being described as "richer than the gold mines of Peru." Britain exercises sovereignty over the whole island, and fishery rights over its seaboard, by the title of ownership and possession, and by the express terms of the several treaties between herself and France during the past two centuries, the latter country having been her unsuccessful antagonist in the wars which were waged for the mastery of the island.

By the Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, amplified and amended by the similar instruments executed at Paris in 1763 and at Versailles in 1783, the full sovereignty of Newfoundland was ceded to Great Britain, but to France was given the right to catch and dry fish upon the aforementioned portions of its coast; to build temporary huts and stages for cleaning and curing the fish, and to occupy the Miquelon Isles, off the southern coast of Newfoundland, as French territory, to be used as a real shelter for the fishermen of that nationality frequenting the region.

The right which the American colonies possessed, up to the time of their throwing off the British authority, of fishing in all the North Atlantic waters was continued to them after the War of Independence, and was exercised by them until 1812, when the rupture of friendly relations deprived them of it. Quarrels resulting from the attempts of the United States fishermen to continue in the pursuit, the Convention of 1818 was agreed to, which gave them the right to take fish of every kind on the south-west and west coasts of this island, and to dry and cure this fish on the unsettled parts of the southern seaboard, said right to cease on any portion of it as soon as such portion of the coast became peopled, unless the previous consent of the inhabitants could be procured. The United States renounced any fishery rights or claims to take, dry or cure fish in any other portion of

British North America, save on these sections of our coast line and a few other localities specified in detail.

The above epitome serves to show two things—the very great importance the other Powers attached to the right of taking fish in the waters of Newfoundland, and the very slight store which the British Government set upon the possession of one-third of the entire coast line of the island so recently as eighty years ago. The besetting sin of Imperial administrators in dealing with the colony—ignorance of its circumstances and indifference to its possibilities—is here abundantly exposed. The truism that “what England gains by the sword she loses by diplomacy” finds an apt illustration in the case of Newfoundland. Concessions were secured by all comers, and the prospect of the colony ever developing other resources, the exploitation of which might be resisted by the nations possessing fishery rights on the seaboard, was never given a thought. France and the United States, secure in the enjoyment of their treaty concessions, undertook to utilize them to the fullest possible extent. Newfoundland, as may be seen from the map, almost encloses the Gulf of St. Lawrence, two entrances only existing, Belle Isle Strait, on the north, about twenty miles wide at its narrowest point, and Cabot Strait, on the south, with a width of sixty miles. The gulf thus takes the form of an enclosed basin, blocked for some five months each year with great ice-floes, which render the fishing season along the west coast of Newfoundland both short and precarious. Consequently, the French conducted their major operations on the northeast coast, and the Americans made the southwest littoral their headquarters, both in time largely depleting the adjacent waters of any fishes of commercial or economic value. So unremunerative has the fishery on the former coast line become that on the two hundred miles of foreshore which it comprises the French maintained only two fishing stations during the past season, and even these met with such poor success that it is probable they will abandon it altogether next year. On the southwest coast the Americans no longer exercise their rights at all. The codfish they practically extirpated, and the settlers who made their homes in this quarter, bent on the same pursuit, in time forced them off the shore by appropriating the best locations. The settlement of the coast deprives the Americans of the power of drying fish there, and hence they only frequent it nowadays

for the purpose of procuring bait, which they purchase from the residents, as they do not themselves carry the appliances for netting this essential.

The practical value of these two strips of seashore being, therefore, of no account, it is clear that the seat of the present industrial operations of the fishermen of the three countries, and the theatre of any possible future international difficulty, must be the western water front of the island, and, that being the case, it is best to approach the consideration of that aspect of the matter by examining the value of the relative tenures of the men in possession. Great Britain, in the first place, claims not alone the widest and most comprehensive rights as to fishing, but also, as owner of the island, the power to develop the hinterland of this western slope, the resources of which are said to be both varied and valuable. Her claim does not seem an extravagant one, when her title to the ownership of the territory is taken into consideration.

But right at this juncture arises the much-vexed question of "French rights." As previously explained, the French have the right to catch fish in the territorial waters of the coast (the off-shore waters being free to all), and to dry it on the strand, maintain temporary structures on the coast for the latter purpose, and cut wood in the forests to construct these erections. It would seem that no ambiguity could be possible in this respect, for the provisions are clear; but, strangely enough, the key to the gravity of the problem now taxing the statesmanship of England and France is afforded by the simple query: "What is meant by the word fish, as used in the treaties?"

"Codfish," say the British; "the only fish known, caught and of value in the region at the time the treaties were made, and therefore the only fish which could have been meant by those who framed the treaties; furthermore, the only fish which is dried and cured by exposure on stages on the beach, as the process is detailed in the treaties."

The French repudiate this construction and maintain that every fish or marine animal found on the coast comes within the meaning of the treaty terms. On the strength of their contention they have set up substantial permanent factories and gone into the business of canning lobsters, an enlargement of the treaty privileges which the British maintain is altogether unwarranted

by the language of the instruments. But that represents only the first issue upon which there is a disagreement. The second lies in the French contention that their fishery privileges are exclusive, or to be enjoyed by them alone, while the British argument is that these rights are merely concurrent, with the colonists participating on the same basis, saving only that they are not to interfere with the Frenchmen by their competition. The British Monarch attached to the Treaty of Versailles, in 1783, a private declaration that he would use his best efforts to prevent his subjects hampering those of his brother of France, who on his part pledged himself that the Miquelon Isles should never become an object of jealousy between the two nations. On the strength of the former declaration the French set up their claim to exclusive rights of fishing, and to the uninterrupted use of the strand for half a mile from high water around the whole eight hundred miles of coast comprised in the disputed territory. The French have still further complicated the original issues by constantly enlarging their demands and asserting new claims, putting forward the most vexatious and unfounded pretensions; and the British authorities, regardless of parties or policies, have invariably acquiesced in the propositions advanced by the French, though nominally refusing to subscribe to them. The British Empire has never been in a position, in recent years, when British rights could be adequately asserted here without risk of precipitating war with France, and to avoid this until in a position to force her own views, England is obliged to tamely submit to French dictation in this quarter.

Repeated attempts have been made to settle the question, but as they have always been characterized by a sacrifice of the colony's rights by the British plenipotentiaries, and as the colony is entitled to decide whether the terms are satisfactory or not, she has invariably rejected them. The practice of the British Foreign Office has been to entrust the negotiations to Under-Secretaries who have never seen Newfoundland. The French, on the contrary, choose an Admiral who has served on the disputed coast. Therefore the potential prospect of France's getting the best of the bargain is always assured, and the colony vetoes the draft arrangement.

Not until Mr. Chamberlain took charge of the Colonial Office was there a British Minister who seemed to realize what was

due by him and his colleagues to the oldest colony of the Empire; and one of his first acts was to despatch to this island a Royal Commission of Inquiry to investigate the whole question of French rights and obtain official data as to the actual condition of affairs on the Treaty Coast. These Commissioners found that the total catch of cod by the French on the seaboard over which their rights extend did not exceed 15,000 quintals in a season, a quantity which would not make more than a cargo for one tramp steamer to carry to market. The whole French personnel on the coast was under 600, stationed in sixteen harbors and fishing within well-defined limits, so that the resident fishermen caused them no inconvenience. The French also canned about 16,000 cases of lobsters, in addition to their catch of cod, having ten canneries in operation. Yet, in the face of their small and declining occupation of the coast, in the face of the shrinkage of their industries from twenty-five years ago, when they had 130 stations on the coast and an annual catch of 350,000 quintals of cod, they were found by the Commissioners to be hampering the industries of the settlers and enforcing their autocratic pretensions to the same extravagant extent as ever. British warships were at their beck and call, to drive the cod-catcher off his fishing ground so that the Frenchman might occupy it, or to harry the lobster-man who was canning in defiance of the infamous *modus vivendi* executed in 1890, which penalized a perfectly legitimate industry and put it in the power of British naval officers to banish their fellow-subjects from their own soil. The Commissioners further found that the opening of any mines was forbidden, because such might interfere with the French fishery. For the same reason a wharf was not permitted to be built on the coast, and more than one has been torn down by the warships. Only last season, to refute the charge of the French Commodore that a certain building, erected on the strand, was a sedentary structure, the British commander had to land a party of bluejackets, put rollers under the building, and move it some distance. The mining, homestead and timber leases granted for the coast all contain a clause that they are issued "subject to the French Treaty rights."

The Commissioners made a cruise around the coast, to find that the French, in blank defiance of the treaties, which prohibited them from any permanent occupation of the shore, had

erected stables and storehouses at one point, where they kept cattle and supplies for the use of their warships, and at other centres had established stores, by means of which they trafficked with the settlers, smuggling great quantities of goods and liquors from St. Pierre in their fishing schooners. By this means they demoralized the legitimate trade of the resident dealers, who were obliged to pay duties to the Newfoundland Customs. The French had, at various other harbors along the coast, seized upon the lands and fishing stations of the settlers, who could secure no legal redress for their dispossession. They had, again, sent boats from their warships time after time to cut up the nets of the settlers whom they regarded as interfering with the French trawlers. They had overhauled the Newfoundland vessels in territorial waters, by means of launches from the French cruisers, and compelled them to show their official papers. They had published proclamations in several harbors, enunciating the priority of French rights and threatening severe penalties upon all violators thereof. They had summarily ejected prospectors and compelled capitalists to abandon valuable mines in despair of being able to work them. They had been persecuting the settlers in every conceivable manner, terrorizing the unlettered population by their assumption of authority and the ready aid given them by the British warships, asserting the most arrogant pretensions, and exercising sovereign rights on a coast where, really, they were only permitted to fish during the summer months. In a word, they were found to be persistently and flagrantly violating the treaties, trusting to the license which had been permitted them in the past, and to what they thought the "backboneless policy" of the British Ministry to carry them through and prevent an outburst of indignation on the part of the aggrieved Power such as would have been the outcome of the exposure in any other country.

But the French made a great mistake when they counted upon the acquiescence of Mr. Chamberlain in their proceedings, for as soon as the Commissioners returned to England and laid before him an outline of their work and findings, he began a vigorous platform crusade against the intolerable conditions created by the French occupation of the coast. He berated the interlopers in a series of speeches, in which he asserted that France was adopting a pin-prick policy, was strangling the commerce of the colony without deriving any benefit whatever from such a course

herself. He adopted his characteristic method; instead of enunciating diplomatic platitudes, he strongly and aggressively outlined the case for the two countries, and warned France that she must be prepared to quit ere long, on a basis of compensation in money or territory elsewhere. This unexpected attitude on the part of a British Minister precipitated a complete change of policy by France. She as good as subscribed to the doctrine laid down by Mr. Chamberlain. Admiral Reveillere, who commanded on this station some years ago, was put forward to declare, by a letter to the *Paris Matin* (the letter being undoubtedly written with the sanction of the Government), that "the French shore is no longer of any value to France," while Marc Landry, the well-known writer, declared "that the fishing rights of the Republic in Newfoundland waters are not worth the shedding of the blood of a single French seaman." In view of these and other utterances of like effect, it is clear that France is at last coming to see the question in its true light, though the prolongation of the South African war has made it impossible for Great Britain to push forward proposals for a settlement of the whole dispute in all its different aspects.

The British idea is to effect an agreement with France for a renunciation of her rights in this region, France to be paid in cash for giving up her Treaty coast liberties, and to be granted some territorial equivalent elsewhere for ceding up to England the Miquelon Isles, which form the base of operations for the whole Gallic fishing industry in North America, whether on the coast of Newfoundland or on the great submarine banks to which it gives its name, and which are the home of the finest codfish in the world. It is as a depot for procuring bait with which to carry on this bank fishery, and as a base for supplies and shelter, that the French mainly use these Miquelon Isles, the capital of which is St. Pierre, and it is over the preventing of the Frenchmen from obtaining the bait from our littoral waters that one of the most acrimonious disputes subsidiary to this main French shore question arose, threatening to involve the two nations in war more than once, owing to the friction occurring each spring between the rival fishermen.

It now becomes proper to consider the rights which the Americans possess on the west coast. These are quite clear and well defined, for, profiting by the bitter experience which the am-

biguity of the treaties with France caused, the first article of the Convention of 1818 stipulated that "the inhabitants of the United States shall have, forever, in common with the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, the liberty to take *fish of every kind* on that part of the coast of Newfoundland, etc." The American right is therefore "concurrent," it exists for all time, and it applies to every kind of fish. It is a concession of rare commercial value, and if the fisheries were conducted upon any kind of scientific basis, and with judicious regulations calculated to perpetuate the fish life of the North Atlantic, it would provide an unfailing mine of wealth for the New England fishermen. Even as it is, it is the existence of this right to fish in Newfoundland waters which renders it possible for the deep-sea fisheries of which Massachusetts is the centre to be prosecuted with success, for it is the bait obtained in Newfoundland harbors which forms the indispensable requisite for carrying on the great cod, haddock and halibut fisheries of the Grand Banks, which are so vividly pictured in Kipling's "Captains Courageous." The herring is the best bait fish known; and, besides being in large demand as an article of food, it forms the foundation of the operations of every American fishing vessel. The herrings first appear on the west coast in the early fall, and a fleet of about fifty American vessels conveys cargoes of 1,000 barrels each to the home markets, where they are eagerly bought up by the scores of deep-sea fishing schooners which ply their calling on the banks, especially the Georges and Southern ledges, the whole winter through. Later the herring make their way around to Placentia and Fortune Bays, on the south coast, where the American "herringers" follow them, and as the taking of the fishes calls for costly seines which the vessels do not find it profitable to carry, the colony permits them to purchase what herring they require from the coast folk at a stated figure per barrel, which makes this a paying winter industry for her own people. The Americans also find it a very lucrative venture, for the French are not on the coast at this season, and so there is no interference from them or warship patrols to spoil the "hauls" of herring.

But in the spring the Americans have not the same good fortune. At this season Bay St. George, sixty miles from Cape Ray, is the herring centre, the fishes coming in there to spawn. The prosecution of the bank fishery is then at its height, and

herrings for bait are then the great desideratum, and French, American, Canadian and Newfoundland vessels gather there, sometimes to the number of 100 sail or more. The French here maintain their prior, or exclusive, rights, claiming to take the herrings before any other fishermen, and without any interference from them. A British warship is always stationed in the bay when the baiting season begins, and she invariably upholds the French in their contention. Some years ago a tentative agreement was made by the two Commodores to the effect that the French should forego their right to net herrings on condition that the settlers supply them with what quantity they required, at the maximum price of one dollar a barrel. In accordance with this understanding, the British gunboats compel the resident herring-catchers to bait the French vessels at whatever price they are willing to pay, and not a herring is permitted to be put on board a vessel of any other nationality, even if paying a higher price, until all the Frenchmen in port have been supplied. For instance: A French vessel offers thirty cents a barrel for herrings (and unless they are very scarce the French never give any more), while an American offers one dollar; the settler dare not supply the American until he has previously satisfied the Frenchman's wants. Should a settler seek to evade the rules by baiting the American after nightfall, he is often detected by the naval patrol boats, and his skiff-load of herring is thrown overboard as a punishment, or he is haled before the British Commander and threatened with the direst penalties if he again attempts to pursue this means of securing a livelihood. Should the herrings have actually been put on board an interdicted vessel, armed boats are sent to her and the skipper is compelled to give up the fish, the settler being forced, at the same time, to refund the money received therefor. Each year supplies its quota of incidents like these, of wholly unwarranted interference with the rights of American citizens, of attempts to prevent the exercise of independent trading privileges by the fishermen of a nation to whom the fullest liberties were conceded by the Power which claims, and should efficiently exercise, the sovereignty of the region.

Of course, all these proceedings have not a shadow of legality, and in the past two years the Americans have refused to be trodden under foot, as was the practice previously. That the French claim to exclusive fishing rights is baseless is proved by the fact

that, in spite of the French treaties made in 1783, Great Britain ceded the Americans full rights in 1818. The American fishermen do not realize their power on that coast. If a resolute skipper would bring a herring seine from Gloucester and let it down into the water at Bay St. George he could defy the warships to touch him, and would do more to bring the whole question to a head than all the *pourparlers* of diplomats in a decade. Twenty years ago some Gloucester skippers caused an entanglement in Fortune Bay over the seining of herring, which cost the British Government \$100,000 as compensation. The wonder is that the same policy has not long ere this been put into effect on the Treaty Coast, as the American vessels are often delayed so long in obtaining herring that they meet very heavy losses.

To them, therefore, a settlement of the question of French rights on the coast will be very welcome, as it will enable them to avail themselves without hindrance of the concession really most valuable to them. As matters are at present, no one knows when some new and preposterous claim will be advanced by the French the effect of which may be to stultify the rights conceded to the United States by the Convention of 1818. The French are every year becoming fewer, and their final departure from the shore would be hailed with delight by all. Their occupation of it has blasted the prospects of the fairest quarter of the island, impoverished a large section of its population and kept the people in perpetual ferment and unrest, besides endangering the commercial stability of the island and the profitable pursuit of a large industry by its people.

On the other hand, the people of Newfoundland cannot afford to risk any interruption of their friendly relations with the Americans, who are their best customers. Open-hearted and generous-handed, it is scarcely surprising that they should be welcome where the French are barely endured. The presence of the one means peace and prosperity; the continuance of the obsolete "rights" of the other renders it certain that the vexatious controversies of the past will be continued in the future. The privileges which the Americans possess are condensed into a demand for bait, which the people of Newfoundland are glad to supply; the liberties which the French outrage are used so as to cripple every industry along a whole seaboard, settled by 14,000 colonists.

P. T. McGRATH.

THE PUBLIC DEBT OF RUSSIA.

BY ARTHUR RAFFALOVICH, AGENT IN FRANCE OF THE RUSSIAN
MINISTER OF FINANCE.

I.

RUSSIA'S general situation has greatly improved of late years. This is true not only in regard to her territory, to her population, which now numbers over 126,000,000, and to her natural wealth, developed or latent. Other factors have contributed to strengthen her prestige. The influence exercised by Russia is one eminently pacific. The progress made by Russia in the domain of industry, in the working of her great coal and mineral beds—an activity which gives a truly American aspect to certain regions in her vast territory—has been rendered possible by this policy of external peace. Foreign capital has played an important part in this development, in this evolution from purely agricultural interests toward other branches of activity. This capital has been attracted by the high rate of remuneration which it could obtain in Russian industrial centres; its entry into the country was facilitated by the monetary reform, which tended above all to give stability to Russian money and has replaced the paper standard by that of gold. The policy of protection has also played its part in the rapid creation of Russian industry.

Energetic efforts have been made to increase the number of railroads in the country, to cover it with a tighter network, and also to unite it with the Pacific coast by an unbroken iron ribbon crossing Siberia and Manchuria. Every necessity of the life of a nation finds its expression in the Budget, which is the reflection of present needs and of the general economic condition, and also has its part in the heritage of the past. Thus the study of the public finance of a country is not so dry as is usually supposed, when pursued from this point of view; and in that study one again finds the proof of the great progress which Russia has made. It has had

the good fortune to have a succession of Ministers of Finance who, with various kinds of character and temperament, have inaugurated and conducted to a successful conclusion the re-establishment of the State finances on a firm basis, the alleviation of the burden of debt, and the monetary reform. M. de Witte, the present Minister of Finance, is the one among them who has the broadest views, the most exact understanding of the general needs, and who represents the best type of the energetic statesman. But it would be unjust not to recognize the merits of two of his immediate predecessors: M. Bunge, who prepared the reform of the taxes, who incorporated in the Budget certain items which up to his time had been excluded therefrom, and who abolished the poll-tax; and M. Vischnegradsky, who began the accumulation of the gold reserve, undertook with such success the conversions of the Russian debt and saw the chronic deficit come to an end.

II.

On the 1st of January, 1899, the debt was increased to 6,108 millions of rubles (a ruble is 51½ cents), half of which sum represents the engagements to pay in foreign money; since the accomplishment of currency reform, which brought Russia round to a gold standard, all the interest may be considered as paid at a fixed and stable rate of exchange. The annual service—interest and sinking fund together—rose, for 1899, to 279 millions of rubles; that is, to a figure a little higher than that of 1895. It must not be forgotten that, in this total of 279 millions, more than a hundred millions are to be put down to the account of the railroads, and another sum of thirty-five millions is due to loans contracted for the redemption of the peasants.

On the 1st of January, 1898, when the administration of the debt required 272 millions of rubles for interest and redemption, the debt comprised:

Loans Contracted for Needs of the State.

	Rubles.
3 per cent.....	496,000,000
3½ per cent.....	23,000,000
3.79 per cent.....	104,000,000
4 per cent.....	2,539,000,000
4½ per cent.....	217,000,000
5 per cent.....	275,000,000
6 per cent.....	38,000,000
Other loans	58,000,000
Without interest	175,000,000
Total	3,925,000,000

Loans Made on Account of Railroads.

	Rubles.
3 per cent.....	103,000,000
3½ per cent.....	126,000,000
4 per cent.....	1,959,000,000
4½ per cent.....	193,000,000
5 per cent.....	33,000,000
Total	2,414,000,000

Thus the greater part of this debt is in the four per cents. The value is at present at par; it was above par before the rise in the cost of capital, which has affected the state funds of all countries. The same is true of the three per cents, which, like the English and German consols, have gone down, having fallen to 90½, from 96.

A great part of the public debt of Russia is secured by the most real and substantial assets, the network of state railroads, which may be estimated at about three billion rubles.

III.

The first period of the Russian debt ends with the reign of Catherine II. Before the great Empress there was the epoch of the infancy of the Russian power. Public credit did not exist. The sovereign obtained the means for prosecuting his struggles against his neighbors and the independent princes, by loans negotiated with the convents, by the creation of monopolies and by farming out the sources of revenue and debasing the currency. In the seventeenth century imposts and custom-house duties were established. At different times it was attempted to get money from foreign powers, particularly from England and from Holland; but in return these two countries demanded commercial privileges altogether too considerable. In 1656 Czar Alexis received a Venetian embassy which came to solicit his assistance against the Turks, and it was this embassy which was responsible for the attempt to obtain a loan from the rich Italian Republic. Russian envoys embarked at Archangel on a Dutch boat, and made the then prodigious voyage to the Mediterranean; but no agreement could be effected with Venice. No better success was had with Charles II. and the London merchants in 1662, on account of the lack of sufficient guarantee. In the reign of Peter the Great the Budget gradually rose from three to ten millions of rubles; the deficits were met by the aid of fresh taxes and new monopolies. Peter the Great tampered anew with the currency.

A second period in the history of the Russian debt extends

from the accession of Catherine II. to the end of the Napoleonic wars (1768-1816). Russia had become a centralized State, whose power, already acquired, was to be solidified and extended. The debt furnished a part of the indispensable means to this end. Three-quarters of the public expense at the accession of Catherine II. were devoted to the maintenance of the army. New taxes were designed and issues of paper money inaugurated. In spite of the best intentions, in spite of the decision to establish a metallic basis, the Government was at its wit's end in 1770; in 1796 there were 156 millions in circulation, and the loss in exchange was considerable. Catherine II. succeeded in procuring money in Holland. The first loan of two million rubles was made in 1769. An imperial ukase gave as guarantee the whole of the receipts of the State, notably the imposts from Esthonia and Livonia; and the sovereign gave her word of honor that, in the event of a war with Holland, neither the principal nor the arrears of the debt would be confiscated. The loan was to be divided into obligations of 500,000 florins, which the bankers might break up into bonds of 1,000 florins. The annual interest was to be five per cent.; the placing of the loan, redeemable by lot in ten years, confided at first to the Smet Bank, failed. Messrs. Hope and Company were called upon, and they promised their aid for future operations. An advance of a million piastres was arranged for with the Marquis Maruzzi of Genoa. The war indemnity paid by the Turks made it possible to repay this loan, and a part of the Dutch loan, the rest of which was converted into four per cents. From 1774 to 1796, numerous financial operations were transacted with the Dutch through the instrumentality of Hope, with the aid of de Wolff at Antwerp, and de Regny at Genoa. Nineteen Dutch loans and three or four Genoese ones furnished the money for military campaigns, for the redemption of loans due or for conversions. In 1796, the debt had risen to 41.4 millions of foreign obligations, 82.4 millions of domestic and 156.7 millions without interest (assignats); that is altogether 280.5 million rubles. Paul I. endeavored to re-establish the State finances, and to raise the current value of the ruble without renouncing the issue of paper money. He consolidated the different foreign debts of Russia, and, in place of various existing obligations, Hope and Company received a single bond for 88 1-3 million florins, bearing five per cent. interest, and redeemable in twelve years.

The first fifteen years of the reign of Alexander I. (1801-1825) were full of difficulties for the treasury, the Napoleonic wars absorbing vast sums. The presses unceasingly printed paper money; in 1810 the amount of this reached 579 million rubles, and a ruble was not worth more than 44 kopecks. The Council of State being consulted, declared that the forced circulation and the issuing of paper currency constituted the heaviest of imposts; it recommended that an increase of taxes should be made with great caution, that rigid economy should be practised in public expenditure, and, above all, that publicity should be given to the operations of the treasury. Political complications and the war came to cut short these proposed and decreed reforms. The consolidated debt was not much decreased during the years from 1801 to 1817. The authorities redeemed with one hand and borrowed with the other. In 1810 was created an imperial commission of the sinking fund, to procure the sums necessary for its operations by the sale of domains, which consisted mainly of immense forests.

The sale progressed so slowly that in 1812 it was resolved to reinforce the resources of the sinking fund, and certain imposts and rents were appropriated. All these resources, however, were absorbed by the expense of the war which broke out anew. Subsidies from England replaced foreign loans. At the time when the Russian troops had passed the frontiers, it was necessary to provide metal money in place of the paper currency circulating in Russia; and for this the help of England was useful.

After the re-establishment of peace in Europe, it was attempted to provide some remedy against the inconvenience of an excessive quantity of State notes. Loans were made at home and abroad, and with this money the number of assignats was reduced; by 1824 247 millions of them had been cancelled. In 1817 was instituted the council for the establishment of State credit, which was to control the action of various Government institutions, as well as the commission of the sinking fund. A great ledger of the public debt was organized, which comprised the foreign debt, the perpetual internal debt and the reimbursable debt. In order to withdraw the assignats, several foreign loans were concluded, and in 1824 the debt amounted to 383 millions.

The wars which occupied the period of 1828 to 1834 disturbed the equilibrium of the Budget; a deficiency arose and it was necessary to make an appeal to credit. On the 1st of January, 1834, the

debt had risen to 493 millions. In six years it increased 120 millions. Military expenses had to be met, large sums had to be devoted to the maintenance of the army, and the construction of the railway from Moscow to St. Petersburg bore heavily upon the State finances. In 1841 a loan with Hope of 25 millions at four per cent. was made. In 1842 occurred the first loan made through a Russian intermediary, the house of Stieglitz and Company, and this, as well as loans made in 1843, 1844 and 1847, was devoted to the Nicholas Railroad.

In 1839 the Government took measures to reform the fiduciary circulation; the silver ruble, valued at 350 assignat-kopecks, became the money unit.

On the 1st of January, 1848, the Russian debt stood at 828 millions. From 1848 to 1853 Russia intervened in Hungary, and the Western conflict arose; during this time, she concluded a loan of five and a half million pounds, sterling, with Barings. By the 1st of January, 1853, the debt had risen to 1,034 millions, of which 300 millions consisted of notes of credit. The State receipts amounted to 248 millions; among the expenses, the debt absorbed 44 millions, the war 82 millions, the navy 17 millions, and roads of communication 19 millions. The gold and silver reserve from the funds on exchange rose to 123 millions.

The period from 1853 to 1877 commenced with the war of the Crimea and finished with the last struggle against the Turks. From the point of view of interior politics, this period was marked by the great reforms that are the glory of the reign of Alexander II. The expenses of the war and of the army were met by loans and by the issue of paper money. In four years the amount of notes of credit had grown to 420 millions, as a natural consequence of the suspension of cash payments of notes. From 1857 to 1866 Russia was at peace with the world. She was absorbed in the enfranchisement of the serfs, and in reforms, administrative, judicial and fiscal (the publishing of the State Budget and the reorganization of administration in 1862), and in the development of her network of railroads. In 1858, the establishments of State credit were replaced by the Bank of Russia, destined to develop commerce and industry, and endowed with the privilege of issuing notes. The Government consolidated different floating debts by the issue of four per cent. perpetuals at home, and it contracted several loans (three per cents. issued in 1859 at 65, four and a half

per cents. issued at 90 in 1860) to strengthen the bank's reserve. It endeavored to return to cash payments, and issued in 1862 at 91½ a loan of 15 million pounds, sterling, with this aim. Unfortunately, the insurrection in Poland frustrated these good intentions. About the same time the freeing of the peasants was marked by a bond issue, the State undertaking to float them and receive in return the redemption payments.

Gradually, 400 million rubles were issued, which at the beginning were valued at at least 65, and have been for a long time at par, and have been used for conversion. The credit of Russia was not high at this period; several loans concluded with foreign banks were often but half taken up. The State had recourse to credit in order to increase the resources of the Bank of Russia, and to continue the most important lines of the railway between Moscow and the Black Sea.

The ten years from 1866 to 1876 are important on account of the establishment of the network of railroads, which could not have been accomplished save for foreign capital. The Minister of Finance, M. de Reutern, devoted all his energy to this purpose, so necessary to the development of natural resources, and so well did he succeed that in place of 2,000 kilometres of exploited road, all that existed on his entrance into office, there were in 1876 nearly 20,000 kilometres in full activity. In 1867 and 1869 two loans, amounting together to 577 million francs, were made on hard conditions (four per cents. at 61 and 63) to facilitate the sale of the Nicholas Railroad, and to create a special fund for the purpose of constructing State roads and ports. M. de Reutern had an ingenious idea which the Italian Government afterward adopted. He made the State serve as an intermediary between the Russian companies and foreign exchanges. He made advances to the companies, *ad valorem*, on the obligations that they were authorized to arrange, and he recouped himself for these advances by issuing consolidated obligations the moment he judged it opportune to do so. From 1870 to 1875 there were issued, under these conditions and through the intervention of the Rothschilds, five series of consolidated obligations of the Russian railroads (the first four at five and the last at four and a half per cent.), making in all 69 million pounds, and at prices higher and higher, from 76 in 1870 to 91 in 1875. Two other issues of the same sort were made in 1880 and 1884. All these bonds were redeemable by degrees, and

they have all been converted into a fund of four per cents. The war with Turkey showed the great importance of these 20,000 kilometres of railroads. In 1877, in spite of the blockade of the Black Sea and the fact that the railroads were occupied with the transportation of troops, Russia was able to export 60 million hectolitres of grain. The efforts made to improve the financial situation and to raise the credit of the State were crowned with success in 1876: the Russian five per cents. were cited at 106 on the Bourse at Paris, and the ruble was worth about three and a half francs.*

Foreign political complications again occurred to disturb this. From 1876 to 1881 the extraordinary military expenses due to the war were 1,020 millions. The resources realized by the treasury consisted of 904 millions in loans, and to this must be added the balances of the closed Budgets, and 25 millions, the surplus receipts of 1878.

The immediate expenses of the war were covered by the issue of paper money; the treasury received as much as 525 million rubles (the maximum received in August, 1879). On the 28th of July, 1880, the floating debt was reduced to 352 millions by Gen. Greig, who used for this reduction the disposable funds remaining from the Oriental loans. Unfortunately, from August to December the floating debt was augmented by the issue of paper money and amounted to 417 millions. M. Abara, who replaced Gen. Greig, had the courage to renounce the resources arising from the printing of the State notes and at the same time he engaged to pay back in eight annual instalments the debt of the treasury to the Bank of Russia. He remitted to the bank 173 millions, one-half in five per cent. bonds, and 243 million rubles in notes of credit, of which 87 millions were destroyed.

From 1880 to 1887, Russia proceeded by a series of financial operations, sometimes at home and sometimes abroad, to construct the railroads without diminishing the resources of the treasury. In 1885 the appearance of the Budget was modified by the incorporation of the payments made for the redemption of the serfs. On the 1st of January, 1888, the total debt of Russia amounted to 5,469,739,746 rubles, this including the increase of the debt without interest. The original total had been 6,572 millions,

*The budget of 1875 closed with a surplus of 33 millions. (See my book "*Les Finances de la Russie depuis la Guerre d'Orient.*" Guillaumen & Cie, 1884.)

of which 1,102 millions had been gradually redeemed. The annual mechanical decrease, resulting from the fact that loans had been contracted with a clause stipulating for repayment by degrees, has played an important rôle in the question of the Russian public debt.

IV.

A Minister of Finance can alleviate the burden of annual charges by efficacious means: the conversions of the debt. When in 1875 the credit of Russia appeared to justify the current price of 106 for the consolidated debt, the issue was too recent to permit of a conversion; the war with Turkey destroyed the work of M. de Reutern. Eleven or twelve years afterward circumstances once more became favorable; the German banks which had conducted the Hungarian conversion took the field in order to be charged with the Russian conversion. M. de Hausemann, president of *Der Rontogesellschaft*, of Berlin, came to offer his services to M. de Bunge. The discussion terminated in nothing; but, nevertheless, the conversion was not lost to sight, although it was necessary to wait two and a half years before effecting it. The European bankers watched operations as closely as did the Russian Government. Overtures were made in the autumn to M. de Vischnegradsky, who had replaced M. de Bunge. He skilfully profited by a variety of circumstances and by the rivalry among the bankers; he was able to attach his name to a number of conversions, the first of which, made with an understanding with the French financial establishments and French, English and Dutch bankers, raised 2,500 million francs in 1888 and 1889. The issue of new four per cent. loans, destined to replace the five per cent. bonds, was accomplished with very great success at prices continually rising from 86.45 to 91.50. In subsequent operations a closer approach was made to par value, and the redeemed railroad obligations, bearing a considerably higher interest, were replaced by three and a half per cent. bonds, put on the market at 94.50.

We will not go into the history of the conversions which continued in 1890 and the following years. If we take the indications from 1889 to 1897, as they appear in the reports of the imperial treasury, we see that the nominal amount of the loans converted during this period (loans at six per cent., five and a half per cent., five per cent., four and a half per cent.) reached

2,779 million rubles, which have been replaced by four per cent. and three and a half per cent. obligations. To redeem and modify these obligations, 2,838 million rubles were spent. The loans issued have brought in, as increase in the principal of the debt, 260 millions. It must not be forgotten, indeed, that the first four per cents. were issued at 86, and that it was only gradually that par was arrived at. The new obligations have been for the most part exchanged for the obligations of converted loans. Out of 796 million rubles of gold, 30 millions were not presented for exchange, and have had to be reimbursed. Out of 1,584 millions credit, 1,454 millions accepted the conversion. These are figures which indicate the great success of the operations carried on by MM. Vischnegradsky and de Witte. As for certain small loans, they were also reimbursed from the resources of the treasury. It must be added that during this period, from 1889 to 1897, the sinking fund of the treasury rose to 306 million rubles for the debt at interest.

V.

The total of the Russian Budget has grown considerably during the last fifteen years, in consequence of its inclusion of expenditures and receipts which might be called *comptes d'ordre*, such as the construction of the State railways and the monopoly of the sale of spirits. If one compares the receipts of 1888 with those of 1897, one sees that they progressed from 873 million to 1,416 million rubles. In the Budget of 1888 the railroads figure to the amount of 75 millions; in that of 1897 they reach 293 millions. This same consideration, concerning the causes of the increase in the total of the Russian Budget, may be repeated in speaking of the public debt. As M. de Witte explains in his *exposé* of the Budget of 1899, the increase of the public debt during the last twelve years is entirely due to the large sums spent in the acquisition and construction of railways; that is to say, for a purpose which not only has the first importance for the general interest of the State and the economic development of the country, but which is directly productive from the financial point of view.

From the 1st of January, 1887, to the 1st of January, 1899, the public debt increased by 1,531 million rubles. Of this total, 1,139 millions represent the amount of loans contracted to redeem the railroad concessions and to continue the construction of the State lines. Furthermore, the State spent 425 million rubles of

gold, above this sum, in that construction, calling upon the treasury. In consequence, for this period of twelve years the cost of the increase in the State railways (1,564 millions) exceeded by 33 millions the total increase in the debt. During this same period 440 million rubles were paid to the Bank of Russia to reduce its account with the treasury for its principal note issues.

The following is the situation of the Russian public debt at interest on the 1st of January, 1887, and on the same date in 1899 and 1900:

Balance of Nominal Capital.	Jan. 1, 1887.	Jan. 1, 1899.	Jan. 1, 1900.
Debt, in gold rubles, pounds sterling, etc.	1,975,476,600	3,062,147,280	3,045,105,611
Debt, in rubles (credit).....	2,381,811,153	3,046,644,837	3,105,029,263
<hr/>			
Total (in rubles at 2% francs)...	4,357,287,753	6,108,792,117	6,150,134,874

A very interesting chapter on the history of the debt would be that of the non-interest bearing portion, that is to say, the State notes issued with no metallic basis. This part of the debt has gradually been reduced, and in 1900 a final payment wiped out the last vestige of it, the treasury turning in to the bank gold to cover it. The fiduciary circulation has been reduced from 1,100 millions to 600 millions, and 250 millions of gold have been put in circulation in the country.

Thus, at the end of 1896, there were in circulation 37.5 million gold rubles; in 1897, 155 millions; in 1898, 445 millions; in 1899, 639 millions; in 1900, 684 millions. In 1899 and 1900, despite various unfavorable circumstances, such as the small receipts from commercial sources and the extraordinary expenses entailed by the difficulties in China, the exports of gold from Russia—that is to say, the diminution of the stock of gold—were only about 24.6+74.1 millions, a total of 98.7 millions. At the end of 1900, the stock of gold was about 807 millions at the Bank of Russia and in the vaults of the treasury, about 684 millions in circulation, altogether about 1,492 millions; with 222 millions of silver money (of which 58.3 millions was at the Bank and in the treasury), while the fiduciary circulation amounted to only 552 millions. The Bank had in reserve 77 millions of its own notes.

VI.

The credits opened in the Budget of 1899, for the administration of the debt, amounted to 276.6 million rubles; in that of

1900 to 274.7 millions; in that of 1901 to 274.7 millions. (The expenses incurred in 1899 were only 275.7 millions.) Of late years, in the process of manipulating the debt, in consequence of various sorts of unifications, of purchases of railways, and of conversions, the amount to be paid annually has scarcely varied.

From 1896 on, Russia contracted no foreign debt, on account of the State, until May, 1901, when she placed a loan of 424 million francs, at four per cent., with the greatest success. The product of this loan was destined to reimburse the treasury for the advances made to the railway companies. The operation was very successful, the price of conversion, 98½, was not too high, the subscriptions were very numerous, the distribution being rated to benefit the public which buys bonds to keep, and to discourage speculation. The fact that the price of the new four per cents., which bear the name of Russian consolidated four per cents., and which are not convertible before 1915, has risen constantly since the issue and is now 102, shows the good standing of the new bonds.

Russia, whom her enemies never cease to represent as overwhelmed by her financial necessities, negotiated her last loan, in 1901, at what she judged the most opportune moment, from the point of view of the market and of her own convenience. The reception given to this operation shows that her credit is absolutely intact, and that Russia receives from foreign capitalists the confidence which her solvability and her respect for the obligations which she undertakes merit. The solicitations of bankers and offers to arrange loans have not been wanting in St. Petersburg, but they have been resisted, and the wise principles of financial administration practised which, tending to constitute considerable reserves, enable her to face sudden emergencies. Thanks to these reserves, formed for the most part from the surplus of the ordinary Budgets, Russia has been able to almost entirely complete the Trans-Siberian railway, to increase her navy, to equip her army with new weapons, to aid the peasants affected by the bad harvests, to repay to the Bank of Russia the non-interest-bearing debt, and to meet the Chinese expenses in 1900.

ARTHUR RAFFALOVICH.

SOME NEW VOLUMES OF VERSE.*

BY W. D. HOWELLS.

THE intelligence and temperance with which the late James C. Onderdonk has done his work in the "History of American Verse" are such as to deepen, at each page of his book, the regret one must feel for his early death. We are told, in the introduction to his posthumous volume, that if the author had lived the chapter on the latest of our poets would probably have been enlarged and revised; and in taking up some of their latest poems I have been haunted by a wish, which I cannot dismiss, that he might have dealt with them, and could have remained to deal with other new poets as fast as they manifested themselves in new poems. Justice is in all cases difficult, though praise is easy, and blame is easy; but justice is most of all difficult in the case of those whom we must judge straight from our consciences and not roundabout through our acquaintance with the judgment of others. I think Mr. Onderdonk was peculiarly fitted to render the direct sort of justice, for he brings it to bear even upon writers who have been judged so often that they seem to pass sentence on themselves as soon as they are named. He begins with our beginnings, and he ends with our endings, or so nearly that the poets of the last decade of the nineteenth century receive the same impartial, the same sincere, the same courteous, study that he bestows on the poets of the first decade of the seventeenth century. He shows himself a connoisseur of poetry who can feel passionately but

* "A History of American Verse (1610-1897)." By James C. Onderdonk. McClurg & Co.

"Lincoln, and Other Poems." By Edwin Markham. McClure, Phillips & Co.

"Poems of the Past and Present." By Thomas Hardy. Harper & Brothers.

"Weeds by the Wall. Verses." By Madison Cawein. John P. Morton & Co.

"A Gage of Youth. Lyrics from the Lark and Other Poems." By Gelett Burgess. Small, Maynard & Co.

"More Animals." By Oliver Herford. Charles Scribner's Sons.

speaking dispassionately, who can cherish a grateful appreciation of beauty without a sentimental overflow, who can recognize a fault without the schoolmasterly impulse to punish it. I might name things in which I disagreed with him, but in most things I have agreed with him, and thought it to my credit that I did so. All his criticisms, I should say in the large way which I might later wish to hedge from, are based upon reasons which he gives, and upon grounds which he proves solid. I should like to allege other instances, but time and space are both short, and I must content myself with alleging for sole evidence the passages which he devotes to the study of Longfellow. His judgment of a poet, whose genius was at once so simple and so fine, so universal and so exceptional, is as nearly the measure of it as it has ever got; and it is most where one reads those passages of his book, that one feels the bereavement of our literature in his loss.

I.

I like to indulge the fancy of this intelligent and temperate critic taking up Mr. Edwin Markham's "Second Book of Verse" and sharing my own pleasure in finding it better than his first. In "Lincoln and Other Poems" there is no Man with a Hoe, who might have been expected there, and perhaps feared; but Mr. Onderdonk would have been glad to recognize that this Man was present in the qualities which gave the poet his hold on the common heart, while absent in the defects that made his hold slip from the uncommon head. Here is something of the eloquence, tending to elocution, with much more than the earlier proportion of the poetry which neither head nor heart can deny in Mr. Markham's former volume. We are still a good deal exhorted, as we need to be, unless we are left to forget the misery which the world is nearly as full of as ever; but we are charmed a good deal more. The moral level of the verse is as lofty as it was before, but we have not the same sense of jolting from peak to peak. In the appeals to humanity there is something more of consideration for human nature: not quite the human nature that those imagine who would have it remain as bad as it is, or worse, but the human nature which will not stand too much girding up, and is better at making fresh starts than long runs in the right direction. Possibly, I read these ameliorations into the book, but I will abate nothing of my confidence as to its positive excellences, for I could

prove them from it much more often than these envious limits will let me. I am sure that I feel a sort of dynamic picturesqueness in the notion of

"the Matterhorn

That shoulders out the sky;"

and the line that tells me Lincoln

"Held the long purpose like a growing tree,"

really adds to the history of the man. The picturesqueness prevails again in the statement that

"he went down

As when a kingly cedar, green with boughs,

Goes down with a great shout upon the hills,

And leaves a lonesome place against the sky."

and here again the picturesqueness is most dynamic.

I could wish, indeed, that Mr. Markham, in saying that "the Norn-Mother"

"took the tried clay of the common road,"

for the stuff of her greatest son, had not forgotten how Lowell had already said that Nature (a more familiar name for the Norn-Mother, though not so mouth-filling), threw aside her "Old-World moulds,"

"And choosing sweet clay from the breast

Of the unexhausted West,

With stuff untainted shaped a hero new,"

just as I could wish he had remembered that Gray asked

"Can storied urn or animated bust

Back to its mansion call the fleeting breath?"

when he declares that

"The soaring pillar and the epic boast,

The flaring pageant and the storied pile,

May parley with Oblivion awhile."

When he writes

"The pomp, the arch, the scroll, cannot beguile

The ever-circling Destinies that must

Mix king and clown into one rabble dust,"

he seems to blend an echo of the Elegy with that of an elder elegy:

"Sceptre and crown

Must both lie down

And in the dust be equal made

With the poor, crooked scythe and spade."

But no one whose praise is worth having, or whose blame is to be feared, will accuse our poet of more than a reverberation of the nerves reporting itself in his verse, though even this is a pity; and it is to be more regretted because such a great line as

"May parley with Oblivion awhile"

is not only of an unimpeachable indigeneity, but is of a growth that may be said rather to abound with him. There are many fine passages in his book, and there is hardly any faultiest poem but is redeemed by some high thought, some splendid turn of phrase. These often touch the heart as well as illumine the mind, so that one almost ascribes merit to one's self when in "The Sower" one thrills at the magnanimous words:

"The grime of this bruised hand keeps tender white
The hands that never labor, day or night;
His feet that only know the field's rough floors
Send lordly steps down echoing corridors."

It is with a fellow feeling yet more mystical and sweet, that, turning from the lurid picture of "The Wall Street Pit," one rests one's soul in a glimpse of "stiller ways," where the lives of men "grow softly as the apples on a bough." "A Mendocino Memory" is a lovely idyl, full of youth and gladness, and "Which Was a Dream" suggests mysteries "deeper than did ever plummet sound." In such things Mr. Markham attests his quality as poet; and the poet is more precious than the preacher, though the world is better, or always just going to be better, for preaching. I do not say that good people resent his appeals and reproaches, but the bad people might be humored a little, and persuaded that the poet means them no harm by his preaching. There are signs, amusing signs, however, that those who have most resented it, and most bidden the poet go to because of it, are resenting it less. Some of the reviews of his new book say that there is a glad note of optimism in it, as if optimism were a virtue in itself or pessimism a vice; and I would have him realize that such reviewers only mean that they have got used to his pessimism, if it was pessimism; they do not know, poor souls! Yet, and yet, if the little piece with which I shall leave him were to be his farewell to the pulpit, I should not be sorry in one wise, though still I should be sorry:

WIND OF THE FALL.

"I hear that wail in the windy pine,
And I suddenly know;
It wakes in my breast a dream divine,
And a sacred woe.
I heard that cry from your spirit then,
Oh, wind of the Fall!
I too have carried the grief of men;
I have felt it all."

II.

Whatever any one may say of Mr. Markham's optimism, **no** one can say of Mr. Thomas Hardy's pessimism, that it is less in his second volume than it was in his first, and I, for my part, could not wish it less, for pessimism may be a very good thing, if not a cheerful. It is apt, at least, to be spontaneous and honest after one gets to be fifty, and ashamed of the follies of forty—in others. There is, possibly, too much unreasoned gayety in a world where death is, and youth fades and love passes, often before death comes. Pessimism can commonly give a reason for itself, and optimism at most only the excuse that it is a fine day, or its dinner has agreed with it. But even pessimism without a cause, if it results in poetry like Mr. Hardy's, is justifiable, and if it is his increased pessimism which has made "*Poems of the Past and Present*" better than "*Wessex Poems*," one must wish it to abound in him more and more. In the meantime, I have been reading his new book with the solid comfort which sometimes only solid gloom can bring, and I have felt very curiously in his poems the qualities which, in more dramatic appointments, affect me finally from his fiction; it is as if I had been reading all his novels over again. The humor, indeed, except in the sparest glimmers, is absent, for one can hardly call the grim mocking in certain of the pieces by that kindly name, that almost weakly sentimental name; and there is no compensation in the way of the smoother and sleeker shapes of beauty, though if one likes such forms of it as do not know themselves from truth, one will not want for joy in these joyless portraits and landscapes. There is not even the small sum of impersonated feeling that there was in the "*Wessex Poems*"; the thinking is straight from the poet to the reader, with seldom an interpreter in character or story, though there is now and then a sardonic allegory, and now and then an interlude of such an eery mirthsomeness that one could wish it less merry or less ghastly. For illustration, I commend to the robuster sort of reader that peculiar "riddle of the painful earth" which the poet calls "*God-Forgotten*." I must not risk shrivelling this sensitive page by giving it here entire, and may only intimate that the poet fancies the Creator to have forgotten that He had made the earth and to be recalling the fact with difficulty.

"It lost my interest from the first,
My aims therefor succeeding ill;

Haply it died of doing as it durst?"—

"'Lord, it existeth still.'"

"'Dark, then, its life! For not a cry
Of aught it bears do I now hear;
Of its own act the threads were snapt whereby
Its plaints had reached mine ear.

"'It used to ask for gifts of good,
Till came its severance self-entailed,
When sudden silence on that side ensued,
And has till now prevailed.

"'And other orbs have kept in touch;
Their voicings reach me speedily:
Thy people took upon them overmuch
In sundering them from me!

"'And it is strange—though sad enough—
Earth's race should think that one whose call
Frames, daily, shining spheres of flawless stuff
Must heed their tainted ball!

"'Thou should'st have learnt that *Not to Mend*
For Me could mean but *Not to Know*;
Hence, Messengers! and straightway put an end
To what men undergo.'"

"Homing at dawn, I thought to see
One of the Messengers standing by.
—Oh, childish thought! . . . Yet oft it comes to me,
When trouble hovers nigh."

There is, possibly, a faint ray of hope in the closing lines of this unflattering poem, but it is not such as to be sharply discordant with the prevailing mood of Mr. Hardy's volume. He writes verse, as he writes prose, like no one else, and those who do not enjoy his thinking will hardly enjoy his singing. His strong lines have small disposition to trip upon the tongue, but such a piece as "The Ruined Maid" haunts the ear with its crazy lilt, while it pierces the heart with a meaning all too sane.

III.

One never praises an author for certain things without afterwards doubting if they were the characteristic things, or whether just the reverse might not be said. Praise is, in fact, a delicate business, and I, who am rather fond of dealing in it, never feel it quite safe. Not only is it questionable at the moment, but the later behavior of the author is sometimes such that one is sorry

not to have made it blame. It is always with a shrinking, which I try to hide from the public, that I take up the fresh venture of a poet whom I have once bet on. But there is a joy when I find that I have not lost my wager which is full compensation for the anxiety suffered. This joy has lately been mine in the latest little book of Mr. Madison Cawein, whose work I long ago confessed my pleasure in. I am not sure that he has since transcended the limits which he then seemed to give himself as the lover, the prophet, of beauty in the woods and waters and skies of the southern Mid-West. I do not know that he need have done more than unlock the riches of emotion within these limits. What I am sure of is that in "Weeds by the Wall" he has more deeply charmed me with an art perfected from that I felt in "Blooms of the Berry" ten or fifteen years since. Many little books of his have come (I hope not also gone) between the first and last, and none of them has failed to make me glad of his work; and now again I am finding the same impassioned moods in the same impassive presences. To my knowledge, no such nature-poems have been written within the time since Mr. Cawein began to write as his are, or from such an intimacy with the "various language" which nature speaks. There are other good poems in the book, poems which would have made reputes in the eighteenth century, and which it would be a shame not to own good in the twentieth; but those which speak for "The Cricket," "A Twilight Moth," "The Grasshopper," "The Tree Toad," "The Screech Owl," "The Chipmunk," "Drouth," "Before the Rain," and the like, are in a voice which interprets the very soul of what we call the inarticulate things, though they seem to have enunciated themselves so distinctly to this poet. It is cheap to note his increasing control of his affluent imagery and the growing mastery that makes him so fine an artist. These things were to be expected from his early poems, but what makes one think he will go far and long, and outlive both praise and blame, is the blending of a sense of the Kentucky nature with a sense of the Kentucky civilization in such a poem as "Feud":

"A mile of lane,—hedged-high with ironweeds
And dying daisies,—white with sun, that leads
Downward into a wood; through which a stream
Steals like a shadow; over which is laid
A bridge of logs, worn deep by many a team,
Sunk in the tangled shade.

Fields over which a path, o'erwhelmed with burrs
 And ragweeds, noisy with the grasshoppers,
 Leads,—lost, irresolute as paths the cows
 Wear through the woods,—unto a woodshed; then,
 With wrecks of windows, to a huddled house,
 Where men have murdered men.

"A house whose tottering chimney, clay and rock,
 Is seamed and crannied; whose lame door and lock
 Are bullet bored; around which here and there
 Are sinister stains. . . .
 Within is emptiness: the sunlight falls
 On faded journals papering the walls,
 On advertisement chromos, torn with time,
 Around a hearth where wasps and spiders build.—
 The house is dead; meseems that night of crime
 It too was shot and killed."

"Civilization" may not be quite the word for the condition of things suggested here, but there can be no doubt of the dramatic and the graphic power that suggests it, and that imparts a personal sense of the tragic squalor, the sultry drouth, the forlorn wickedness of it all. By such a way as this lies Mr. Cawein's hope of rise from Nature up to Man, if it is up; and also, as I perceive too late, lies confusion for the critic who said that the poet does not transcend the limits he once seemed to give himself.

IV.

With Mr. Gelett Burgess's book I have not quite the embarrassment I had in taking up Mr. Cawein's. I am at least not committed to it by any earlier praise, and I may say what I please of it, without having to look after my consistency. The best thing in it is, I think, a certain "Sestina of Youth and Age," which has a sweetness and tenderness of its own, and expresses a phase of the common experience not recognized before:

"My father died when I was all too young,
 And he too old, too crowded with his care,
 For me to know he knew my hot, fierce hopes.
 Youth sees wide chasms between itself and age—
 How could I think he too had lived my life?
 My dreams were all of war, and his of rest."

That is a beautiful poem, from first to last, truly felt and rendered in a spirit of fine repose. If I say it is the best thing in Mr. Burgess's book, I hope that I do not dispraise the other pieces, which, indeed, I wish had made room among them for more

of those gayer caprices of "The Lark," more associated with the author's manner and more characteristic of his fancy.

V.

Mr. Oliver Herford braves it out where Mr. Burgess seems to shrink from owning his antic muse, and in a book of "More Animals" he gives us again the wise nonsense that edifies and consoles. If it is by a *tour de force* that one groups him with the poets, he is worth that outlay of strength, and the poets ought to be glad of his company. His book is at least a new volume of verse, and is of a freshness which the critic, panting from his exertion, might overstate, but probably would not if he meant its delightful audacity, its perennial unexpectedness. Mr. Herford's humor, both of pen and pencil, is personal to himself, like Mr. Gilbert's, but it hospitably insists upon making itself the reader's at the same time, for it is difficult not to learn "The Animals" by heart. In fact, you are rather obliged to do that, if you will not have them tagging after you in fragments and haunting your memory piece-meal. Among them all, I believe I like the *Gnu* best, for reasons that will appear when I repeat it:

"Beware, my dear, if ever you
Should chance to come across a gnu.
You may be fair, and tall and svelte,
But do not hope the gnu to melt.
You may be gentle, kind and true,
These things mean nothing to the gnu.
You may love beasts, both great and small,
That won't affect the gnu at all.
You may be generous, you may
Subscribe to the S. P. C. A.
All this of no avail will be,
The only thing's to climb a tree;
And if there is no tree to climb,
Don't say you were not warned in time."

Yet, when I have tried to account for my liking the *Gnu* best, the *Octopus*, the *Shark*, the *Dodo* and all the rest rise up to reproach me; and without the picture of the young lady swarming up the palm, I do not feel that the mere literary testimony of the *Gnu* quite justifies me. It is much simpler to make my escape by owning them all good than to insist upon a distinction that may seem invidious. Whatever Mr. Herford touches, at least in the animal kingdom, he gives something of the amiable grace of his own fantastic spirit, so that the most dreadful of his beasts seem so half in joke.

W. D. HOWELLS.

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CONDITIONS WHICH DISCOURAGE SCIENTIFIC WORK IN AMERICA.

BY SIMON NEWCOMB, LL.D., UNITED STATES NAVY.

THE picture of America's inferior place in the scientific world drawn by Mr. Carl Snyder in the January number of this REVIEW hardly does justice to the present state of research in our own country. It is quite near the truth as it was twenty or even ten years ago, but is not quite correct for to-day, when we see investigators of the first class in all the sciences coming forward in every direction. He states that we stand in the front in astronomy, and he might have added that our recent advance in all the physical sciences has been remarkable. I cannot speak confidently on the biological side, but would be disappointed if a competent judge should say that the pathological and other work now being done at the Harvard and Johns Hopkins medical schools was hopelessly behind in the race when pitted against that of the Pasteur Institute.

Notwithstanding all this, Mr. Snyder's picture is correct for the past, and, if not strictly so for the present, is still a wholesome lesson to one who desires to see our country pre-eminent in science and learning. It must be admitted that the great generalizations of science during our time are of European origin and that the initiative in their development has not been taken by us. The

highest and best forms of research require the right atmosphere for their growth; and of this atmosphere intelligent public opinion is the most stimulating and, therefore, the most essential constituent. I desire to supplement the picture by another, showing how great the want we suffer in this respect.

Two supposed reasons for our backward condition are familiar. We are supposed to be not yet far enough beyond the backwoods stage of civilization to appreciate the higher form of intellectual progress or support works which are intended only to advance pure science. And it is not uncommon to hear men maintain—in whispers, perhaps—that indifference to the higher forms of thought is associated with democracy. I shall only remark on these suggestions that neither of them can be shown to be sound by a careful examination into the facts. We passed beyond the backwoods stage of learning half a century ago, and the development of our universities and educational institutions during the past twenty-five years shows that we are now entirely clear of it. Nor does there appear to be good evidence that a republican form of government is associated with indifference to science. No doubt, revolutionary France, up to the time of the Terror, showed a spirit antagonistic to all learning, as it did to every other creation of the past. But a wholly different view was taken as soon as sensible men got control of affairs. Republican France of to-day is no less appreciative of science than was the France of the First and Second Empires. So far as our country is concerned, the matter has been so well summed up by Mr. Bryce that I cannot do better than quote his conclusion: "To ascribe the deficiencies, such as they are, of art and culture in America, solely or even mainly to her form of government, is not less absurd than to ascribe, as many Americans of what I may call the trumpeting school do, her marvellous material progress to the same cause."

Of the high appreciation of scientific research and of learning generally entertained by our people we have the best proof in the munificence with which private individuals have endowed our institutions for learning and research. These men have desired to employ their wealth in a way which would promote the public weal and bring honor to their names. They were of sound judgment, fully able to feel the public pulse; and they saw that their fellow-citizens would look upon this as the most admirable way of disposing of their surplus wealth.

And yet our public, with all its appreciation of learning in the abstract, has only the vaguest and most imperfect idea of the true spirit of science and of the peculiar conditions under which the most advanced research is possible. We look upon the latter as if it were the practice of a profession, forgetting that, when it reaches that point, it ceases to be science. New methods, new laws, new results—these are the aims of science. We naturally forget that these are the creations of individual minds. When an institution for learning or research is munificently endowed by an individual, good sense and experience of the world naturally prompt him to establish something more lasting than the life of an individual—something of the nature of an organization which will continue to perform its functions, whatever changes may take place among the persons who direct or manage it. To him, scientific investigators are simply bodies of men of whose individual members he need know nothing.

Much the same is the impression which I have found by long experience to be that of the men who manage our public affairs. They look upon science as a profession, or collection of professions, which men learn at college or university much as they learn law or medicine. It is said—and, truly, I think—that no government is more liberal than our own in enterprises for the promotion of science. I do not know that our Agricultural Department has an equal in the world. The spirit of this policy may be expressed in some such form as this: "We see how much science has done for the world; how it has recast the whole industry of mankind and produced benefits to society of which our ancestors had no conception. Let us, then, promote scientific research and its application to practical ends on the largest scale. Men learn to be scientific investigators at college; our colleges and universities turn out thousands of graduates every year. Let us select the best of these we can find, pay them as good salaries as such men commonly expect to earn, and set them to work, each in his chosen field, under the best administrative direction we can get." Having done this, the function of the government is at an end. Of the individual men who are conducting the investigation the public need know no more than of the individual soldiers in an army.

There is no inherent error in all this; it is merely an incomplete view of the case, like the idea of an arch entertained by one

who saw its entire figure, but knew nothing of the keystone. The leader in science, the divinely inspired explorer of nature—whom no university has made what he is, who has learned for himself how knowledge can be advanced, whose main outfit is the original genius with which nature has endowed him, whose paramount motive is a native impulse—has no place in the scheme. Yet, the whole history of modern progress, whether in science or industry, is a history of the efforts of exceptional men. How abnormal a man the native born scientific investigator is may be seen by the reflection that civilization was thousands of years old before men knew anything about the laws of motion which they saw in operation all around them every day of their lives, the power of steam or the source of electricity; that the wind had blown and the rivers had flowed all these thousands of years, without one member of the whole human race seeing how the water could be harnessed or the winds employed in the grinding of wheat. It is impressive to think how few men we should have to remove from the earth during the past three centuries to have stopped the advance of our civilization. In the seventeenth century there would only have been Galileo, Newton and a few other contemporaries; in the eighteenth, they could almost have been counted on the fingers; and they have not crowded the nineteenth. Even to-day, almost every great institution for scientific research owes its being to some one man, who, as its founder or regenerator, breathed into it the breath of life. If we think of the human personality as comprehending not merely mind and body, but all that the brain has set in motion, then may the Greenwich observatory of to-day be called Airy; that of Pulkowa, Struve; the German Reichsanstalt, Helmholtz; the Smithsonian Institution, Henry; the Harvard Museum of Comparative Zoölogy, Agassiz; the Harvard observatory, Pickering.

It is in our failure to estimate the individual scientific investigator that we stand so far behind other enlightened nations. I ask the reader's attention to some examples of this, beginning with men in the two hemispheres, who, in the matter of natural endowment, might be placed on an equality.

Henry and Faraday may be fairly taken as two such men. The former, born in obscurity and with no early education except such as an academy could offer, had a natural genius for interrogating nature which, under more favorable surroundings, might have

given him the first place among the experimental philosophers of the age. What Faraday did we all know. But see the difference in the surroundings of the two men, and the incentives placed before them. The one was the honored of a great centre of the world's learning, commanding every facility that the wealth of scientific London could afford, stimulated by the appreciation of a great and influential society, and receiving so liberal a support that he had no need to think of the future. The other was a plain professor, commanding no apparatus but the meagre outfit of our traditional college, having none but students to whom he could personally communicate his discoveries; placed in a community which, though enlightened enough to regard what he was doing with interest, had no conception of the value attaching to his works. What wonder if he fell behind in the race!

Our own generation may supply another example. I speak subject to correction on a matter outside of my immediate knowledge in naming Max Müller and Whitney as the two most illustrious scholars in their branch of whom the English-speaking world could boast, and as being co-equal in learning and native power. But how different the positions of the two men! The one, notwithstanding his foreign birth, was honored of all England, and supported by almost princely liberality on a scale corresponding to his attainments, while the other was eking out the salary of a Yale professor by publishing text-books and editing a dictionary.

Let us suppose one side of another case. The greatest comparative anatomist in our country, combining the scientific eminence of a Jeffries Wyman and a Joseph Leidy, becomes an instructor of the public in the art of right thinking. He attacks cherished beliefs; he is contentious in the last degree, never letting go a subject as long as his opponents can have anything to say; criticises the course of his best friends whenever he thinks it wrong; is ready to make his voice heard on any question of which the public seems to him to be taking the wrong side, and that in a style of which the classic polish only adds to the pungency. What would we have done more than tolerate him? Would popular magazines twenty years ago have dared to publish his articles? Could he have reached, by virtue of his power of statement and scientific standing, a much higher level in the public estimation than other teachers of the same kind? Yet in England

Huxley was, perhaps, the greatest power that our generation has seen in moulding the current of national thought on the problems of life, and he was publicly rewarded by elevation to the rank of Privy Councillor to the Queen, a position which left few grades above him in the official hierarchy.

Within the past few years it has been the writer's fortune to assist at three celebrations in Great Britain, to each of which the learned of the world were invited. Two of the three were in honor of individuals. In 1896 the University of Glasgow celebrated the jubilee of Kelvin by a function which brought together an impressive representation of the science, not only of the whole British Empire, but of Europe and America. Three years later, the University of Cambridge celebrated the jubilee of Stokes in the same way. Immediately after the latter the Royal Institution of London celebrated its centenary. The point to which I call especial attention is that these celebrations were not merely meetings of learned men, but functions to which the leading classes of England, from royalty downward, gave dignity, either by their presence or by letter. The seventieth birthday of Helmholtz was celebrated by the great men of Germany, from the Emperor down, in a series of addresses and congratulations. The recent tribute of all France to Berthelot I need only allude to.

Is it significant of our inferior place in science that the idea of such celebrations in honor of science or a scientific man is so foreign to our notions that it is hardly likely to present itself for generations to come?

In thus pointing out the superior rewards and the superior position which the highest eminence in science and learning commands in other countries, it is not implied that these form the direct incentives to research. The idea that salary paid is the measure of service rendered leads to our pernicious habit of looking upon the investigator in the public service as a laborer for hire. The man whose aim in life is either gain or popular applause must seek other groves than those of Academus, for in them he will surely find none but chilly breezes. All modern experience shows that Nature does not make known her secrets to those who court her for lucre. The work of him who enters the field of science with any other immediate motive than the advance of knowledge will lack that thoroughness and comprehensiveness which is necessary to success. Disinterestedness is the

first condition of the highest forms of research. In describing, as I have, the superior rewards offered in other lands to the highest success in research, I do not mean to imply that the man of science can have any such reward in view in mapping out his work. We may rest assured that if it should be suggested to an American investigator that he become the recipient of such an ovation as that bestowed on Kelvin or Stokes, he would be the more likely to nip it in the bud, if he could, the more worthy he might be of receiving it.

But let us not mistake what this means. It does not mean that the scientific investigator can work as well in poverty as in affluence, and must be indifferent to the question whether his children shall be well clothed or in rags, whether he himself shall be supplied with the comforts of life, or be unable to return the hospitalities of his friends. It does not mean that he is indifferent to his own standing in the world, and cares not whether men think ill or well of what he does. On the contrary, that he is doing something of which mankind will appreciate the benefit, and on which at least the best part of the world shall bestow its approbation, is the great incentive to his labors. He appreciates the difference between mere popular applause and enduring reputation; between seeing his name in a morning journal and believing that it will be associated by future generations with some great movement in the world of thought; between the good opinion of his fellowmen and the outward expressions by which that opinion is manifested. The thought of the English, German or French scientist who sees his country bestow its highest honors on some great investigator is not, "See what may be done for me if I am successful," but it is, "See what a high value my countrymen set upon the best kind of intellectual work."

Perhaps as telling an example as we can cite of the relative standing of pure science in this and in other countries will be afforded by a study of those national scientific organizations—academies, they are commonly called—which have been such important factors in the advance of civilization. Among the first of these to come into existence were the Royal Society of London and the Academy of Sciences of Paris. The former, originating in what, some two and a half centuries ago, was little more than a scientific club, gradually drew around it the leading men of science and letters in England, until it became a national scientific

society whose reputation is one of the glories of Great Britain. The visitor to London who wants to know what the England of to-day thinks of its work has only to visit the Burlington House, erected by the government as a home of science and art, and see the quarters in which its collections are kept, its business transacted and its meetings held. If he wants to appreciate its actual value as a factor in British greatness, he has only to notice the close association between its leading members and the men who administrate the British government, and see how readily the latter can avail themselves of the knowledge possessed by the Royal Society on every subject which falls within its range.

In Paris, the visitor will find the five academies which form the Institute of France, perhaps the most eminent organization in the world of learning, housed in the Palace of the Institute, where the government has been providing for its wants for two centuries. The closeness of the relations between the Academy of Sciences and the government is shown in the constant calls by the latter for the services of the Academy. When a question arises in which expert advice can be useful, the Academy is asked for its opinion. If an important scientific appointment is to be made, the Academy is requested to present a list of the three best names from which one is to be selected.

In almost every other capital the same thing is true, in a greater or less degree. In Russia, the Academy of Sciences has nearly or quite the position of a branch of the government. Its ranks include one or more grand dukes, and the dignity of membership is high in the official scale.

In Germany, the body is more purely a learned one. Still, it is under the immediate patronage of the Emperor, and its wants are supplied in the same way as in other European countries.

We also have a National Academy of Sciences, chartered in the midst of the Civil War as an adviser of the government on all matters connected with science, literature or art. In a former number of this REVIEW (May, 1900), the present writer described the origin of the Academy, and the public services which it has rendered. Of these, two merit consideration.

During the years preceding 1877 several independent and competing organizations were surveying and mapping the territories and duplicating each other's work at the public expense, even issuing independent maps of the same territory. Congress

called on the Academy to devise a single comprehensive plan for these competing surveys. The result was the present Geological Survey, which has extended its operations over the whole country, and has given such satisfaction to the public and proved its value in so striking a way as to become one of the two greatest scientific bureaus at Washington.

The other case occurred only a few years ago. The Interior Department had time and again grappled in vain with the problem of administering the forests on our public domain, and preserving them for ourselves and our posterity from depredations by men and combinations of such influence that every effort to restrain them had failed. The National Academy of Sciences was called upon, because within its members was included that knowledge of the growth of forests and of the systems of administration in foreign countries which would enable a successful remedy to be devised. The outcome of the work was our present forestry system, the value of which, as administered by the Interior and Agricultural Departments, I shall not reflect on the intelligence of the reader by attempting to estimate.

Looking at what foreign governments have done for their academies, the question naturally arises: What has our government done for our own? The answer is: Absolutely nothing. Its condition as an academy of sciences is humiliating. It has no local habitation. It must pay its expenses, clerical and otherwise, of every kind, by the contributions of its members. In the eyes of foreign academies it is the official representative of our growing American science, and as such holds a high rank among such bodies. When it comes to doing anything in a representative capacity to uphold that rank, the expense must come out of the pockets of its members.

Nor is there a prospect of anything better in the future. Instead of increasing in influence, it seems almost to have passed out of recollection as a factor in our progress. Its last and greatest work for the government, that of devising a forestry system, marked its disappearance from the public view. It would be interesting to know how many men in Congress know what it is, or are even aware of its existence. Whether a census would show one in ten or one in fifty, no one can say. One hardly knows where to look for a spectacle less befitting our civilization than that of such a body of men searching through Washington to find

a suitable place for their meeting; debating where they shall put the publications presented them by similar bodies abroad; grateful to one of their officers when he has a spare corner in which to keep their records; wondering what shall be done with an invitation from a foreign organization to send a delegate to a celebration or an international conference.

If the picture needs any additional touch, it is given by the fact that the Academy is required by its charter to give its services to the government gratuitously. Those of its members who spent their time in devising the two administrative systems which I have described could never receive a dollar for what they did; and to-day the Academy may be said to exist and live in the hope that, at some time in the near or distant future, the government may feel some need for its gratuitous services as an authority on the multifarious scientific problems with which public administration is confronted.

The founders of the Academy believed that the spectacle of a body of the ablest scientific investigators giving their services without reward to promote the public weal would act as an inspiring example, impress the public with a high sense of the dignity of science, and elevate learning in the eyes of our political leaders.

A cynic might reply that this only shows how slight was the knowledge of the world possessed by these men. Congress has no way of measuring the value of services lying outside the usual range of its experience except by their cost. When one works for nothing the value set upon his services will naturally be expressed by the mathematical zero. The idea that Congress would ever supply a place of meeting or a clerk to such men would never have been entertained by men of practical sagacity.

Between these views, I leave it to the reader to determine where the truth lies. I do not think any close observer of the operations of government during the past thirty years will contest the following proposition. If Congress, when it chartered the National Academy of Sciences, had supplied it with a fine building for its meetings, records and collections, had paid the expenses of every member who attended its meetings, had supplied it with the necessary assistance to enable it to conduct business continuously, and had provided that no appropriation should be made for any scientific object until it had been referred to and recommended

by the Academy, the outlay would have proved, from a purely sordid point of view, a good paying investment.

This state of things looks all the more anomalous when we consider the unsurpassed interest which, as I have already shown, our people and its government take in the progress of science. If our views were no broader than those of the European peasantry and our national resources meagre in a corresponding degree, it would not be at all surprising that an Academy of Sciences should receive scant attention at the hands of government, and that men should be unable to see of what use it could be to the public. But how can such a state of things exist in a community and under a government like ours? The answer is clear. It is the natural outcome of that gap between the world of politics and the world of learning which is so marked a feature of society as it exists to-day, both in the country at large and at the National Capital. How the government and the learning of the great European nations are brought into contact I have already set forth, in describing the relations of national scientific organizations to their respective governments. But this does not constitute the sole point of contact between politics and learning abroad. To the American visitor to England, seizing the opportunity to make careful observations, no feature of public life will be more striking than the extent to which national leadership of every kind is united in a homogeneous mass. The leaders of thought and the leaders of action, the men of letters and the men of affairs, know each other personally, meet together, club together and dine together to an extent quite beyond anything that we know. At the annual banquet of the Royal Society one may see the government represented by one or more of its leading members. At the principal clubs he will find Members of Parliament, both lords and commoners, as well as men of science, art and letters. If he is present at an informal sociable at the house of a political leader, he may find the best known men of letters among them. Sitting in both Houses of Parliament will be found representatives of literature and science, the leading men of the universities, as well as the more prominent actors in all other walks of life. He will find men like Kelvin with a seat in the House of Lords, and hereditary lords interested in scientific investigation.

Very different is the case with us. I speak subject to correction; but my impression is that the foreign visitor to Washington,

mingling with our public men, would not be likely to meet a single person whose name he would recall as prominent in the world of learning. If he attended the gatherings of the large body of scientific men now in the employ of the government, I speak with entire confidence in saying that he would not meet a single man prominent in public life, unless special arrangements were made for him to do so. During the last thirty years I know of only two well-known writers of books who have sat in either house of Congress. One was Mr. Cox, first of Ohio and then of New York; the other is the present junior Senator from Massachusetts. If the opinion that men of learning are, by that very fact, more or less incapacitated from being factors in public affairs is still entertained by any intelligent person, the examples of these men should set it at rest. Mr. Bryce has considered this subject somewhat briefly in the chapter in which he discusses the question why the best men among us do not enter into politics; but the special point here brought out seems to have escaped him.

This want of touch between our academic and political classes is at the same time the cause and the effect of the imperfections in the apprehension of things scientific by our public men. It is clearly abnormal. If a statesman cannot be expected to have a close acquaintance with the principles of science, he should at least be able to appreciate the special relation of each branch of research to the public welfare, and should know where or to whom to go for light on the relation of a scientific subject to the government.

It might naturally be supposed that this deplorable gap between the two classes whose co-operation is essential to the progress of civilization grows out of our backward condition as a learned nation, and will rapidly close up with the advance of intelligence. But the feature of the case which will, at first sight, seem most singular is that, instead of showing this tendency, the trend of events is in the opposite direction. That the gap is not a mark of our former backward condition in science and letters is shown by the fact that it did not exist in the early days of the republic. What little science the country had in his day was in close touch with Washington. Jefferson took pride in being personally acquainted with such of his countrymen as had any claims to a position in the world of learning. He was actively interested in scientific progress, not merely in a technical and machinelike

way, but in promoting science through stimulating the work of individual investigators. Sometime in the forties a National Institute for the promotion of science was organized in Washington. It may surprise the reader of the present day to hear that, even at as late a date as that, men eminent in public life were leading members of this organization. Its first president was a Secretary of the Navy; its second a Senator. In the early days of our National Academy of Sciences it was much more a feature of Washington life than it is now. The fact of its annual meetings in Washington was known to men holding positions as high as that of head of a department, the daily journals reported and discussed its proceedings to a greater or less extent, and on one occasion a President of the United States appeared at a meeting.

We are not to regard this seeming case of decadence as proof of any retrograde movement in the intellectual standard of our politics. It is one of the natural features of social development—a result of that multiplication and differentiation of social functions which are characteristic of advancing civilization; and the only reason why it is not universal is that those agencies which prevent the same effect in other countries do not exist among us. Our statesmen find the problems of government which press on their attention continually increasing both in number and complexity, thus giving them less and less time for informing themselves on any subject lying outside the range of their immediate interests. The reason why the same effect is not produced in foreign countries will be seen from what I have already said. The association between science and politics has there been so closely kept up, both by custom and by the influence of men of learning in public affairs, as to counteract the tendency in question. Among us this binding influence has not existed and differentiation has gone on without impediment.

I see but one cure for these conditions, but one way of introducing the academic element into the political atmosphere of our capital. It is to make Washington a centre of learning in which all that is greatest in the human intellect shall be represented by leaders of world-wide reputation and strong personality, who can speak and act independently of government control, and thus be free from the restraint which shackles the utterances of a public officer. The most effective way to bring this about would seem to lie through the establishment of a great university or other

scientific institution having as little connection with government as possible, yet not so foreign to it as to be of no interest to our authorities. Great things may be hoped of the Carnegie Institution as a coming agency of reform. One is bewildered in trying to forecast the results of an enterprise starting on so magnificent a scale and under conditions so promising as this does. What can be said is that there is every prospect of its proving such an agency in the promotion of knowledge as the world has rarely seen. Let us hope that the historian of the future shall also be able to add that it was the agency that brought the politics and the learning of our country into sympathy and harmonious co-operation.

SIMON NEWCOMB.

HOW CIVIL GOVERNMENT WAS ESTABLISHED IN PORTO RICO.

BY CHARLES H. ALLEN, FIRST CIVIL GOVERNOR OF PORTO RICO.

IF civil government in Porto Rico has not cost the people of the United States one dollar, because it has been self supporting from the beginning, it must not therefore be carelessly thought that such a condition came about naturally, and without anxiety and constant watchfulness. The story of some of the earlier anxieties, and of the problems which were met and successfully solved without precedent to guide those who were charged with the task of inaugurating the new order, may prove interesting as forming a new chapter in the history of our national development.

On the completion of the transfer of the island to American control, the Department of Porto Rico was created, and Major General John R. Brooke was placed in command as military governor. He was succeeded in that capacity, on the 6th of December, 1898, by Major General Guy V. Henry, and he in turn, on the 9th of May, 1899, by Brigadier General George W. Davis, who held the position until, under the act of Congress, the civil government was put in force on the 1st of May, 1900.

The exciting debate in the House of Representatives over the Civil Government Act for Porto Rico will be remembered. It was vigorous, interesting, and as much of the bill as related to the tariff provision as applied to the new government of the island was earnestly contested. Indeed, so close was the division that up to the taking of the final roll call the outcome of the whole measure was in doubt.

The organic act received the approval of President McKinley on the 12th of April, 1900, only eighteen days prior to the date fixed in it for the inauguration of the civil government for which it provided.

The governor's commission was signed by the President on the 18th of April. Very brief indeed was the time allowed him to prepare for the duties about to devolve upon him, as he left Washington for Porto Rico on the 21st of the same month. Reaching San Juan, the capital, on the forenoon of the 27th of April, he was visited on the ship by the military governor, General Davis; and without loss of time the two governors proceeded together to the Marina, where they stepped ashore at noon in a drenching rain. Notwithstanding the downpour, the neighboring buildings and streets were thronged with people, all seemingly bent on according the new official a hearty welcome. The insular police, together with the Porto Rican regiment under Colonel Buchanan, were drawn up in military array, and, after reviewing these bodies, the military and civil governors drove directly to the executive mansion.

Before leaving Washington, the civil governor had discussed with considerable earnestness and some anxiety the method of putting the organic act in operation, in accordance with its terms, without, however, reaching any definite conclusion in regard to a proper programme. The problem was a difficult one. The American military government of Porto Rico was modelled on the old Spanish organization—in fact, was only a modification of it—and military officers were holding nearly all the civil offices throughout the island. But, according to the statutes of the United States, no military officer could hold a civil position, even though he received no salary for it, without forfeiting his commission in the army. It had been reported from Porto Rico that there would be difficulty in securing at once suitable persons to fill the important offices as heads of the several departments. To meet this difficulty, a joint resolution had been introduced in Congress in the latter part of April, empowering military officers to continue to hold for a limited period under the civil government the positions they had occupied under the military government, so as to secure to the civil administration the aid of officers who had become experienced in their work, until such time as the proper authorities might be able to make a selection of competent civilians to fill the posts. The joint resolution passed the Senate without delay. It was still under discussion in the House of Representatives, however, when the civil governor left for the island, and when he landed at San Juan no information had been

received from Washington as to its fate. This silence naturally increased the perplexities of the situation. The civil government had to be established, within two or three days, without the aid of the experienced incumbents then holding administrative positions, owing to their inability under the law to continue longer than the 30th of April; and the problem presented was to find competent civilians to discharge the official duties temporarily, and to devise some legal method of inducting them into office.

The key to the whole intricate situation was found in that part of the organic act which provided: "That the laws and ordinances now in force shall continue in full force and effect, except as altered, amended, or modified hereinafter, or as altered or modified by military orders and decrees in force when this act shall take effect." By an application of this provision the perplexing problem was solved. Under the act, it was clearly within the authority of the military governor at any time during the month of April so to "alter, amend, or modify" by military orders the scheme and personnel of the existing government as to make them conform, as far as possible, to the organization of the civil government as contemplated by the organic law. Since Congress had not at this time passed the joint resolution above mentioned, and none but civilians could fill the civil offices, the military governor, upon the recommendation of the civil governor, promulgated and published on the evening of April 30th, 1900, a military order changing the existing system of government so as to make it conform to the system adopted by Congress; and competent, careful, and discreet civilians were selected to serve as acting officers pending the making of permanent appointments to the several positions, as the law required. The gentlemen selected assembled at the executive mansion and took the oaths of office, as acting officers.

Thus there was on the night of the 30th of April, 1900, a *de facto* government of competent persons, in no way disqualified, ready to be recognized and employed by the civil governor, as soon as he should be inaugurated on the following morning. The want of any pertinent precedent was gravely felt in all these proceedings.

The peculiar situation of Porto Rico, acquired as it had been by a treaty which left the whole future disposition of the country and its people in the hands of the American Congress, had no

parallel in the previous history of our country known to those intrusted with the organization of the new government. The act of Congress is very brief, and gives no direction as to the manner in which the military was to be superseded by the civil government. The natives of the island, speaking a foreign language, were unaccustomed to self-government and strangers to free institutions. All things considered, therefore, the governor regarded himself as fortunate in that the way had thus been cleared for the transition from military to civil authority.

The transactions of the first year are naturally divided into three periods, which may be called the transition, the formative, and the progressive periods. The transition period begins with the close of the military government and the inauguration of the civil government on the 1st of May, 1900, and ends with the formal organization of the executive council on the 28th of June following. The formative period begins with the organization of the executive council, and continues through their labors, in connection with the governor, passing the election of delegates provided for in the organic act—which occurred on the 6th day of November, 1900—and ends with the organization of the legislative assembly on the 3d of December. The progressive period begins with the organization of the legislative assembly, continues through its session, and includes the events which occurred after its adjournment.

Transition period.—At 9 o'clock on the morning of May 1st, 1900, after reviewing an impressive military and naval parade, in company with the commanding general, from the balcony of the City Hall, on the principal plaza of the capital, the governor returned to the executive mansion, escorted by the municipal council of San Juan, when the inaugural ceremonies immediately took place. On the temporary platform which had been erected at the end of Fortaleza street, just in front of and adjoining the executive mansion, and in the contiguous council chambers, about 300 prominent residents of the island were assembled, consisting of the judiciary, officials of the retiring military government and of the Army and Navy, the clergy, foreign consuls, representatives of the press, and other distinguished citizens. The streets and roofs about were thronged with an interesting multitude, who followed up the inaugural procession and filled all the vacant space as far as the voice could reach. The inaugural ceremonies

were impressive and dignified, and were witnessed by the people with great interest.

The army officers having been relieved from all civil duties, never thereafter, with one or two exceptions, held any civil office in Porto Rico, although the joint resolution empowering them to do so, if necessary, passed Congress on the 30th of April, and received executive approval on the 1st of May, as was learned in Porto Rico at 5 o'clock on May 1st, after the civilian officers had been installed in their respective places. As events proved, it was perhaps fortunate that the change was made at once and civil officers placed in charge of all the branches of the government at the same time. It is true, none of the officers acting temporarily were appointed in the manner required by the organic act, but they constituted a *de facto* if not a *de jure* government, and were recognized as such, at least for the time being.

A proclamation was issued announcing the establishment of the civil government, with the acting officers who had been appointed on the previous day by the military commander. Thus were the wheels of government set in motion.

Two of the acting officers were appointed to the offices which they had accepted temporarily, Mr. Hollander as treasurer and Mr. Garrison as auditor.

On the 19th of May, the Hon. W. H. Hunt, from the supreme bench of Montana, was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate as secretary. He came to the island promptly, reaching San Juan on the 8th of June, and qualified immediately. He assumed the burdens of his office on the 9th. In recognition of his excellent qualifications, he was promoted to the position of governor, upon the resignation of the writer on the 25th of last September.

The formation of the executive council was, of course, one of the first matters to claim attention. There being two political parties in the island—divided purely on local issues, without regard to such principles as align parties in the United States—names from both parties were submitted to the President, and from these he selected and appointed the five members of the council who were required by the organic act to be natives of Porto Rico. Two of the Porto Ricans were Federals, two were Republicans, and one Independent.

As the end of the fiscal year, June 30th, was fast approaching,

the budget for the incoming year had to be prepared without delay. This duty, of course, devolved on the governor. All available sources of information were explored, and finally a budget was arranged, sufficiently comprehensive to cover the running expenses on an economical scale, and it was duly promulgated. Acquaintance with the requirements of the civil government and its probable revenues being of necessity very limited, it was deemed expedient to reserve the right to alter, amend, or enlarge the budget as the exigencies of the government might demand.

The first meeting of the executive council was held in the council chamber at the executive mansion on Thursday, the 28th of June. A permanent organization of the council was at once effected, the Hon. W. H. Hunt, the insular secretary, being unanimously chosen president. The first business before the council was the consideration of the annual budget, which was submitted by the governor, and received unanimous approval.

On the following day, the supreme court of Porto Rico was duly organized, all the members, except Judge Sulzbacher, being present. Mr. Russell, the attorney-general, reached the island on the 12th of July, and at once entered upon the duties of his office. Judge Holt, of the United States district court, Judge Sulzbacher, of the insular supreme court, and Mr. Brumbaugh, commissioner of education, arrived on the 4th of August, and assumed charge of their respective offices on the Monday following. This completed the personnel of the insular government.

Formative period.—The formative period may be considered as beginning with the organization of the executive council, on the 28th of June, as that fact more specially marks the change in the current of events; although the delay in the arrival of some of the other officers and in the complete organization of some other departments causes the first period to overlap the second in some particulars. The active work of administration, embracing not only the routine of official duties, but the careful planning of ways and means to carry out the directions of the organic act, was entered upon promptly and pursued with alacrity. One of the first important duties of the administration, after the organization of the executive council, was to prepare for the general election which the law required to be held for the choice of delegates to the legislative assembly, and also of a resident commissioner to the United States. During those early days there was

much political excitement throughout the island, and the American members of the administration were naturally anxious that public order should be maintained, and that the election should be arranged for and held, and the legislative assembly organized, with as little nervous agitation on the part of the people as possible.

The day for the election of the commissioner being fixed by law on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, synchronous with the general election in the United States, it was thought to be wise and economical to hold the general election on the same date; accordingly, it was so ordered. The organic law enacted that the island should be divided into seven districts, and that each district should be represented by five delegates, thus making the house of delegates to consist of 35 members. The legislative assembly was to be composed of two houses, the upper being the executive council and the lower being the house of delegates. The council, being already organized, was charged with the duty of providing for the election of the members of the other chamber, to complete the assembly. Obviously, the first step which the council had to take, after fixing the date of election, was to divide the island into seven districts, as the law required. This apparently simple matter proved a very serious and intricate one, and after careful consideration it was determined to refer the question to a special committee, composed of the five Porto Rican members. Party feeling among the people was very pronounced, and the popular excitement had permeated all classes and even penetrated to the council chamber itself. After due consideration in the committee, three plans were presented to the executive council, and two days were devoted to debate upon the various propositions involved in the reports. Finally the plan proposed by the Independent member of the committee was selected by a vote of 9 to 2.

The two Federal members of the council were greatly disappointed and at once threatened to resign, which they did on the next day, the 6th of September, forwarding their resignations by cable directly to the President, who promptly accepted them. The vacancies thus created were not filled for more than two months, and matters moved on in the council with much more harmony.

It was the unchanging purpose of those intrusted with the conduct of the election, and kindred matters of importance, to con-

sider, as far as they properly could, both of the insular political parties. The leaders of each party were asked from time to time to furnish to the appointing power lists of names of their several partisans qualified to fill the various official positions. Selections were made from these lists, equal representation being given, as far as possible, to each party. As soon as the island had been divided into proper districts, the next step was to prepare an election order suited to the condition of affairs and the genius of these people, so simple in its terms as to be easily understood, and sufficiently complete in its requirements to repress and restrain fraud and dishonesty to the utmost. The task was by no means an easy one, but honest hearts and willing hands came to the aid of active minds in the council, with most excellent results.

The election laws of the various States were consulted, and portions of each were selected and modified so as to meet the conditions existing in Porto Rico. An election order was produced which has worked well, and which is thought to be equal in merit to any election law in the United States. It prescribed the qualifications of the voters, and provided for supervisors of elections and district and precinct officers. It subdivided the seven districts into 219 polling precincts, and prescribed the duties of all the officers charged with holding the election. Few, if any, defects were found in the working of the order on the important day of its trial at the polls.

But the duties of the executive council in regard to the election did not cease with the promulgation of the order. A complete registration of voters, in compliance with the very mild restrictions which had been placed upon the privilege of suffrage, was indispensable under the electoral system desired, and was provided for in an order of the council passed and promulgated on the 19th of September. It was appropriately adjusted to the terms of the election order, and, while permitting every qualified voter to cast his ballot and requiring it to be counted, was designed to prevent the reception of any illegal vote on election day or tampering with the returns thereafter. All of these purposes proved to have been accomplished by it when it was tested at the polls in actual practice. The preparation of these regulations was entrusted to Judge Hunt, and the result of his careful and intelligent effort reflects great credit upon him.

But the legislative duties of the council in preparing for the

election, while the most important, were by no means the most difficult of their labors. The smaller details of the administration and execution of these orders had to be continually watched and supervised by the council or its election committee. The supervisor of election, the district boards, the precinct officers, and polling clerks had to be appointed. Cards of advice and explanation, registration blanks, and numberless circulars of information were issued to teach these officers their functions, and the situation seemed almost to resolve itself into an electoral kindergarten, so simple were some of the queries propounded. But the council cheerfully complied with all demands made upon its time and patience, the more readily because of the strangeness of these methods to the people, and the earnest desire universally evinced to acquire practical knowledge of them. The success of their labors was a fitting and sufficient reward for all engaged in this work. No frauds were practised, and no contests made when the registration and election had been completed and the final result declared.

About the middle of September the political rancor and excitement had reached their flood tide. Articles calculated to stir the basest passions had been published in various newspapers in different towns, and personal encounters between individual members of the two parties were common. This condition of affairs culminated in an incipient riot, which occurred in the streets of the capital on the night of the 14th of September. Many shots were fired, most of them into the air, but fortunately nobody was wounded. The whole affair seemed to have been gotten up for political effect. There were, on the part of the executive, many anxious days and wakeful nights during this period, but the popular excitement gradually subsided, people began to take a more reasonable view of the situation, the baser sort were held in check, the better class regained their influence, public order was restored and maintained, and the march of progress was resumed and went steadily forward.

Immediately before the election the air was filled with divers rumors as to direful things that were to occur in the various municipalities on election day. More or less dissatisfaction had been expressed by both political parties, each charging the other with fraudulent practices. As the registration grew in numbers, the disaffection of the Federal leaders had become more pro-

nounced and had culminated in a formal announcement of the withdrawal of their party. This unexpected withdrawal, accompanied as it was by threats of intimidation on the part of irresponsible persons, had filled the more timid with alarm. In these circumstances, men, whose judgment was ordinarily to be relied upon, came in numbers to the executive mansion to insist that United States soldiers should be stationed at the various polling places throughout the island. But a careful study of the situation convinced the administration that nothing could be more unwise than to follow such advice. It was believed that if the first election could be conducted without soldiers at the polls, the object lesson which it would afford in civil government under a republic would be purchased cheaply enough, even at the cost of a few broken heads. No soldiers were called on, and none were used or needed at any polling place in the island on election day. The election was held under the control of the civil authorities alone, and more than 95 per cent. of the election officers were natives. Ample provision had been made, of course, for emergencies. The insular police were so posted that if a riot broke out at any polling place order could be at once restored. But no disorder whatever occurred, and the election passed off as quietly as it might have done in Connecticut or Massachusetts.

The election returns all came in promptly and were immediately tabulated and preserved in order, and there seemed to be no good reason why the island should not have the advantage of an early session of the legislative assembly. Accordingly, the members of the house of delegates were called upon to meet at the executive mansion on December 3d, for the purpose of organization. On the day appointed, the members marched in procession down the "Calle de la Fortaleza" to the executive mansion and paid their respects to the governor. They were a fine-looking body of men, fit to compare favorably with similar assemblies on the continent, and were all duly impressed with the dignity and importance of the high offices to which they had been elected and with the weight of the responsibility imposed upon them by the choice of their fellow-citizens. They passed through the reception room, retired to the hall which had been fitted up for the house of delegates, and there completed their organization by the election of a speaker and other necessary officers.

The terrible effects of the hurricane of August, 1899, which

had caused great devastation, loss of life and property, and general distress in the island, were fast disappearing. Something like 32,000,000 rations had been distributed by the Army during the ten months succeeding the hurricane, and the result was not generally considered to have been helpful to the people in its ulterior effects. So, upon the advent of the civil government, the special distribution to the planters had been promptly discontinued, and the general distribution throughout the island, after due notice, was stopped on the 15th of July. It had been usual to circulate reports of "destitution and starvation," and such conditions, or something approximating them, may have to some extent prevailed. There have always been poverty and destitution in this as well as in other islands of the tropics, and, on reflection, that is not very surprising. Where nature has done so much for man and requires so little in return, the problem of subsistence needs but a modicum of energy for its practical solution. A policy of "no work no ration" was promptly instituted, apparently with good results throughout the island, as it soon became more clearly apparent that the cry of "destitution" was raised more for political effect than from any necessities based upon actual conditions.

Two other causes contributed to the unsettled condition of the island, both of which, like the distribution of rations, arose out of kindly and charitable motives. The first was the remission of taxes because of losses caused by the hurricane, and the second the suspension of the law providing for the foreclosure of mortgages. The continuation of the latter was reluctantly proclaimed by the military authorities in April, 1900, for the last time. This postponed foreclosures until the 19th of January, 1901. It was thought to be the duty of the civil government to let it be publicly known at as early a date as possible that the enforcement of the mortgage law would not be further deferred, and that all people possessing means and able to pay their taxes would be expected in future to bear their proper share of the burdens of government.

To succeed the two members of the executive council who had resigned on the 6th of September, the President appointed two Porto Ricans. The appointment of the full complement of officers and the complete organization of the legislative assembly not only relieved the executive to some extent from very onerous

responsibility, but was a long stride in the direction of local self-government, and gave the native population great satisfaction. The house of delegates being almost entirely Porto Rican, and the executive council being largely so, the assembly could be fairly considered as reflecting the capacity of this insular people for local legislation.

Progressive period.—This period properly begins with the organization of the legislative assembly on December 3d, 1900. The two chambers having duly organized, notified the governor of that action on December 4th. On that day both branches of the assembly met in joint session at the theatre in the Plaza de Colon, that being the only building in San Juan large enough to accommodate the crowds of people who attended the opening session of the legislature.

The executive council, headed by its president, and the house of delegates, led by its speaker, marched in procession from their respective halls to the theatre. This auditorium is capable of holding about 2,000 people. It was beautifully decorated with American flags, palms, and a great variety of potted plants. These gave it a holiday aspect, and, with the tasteful costumes of the ladies present, made a most attractive picture. Upon one side of the stage were seated the members of the executive council, and upon the other, facing them, were arranged the members of the house of delegates. At a large table in the centre, and facing the audience assembled in the body of the house, were seated the president of the executive council, Judge Hunt, and the speaker of the house of delegates, Mr. Rossy. The parquet was floored over, bringing it to a level with the stage, and was filled to overflowing with a deeply interested and very orderly throng of spectators. The boxes on the first floor of the hall on the tier above were reserved for officers of the Army and Navy, the supreme court, and various other public functionaries, and were brilliant with the full-dress uniforms of the officers and the bright and beautiful apparel of the ladies. Officers of the British war ship "Psyche" were in attendance in full uniform, as interested spectators of this unusual scene. The upper gallery was packed with a quiet crowd of native islanders. No audience in any country could have conducted itself with better order and decorum. As soon as the legislative assembly in joint session was seated, the governor was notified and made

his appearance, accompanied by several officers, both civil and military. He was met at the entrance by a joint committee of the legislative assembly, and escorted through the broad central aisle to the seat reserved for him upon the stage between the two presiding officers.

The proceedings consisted principally of the address of the governor to the legislative assembly, which supplied the place of an opening message. This being the first discourse of the kind ever delivered in Porto Rico, it was listened to with great interest. It was read by the governor in English, and topic by topic was translated into Spanish by a competent interpreter. Being regarded by the people as an indication of the purposes of the American Administration with respect to the island, the address was received throughout with great cordiality and many expressions of entire satisfaction. At their ensuing sessions, the two houses at once proceeded to take up the recommendations which had been made to them by the chief magistrate, and to consider bills concerning the same. When it is remembered that there was not a single member of the house of delegates who had heretofore had any experience in American methods of parliamentary procedure, the work of that body is entitled to very great credit. Many bills were introduced, but comparatively few were passed. The executive council, however, had been in frequent session since the 28th of June, and had acquired all the steadiness of a reliable legislative body, as it soon proved itself to be.

By the organic act the session of the legislative assembly was limited to sixty days. Though some time was probably lost during the early days of the session, the members of the assembly, when they became accustomed to legislative business, worked diligently and steadily, holding during the month of January two or three sessions daily, and finally adjourned late at night on the last day of that month, in entire cordiality and good feeling, having placed upon the statute book thirty-six laws, all of them believed to have been wisely enacted. Altogether, there were introduced in both houses one hundred and thirty-three bills, of which one hundred and five were house bills, and twenty-eight council bills. Of the house bills fourteen became laws, and of the council bills twenty-two. A joint resolution originating in the council and a memorial to Congress originating in the house were also passed early in the session. All the enactments of the

legislative assembly, with the exception of one measure which was vetoed on technical grounds, received the executive approval, and the entire session was characterized by the utmost harmony and good feeling between the legislative and the executive departments.

The session of the legislature was well conducted and entirely creditable. The statute book should be judged by its quality rather than by its quantity. There is not a bad law in the book; very likely, some will be modified or amended as time goes on, but it is most unlikely that any will ever be repealed.

The house of delegates refused to continue further the time in which suits for foreclosure of mortgages might not be brought, and by this action Porto Ricans themselves announced that the law of contracts shall be inviolate in the island. It also passed an act authorizing the government to contract a loan of \$3,000,000 for the benefit of the agriculturists of the island. This bill was defeated in the council, and was the one instance of the session in which a clean-cut line was drawn between Continentals and Islanders, the five Porto Ricans voting for the measure, and five of the Americans against it. Throughout the session good feeling prevailed among the members and between the two houses, and after one or two experiences the defeat of a measure was accepted in good part by those who desired its passage.

At the close of the session the usual resolutions of thanks to the presiding officers were passed, and a stranger casually visiting the assembly would never have known that one of the most interesting experiments in the formation of a new government was just about to close.

The most important action of the legislature of Porto Rico, perhaps, was the enacting of the revenue law which came to be generally known as the "Hollander bill," from the Hon. J. H. Hollander, who introduced the measure. Based upon modern methods of taxation, prepared by Dr. Hollander after an expert and careful study of the local situation, it is so well adapted to the wants of the people and of the country that it is not only working with remarkable smoothness, but is yielding a revenue quite sufficient for the needs of government. More than that, the measure is so framed that the legislature, by changing percentages, may increase or reduce taxation, or by modifications of the excise features it may maintain the revenue by shifting the

tax from one commodity to another, as circumstances seem to require. Naturally, such a radical departure from tax systems of centuries aroused great apprehension among property holders, before the justice and fairness of the measure were understood and appreciated. But so well did it meet the needs of the situation, that it was possible to anticipate by more than eight months the time fixed by Congress for the discontinuance of the tariff provisions of the organic act (which were to expire by law in March, 1902), and to permit the legislature, in extraordinary session on July 4th, to pass the joint resolution informing the President that the legislative assembly of Porto Rico had enacted and put into operation a system of local taxation to meet the necessities of the government of Porto Rico; on receipt of which, on the 25th of July, 1901, he issued his proclamation declaring free trade between the United States and Porto Rico.

It will not be out of place here to call attention to the wisdom of the tariff discrimination in favor of Porto Rico enacted in the organic law, by which, owing to the growing business, the needs of government in the way of revenue were so well supplied that those charged with the administration of affairs could devote their best energies to devising a system of revenue for the island which should be permanent.

The financial situation, indeed, at the beginning of the civil government, caused much anxiety. But the administration determined that economy, prudence, absolute honesty on the part of all public functionaries, should be insisted upon, and that the safe, old-fashioned policy of "pay as you go" should be rigorously carried out. The revenue from customs receipts was the greatest help. True, the receipts for the first week, ending May 7th, only amounted to \$1,505.87; but they increased weekly, until in the third week of January last the receipts from customs alone amounted to over \$46,000.00; or in itself, in that proportion, more than enough to provide for the entire budget of about two million dollars.

In addition to this satisfactory income, there remained unexpended a large balance from the "two million dollar fund," and also the entire collections in the North of customs on merchandise received in the various ports in the United States from Porto Rico, during the period of civil government. So that the first fiscal year closed on June 30th, 1900, with all bills paid;

with a valuation of the island of over one hundred million dollars—against which there was not a dollar of floating or funded insular debt—and with a clean, wholesome surplus of over one and a half million dollars, entirely available and subject to check.

Such is the result of the first year's American administration of Porto Rico: civil government fully established and running smoothly in all departments; a complete financial reorganization, with a lower rate of taxation than elsewhere to be found, and yet yielding abundant revenue; a people contented and beginning to realize the benefits of American sovereignty, and ready to understand, perhaps, the real meaning of the motto on their Great Seal, "*Prospera lux oritur*"—a happy day is dawning.

CHARLES H. ALLEN.

THE CONFERENCE FOR INDUSTRIAL PEACE.

BY OSCAR S. STRAUS, FORMERLY UNITED STATES
MINISTER TO TURKEY.

THE recent conference under the auspices of the National Civic Federation for Industrial Peace, which assembled in the rooms of the New York Board of Trade and Transportation on December 16th and 17th last, was significant. Some claim that it will mark an epoch; I prefer to await permanent results rather than to indulge in predictions begotten of hopes. The Conference was made up of the chief leaders of organized labor, representing a membership of 2,000,000, some of the foremost representatives of the largest employers of labor, and, lastly, a number of men who by their character, standing, and unselfish services for the general welfare, represented the great public as a whole, not as diversified or separated groups, not as capitalists or laborers, but in their collective interests as members of the great body politic of our country. The Conference was significant in the fact that these varied and often warring interests assembled on a common ground, upon equal terms, with the desire of effecting results which would be advantageous to all of them by promoting industrial peace. The purpose was not to evolve theories, nor to scold at conditions, but to recognize conditions, and to endeavor in a practical way to formulate a practical plan to bring about practical harmony between the various represented interests.

The key-note of the Conference was sounded by John Mitchell, President of the United Mine Workers of America, when he stated, speaking from an experience gained from participation in as many strikes as any one of his age has taken part in:

"If the employers of labor and the representatives of the labor unions can meet in honest conference; if, when they meet, they will tell one another the absolute truth; I dare say the days of strikes and lock-outs

shall be over. I have never seen in my experience a strike that could not have been averted, if the employers and the men who work had met in conference before the strike was started."

The other representatives of organized labor, such as Gompers, Sargent, and Keefe, expressed equally hopeful views on similar lines, to the effect that, if the representatives of labor and capital, instead of trying to misunderstand each other, "will sit down and reason together, they will hasten industrial peace." The spirit of the Conference was encouraging, its deliberations were carried on upon a high and broad plane, a circumstance which was due, no doubt, to the fact that the representatives of capital and labor and of the general public met in a conciliatory and not in a carping mood, and did "sit down and reason together."

There were not lacking those who prophesied that it would be impossible to bring about a conference of so many of the leading representatives of organized labor and organized capital. That this was done is largely due to the energy, tact, and judgment of Mr. Ralph M. Easley, the Secretary of the National Civic Federation, and to his advisers, among whom were John Mitchell, Archbishop Ireland, Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, and Senator Marcus Hanna. There were others who, reasoning from past failures and from pessimistic premises, prophesied that, even if such a conference could be brought about, it would result in widening the very gap its promoters desired to bridge over. I cannot better illustrate the result of the Conference than by setting out the plan and scope of work which it unanimously adopted:

"The scope and province of this department shall be to do what may seem best to promote industrial peace; to be helpful in establishing rightful relations between employers and workers; by its good offices to endeavor to obviate and prevent strikes and lock-outs; to aid in renewing industrial relations where a rupture has occurred.

"That at all times representatives of employers and workers, organized or unorganized, should confer for the adjustment of differences or disputes before an acute stage is reached, and thus avoid or minimize the number of strikes or lock-outs.

"That mutual agreements as to conditions under which labor shall be performed should be encouraged, and that when agreements are made the terms thereof should be faithfully adhered to both in letter and spirit by both parties.

"This department, either as a whole, or a sub-committee by it appointed, shall when requested act as a forum to adjust and decide upon

questions at issue between workers and their employers, provided in its opinion the subject is one of sufficient importance.

"This department will not consider abstract industrial problems.

"This department assumes no powers of arbitration unless such powers be conferred by both parties to a dispute."

This plan is not Utopian; it does not undertake the impossible or the impracticable; its premise is voluntary action, based upon equality of rights and upon mutual concessions. The plan, it will be observed, is broad; it includes all labor, "organized and unorganized." The duty of the permanent committee is primarily preventative, "by its good offices to endeavor to obviate and prevent strikes and lock-outs." The victories which capital and labor will win under its auspices are calculated to be such as Disraeli achieved at the Congress of Berlin, bringing "peace with honor," and not such as Pyrrhus won over the Romans, when he said: "If we have such another victory, we are undone."

The plan upon which the permanent committee was formed is so simple, and so evidently just to all interests, that it is surprising it has not been tried before. While not new in itself, it is new in its application. The permanent standing committee is tripartite in its composition, embracing representatives of the two parties in direct interest, and of the third party holding the scales between them. Its chief aim is not to decide issues, but to bring parties together, to compose misunderstandings, to confer and adjust disagreements at their inception before the strike stage is reached, and to remove the causes that usually lead to that stage. In other words, its main object will be to promote, and under exceptional conditions to restore, industrial peace.

That the Committee will effect much good it is also fair to assume, by reason of the public confidence in the purposes, sincerity, and character of the members of the committee who represent the Public, Employers, and Laborers, headed, respectively, by ex-President Cleveland, Senator Hanna, and Samuel Gompers. Mr. Cleveland, whose distinguished and arduous public services have earned for him the right to enjoy his years free from public and semi-public duties, has given another evidence of his devotion to the general welfare by consenting to act as a member of this permanent committee. The fact that his acceptance was written in a sick-room emphasizes his deep interest in the cause of industrial peace. He says: "My reflections have

made it clear to me that I should accept the place assigned to me; and I do so with an earnest wish that those selected to actively represent the purposes and motives of your conference may not labor in vain."

The Conference gave an object-lesson of friendly deliberation in the spirit which pervaded it and characterized the discussions. The representatives of labor and capital spoke from the same platform, not only asserting their rights but conceding their respective errors and shortcomings. The emphatic statement by Mr. Schwab, the President of the United States Steel Company, that labor unions will never succeed as trusts in the attempt to restrict output, or in the attempt to put any restrictions upon trade in general, and that great trusts formed to control the output of any commodity, so as to raise its price, have all failed and will fail, was received by Mr. Gompers with the statement that:

"There is in our time, if not a harmony of interests, a community of interests that industrial peace shall be maintained. I will not join in that hue and cry against the combinations of capital; I realize that that is a matter of economy, of development and strength. I want to see the wage-earners discuss with the employers the question of wages and the hours of labor, and the conditions of employment that shall tend to the uplifting of the human family consistently with the industrial and commercial success of the country."

The report of the Conference will be published in full; and it is hoped that it will have the effect of bringing its light and spirit into every workshop, factory, and mine in the country, for the guidance and edification of employer as well as workman. That the problem is a difficult one; that its solution or even partial solution has not been effected in European countries, is no reason why in this country we should not ultimately reach better results. In our country, the chasm between classes, between capital and labor, is neither so wide nor so deep as it is in Europe; the transit from one class to another is continuous here. It does not require three generations to pass from the one class to the other; often only a few years of energy, industry, and ability suffice to effect the transfer. The employer and the wage-earner, therefore, ought to understand one another better, and they do understand one another better here than in Europe. The organization of laborers, instead of obstructing the relations between the employer and his employees, will, in proportion as the rights

of each are better recognized by the other, have just the contrary effect. If this "permanent forum," as the committee has been called, does nothing more than afford, to the representatives of the employers and of the workmen, a common meeting-ground on which they can discuss with each other their rights and their grievances as they arise, and if it can help to clear away misunderstandings without irritation and passion, it will perform a service of far-reaching effect. The mutterings of threatened disturbance will be a signal to summon the committee. Once summoned, the respective interests as represented on the committee will confront each other in the friendly councils of their colleagues.

That is precisely what has taken place since the writing of this article was begun. Nearly a year ago, the United Garment Workers of America, the union of organizations of garment cutters, asked the clothing manufacturers, through the National Association, to grant the cutters a working-day of eight hours. The clothiers firmly declined the request. The leaders of the union instituted a movement to strengthen their organization, so that the organization grew from about 20,000 to 40,000 members, all pledged to the struggle which was impending. The garment workers decided in December last to take their stand during the month of January. The committee that was appointed at the recent Industrial Conference has among its membership the leading representatives of both of these interests. An informal meeting of the local members of the committee was called on January 9th, and at this meeting a compromise was expeditiously reached, and the basis of an agreement was formulated by the leaders themselves, without even the need of the active participation of the other members of the committee. The agreement which has been reached, according to the statement of the representatives, will apply to the manufacturers and cutters in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, Syracuse, Utica, Rochester, Baltimore, and Cincinnati, and elsewhere throughout the country where this large industry is carried on. It affects no less than 40,000 workmen, and carries with it all the advantages and blessings that appertain to uninterrupted employment in this field of labor.

Competition, which is the propelling wheel in commerce and manufacture, which has stimulated modern inventions and the

improvement of conditions, has affected the practical application of the principle of organization and consolidation which is characteristic of our generation. Consolidation and organization on the employer's side have, naturally and perhaps necessarily, been followed by consolidation and organization on the side of labor. The new responsibilities, duties and powers thus accruing to both are not yet fully assimilated; but it can be truly said that each side is beginning to respect the rights of the other, and that both are ready to recognize the natural laws of their respective development. This is a great point gained. As Carroll D. Wright, the United States Commissioner of Labor, states in the January number of the *REVIEW*:

"After a long and tedious contest against great odds, covering nearly a century of time, consolidated labor was able to throw off legal disabilities, and take its place among modern institutions as a recognized force in public welfare, and there it must remain. . . . In our own as well as in the old country, the history of consolidated labor constitutes an integral part of our industrial development."

This same author summarizes the losses which have occurred through strikes during the last twenty years. The wage loss was \$257,863,478; the employers lost \$122,731,121. The suffering and distress, the direct and consequential losses that accompanied the pecuniary loss represented by these figures, cannot be summarized; they do not yield themselves to calculation, but they stimulate the ethical force that awakens the public conscience to the imperative duty of solving this most urgent problem of our day and generation. I am sure every member of the committee has accepted his position thereon with the sincere purpose to give his best efforts to its solution, and the faith that public opinion will encourage these efforts by its weighty support. The natural and legitimate desire on the part of wage-earners to elevate their standard of living and to improve their condition consistently with the laws of trade, must, from a sense of enlightened self-interest, win the sympathy of the employer class. No better evidence of progress in this direction need be cited than the assembling of this Conference, composed, as it was, of so many representative members, and the good feeling and harmony that characterized its proceedings from beginning to end.

Bishop Potter, in concluding his address at the Conference, said in substance:

"The labor organizations get their members into a room, and they are harangued by none others but men who look at their side of the problem. The capitalists, on the other hand, do the same thing. If I were asked to design a seal for this department, it would be the representation of the fable of the knights of the gold and silver shield, each charging the other with being a liar, because neither of them could see both sides of the shield."

This striking illustration suggests the main function and purposes of the committee—to enable both sides of this ever menacing labor question to see both sides of the question, and to apply its mystic powers to protecting the rights of each with a view to guarding and promoting Industrial Peace.

OSCAR S. STRAUS.

LAUNCHING A BATTLESHIP FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL WAYS.

BY WILLIAM M'ADOO, FORMERLY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
UNITED STATES NAVY.

GAZING at a warship lying at anchor in any of our bays, and taking in the splendid proportions, the strength, dignity and power represented by it, one's mind naturally reverts to the professional men who planned it, the builders who executed the work, and the officers and crew who man it. Here is a condensation of the best efforts of science and mechanical skill—this wonderful modern war engine, so graceful and so majestic, so instructive and pleasing to the expert critic, and so inspiring to the patriot. We can see in this embodied result the research of scientific learning, mathematical accuracy, and long and patient toil, from the day the ore left its native hills until this creation of man's experience, skill and industry appears before us as the defender of a nation's rights, liberty and honor. We imagine this ship as born in the professional council of the minds which conceived the design; but in truth hammer had never rung on its sides, nor would it have floated here, had it not been piloted skilfully through the waters of executive council and Congressional deliberation and debate.

Let us see how a warship comes to be a thing in reality from a mere conception of the professional mind. In the Navy Department there is a board composed of the heads of the Bureaus of Construction, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, Equipment, and Navigation, and Chief Intelligence Officer; and over all these is the Secretary of the Navy, who represents the President and speaks and acts for him. This board, called the Board of Construction, the General Board, of which Admiral Dewey is head, and the Chief Constructor, are the main factors in formulating

plans for new ships. The Secretary personifies the sovereignty of the civil power, as distinguished from the military or professional. He is the final and undisputed arbiter, against whose veto no action is taken, and without whose approval no official act is complete. He must be advised on the one side as to what the profession deem best for the Navy; and on the other he must be guided by the largest questions of public policy as to what is best for the nation. Before the opening of each Congress, he draws up his annual report, which is a résumé of the work of the Department for the preceding months. The wants of the service, both as to personnel and material, are stated, and Congress is urged to meet them by proper legislation.

In every report there is a building programme; that is, the Secretary states how many and what classes of ships he deems should be built in the coming year. Here is the genesis of the battleship. Before he commits himself to recommendations, he consults the professional advisers in the Department, and his recommendation as to numbers and types is generally, though not always, a consensus of professional opinion. There have been striking instances in the civil history of the Navy where the Secretary has gotten his plans outside of the Navy Department and pushed his own policy into practice as to the number and kind of ships to be built; if he so desires he has the unquestioned power to do so. Once, however, the Secretary and the General Board, which corresponds in practice somewhat to the British Admiralty, have agreed on the character of the ships, the Bureaus of Construction, Steam Engineering, Ordnance and Equipment, begin the elaboration of plans. All questions of weights, displacement and speed are put through the crucible of most careful analysis and accurate calculation; every calculation is verified again and again; models are made and tested in the proving tank at the Washington Navy Yard; all friction between the different bureaus, if any arises, must be harmonized. The hull with its armor must be capable of carrying the requirements as to ordnance; the engines, as to weight, space and speed, must meet the requirements of the completed design; the equipment must make the ship efficient, comfortable and sanitary, so as to keep at their best the living intelligences which are to inhabit her, and without which, however otherwise powerful, she would be an inert and dead thing.

The Secretary having concluded his labors and made his recommendations, reports the results to the President. Unless the President agrees to the report the recommendations are not made to Congress, and all the departmental labors will have been for naught. The President having agreed to the Secretary's report, generally embodies in his annual message his views regarding the policies recommended. His endorsement of the Secretary's recommendations for building new ships may be either positive and earnest, or conventional and conservative. The recommendations of the Executive are, so far as the building of new ships is concerned, first taken up by the House of Representatives. The report is referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, which is composed of seventeen men. The chairman of this committee and a majority of its members belong to the party controlling the House.

Our ship has now entered the stormy and sometimes dangerous waters of Congressional life. She may have received the professional and departmental sanction, but she is very likely to encounter here critics, and, possibly, enemies. Her fate is before these seventeen men. If a majority of them decide to leave her out of the appropriation bill she will vanish into the ghostland of unacted resolutions. These men are the jurors and are sovereign in their decision so far as the House is concerned. They may, if they wish, reject the highest expert opinion, and may, and very frequently do, make a naval programme of their own. Here is seen the influence of that latent jealousy which exists in all countries between the civilian and the professional soldier and sailor. It is not a turbulent and factious opposition, but one who has listened to the debates can readily see how reluctant the civilian representative is to accepting professional advice if it is thrust upon him cavalierly, and without due acknowledgment of his powers. "I know more about building a ship than you do," says the professional authority, "and you should accept my opinions without question." "You shall build no ships unless you convince me," is the retort of the civilian. It generally happens, too, that in any contest of this kind, professional opinion is divided, so that a representative who opposes the official recommendations can readily find experts to whom he can appeal in behalf of his contention—officers in and out of the service, within, of course, the limits of the Naval Regulations; naval architects, ship build-

ers, specialist writers for newspapers and magazines on questions relating to the Navy and the building of warships, and foreign opinions of a professional or other character from a multitude of sources. A strong-minded chairman of committee having his colleagues well in hand might easily defeat the united professional recommendation, say, for superimposed turrets, and in the debate in the House, composed altogether of laymen, so take advantage of professional differences in the naval world as to convince the majority that he had the best of the argument. These seventeen men, who now labor in travail with the future warship, represent many callings and all sections of the country. In times past, in the long and bitter struggles that begot the first of the New Navy, the opposition showed political, sectional, temperamental and economic differences, and sociological distrust of a professional, military body of any kind, and at times, it must be confessed, a lamentable ignorance of the subject. At the legislative beginnings of the New Navy its worst enemy was indifference. The naval question was entirely subordinated to economic ones. You could fill the House to build a post-office; you could scarcely ever get a quorum to listen to a debate on a battleship. Many otherwise patriotic men believed that war was over, and to none did this seem more plausible than to the survivors on both sides of the great civil strife through which the Republic had passed.

The Naval Affairs Committee is divided into sub-committees following the leading subjects of appropriation, such as ordnance, and construction and repairs. This latter sub-division is the first to consider the building programme. This sub-committee makes its report to the full committee. If the House is in political sympathy with the Executive, and the Secretary of the Navy for the time being has those personal qualities which commend him to members of the committee who belong to the same political party, the views of the Department will have great weight. It is always fortunate for the Navy when the Secretary commands the respect, confidence, and good will of the chairmen of the Naval Affairs Committees in the House and Senate; and it does not always follow that a Congress of the same political faith with the President will follow his views on the naval programme, if they differ with him on other subjects. Friction of a political or personal character between the Executive and Congress will always endanger the execution of the Depart-

ment's policy, and in cases of this character the Secretary may find warmer friends among the party in opposition than among those who belong to his own party. It is in this respect that the personality of the Secretary becomes a great factor in the case. A personal disagreement which has given offence to a leading member of either committee in the House or Senate may beget bitter, revengeful, and relentless opposition to any policy he may propose. Nice questions in the matter of official patronage; the extension of official courtesies, and the giving of intentional or unintended offence, may make a Secretary many enemies. Under normal conditions, and outside of the stress of war or great public enthusiasm, such as followed the battles of Manila and Santiago, harmonizing influences must be constantly at work to carry on a project such as the upbuilding of the Navy, at once national in its larger aims and local and sectional in its actual construction. It is different in England, where all parties are for naval increase, but in Germany, as here, other questions interlace with the naval one, and the government's programme has often no easy road, but in Germany the general and well rounded building scheme is never compromised as to details. Other great appropriations submitted to Congress have behind them the brutal and debauching "pork barrel" argument. You can scatter post-offices and court-houses with a lavish hand, as the farmer sows his seed, and battalions of votes will marshal themselves to defend their local interests; and when you rain the contents of the national treasury over a happy land to make waters flow where none flowed before, or check them from flowing where now the sea surges, nearly every hand is out to grasp at the golden shower, and the voice of every district, not excepting the arid lands, is warning the unhappy representative, on pain of political oblivion, to get his full share, and, if possible, a little more. A member may vote against battleships who would expire at the very thought of opposing a pension bill, without regard to its amount or its justice. At some time in his life every citizen has been in a post-office, or has certainly received a letter; millions will live and die without ever having viewed a warship, and thousands of good patriots are personally better acquainted with the local letter-carrier than they are with Admiral Dewey.

It is different with questions relating to the Army. The Navy is unlike the Army in this respect—that it has practically

no professional representatives in either House. In both Houses of Congress the soldiers of both the Union and Confederate Armies are well represented; not so with the sailors. Even in the greatest navy, the personnel is insignificant in numbers as compared with that of a great army. Six hundred men on board a battleship may, in a decisive conflict, at an important point, do or undo the work of a whole army corps; and yet, when the war is over and the relative numbers melt back again into the mass of citizens, the sailor bears a ridiculous proportion to those who fought on land. A great army represents hundreds of thousands of homes where a deep personal interest is taken in its movements, and a strong attachment and loyalty is formed for all its members. After the conflict is over, its influence on the civil administration is very great and far-reaching. The military element, by which is meant the ex-soldiers in both Houses, while generally friendly to the increase of the naval establishment, are often indifferent critics; and in the beginnings of the New Navy it was hard to convince the veterans of 1861-5 how thoroughly obsolete the ordnance and ships of that period were, and how largely modern tactics and weapons have discounted the greatest gallantry and personal bravery.

The sub-committee having reported their findings to the larger committee, the bill is then dealt with as a whole. The first consideration is as to the total amount of all the appropriations, which has to be carefully compared with those of other years. If the keynote of the session is economy, the chairman of the committee is solemnly warned by the leaders of his party in the House that all the appropriations must be unsparingly pared. He hears on all sides mutterings of bitter opposition to any increase over the preceding session. If in the country at large there is a national issue on economical administration, his party colleagues will bring every pressure to bear on him in order that his appropriation may not exceed that of the Opposition when last in power. Under such conditions the bill is before the whole committee; with an earnest endeavor to keep down the aggregate, it will be impossible to meet all the demands of the establishment, and some otherwise laudable projects will have to suffer delay or permanent defeat. Shall we give up a dock for a battleship, a machine-shop for a gunboat, a cruiser for a thousand additional men; shall we reduce the scrub-women and increase the

torpedo-boats? The committee as a whole is generally favorable to naval increase, and the following epitome of difference does not apply to it as a sample of its deliberations.

"Gentlemen," says a member from an Eastern seaport, "my people are at the mercy of England and Germany, and I have been told confidentially that we are practically defenseless. What we want are battleships that can stand up and fight, and quick enough to manœuvre with good speed. They are the cheapest defence on the whole, and there is no substitute for them. Let us have real fighting-ships, not make-believe fighting-ships. If we have to fight at all we want to fight well; we don't want canal-boats with painted ports, or converted cattle-ships, or Jules Verne's lobster chasers." "Let us go slow," says a member from the interior. "Appropriations are very great. If Kaiser Wilhelm's battleships can get up Sinkinany creek in the month of August, they don't draw enough water to mix a cup of tea in the House restaurant. What we want to do is to chase the big merchant-ships, build fast cruisers that will run down the merchant-marine and fine the enemy in hard cash; destroy his merchant-marine, as England indirectly destroyed ours during the Civil War. Let us have one with a thirty-knot speed, so that she can catch the 'Lucania' and 'Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse.' If she can run for them and run from them, she can do them up with a few duck-guns, so that you needn't pay much attention to ordnance, but just fill her up with engines, and give her six screws." "Well," says the Eastern seaboard members, "let us compromise, and in order to be sure that the battleship will not get us into any trouble with foreign nations, let us call her a 'coast-defence' battleship."

Here it may be stated that the first battleships built were designated by the Department itself as "coast-defence" battleships. These terms were undoubtedly used, as a matter of policy, to avoid Congressional opposition and meet the objections of those members and senators who were sternly opposed to our becoming a world power in the naval sense. These men believed that a battleship, simply for coast-defense, might be all right, but that a battleship which could steam across the ocean and fight would be a great national menace. The so-called coast-defence battleships are effective engines of war in the Far East, and would be safer for a trip around the world than the best Atlantic liner.

"I am opposed," says another member, "to building a battleship, and believe we should build small gun-boats." "And I," says another, "believe we should build torpedo-boats." "I, gentlemen," says another, "believe we should eliminate the whole programme and build submarine boats." "I object to the naval programme," says another member, "because the Navy is entirely an Eastern project, and all the money spent in its building is expended there and benefits that section alone." This last narrow and unpatriotic argument never found any great number of advocates. Indeed, some of the staunchest and best friends of the upbuilding of the Navy came from the Middle and Far West.

The committee generally gives hearings to the naval officers of the Department, and often requests the presence of the Secretary himself to explain in detail the proposed naval programme. Here the tact and diplomacy of the Executive office come into play. Individual members frequently come to the Department and ask for professional explanations of the character of the proposed work. If the ship is ever to be built, a wise Secretary will understand at once that the members of the committee must be reasoned with, and the whole machinery of the Department, if necessary, put in action for their enlightenment. Frequent visiting of the existing warships is a kind of object-lesson teaching which is most efficacious. Private friendships existing between naval officers and members and senators are sometimes of more effect than long range discussions; and, above and beyond all, nowhere is the press more potent. Intelligent discussions in the great dailies, in magazines and books, are very apt to affect the Congressional mind. The rudder which steers the Congressional ship through the fogs of committee debate, personal differences and the clash of interests is the aroused intelligence and forcibly expressed opinion of the majority of the people. As in nearly all cases in deliberative bodies, the programme finally agreed upon is one of compromises. It was only last winter that the country saw the whole naval programme held up for months in the fierce controversy as to the building of additional submarine boats. Often the proud squadron of battleships on paper which sets out from the granite building on Pennsylvania Avenue, emerges from the committee room on Capitol Hill decimated in numbers and reduced in proportions. The lay architect has taken a hand. Backed by the expert critics of the official proposals, he has in-

creased or decreased the number of guns, made them rapid of fire or otherwise, fixed new standards of speed, and marred or improved, as only the future can tell. Here is the weakest point in our naval progress, begetting lack of uniformity in type and of continuity of the building programme. A great, harmonious professional scheme having a definite end wanders off into needless varieties, halts, and all but stops one year, and rushes recklessly forward the year following.

The committee having agreed on the bill, it is reported to the House, accompanied by a report, generally more or less argumentative and statistical. The committee now has the laboring oar. It has worked for months on the bill in a strong educational atmosphere, and in more or less constant touch with the Department and the naval profession. Many of its members have listened to professional arguments, and have read carefully much professional matter in books and elsewhere. They have crammed up on the history of naval progress. They must now convert their less fortunate fellows. The first essential for the success of the new ship is that the committee shall be united. A divided committee in an indifferent or unfriendly House might as well abandon its programme. If the committee is thoroughly aroused to the patriotic duty of insuring the building of the new ships, the members have to become missionaries among their fellows. The proposed ship is now sailing on dangerous and tempestuous waters. She must be piloted by a clear head, a steady hand and a quick eye. She has passed out of the bay into the open waters of the Congressional Sea, into which we shall try to follow her.

She is now in the House and well within the range of another committee fortification. The cold, critical eyes of the leaders of the Committee on Appropriations, which, next to that of Ways and Means, is by far the most powerful committee in the House, are upon her. This committee, until some years ago, handled practically all of the appropriations, including that for the naval establishment. They resented bitterly the division of their powers, and in fact withstood repeated assaults before the present rules were finally carried. It is no charge against the patriotism of the members of this committee to say that it is very doubtful, had the rule remained unchanged, if the New Navy could have been built at all. Through this committee, as through a flood gate, rushed the enormous appropriations for the whole

conduct of the government. In the turbulent outrush of waters which threaten to drain the reservoir, the general inclination is very properly to lower the sluice gate. The grand totals are always in view; the enormous physical task of examining into these vast and widespread expenditures is of itself sufficient to prevent such a great, national, international, scientific, and mechanical subject as the Navy from receiving the consideration to which it is entitled; the overworked members, struggling in a chaos of statistics and disordered heaps of figures, have no time for careful and studious consideration of great and far-reaching questions of national and international importance. Among the members of this committee the appropriations for the increase of the Navy have found their most earnest and critical opponents.

The bill is to be assailed with broadsides of figures; comparisons with other appropriations, cost of maintenance of warships, cost of deviation from plans, increase in actual expenditures over estimates, difference in cost of ships of the same type, with decided preference for the most economic ship at the possible sacrifice of the most efficient one. Sometimes this opposition is very bitter and determined, and if the bill is not to be lost, the Naval Affairs Committee must countermine against the enemy's arithmetic, oppose the narrow objections of locality with the greater wants of the nation, defend the wisdom of professional experience against the pretensions of lay ignorance, and place their chief reliance on the general patriotism and pride of country of the majority of their colleagues.

The appropriation bills in the House, being placed on the calendar irregularly, come up without any special regard to order in the later weeks of the session. To each bill is assigned a day for general debate, to be followed by reading in Committee of the Whole, section by section, and then more debate to close. The order and length of debate are generally governed by a resolution of the Committee on Rules, made an order of the House. In the general debate the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee is supposed to enlighten the House fully on all the features of the bill, dwelling, of course, more especially on the increase of the Navy. This debate at times, of late years, has become very spirited and often heated. The magnitude of the sums involved and the questions of national and international policies are so interlaced that there is a wide range of discussion.

Sometimes the debate wanders off into side issues, in which the original question is lost sight of. Sometimes it becomes personal, sectional and partisan. Much depends on the chairman of the committee; he requires a thorough knowledge of his subject, expertness in debate, tact, diplomacy and good judgment, and, above all, the confidence of his colleagues. If his personal relations are unpleasant with the body of the membership, some of his colleagues on the committee must shoulder most of the work. When the New Navy was first started the opposition was not so much partisan, in that it did not follow the cleavage between the two political parties, but it was mostly personal and sectional. The opposition might be classified as, first, the general opposition to any professional military establishment, arising from a fear that a great navy would be a temptation to war, and also the source of very large expenditures; secondly, an opposition arising from a doubt in the lay mind as to whether or not the present ships, so rapid was the progress of naval architecture, would not become obsolete in a few years. This feeling was much augmented by the constant exploiting in the press and elsewhere of new weapons of offence and defence alleged to be powerful, and was heightened by discordance in the professional world on much debated questions of ships, ordnance and armor; and, lastly, a small, but bitter, opposition from the interior of the country based on the contention that the eastern and western seaboard were not so much affected by the lack of naval defence as by their eagerness to stimulate and enrich their shipbuilding plants at the expense of the Government. This last objection has been very much weakened by the fact that, in the construction of the Navy, a large number of industries, extending more or less over all the manufacturing and mining districts of the country, have been employed; and, besides, as the Navy increased, the naval stations and supply depots became more numerous, not only on the Atlantic but also on the Gulf and Pacific coasts; but, better perhaps than any economic argument based on local conditions as to expenditures, was the powerful appeal to sentiment by the felicitous practice of naming the ships after cities and States. A glance at the list in the Naval Register will show that, in this distribution, astute and diplomatic Secretaries of the Navy were quick to give due honor to interior cities and States. We are speaking now more particularly of the period before the Spanish War, the

brilliant and almost miraculous victories in that war having, it is believed, practically done away with all sectional opposition; so that this in the future is very likely to become a minor factor.

The larger question as to how great a navy we shall need is one on which men will honestly differ, according to their conception as to what is the true mission of the Republic, and what the best policy for its welfare. The friends of the Navy have always insisted that the larger the Navy the greater is the security for peace, on the same principle that the larger the police force the more safety there is for life and property; that a rich nation, weak in its naval and military defence, would be a great temptation to the covetous, overtaxed, less prosperous, but strongly armed, nations of Europe; that our diplomacy, however based on justice and ethical right, would be entirely impotent in dealing with those who, as a rule, recognize no right which has not the might to defend it; that the Navy, especially on this great hemisphere, is a civilizing influence; that the fathers of the Republic in the very articles of the Constitution* show that they did not blend their distrust of a professional military establishment with that of a proper naval defence, believing that a Navy had never imperilled the liberties of the country which created it; that the growth of our trade and the increase of our shipping demanded an increase of the Navy for their protection; that the economy of the naval budget was not to be judged by the amount but by the necessity of the expenditure it proposed, subject, however, to a strict supervision to the end of ensuring an aggressively honest administration. In all these debates the friends of the Navy had a powerful weapon in the admittedly high sense of honor and integrity of naval officers in the details of honest supervision and the high traditions of the service forbade criticism of their motives, even if one disagreed with their judgment.

The debate having consumed the time allotted to it, the bill is then read, section by section, in the committee of the whole House. Sometimes special paragraphs, such as increase of the Navy, are here again reserved for debate, limited to a certain time. The leaders of the House, if the debate becomes important, take part in this discussion. The bill is then voted on by roll call, and, if passed, is properly engrossed and sent to the Senate.

* Vide Art. I, Sec. 8, "To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money for that use shall be for a longer period than two years: to provide and maintain a navy."

It may be said that the fate of the New Navy at one time hung largely on the decision of the member who was acting temporarily for the Speaker. The opponents of the Naval Appropriation took the ground that, at each session, the amount to be expended on ships authorized by law had to be especially appropriated for as new law, in separate bills, instead of as a continuing public work. Mr. McCreery, of Kentucky, in the chair, decided that it was a continuing public work and not a new law, and therefore the moneys could be appropriated in the general appropriation bill, and not by special bills for each ship as if it were a public building.

The bill has now gone to the Senate Committee. Our ship has sailed through Statuary Hall, past the august chamber of the Supreme Court, and finds herself anchored in the finely decorated and more or less imposing room of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate. Remembering the provision of the Constitution that all appropriations must originate in the House, one might suppose that these gentlemen had been patiently awaiting the action of the House and the arrival of our warship. Such, however, in practice is far from being the case. Our ship finds herself in a crowded harbor; the Senate Committee has already constructed a programme of their own. Warships above and below the water, docks, novel weapons, battleships, gunboats, armor plate, litter this naval station of the Senate. As oblivious of the House as if the latter had been sitting in Jefferson City, Missouri, and legislating for Pike county, the Senate had considered the estimates, examined and cross-examined officers and experts, given hearings on independent bills for the construction of various craft and weapons of war, and practically formulated its own bill. The senatorial scissors and blue pencil, it can be seen at a glance, will be freely used. The Senate being a smaller body, each member has an unlimited chance of debate, senatorial courtesy rules, and the personal influence of an able and popular Senator is so powerful that the entire atmosphere surrounding the Naval Bill is more or less changed. The consideration given by the Senate Committee to the House bill is more or less, outside of conventional details, a comparison of their own bill with that of the House. The Senate Committee being the agents of a smaller and more compact body are able to give more careful attention and investigation than can the House Committee. They have,

moreover, this advantage: all of the Senators are elected for a longer term, and many of them have long records of service on the Naval Affairs Committee, so that they have acquired, if only by absorption, a wider range of knowledge regarding the subject. They have in the course of a senatorial career ample opportunity for personal observation of the actual workings of the Naval service. The Department is glad at all times to extend every possible courtesy to a Senator seeking information, and more especially to those on the committee which has charge of its affairs. All the sources of the Navy Department's information are at its command; it sits as a court of appeals to review the verdicts of the House and the decisions of its committee. Here the personality of the Senator is all important. The chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, for the best interests of the Navy, should, if possible, be in harmony on the naval question with the President and the Secretary, and as well informed as they are. A radical and personal difference between him and the Department will place our proposed ship in very dangerous waters. She will never meet in a long naval career more skilful opponents, more deadly tacticians, more persistent and successful strategists; her dangers are far greater in the apparently smooth waters of the committee harbor than in the open sea of the Senate Chamber. A whispered conversation of five minutes between two powerful Senators may wreck her on a hidden reef, or sink her without a moment's warning. The naval Senator, too, has not the same dread of contemporary opinion; he can afford to discount the pressure of the moment and is not always pursued by the shadow of the biennial nominating convention. In justice, however, to the Senate Committee it should be said that it has been characterized by a fair and equitable disposition to give full and patient hearings on the merits of the question, and has always been courteously kind in allowing both sides to enlighten it with their views.

The opposition in the Senate proper follows somewhat the same lines as in the House, but has at times been characterized by much more bitterness in debate, and by bolder charges and fiercer criticism of persons and things. The ability of every Senator to take the floor gives the widest possible range to discussion. The Senate Committee's bill has now engulfed the House bill, and is frequently marked by independence of both House

and Department. Of course, at times there is more or less substantial agreement; but now and again, as was shown last session, an intense and irreconcilable divergence between the two programmes springs up, and the contention is carried to the very last minutes of the session, to the peril of public business.

So marked has been the influence of the Senate in shaping the programme for naval increase, that very frequently independent propositions, which could not obtain the consent of the Department, ignore the House entirely and make their fight before the Senate Committee. When the naval appropriation bill is brought up in the Senate, certain Senators, by right of long, consecutive service on the Naval Affairs Committee, are given great consideration by the main body. United and determined opposition by these Senators to the Department's proposals would make their success very doubtful. These Senators have studied the naval question more or less, and have convictions on certain phases of the subject which it is hard to overcome. In both Houses our battleship is always imperilled by Senators and members who have adopted certain professional theories. When the first battleships were being provided for, the opposition rallied around a counter-programme for building monitors. The men forming this opposition were entirely honest, and were led on the outside by a distinguished and gallant admiral then in the service who believed at that time, and no doubt believes now, that a monitor is superior as a fighting machine to any battleship. As a matter of parliamentary tactics, a member or senator who believes the Navy is large enough has a very friendly welcome for any innovator who may propose anything as a substitute for the battleship or armored cruiser. In making up a successful programme, our battleship must sometimes find herself among odd marine collections. Shipbuilding plants and navy yards far apart in the different sections of the country have to be considered as possible competitive bidders. Small yards in one section where they can only build gunboats will of course desire to have more or less of these ships in the bill; and with the renewed activity in American shipbuilding, yards have sprung up in the far northwest and northeast, and signs of activity are seen on the Gulf, while the Lake region has made a most determined effort to have the treaty with Great Britain abrogated, so that gunboats might be built in the well-equipped plants of the Lake cities.

The debate in the Senate, unlike that in the House, has practically no limit. The average member of the House has to confine himself to his five minutes on a *pro-forma* amendment. A Senator can talk until exhausted on any phase of the naval question, or on subjects far removed from it. In the long, and sometimes bitter, debates in the Senate, the lines of division are more sharply accentuated than in the House. Certain Senators may be called an academic opposition, expressing jealousy of all naval and military establishments, and allowing for no difference between the army and navy as imperialistic and unrepugnant institutions, and giving voice to a glowing optimism in unarmed morality and unprotected justice, and a radical distrust of adding to the personnel of a professional military body; criticism of the prerogatives of those holding life offices, whether naval or civilian; others conduct their opposition under the general banner of retrenchment; and, lastly, there is the class alluded to above, who criticise the proposed programme from a more or less naval standpoint. Sometimes an unexpressed conviction that the appropriations should be cut down will lead to objections to the technical programme. The ships are too large; naval architects are in doubt; the ships are too small; there are proposed novelties in them; it would be better to wait for further investigation; many types are becoming obsolete; there are frauds in naval armor; the Government is being defrauded; more work should be done in the navy yards; all work should be done by contract; let us wait until we can all agree—these and many other objections are put forward with no little skill and ability. A strong, earnest appeal by the President on a question like that of the Navy is bound to have great effect, not only with his own party, but with the opposition. Sometimes our battleship is lost sight of entirely in the heat of a Senatorial debate; those bitter and relentless personal feuds which have unfortunately arisen with regard to officers in the service are brought forth, and an acrimonious debate ensues to the great injury of the service.

It would be unjust to the Senate in passing not to say that some of the speeches delivered on naval subjects, both as to material and personnel, are masterly and thoughtful, both those for and against naval increase.

Possessing such powers, the Senate works under greater external pressure from the interests concerned than does the House.

As in the House, so in the Senate, the general Appropriations Committee has to be admitted into a sort of partnership with the Naval Committee proper in superintending the development and scope of the bill, and especially as regards the actual amount of money to be expended. A great navy is proportionately much more expensive than a great army. A warship requires constant and unremitting attention to keep her in good condition; every foot she moves is at an expenditure for coal; in the course of a year she travels many thousands of miles, involving two great items for coal and oil; shifts in her crew to and from foreign stations require costly transportation; in foreign ports she is more or less at the mercy of local coal-dealers and repair-shops, so that, in addition to her great original cost, it needs a large outlay to keep her fit. This gives the critics of large expenditures an opportunity for invidious, and sometimes unjust, comparison between the aggregates for appropriations for the Army and Navy. A fort having 600 men represents nothing like the expense of a battleship with a smaller number of sailors in her crew. Her first cost is necessarily large, and to keep her in good condition there must be yards at various points, with docks capable of receiving her, surrounded by machine-shops and endless supplies to repair her in case of damage. She has to be fitted out with every appliance. She is a city in herself; she distils her own water; she makes her own electricity; she manufactures her own ice; she must have a perfect sewerage and ventilating system; she must have proper kitchens for all divisions of her crew, suitable sleeping and living apartments for her officers and men, a well-conditioned hospital, a library and a church; and last, but not least, she must have a prison and a police force.

When the debate is ended and the bill has been passed it is sent to the House. Here and there, if they are fortunate, the House members may see some faint traces of their work. Sometimes, in happy years, radical features remain untouched. The House Committee, after considering the bill, generally reports to the House that they dissent from certain Senate amendments, and the bill is returned to the Senate. The Senate reports the bill back to the House, refusing to accede to certain amendments, which are designated, and they ask that conferrees be appointed on the part of the House. The Senate and House appoint conferrees, three on each side. Now comes the real tug of war. Our

battleship is ready for the launching, but if her friends are not pulling hard and steady on the ropes she may never feel the water beneath her keel. In this conference sometimes the bill undergoes radical changes in the matter of concessions and counter-concessions. The debate in the House and Senate will probably show that each body is determined on some one feature of the programme which is in opposition to that advocated by the other. The House bill will generally come nearer to the Department's wishes than that framed by the Senate. The fate of the bill in the Senate is practically in the hands of the Senators in the conference. If they are doggedly stubborn, with a small and compact body behind them, they have the advantage. This, however, is not always the case. If the House committee is determined and united, or if its chairman throws his personality with great vigor into the contest, and can manage to hold the confidence of the House, the appropriation bill may fail if the Senate does not give way. These meetings between the conferrees at the close of an exciting session are at times marked by more or less personal feeling and great stubbornness on both sides. In this game the able and shrewd diplomats of the Senate may prove themselves masterful tacticians. Before our battleship emerges from this last and bitter contest she may have parted company with many of her fellows. The angry waters of the Senatorial whirlpool have absorbed them; her sister ships have been lost in the mysterious fogs of Senatorial diplomacy and finesse, or have gone down in raging armor-plate hurricanes, typhoons of personal contention, or perished in pitiless storms of economic sleet and snow, or been wrecked on the jagged rocks of the general opposition to a great naval establishment.

In the expiring hours of Congress, often in the early hours of morning, the opposition have had to let go their hold from sheer physical exhaustion, and our battleship is launched from the Congressional ways. Her total cost is fixed in the bill, and there is an appropriation made for beginning her construction. This total cost fixed at the time is often increased by subsequent bills, so that it is not always a criterion of the actual cost of a warship. Departmental deviation from the original plans, delays and other causes, may add to the total. Our battleship can now come proudly down Pennsylvania Avenue to receive the Presidential blessing in the shape of his signature to the bill. She must now

run the gauntlet of the sharply competing shipbuilders who are looking after the interests of the various establishments. To comply with the law, proposals and specifications are carefully compiled by the Navy Department and bids are asked. Frequently, shipbuilding firms will make two offers for the same ship, one on the Department's plans, and one on plans proposed by themselves. The bidding for the first battleships was naturally confined to one or two establishments. In fact, there was practically only one capable of doing such work on the east coast. There is generally a provision, as a concession to section—if there are two battleships, say—that one shall be built on the Pacific Coast; and, in consideration of the increased cost of labor and materials there, a certain percentage is granted to Pacific builders over their eastern competitors. If the law has allowed the Department the option, there is always a pressure to build some of these ships in the navy yards, and the Congressional delegations from States having such establishments are very apt to make themselves more or less felt. The bids being received and the contracts prepared, the Department is sometimes confronted with grave questions as to their proper distribution, having in view what is best for the interests of the Government, the capacity of the establishment, its ability to do the work in a given time, and, of course, the lowness of the bid.

Our ship has crossed the great civilian seas of contention; she is now in professional waters, endangered only as to her physical characteristics by possible frictions between the builders and the Department. In about two years, while her officers and men stand at salute and the band plays "The Star Spangled Banner," the flag so dear to all of us will slowly climb its staff, and she will go into commission and become a very part of our nation, representing the august sovereignty of eighty millions of free people, as the defender of their honor, their rights and liberties; a mighty engine of militant civilization, in peace discouraging war, and in war commanding an honorable peace.

WILLIAM McADOO.

THE PROPOSED PAN-AMERICAN UNION.

BY PRINCE A. DE YTURBIDE.

THE press and other agencies on the northern side of the Rio Grande have conveyed to the public so much erroneous information regarding Latin-America that the average American of the United States is not to blame for being ignorant of our countries and of their affairs. Error in his premises, however, unfortunately leads to error in his conclusions as to the international relations of American countries in general and as to the proposed Pan-American Union in particular. This has been shown in many instances that have revealed the belief of our northern neighbor to be that the union of American republics should appear to us in the light in which he sees it, although this belief is not founded in any measure upon knowledge of the interests and ambitions of Latin-America, but mostly upon considerations relating to his own country which seem to render such a union desirable for it.

These reflections would be justified by numerous public statements that have been made of late years, but they are suggested now by the unfavorable comments that were heard the other day in the United States when a distinguished delegate to the Pan-American Conference made, at a banquet in the City of Mexico, some amicable reference to the countries that colonized this hemisphere—and among them, of course, to the one that discovered these continents, and is, withal, the mother country of a great majority of the states represented at the Conference. It appeared to me that a few words would not be out of place at this time, to show how certain aspects of the proposed union present themselves to the conservative judgment of Spanish-America, and it may be, indeed, to the view of impartial people in the United States. Considering the nature of the official language of the day and

the influence of the erroneous conceptions to which I have referred, it is not astonishing that it should have become a habit, in discussing the international relations of America, to assume that the Latin countries of the New World are bound by their paramount interests to their northern neighbor, nor that it should be taken as a sign of intelligence to regard those interests as being so obvious as not to require clear definition, and their development as being the assurance of Spanish-American prosperity.

The conservative sense of Spanish-America does not indorse that hypothesis. On the contrary, it does not see, nor do I know that any one has explained, what interests Spanish-American countries have in common with any Power whatever to the exclusion of other countries with which they maintain profitable intercourse, and whose resources assist in the development of their wealth. Undoubtedly, friendship between the racial sections of America, based upon mutual understanding between the two races, and pursuing legitimate ends, would be prolific of common advantages which we certainly do not enjoy, and which for the present, at least, do not seem to be in the course of attainment. For it is improbable that the policy now being pursued toward this end could produce a condition of affairs that would be desirable from a Latin-American point of view, even if it reposed on a firmer basis than this union of American republics could be.

The interests common to Spanish-American countries are not subjects of arbitrary formulation. They are determined in part by universal conditions that no single nation controls, while they depend in a still greater measure upon our own special circumstances.

In the light of that elementary truth, it is easy to perceive what the most important interests of the Spanish-American countries are, and what foreign relations are best calculated to subserve them. However aptly this age may be defined as one of iron and gold, the fact remains that it is one of greater intellectual activity than any of which there is record—an age of transformation, too; and, whatever may be the conditions in which the world will rest for a while, our progress toward them has assumed, at the present stage, the form of commercialism, with its beneficent consequences of colonization and of moral and material improvement by the exchange of thought as well as of commodities. Universal commercialism, however, necessarily contains an element

which, for a long time to come, will be one of danger for Latin-American countries, and will redound to their advantage or detriment according as they deal with it. This element is the rivalry of the great exporting Powers.

The special conditions characteristic of Latin-American countries are these: They possess every element of prosperity, from the intelligence of their people to the favorable geographical position and varied wealth of their territory. They are, however, the newest factors in the scheme of modern civilization, and they may not hope to fill their proper place unless they remain in close contact with all the exponents of the world's progress. They have, on the other hand, an object which no consideration of progress or of prosperity may affect; that is, the unconditional preservation of national independence and the maintenance of the body social on a high moral level.

The paramount interests of Spanish-America, therefore, demand that her external relations be essentially commercial, and that the political phases of these relations conform to that condition. It follows from this that we are bound preferably to our best customer; by which is not necessarily meant the Power in whose account with us there appears the greatest cash balance to our credit, but the one with which we may exchange products to our greatest moral and material advantage. For it is through these relations, chiefly, that we may develop the working capital on which the world will eventually pay the interest.

From all of this it follows that, if our relations with any foreign Power be opposed to any one of those national purposes, it is no longer with interests but with complications that we have to deal.

Let us now see what harmony there would be between these axiomatic truths and a Pan-American Union on the basis of Mr. Bayard's propositions.

It need scarcely be pointed out that, when the idea of a Pan-American Union was launched, the general conditions of the world and the special conditions of each American state were very different from what they are to-day, or from what any one could have predicted that they were to be. A sovereign who has filled a pre-eminent rôle in the world's politics throughout the last decade was not a factor in the calculations of that day. The Eastern question was not an active one, save in so far as England and

Eastern Powers were concerned—there being among the latter a Power now universally recognized which was not then taken into serious account. Cuba had been a subject of speculation since 1823, but the manner in which her affairs were to influence American politics could not have been foreseen before the ratification of the treaty of Paris; and one or two other far-reaching events have taken place in Europe during the period referred to. In Spanish-America many things have occurred to transform the continent into the most hopeful quarter of the civilized world. Of these I will mention only three, the significance of which cannot possibly be exaggerated: the efficient, patriotic action of the Chilians after their revolution; the building of a world-city by the Argentine Republic; and, above all, the radical transformation that has been effected in the spirit of the Mexican people.

None of these things was counted upon, but one of the shrewdest, and perhaps the most aggressive, ministers who ever directed the foreign policy of the United States, understood better than any one else on this continent that the trend of affairs was leading to where the United States would need commercial supremacy in Latin-America. Nor is there reason to suppose that the political and the commercial domination of America by the United States furnished two distinct problems to his mind. Be this as it may, no sooner had Mr. Blaine come into power than he invited the Latin governments of the New World to meet in conference in Washington, in order to devise means of insuring the amicable settlement of differences between Latin-American states. This invitation was generally accepted, but Mr. Blaine's retirement from the Cabinet, at the end of the Garfield administration, and other obstacles chiefly of South American origin, prevented a meeting of the proposed conference. The matter continued to be agitated, however, and finally the Congress of the United States passed a bill, in accordance with which the invitation to our various governments was renewed, to consider not only the original proposition, just mentioned, but also the advisability of creating an international union which, in view of the circumstances, would be more binding than the Zollverein resorted to in the creation of the German Empire under the hegemony of Prussia, and nearly as binding as the union that constitutes the republic of the United States.

I have never heard an argument in favor of those propositions

from the Latin-American point of view, though it is probable that many have been offered. But if any such arguments have been made to appear plausible, they must have omitted all reference to the demands of the actual situation, to the requirements of Spanish-American commerce, and especially to our brilliant prospects of national development. The Spanish-American who takes these things into account necessarily regards them as singular comments upon the altruistic form that Mr. Blaine gave to the Pan-American policy of the United States—a form which was adjusted to the only immediate results to be hoped for, or, indeed, desired, by the United States from a first Pan-American conference, namely, that such a conference by merely convening should indorse the spirit of Mr. Blaine's suggestion that the United States was looked to by the states of Latin-America as their friend and guide. Nor can it be said that the material results of that congress were otherwise representative of concerted action by these continents.

But the moral effect of the Congress of 1890 is incalculable. It created between Latin-America and the United States a solidarity which is not based upon the interests of the former; which is bolstered up by theories of indefinite, so-called "mutual interests," and in which the better thought of Spanish-America finds every political risk without any moral or commercial advantage. It put the United States in a position where, of necessity, it is a factor in the internal affairs of each Spanish-American country whose government uses Pan-American language; and, as a result, the United States is held up as a species of menace to the people by every exponent of Cæsarism in the New World. Otherwise, that conference became a barrier between the racial sections of this hemisphere, so far as a healthy, mutual feeling is concerned. All of which is distinctly at variance with the official utterances of the day; but to what extent it is justified I shall endeavor to show farther on, on the highest United States authority.

These are chiefly political considerations, however, and it is from the purely commercial standpoint that I wish to view the proposed union. I have intimated that the Bayard propositions correspond to no demands of necessity, and that their realization would fulfil no requirement of existing conditions, much less of conditions that, without such a union, may be logically predicted. All of this from the purely commercial, Spanish-American point

of view. But is there not some advantage which Latin-America would derive from assenting to the proposed Zollverein? This question can be answered only by a statement of facts.

I have already given the reasons for the position that the foreign relations of Spanish-America should be essentially commercial, and that the political aspect of these relations should conform to that requirement; and this not merely on account of the immediate moral and material advantages to be derived from that policy, but because that policy would best promote our aspiration to become economically independent of all foreign Powers (to the extent, at least, to which several of the latter enjoy such independence), and to compete with them eventually in all lines, for we have over all of them great elementary advantages.

Now, to what extent are these advantages to be improved or those interests to be subserved by our establishing artificial relations with and in favor of a great exporting Power that has several successful competitors in our markets? Manifestly not at all, seeing that the advantages to be derived from special intercourse with that Power have abundantly asserted themselves already, have been measured by comparison with the benefits derived from intercourse with other Powers, and rated according to their value; and there can be no error in this valuation, for it has been set forth in the results of commercial operations—and commercial operations, as long as they remain untrammelled, give true conclusions with automatic precision. If, therefore, special support is to be given by us to the mercantile interests of any single Power, the Power that competes most successfully in our markets is evidently the one that should be preferred, for it is the one that has succeeded on its own merits, and in doing so has proved its capacity to serve us. It would be difficult to show that any nation, among those that have absorbed our foreign trade, fills so important a place in the scheme of our development that it should be favored by uncalled-for discrimination; but if such a customer we had, it assuredly could not be the Power that requests such discrimination in its favor, for if her commerce had been proven deserving of it she would not need it.

These considerations apply with greater force to the United States than to any other Power, because in the case of the United States every circumstance has been calculated to bring about the most favorable results in its commercial dealings with Spanish-

America. For twenty years the United States has displayed characteristic energy in efforts to secure a preponderance in our commerce, and with every circumstantial advantage over European competitors, it has signally failed in that endeavor. The situation in Mexico especially illustrates this fact. The United States has been connected with Mexico by railways for many years; a portion of the common frontier is on navigable water, and the Gulf of Mexico affords easy communication between Mexican ports and the greatest waterway of the States. Yet the merchant who comes to Mexico from across the sea takes up a strong position among us, which so far has been threatened more by the development of our own industries than by anything else, and it is only within a few years that the United States has been our chief importing and exporting nation, the progress it has made in this sense being largely due to the increasing numbers of the American colony among us, which affects United States trade with Mexico much more than the Italian colony of the Argentine Republic affects the commerce of its mother country.

In varied degrees analogous considerations obtain in regard to the other Spanish-American States. Why has not the United States established a practical monopoly of the trade in Ecuador, Peru and Chili? Its facilities for successful competition in those countries are as great as in the territory of her nearer Latin neighbor, if not greater, yet she is not the leader in the commerce of western South America. As to the northeastern and the eastern coasts of that continent, this geographical disparity is modified, but it is far from being annulled. On the other hand, we have all participated in the conferences, diplomatic and monetary, and in the expositions, temporary and permanent, that have been held to promote our mercantile relations with the United States. Representatives have been brought from each of our several Latin-American countries to acquire personal knowledge of the United States and its resources, and finally a bureau was established at Washington, ten years ago, to further the interests of Pan-American intercourse. The result has been that the commerce of several European Powers has withstood the entire combination, while German commerce has marched ahead of it.

Of course, I have alluded only to the more important steps that have been taken to advance the mercantile interests of the United States in this hemisphere. They represent no more than

a considerable fraction of the work that has been done in that direction by, for instance, the present Mexican government, and, in smaller proportions, by different Peruvian governments. Numerous cases of a similar nature might be cited to show, in connection with the general measures already noted, that the success of other countries in competing with the United States for our trade, in nullifying to a large extent the effect of these influences, has been due to the commercial advantages which our people have derived from intercourse with these other countries.

No one need underestimate the progress that the United States has made of late years; but the fact is almost always lost sight of in the United States that the great American republic is not the only country that has progressed, although at times candid utterances by representative men bear witness to the facts. The United States ambassador at Berlin, for instance, is reported as having made the following statement to a considerable gathering of his fellow-countrymen at a banquet on Thanksgiving Day, 1900, at the Prussian capital:

"In any event, the Americans" (meaning the Americans of the United States) "are indebted to Germany for an opportunity to profit by these splendid facilities for the study of science and art in this country. While Great Britain is known and honored as our mother country, Germany, from an intellectual point of view, is becoming more and more our second mother country, and these intellectual influences constitute a vast force in the development of American civilization."

The authoritative word of an ambassador is not needed, of course, to call one's attention to the rôle of Germany in modern civilization. But the least that may be said of it in this case is that it acknowledges one of the circumstances that make Pan-American propositions appear in a most unfavorable light from the purely commercial, Spanish-American point of view. That this would lead us into the question of the superiority of the United States in matters of invention and of cheap construction, there is no doubt. Personally, my opinion in this connection is that the United States has no more than its due representation in the world of modern scientific discovery. Where there is an Edison, there are a Röntgen, a Tesla and a Marconi. Where Brazil solves at least one feature of the problem of aërial navigation, we find her alone, or with two European powers to some extent in her company. Where Mexico produces the Mondragon gun, we find its equal only in developments of the Mauser; where

France produces nickel-steel, to be known in improved forms in the United States by the name of Harvey, Krupp comes with a German invention in this line fifty per cent. better than its immediate predecessor. And so on through the list of the great scientific applications; while in the abstract sciences and in the arts the United States does not claim to compete with older countries.

In the matter of cheap construction, specific facts would seem to justify the United States in its claim of superiority over all competitors. The commercial world, however, does not appear to concede that claim; because in its most successful fiscal year the United States was some distance from the head of the list as an exporter of manufactured articles, a fact which seems to indicate the world's verdict in the premises. Now, in the face of all these circumstances, we, of Latin-America, are asked to do all of our trading with the United States, and practically to close our markets to the rest of the world.

For my own part, I do not see wherein the mutual commercial interests of these two sections of America would lie, even if the facts to which I have referred were reversed. Would it be to the advantage of the United States that foundries and manufactories of all kinds should be multiplied throughout Spanish-America; that we should develop our copper industries; that we should produce all of our foodstuffs and textiles; and that we should devote a portion of our territory and of our resources to the production of tropical and other commodities, with which to take several hundred millions of dollars yearly from United States circulation? If so, the United States and we have mutual commercial interests of a special character. If it should be to the advantage of the Argentine Republic that United States wheat should flood European markets, and that canned products from the United States should do likewise, then the Argentine Republic has special motives for proclaiming a unity of interest with her northern neighbor. If there be a tropical state of America whose export trade might profit by the development of beet-sugar industries in the United States, or of whatever industries are calculated to compete with our special productions, then again our interests are one with those of the United States. In fine, if it be to our advantage that any Power among our customers should be relieved of the stimulus of competition, and that we should be deprived

of the benefits which that competition implies for us, then Pan-America will secure that advantage for us.

This project of a union of American states is so unreasonable from the commercial Spanish-American point of view, that it has not received serious consideration from the conservative people of Spanish-American countries, a fact that is frequently ascribed to bias by publicists of the United States, but which impartial criticism attributes to more legitimate causes. I myself, prior to 1890, promoted commercial relations between my section of the State of Puebla and northern manufactories; and as a result of suggestions emanating from the Hacienda of Sesma, one machine of United States manufacture became a standard in the Mexican market. I cite this fact to show that the charge of bias does not lie against me in making the assertion that a Pan-American union, on the basis of existing proposals, would involve nothing short of dire calamity to Spanish-America, even if its political aspect were not to be considered.

Its political aspect, of course, is the serious feature of the combination. It is not my purpose to review it here, but in an earlier portion of this article I mentioned that some general statements made in this paper had the support of high United States authority. There remains space to refer but very briefly to only two of the many utterances that might be considered in this connection. First, the definition that was given at the last annual banquet of the New York Chamber of Commerce of what the Monroe Doctrine will be in the twentieth century. That doctrine was fairly flexible in the nineteenth century. Indeed, it served the President of the United States on one occasion as the sole argument on which to base his advice to Congress that the peninsula of Yucatan should be annexed to United States territory, on the ground that the white population of Yucatan was unable to protect itself against the Indians; that that situation invited British intervention; that British intervention would be contrary to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine; and that, therefore, the United States should annex Yucatan. The Monroe Doctrine of the twentieth century, as expounded to the Chamber of Commerce, in the hearing of the Secretary of State, is not at variance with the theory to which more or less frequent expression has been given in the United States, that the mission of that country is one of conquest. Indeed, in the light of circumstances, it is as nearly

the announcement of a mission of conquest as could be given in indirect words. The countries of Spanish-America are not afraid of being conquered; but they are averse to entangling alliances with a great Power whose people wish continually to hear that they have missions of conquest, seeing that arrangements of that kind are calculated to brew trouble under almost any circumstances.

A lecture on Spanish-America, delivered some months ago by the Hon. John W. Foster, contained the second of the two utterances we are considering. On the subject of Mexico, Mr. Foster said, practically, that if the policy of Porfirio Diaz should be seriously interfered with, it might become necessary for the United States to march an army into Mexico, because then the interests of the United States would be in jeopardy. The probability being that few of Mr. Foster's hearers had much definite information as to Mexican affairs, his suggestion may have meant no more to them than that the interests of the United States are well guarded by the present Mexican government. But when that announcement came to be heralded abroad throughout Mexico by those who are interested in the present government there, it informed the citizens of Mexico, upon the *quasi* official authority of an ex-Secretary of State of the United States, that the Diaz policy has the support of the United States—which illustrates the fact, already mentioned, that exponents of Cæsarism who use Pan-American language also use the United States as a menace to the people.

Apart from all other considerations, when every barrier of race, of language, of religion, of tradition, of habit, of thought, and even of geographical distance, stands between two peoples, a political union between them cannot be peaceably brought about in the absence of a common danger or of unusual mutual interests.

There is no danger common to the states of America, and their mutual interests are common to the civilized world.

A. DE YTURBIDE.

IVAN TURGENEV.*

BY CHARLES WHIBLEY.

THE novelist, it has been said, will prove the historian of the future, and if this prophecy be fulfilled, a very generous interpretation of history will be necessary. For the novelist transmutes the baser metal of mechanical truth in the crucible of his own temperament, and the precious gold of one is but the tarnished alloy of another. No two men turn the same eye upon the world; each must discover for himself the relation in shape or color of this object to that, each must allow an individual experience to guide and control his observation. And even when we have acknowledged so much, we are still far from a just discernment of the truth. An author's character is best discovered in his book, and to explain a work by the character which it reveals, is merely to argue in a useless circle. For instance, Zola and Anatole France have both written chapters of contemporary history; and if the one picture be absolutely true, the other must be absolutely false. There is no common point between the quiet country-side of M. France, and the savage animalism of "*La Terre*": if M. Bergeret be the modern type, what shall be said of the ruffianly Rougons and the ineffable Macquarts? Yet a little reflection will save us from too violent a dogmatism. The portraits of Zola and France do not destroy one another; they are but partial, after all; and while M. Zola is gravely conscious of the dung that fertilizes the soil, M. France remembers also the grown corn, which the winds of July toss into waves of gold.

But if it be difficult to reconstruct the France that we know from her experiments in fiction, how shall we understand the secret, mysterious Russia from a study of her novels? Now,

* "The novels of Ivan Turgenev, translated from the Russian by Constance Garnett." London: Heinemann.

in the generation which is dying to-day, three masters have lived and worked, who belong not only to their own time and country, but to the literature of all countries and of all time. Turgenev, Dostoievsky, Tolstoi—all three have painted the Russia of their faith and enthusiasm, but in colors so diverse, with a sentiment so contradictory, that when we have read their books, we are left with a tangle of hostile impressions. To find a formula which shall express the vision of the three is impossible. Their books are all strange to us—strange pictures of a strange land; the elemental man reveals himself at every turn under the polish of Western refinement; but he reveals himself in so dissimilar an aspect that we can do no more than put him in the common class of humanity. If Raskolnikov be a distant cousin of Bazarov, can we regard him even as a vague kinsman to Litvinov, Lepine, or Prince Andry? Impossible though it seem, we must accept in a single act of faith the high authority of Turgenev, Dostoievsky, and Tolstoi; we must believe that their pictures are the truth seen through the eyes of a various temperament, remembering that in fifty years, when the unessential differences of politics are forgotten, the work of all three may appear harmonious even to the stranger.

Meanwhile, we judge them by their opposite faculties. Tolstoi, the real Tolstoi, not the Tolstoi of a fantastic and vapid pietism, displays for our wonder the processional quality of the epic. His vast simplicity, his monumental intuition of life's essence, his large touch, his stern disregard of useless traits and superfluous character, rank him with the early masters of the world. But if he practise the art of Homer, he has illuminated that art with brilliant flashes of insight and comprehension. Human emotion has no secrets from him, and if in his supremacy he be called epic, in his sympathy he is a modern of our latest age. He creates live men and women, as easily as we cast a shadow before us. But his men and women are not shadows; they are not even portraits; they are fashioned of blood and bone, and once they are created, they seem to move and to speak of their own volition. If we saw them in the street we should recognize them; if we heard them speak, their voices would be familiar; we know them body, mind, and soul. So it is that Tolstoi stands alone, and, may be, it is not extravagant to urge that "Peace and War" is the highest achievement in the art of fiction.

Different, indeed, are the novels of Dostoevsky, who is less concerned to sketch a character than to create an impression; and so easily does he drug his reader that, to turn one page of "A Crime and its Punishment" (for instance) is to feel a sudden poison coursing through your veins. You care not for truth or possibility; you think no more of Russia than of England. You know only that your obsession is complete and irresistible, and that peace will not be yours, until Raskolnikov's atonement be complete. A new world of sin and shame, haunted by horrific dreams and crafty spectres—this it is that Dostoevsky reveals to us. A dog, in his hands, becomes an affrighting, supernatural image. What wonder, then, that he turns the country, which his patriot soul forgave and revered, into a dusky melodrama, a wild, weltering delirium of death and darkness? Even his Machiavellian inspector of police, the least curious, yet not the least masterly, of his personages, deserved a better fate than to live again as the sham Vidocq of our modern stage, with sinister coat of fur and fatuously rolling eye. Yet the inspector is half an accident, and it is not his image that the name of Dostoevsky calls up; rather we remember the miscreant, who drank his wife's stockings, or the vision of the poor horse, flogged and broken till he dies.

And what place does Turgenev take in this hierarchy? Surely he is comparable to neither: he is as distant from the Olympus of Tolstoi as from the Inferno of Dostoevsky. He knows not the palatial style of the one, nor the other's faculty of horror. If there be one quality that the three share, it is the sense of something new and strange—as it were, the energy of a fresh people and a young world. As you read their works, you cannot but realize that the country which, lately conscious of itself, has already found so magnificent an expression, is reserved for high destinies and a rare triumph. The Russia of Peter was as a child learning to walk; the Russia of Catharine was an ape of Voltairean pedantry; the Russia of Turgenev is a hero, vague and incomplete, who may presently impose his ideas upon the West of his aspiration. Yet there is nothing heroic in Turgenev's method. He raises no clamor, he beats no drum. From the very first, he disliked plots and all the complications of his craft. Though he drew many a grotesque figure, many a scarecrow of officialdom and vanity, he never descends to caricature, and his

most highly charged portraits, such as Bazarov himself, are felt and sketched to the life. There is an elegance in his arrangement, a certainty in his exposition, which convey the impression of an effortless art, yet the fatality of his stories is sufficient to assure his readers that the effort is sustained from the first page to the last. No sooner are the characters upon the stage, than the result is inevitable. But how daintily is the necessity suggested. Here is no pitiless *ἀνάγκη* which drives men and women to their doom—only the constraint of a reasonable fate, which cannot be avoided and which yet makes no shrill outcry to be obeyed. Thus it is that his characters are men and women, rather than types or bundles of qualities. Moving to their appointed end in a free atmosphere, they need not for credibility's sake rise above the stature of human kind. "I have always needed," said he, "some ground-work upon which I could tread firmly;" and his intimate knowledge of his own personages is but a prelude to the reader's perfect understanding of them. Tolstoi's Olympians are projected from a vast background; you can walk all round them, and see them in every pose. Your acquaintance with Turgenev's men and women is rather intellectual than visible; it seems, says Stepniak, as though he had surprised their correspondence, and let you into the secret.

So he deals with ideas, not with actions. If Bazarov be his highest achievement, he drew many a young Russian besides Bazarov; and it is significant that Bazarov, who would have changed the world, fell too soon before the master of us all. "Well, go and try to disprove death. Death will disprove you, that is all." But Rudin came before, and, may be, Rudin is more clearly characteristic of Turgenev's thought than any other of his personages. "After all, if you think of it," wrote Turgenev in "Torrents of Spring," "nothing is stronger in the world—and weaker—than a word." And it is the strength and weakness of the word that Rudin illustrates. For Rudin always has the courage to speak, and never, until the end, has the courage to *do*. Like all the Russians that Turgenev knew best, he is dominated by thoughts, he is carried away by his own oratory, and it is his friend, Lezhnyov, who best sums up him and his kind:

"It's not our business to punish him, and it's not needed; he has punished himself far more cruelly than he deserved. And God grant that unhappiness may have blotted out all the harm there was in him,

and left only what was fine! I drink to the health of Rudin! I drink to the comrade of my best years, I drink to youth, to its hopes, its endeavors, its faith, and its purity, to all that our hearts beat for at twenty; we have known, and shall know, nothing better than that in life. . . . I drink to that golden time—to the health of Rudin!”

But Lezhnyov, in whom we may believe that Turgenev himself is speaking, loves his friend for his very lack of effect. “There was a time,” he allows, “when I saw your weak side; but now, believe me, I have learnt to value you. You will not make yourself a position. And I love you, Dmitri, for that; indeed I do.”

Truly, that aimlessness is admirable which is bred of sincerity and a too lofty ambition. But there is another prophet of words, whom Turgenev has sketched with a splendid precision and energy—the fool whose words correspond to no beating of the heart, to no movement of the brain. It is in “Smoke” that he pillories this impostor with the best effect, and he is, indeed, a strange animal. An apostle of revolution, he fritters away his thought in a cosmopolitan culture. He discusses Peele and Nash, whom he has not read, and is just as pleased to fall upon science as upon Gothic architecture. He loafes about Baden or Paris discussing the inapposite, and believing all the while that he is saving his country. But listen to Turgenev’s own words:

“Picking up some old, cast-off shoe, dropped ages ago by St. Simon or Fourier, and sticking it on our heads, and treating it as a sacred relic—that’s what we’re capable of; or scribbling an article on the historical and contemporary significance of the proletariat in the principal towns of France—that we can do too!”

It is a sad aimlessness, and while Rudin died at the barricade, the cosmopolitan, you are sure, went back as speedily as Gubaryov himself to savagery and the knout.

A very different creation is Bazarov, by many esteemed the final triumph of Turgenev’s art. For Bazarov is drawn with a firmer hand and a harder line than we expect in the author of his being. Nor is it so easy to appreciate him as it is to delight in Rudin or Litvinov or Sanin. Enthusiasts have carried him out of the world of art into the world of politics; they will demand worship, not appreciation. This one judges him as a real man, and believes him, though a creature of fiction, the regenerator of Russia; that other would cast a reproachful eye upon him, charging him with the destruction of the Apraksinsky shops. But

to Turgenev he was but the child of a sympathetic brain; and it is not surprising that the novelist bitterly resented Bazarov's confusion with rebellious politics. He painted the portrait of the Nihilist, said he, "simply because he could not work otherwise"; and the genesis of "*Fathers and Children*" should be enough to confound those clairvoyants who detect in every line of Turgenev's an allegory of revolution. The idea of the book came into his head, so he tells us, in August, 1860, when he was taking sea-baths at Ventnor, and never was it his intention to elaborate a theory of his own. Bazarov was sketched from life, and the model was a young provincial doctor, in whom was incarnated the fresh, chaotic element of Nihilism. That is all, but it was not enough for the politicians. Either side claimed the book as a pamphlet, and, says Turgenev, "a shadow lay on my name. I don't deceive myself. I know that shadow will remain." The pessimism is hardly justified; the shadow is already passing, but Turgenev suffered the misunderstanding which overtakes all who regard life without fanaticism, and dare to treat politics as the material of an art.

What, then, is Bazarov, whose democratic significance has been grossly exaggerated? He is science, the enemy of art; he is truth, the enemy of politics. "Nature," said he, "is not a temple, but a workshop, and man's a workman in it." Thus he called love, philosophy, and all the adornments of life "romanticism." Why admire a landscape, when you might dissect a frog? Why fall in love with a beautiful woman, whose limbs suggest the anatomist's table? But, above all, Bazarov was the champion of reform, though he knew not along what path his impulse of change and fury would carry him. "There's no dash, no hate in you," said he to Arkady, "but you've the daring of youth, and the fire of youth. Your sort, you gentry, can never get beyond refined submission or refined indignation, and that's no good. You won't fight, and yet you fancy yourselves gallant chaps—but we mean to fight." Yes, Bazarov meant to fight, and his bravery would have recoiled from nothing. Yet he harbored no illusions concerning himself. In the last chapter—a masterpiece of pathos—he confesses his own impotence. "I was needed by Russia," he murmurs "No, it's clear, I wasn't needed. And who is needed? The shoemaker's needed, the tailor's needed, the butcher . . . gives us meat." By what perversity is it that this

character, drawn with so fine, impartial a hand, with so profoundly conscious a sympathy, has been hailed as a caricature, a criminal, and a saviour? Truly politics are the beginning of madness, and perhaps it is impossible for those who are interested superfluously in the regeneration of Russia to understand the masterpieces of Turgenev. "The novelist," said Flaubert once, "has no right to express his opinion on anything whatever. Has *le bon Dieu* ever told us his opinion?" And in "Fathers and Children" Turgenev does not fall far below Flaubert's loftiest ideal.

But if he conceals his opinion of Bazarov's character, he set forth very clearly in a letter addressed to the Russian students at Heidelberg the artistic meaning of his hero. "I dreamed," said he, "of a sombre, savage, and great figure, only half emerged from barbarism, strong, *méchante*, and honest, and nevertheless doomed to perish because it is always in advance of the future." That is the sufficient and best explanation of the fearless critic, inspired to action, who is called Bazarov. But the controversy of thirty years ago is not yet finished, and Messrs. Stepniak and Garnett, who are responsible for the prefaces to Mrs. Garnett's new translation, have done their utmost, it seems to me, to befog their readers. They both have Young Russia on the brain; and, if we are to believe them, Turgenev kept a constant hand upon the public pulse. Mr. Stepniak, for instance, detects a movement in Lavretsky, and declares that "A House of Gentlefolk" is "a poem of the youth of the Russian democracy." Such a criticism would be mischievous, if it were not unintelligible. Again, Elena, the heroine of "On the Eve," "foreshadows and stands for the rise of Young Russia in the sixties." Why, indeed? Because her temperament prefers action to art and philosophy? Because, like many another spirited girl, who never heard of Russia or her movements, she prefers the strong man who can pitch a drunken German into the water or die for his country, to the chatter of a youthful intelligence? Once more, we confess, such criticism baffles us. Turgenev preached neither for nor against the new ideas. He was in no way responsible for the political condition of his country. Russia was the material of his art, and he treated it with a loftiness of purpose and a sincere impartiality which forbade him ever to play the part of advocate. But an unkind fate always confused his masterpieces with the

pamphlets of reform. His incomparable "Sketches of a Sportsman," which for gentle humor and dainty portraiture he never surpassed, appear in their own despite to have suggested to Alexander II. the liberation of the Serfs, and though it is easy to understand the sympathy which such miniatures as Hoe and Kalinitch might evoke in an honest mind, though a sensitive prince might well have deplored at once the sufferings and the resignation of the peasant, Turgenev never once completes—he never initiates—an argument. And when he painted upon a larger canvas, the chatter began of Young Russia. Of this book Young Russia approved or disapproved; at that book Young Russia girded, because it was a mere love-story. But what had Young Russia, who was reading its leaflets, to do with a poet's creations? There is only one standard by which these exquisite novels may be judged, the standard of art; the men and women who wander through the delicate fields of romance, or make love in its arbors, are not so many generalized types; they are separate and individual creations, which have won the immortality denied to radicalism and all its movements.

His young girls, for instance, are miracles of truth and sentiment. Liza, Natalya, Elena, Tatyana, are drawn all with a gentle hand, and with a conviction that sometimes frightens the reader, who now and again cannot but harbor an uneasy feeling of indiscretion. Is it true, he asks himself, that he has been eavesdropping? For how else should he thus discover the secrets of the heart? Yet the perfect effect is obtained without a thought of realism. Though Turgenev worked from the model, he suggested far more than he expressed. It was not his plan to throw down all the materials for our bewildered inspection: he stripped the finished building of its scaffolds, and showed us nothing but the exquisite design of the whole. In other words, he knew nothing of realism, as the process is understood in France. And whatever characters he chose to portray, he portrayed with the same certainty of hand and vision. Irina, the ardent, hesitating lover, is as finely wrought a portrait as Elena or Liza, and she gives him a chance of solving one of his favorite problems—the contest between love and passion. And the generals in "Smoke,"—are they not as witty and as living as the students? And who ever covered the ineffective official, the bumptious trifler, with more amiable a ridicule? Even when he travels far from his accus-

tomed haunts, he regards the strange folk that he encounters with the same intimacy, the same clarity of vision. "The Torrents of Spring," I believe, has been burdened with no allegory. Yet in interest it falls not an inch below the others. The humor of the book—a rare quality with Turgenev—does but accentuate its gentle sadness. No, it is not for his political sympathies nor for his prophetic instinct that we revere Turgenev. His calm restraint, his gay tranquillity, his reticent joy of life, his perfect adaptation of means to ends, the sureness with which his living personages move and speak under his guiding hands—these are qualities at once rarer and more lasting than the fervor of revolution and the ambition of reform.

His landscape is characteristic and appropriate. The spacious steppes, sparsely wooded, the ample gardens musical with birds, which make the backgrounds of his pictures, are suave and quiet as his own moods. Even when he carries his reader to Germany, a strange atmosphere, as of Russia the unknown, enwraps the romance; and his cosmopolitanism, unlike that of M. Bourget, is but an affair of scenic effect. The few Germans or Italians, whom he painted, do not impair an unwavering fidelity to the country of his birth. Even when the stage is foreign, the actors are (with a rare exception) Russian in soul and mind. The truth is that this cosmopolitan loved no other people than his own. Frenchmen, Germans, Englishmen—he smiled at them all, and Baden or Paris interested him, merely because in these cities he saw his countrymen in another light. So in his art he was constant to his own land, acknowledges no foreign influence in thought or style. His books are haunted by no memories that are familiar, and it is noteworthy that Aristophanes—the author whom he praised most highly—was an author from whom he seems to have learned nothing. Indeed, he placed Aristophanes above all men, because he possessed the faculty of laughter, which, said he, had only been given to two or three in the world's history. It is a curious judgment to hear from the lips of him who drew from his readers more tears than smiles; yet it is characteristic of the detached mind, which can contemplate the works of others and absorb them not. As in his writings, so in his life, he was dignified, reticent, and discreet. We know little of him, since he was not of those who courted popularity; and he would have shuddered had he lived to see the figure he cuts in M. de Goncourt's

ragbag of gossip. But the chorus of praise sung by his friends is broken by no dissentient voice. We cannot accept Renan's eloquent rhapsody that Turgenev's conscience was "the conscience of a people," that he was what no other man has ever been, "the incarnation of a race," because we believe him to have been an artist who fashioned his masterpieces without thought of the popular conscience. But Renan's eloquent rhapsody was the expression of a sincere reverence, which is echoed in the wiser, more humane appreciation of Gustave Flaubert; and from the few sketches that have come down to us, one point is clear—he was a distinguished gentleman, as well as a distinguished writer. He knew not the loud-voiced picturesqueness which too often marks his craft; and the glimpses that we get of this "*colosse charmant, ce doux géant aux cheveux blancs, qui a l'air du bienveillant génie d'une montagne ou d'une forêt,*" make us regret that for once the biographer's voice is silent.

But if Turgenev still awaits a biographer, a worthier monument has been raised to him—the monument of translation. For me, who only know Turgenev in other tongues than his own, it is impossible to appraise the merits of Mrs. Garnett's work. I can but take it as an original work; and, surely, whether it represents the precise meaning of Turgenev or not, it is from beginning to end lucid, smooth, and workmanlike. Such achievements as this would speedily remove from us the ancient reproach of Matthew Arnold, that in England the journeywork of literature is ill-done. For you may read Mrs. Garnett's version with little sense of a foreign origin; you may admire the ease with which the narrative runs along; and sometimes you may delight in a deftly turned phrase or in the right epithet. The last volumes, may be, are not quite so quick and happy as the first. But the undertaking was no light one, and it would be surprising, indeed, if the hand and brain had kept their freshness to the end.

At last, under Mrs. Garnett's auspices, Turgenev has taken that place in England which he won long since in Germany and France.

CHARLES WHIBLEY.

AMERICAN TRAVELLERS AND THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

BY F. W. WHITRIDGE.

MR. GAGE's article in the December number of the REVIEW, on the "Customs Inspection of Baggage," is interesting, not only because it is the fullest defense or explanation of the present administration of the law which has been made, but also because it fails to consider the main reasons why that administration is objectionable. Mr. Gage begins by saying that in this land of freedom our only rule is the impartial and universal law, which should be inexorably enforced on everybody. This is unquestionable and unquestioned; but it is stated as if the same were not equally true of the other lands of freedom, which now include most of the modern world. Having laid down this principle, Mr. Gage goes on to show how it was not observed by the Treasury Department, even during the first four years of his own administration. He says that "one of the greatest evils that existed before, was the wholesale extension of the so-called 'courtesies of the port,'" and he devotes eight pages out of twelve to showing the mischief caused by the granting of such courtesies, and how much good has been accomplished by abolishing them altogether, although he says it was not until March 5th of last year that the Department issued an order abolishing the courtesies of the port, and thus entirely cut off the "old impositions." I have no doubt that "the courtesies of the port" were recklessly issued by the Department and that they were abused, but until I read Mr. Gage's article I had no idea what a disreputable set of people managed, with the connivance of men in public life, to upset the impartial and universal execution of the law. Mr. Gage rightly points with pride to the fact that since the Department has abolished privilege the Government has collected

\$655,000 instead of \$152,000 in seven months alone. That is not a very large item in the revenues of the Government; it costs a good many votes and a good deal of money to collect it; but while the law is as it is, of course the duties ought to be collected.

It should be remembered, however, that the "courtesies of the port" not only protected the smuggling friends of officials, but also made up for the absence of a certain amount of common sense among those officials by furnishing a means of identification for a number of reputable people, and preventing them from being treated as if they were of doubtful character; and now that the courtesies are abolished, the Department ought either to furnish the common sense, or provide some other substitute. For it must be said that the Treasury Department's theory in administering the law is not only that everybody should be treated alike, as Mr. Gage asserts, but also that everybody should be treated as one of the worst of men, instead of one of the best. Now, the true theory, which prevails in most civilized lands, is that everybody should be treated like a gentleman, until he does something to justify his treatment as presumably a felon.

I remember two instances where the courtesies of the port were thus useful. I myself arrived in New York some years ago, with three small children, on a cold, wet day in November. As soon as possible, I went to the end of the dock to send the children with their maids to my house in the city of New York. The gatekeeper, with that rough finality which one hears in this land of freedom more often than is pleasant, waved me back, saying: "You can't leave the dock until your trunks are through." While I was attempting to reason with him, another man came up and cried out to the gatekeeper: "Garn, let him alone; de courtesies is on the desk." So my children went home, and I returned to submit my belongings to inspection. On another occasion, a gentleman living in New York, a man of the highest standing, who might fairly suppose himself to be well known, arrived at that port, and after his baggage had been examined, and the duties found to amount to a considerable sum, more than a man usually carries with him, he proposed to draw his check on a city bank in payment. The authorities declined to receive his check, and said his trunks must go to the public stores. As, however, he had the courtesies of the port, they finally agreed to accept his check if Mr. Barney Biglin, who at that time had the express

contract with the Government, would endorse it. Now, Barney Biglin is, or was, a good man. I employed him and his brother once on a time to train a college crew, and that crew won the race. But this person might well have felt annoyed at having to ask Mr. Biglin, whom he had never employed in any capacity, to endorse his check. Now, suppose there had been no courtesies of the port in those days. My children would have caught deathly colds, my friend's baggage would have gone off to the public stores, and both of us would probably have had our tempers permanently injured.

Mr. Gage enforces his point that his order of March 5th has produced a condition with which travellers are satisfied, by a number of stories and instances as to the evils of the old system and as to the workings of the new system, which are surprising. One story about a gentleman who exposed his wife to the indignity of having her person searched on the dock ought to be mentioned, for it is not a pretty story, and it reflects no credit on the gentleman, the lady, or the Custom House. It is a singular fact that a story similar to Mr. Gage's in every detail, except that it locates the extraordinary occurrence at Dover instead of New York, has been current in England for a dozen years or more. Is it possible that it has been smuggled over from that country?

Mr. Gage's argument that the present condition of things is shown to be satisfactory by the fact that the Treasury Department does not now receive as many complaints as it received while the courtesies of the port existed, is even more surprising than his stories. There is a very different explanation of that circumstance. It is that people who used to complain have given up the Department as a bad job. The fatuous character of some of the replies written by the Department, its failure to answer many complaints at all, and the permission granted by it to a private association of second-class* retail shopkeepers to place spies on the dock in New York with every facility to overlook the examination of passengers' clothes, have convinced a large number of habitual travellers that appeals to it are perfectly hopeless. In my own acquaintance I know two people who go abroad every year, who are perfectly prepared to pay duties and to conform to any reasonable regulation, who have found the Department such

* I use the expression "second-class" in no invidious sense, but in the trade sense, as defining the credit, capital and class of goods sold by these shopkeepers.

a nuisance that they now keep nearly a complete set of personal effects in Europe rather than be bothered as they have been bothered when they came back. So, also, a very considerable number of people no longer travel with their baggage, but send a large part of it ahead of them by express, and employ custom-house brokers to get it for them. I arrived, for instance, last spring, and the four or five largest families on the ship had all sent on their heavy baggage in that manner; and yet one lady, who happened to be the wife of a very rich man, and who had thus sent her baggage forward and actually arrived with a comparatively small amount, was kept on the dock for five and a half hours, either because the inspectors thought she had a suspiciously small amount of baggage, or, more probably, because they wanted to demonstrate the impartiality of the Department's administration of the universal law by treating a rich person considerably worse than they would have treated a poor one.

It must not be concluded, therefore, that travellers are very generally convinced of the justice of the Government's course, or that they are pleased with the administration of the customs, or that they think well of it, merely because the Department no longer receives as many protests as it used to receive. It does not receive some, at least, of those protests because the people who used to write them are satisfied that the Department and its officials are inaccessible to reason, insensible to the misery of their fellow-men, and deaf to the sound of derision.

Before leaving the subject of the courtesies of the port and the consequences of their abolition, it must be pointed out that Mr. Gage is in error when he says that the abuses he recites were cut off by the order of "March 5th of this year." As a matter of fact, the identical order which he quotes was issued on December 18th, 1898. It appears on page 999 of Volume II. of the Treasury Decisions for 1898, published at the Government Printing Office; so a good deal of Mr. Gage's argument and many of his instances must fall to the ground. It is at least possible that the increase in the collections for the seven months ending September 30th was in part at least caused by the largely increased purchases of the returning Americans in this *annus mirabilis* of our national prosperity.

Mr. Gage barely touches on the real basis of what he calls "the utterly unreasonable comments" on the Department. He says:

"The complaint is made in some of the newspapers that a passenger is first asked to swear in his declaration to the contents of his baggage, and then, in despite of his oath, he is searched like a criminal when he is on the dock. The passenger is simply required to do what every importer of merchandise must do under the law. There is no difference between the Custom House on the dock and the regular Custom House through which merchandise is passed. In the eyes of the law they are identical. It is rather absurd, therefore, to question the procedure of examination as regards the baggage of incoming passengers, when no one has ever dreamed of questioning the same regulations when applied to the goods of an importer.

"It is true that the law, so far as the baggage is concerned, is permissive and not mandatory; and if the experience of the department had not been such as to make it necessary to enforce a search, there would not to-day be the stringent enforcement that is found at the steamship docks."

And in the beginning of his article he says: "The customs officials are simply enforcing the law as it appears on the statute books, without fear or favor." I, and those for whom I write, have no complaint to make of the law. We are law-abiding people, ready to pay whatever duties the law prescribes, nor have we much reason to complain of the manner of collecting the duties, at least at the port of New York. I have always found the officials reasonable, obliging and efficient; and I have never had any difficulty, except upon one occasion when a special agent insisted upon knowing why my family and myself had our own baggage, and did not have some other kind or quantity—but, then, he was tipsy. Nevertheless, it must be confessed that the present law—which makes personal effects, generally, dutiable and provides that no more than \$100 in *value* of articles purchased abroad by residents of the United States shall be admitted free of duty—is vexatious. It certainly does not conform to the general principles laid down by Mr. Gage as to what the law ought to be, for it discriminates against American citizens who travel for a short time; and it sometimes works great hardship, as in the case of the lady all of whose things were destroyed in the siege of the legation at Peking, and who had to pay duty on everything she had bought to come home in. The law was enacted, moreover, under a complete misapprehension of what its effect would be. The tailors who got it up persuaded Mr. Dingley that it would produce a revenue of \$10,000,000 annually (he so stated in the House of Representatives), and they persuaded themselves that it would largely increase their sales—both of which notions were and are absurd.

What reasonable people complain of is not the law, or its enforcement; it is the regulations of the Treasury Department and its decisions, and the reasons given for these decisions. I am afraid these may be numbered among the "utterly unreasonable" comments, but let the Treasury Department consider these observations:

1. The regulations for roping off part of the dock and keeping the passengers in on one side of the ropes and their friends on the other are absolutely without warrant of law. The owners of the docks might do that, but where is the statute which permits the Department to do it? This regulation has turned out to be much less important than it promised to be; and it need not be discussed, because by common consent nobody now pays any more attention to it than is convenient.

2. The regulations as to the declarations of passengers in respect to their baggage are foolish, because they call on Americans returning home to do an impossible thing. Every America-bound steamer on the Atlantic is flooded with circulars, "By order of the Secretary of the Treasury," which read:

"It will be necessary for you to make a declaration before the United States custom officer in the saloon of this vessel, stating the number of your trunks and other packages, and their contents; and residents of the United States returning from abroad should provide a detailed list of articles purchased abroad and the prices paid therefor."

The form of affidavit American passengers are required to make says, among other things:

"That all the articles in my baggage or on my person, purchased abroad, and their cost prices paid by me or by others who have entrusted them to me, are fully set forth and described in the annexed entry."

Either that means what it says, or it is meaningless; and I think it is obvious that to enable returning Americans to comply with that regulation and to make that affidavit truthfully, every man, woman and child of them must have had hung around his or her neck while abroad an automatic cash register, which recorded not only the amount of their purchases but a description of the articles purchased; or they must have been furnished with some equivalent device. But there are no such devices and there are no such Americans; and it is safe to say that, whatever our dispositions in the matter may be, not one person in a million *can* comply with these regulations of the Treasury Department, which

were apparently made without any consideration of the manners and customs of the people whose conduct they undertake to regulate, and it would seem as if only the minimum of common sense was necessary to show that they should be changed.

3. The regulations requiring every piece of baggage to be opened and searched were not contemplated by the statute; and such regulations cannot be, and are not, complied with; and they are, moreover, offensive. The statutes under which these regulations were made are sections 2799, 2800, 2801 and 3064 of the United States Revised Statutes. The first three of these sections were enacted in 1799, the fourth in 1866. They are clearly permissive statutes only, a fact which the Department apparently did not discover until last summer. I think most lawyers would agree that the Department had gone beyond the intentions entertained by the legislature when these statutes were enacted, respectively 100 and 40 years ago. The exact phraseology of these regulations I do not know; but from the statements of the inspectors on the docks, their orders appear to be to open every piece of a passenger's baggage and to examine everything in it. In fact, that is not done, it cannot be done; and I do not see why it should be pretended that it is done. Take, for instance, a ship with 500 passengers. They will each have, say, five pieces of baggage, or 2,500 pieces in all, and they will have taken at least two hours each in their packing. So, altogether it will have taken the 500 passengers 1,000 hours to pack. Now, if their trunks are to be unpacked, inspected and repacked on the dock, which would be necessary if the search were a search, on an "impartial, universal and inexorable" principle, how long would it take the inspectors to do the job? Moreover, the mere attempt to make such a search after the declaration demanded by the Department's first regulation is offensive. We make our affidavits as to what we have; then the Department has us searched to see if we have committed perjury; and then we are told that we ought not to object, because we are only required to do what importers of merchandise have to do. But we are not such importers. There is ground under the statutes for considering all travellers as importers, but there is equally good ground under the statutes for making the distinction between ordinary travellers and importers which everybody on earth, outside the Treasury in Washington, knows to exist. I have said this regulation is offensive. It is;

but there can be no argument about such a matter. It is a question of perception, like color; either a man sees it, or he is color-blind.

4. The correspondence and decisions of the Treasury Department in respect to these regulations are discreditable to the Government. No one can read them without coming to that conclusion. But to take one or two instances. A correspondence appeared in the New York *Evening Post* three years ago, from which it appeared that the regulation requiring passengers to present an inventory of their purchases abroad was pointed out to the Department as being quite impracticable; that though the statute under which it was made had been in force since 1799, nothing of the kind had ever before been required. The Department stolidly answered that the regulation had been made under the statute "in the ordinary course" of the business of the Department; and when asked how it had taken a hundred years to get round to this particular regulation, the Department was dumb. The next instance is found at page 849 of the Treasury Decisions, 899, Volume I., and is in the form of a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to the Collector of Bangor, Maine. It says:

"You inquire first as to the right of residents of the United States to import, free of duty, personal effects to the amount of \$100 in cases where they cross the border for a temporary stay of two or three days.

"In reply to your first inquiry, I have to state that the law is silent as to the length of time a resident of the United States shall stay abroad to be entitled to the privilege. . . . Each case must be treated on its merits, and no duty levied on goods of a value of \$100 or less, purchased abroad by residents of the United States, even though their stay abroad may have been of short duration, unless it shall appear that the resident went abroad for the chief purpose of *purchasing articles of wearing apparel at a less price than that at which the articles could be procured in the United States, and that it was not his or her first offence.*"

The purchase of wearing apparel abroad by an American, cheaper than he can buy at home, is in the eyes of this gentleman an offence. There has been nothing like that since a Secretary of the Treasury decided that it was unreasonable for an American citizen to have more than seven shirts; and it is almost as bad as the case which occurred last summer, in which a reputable business man living in Philadelphia, on his return to the United States, was sent to Ellis Island, with \$10,000 in his pocket, as

likely to become a public charge because he had lost an arm or hand.

5. I am informed that these regulations were promulgated by the authorities of the Department after they had consulted the officials in actual charge of the collection of duties at all or some of the principal ports, and that the advice of those practical men was entirely disregarded in framing the regulations. Be that as it may, very many of the people in the employ of the Treasury share the views I have ventured to express.

Let me add that if these observations appear "utterly unreasonable" or disrespectful, which I should regret, they are, none the less, the views of the overwhelming majority of American citizens who travel; and they are held, though not expressed, by a very large number of staunch protectionists and loyal Republicans.

F. W. WHITRIDGE.

THE OLIGARCHY OF THE SENATE.

BY A. MAURICE LOW.

OVER the doors of the Senate of the United States might well be inscribed the motto, "*Do ut des*," for it expresses the principle which governs the members of the Senate, especially the inner circle that really controls the Upper House of Congress, that is, in fact, the government of the United States. Bismarck translated this maxim and used it in the sense of "I give in order that you may give;" Mr. Goschen rendered it into English as "the exchange of friendly offices, based on the avowed self-interest of the parties." Whether the Bismarckian or the Goschen version be accepted, the result is the same.

The founders of the Republic, while creating all possible precautions against the usurpation of the Executive, could not altogether close their eyes to the dangers which might come from legislative assumptions. Madison wrote that the founders of the Republic "seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations." And again: "It is against the enterprising ambition of this department [the legislative] that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions." Hamilton pointed this warning: "The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other has been fully displayed and illustrated by example in some preceding number. . . . The representatives of the people . . . often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other departments."

Curiously enough—curiously, that is, in the light of to-day's events—the encroachment of the House of Representatives was more feared than that of the Senate. In No. 53 of the *Federalist* this admonitory language is used:

"A few members [of the House of Representatives], as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent re-elections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members, the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate."

And again, in No. 58 of the same publication, this caution against the danger of encroachment on the part of the House was addressed to the people of New York:

"Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two houses on all legislative subjects, except the originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted that the House, composed of the greater number of members, when supported by the more powerful States, and speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people, will have no small advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two houses."

"But quitting the dim light of historical research," to use Madison's illuminating phrase, and studying the present situation by the broad glare of recent history, it may be asked: Has the House of Representatives passed the limits which rightfully belong to it, or has the Senate absorbed powers that, in the belief of the framers of the Constitution, are properly vested in the other co-ordinate branches of the government?

Basing the Federal Constitution on the British system, *mutatis mutandis*, the framers of the Constitution might well regard the House as having higher authority than the Senate, because it had the sole power to originate money bills. While that is technically correct, the power of the Senate over money bills is, in some respects, even greater than that of the House, since it is able to amend any bill which the House may send to it for concurrent action. This was the very thing feared by Mason, of Virginia, and pointed out by him; and the right of the Senate to originate, by the power of amendment, bills raising revenue and making appropriations has been confirmed by judicial approval. Technically, such bills have not originated, or rather have not been initiated, in the Senate. But when the Senate takes, for example, a tariff bill, strikes out all except the enacting clause, writes in and returns to the House a new bill, which that body is compelled to accept, it may be asked whether that particular law providing for the collection of revenue has not been created, that

is to say, originated, by the Senate, in defiance of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution, despite the permission given to the Senate to propose amendments. That which is *res adjudicata* is no longer open to question. But one may safely hazard the opinion that none of the framers of the Constitution in discussing this clause of that instrument anticipated a day when a tariff bill framed by the House would be treated with contemptuous indifference by the Senate, and a tariff bill framed by the Senate would become the law of the land. But the fact is greater than the opinion. By the power of the Senate to amend, the preponderating control supposed to have been secured to the House by endowing it with the sole right to originate money bills, has been effaced. "They, in a word, hold the purse," Hamilton said of the House; but to-day the House holds the purse while the Senate dips into it.

The Senate and the House, therefore, stand on an equal footing, so far as the control of the public purse is concerned, the House having lost the ability to coerce the Senate by withholding supplies because the Senate by "amendment" can defy the House. But the Senate always has the advantage of the House in any contest, because of the fact that it is a small and well-disciplined body, and because of the feeling of superiority which belongs to the Senatorial estate. Objections have been frequently urged against the common use of the term "Upper House" as descriptive of the Senate, on the ground that, the Senate having co-ordinate and not greater privileges than the House, it is a mistake to give it an appellation that would signify superior authority. Technically, it is true that there is no distinction in the delegated powers, and yet the Constitution itself makes a distinction between the membership of the two Houses, requiring that the Senator shall be possessed of the wisdom that follows from greater age, and the more thorough comprehension of the spirit of the country proceeding from longer citizenship, if of alien birth.

The legislative surrender of the House of Representatives to the Senate began with the election of Mr. Reed to the Speakership of the Fifty-first Congress. Mr. Reed found himself confronted by a state of affairs which needed a drastic remedy. It is only necessary here to refer incidentally to the practice which prevailed in the House of Representatives before Mr. Reed's election

to the Speakership, as the conditions are too well known to the student of current parliamentary history to require more than passing mention. The rules of the House were too feeble to permit the transaction of business unless by unanimous consent or a test of endurance. The minority always had the majority at a disadvantage. It was always possible for the minority to prevent a vote being reached simply by offering dilatory motions, or by breaking a quorum; in the one case time was consumed in calling the roll, in the other nothing could be done until the sergeant-at-arms secured the attendance of a quorum, and it often required several weary hours for the sergeant-at-arms to round up his quarry. Mr. Reed, when he came to the chair, must have had very distinct, and very unpleasant, memories of the bitter contest over the Direct Tax Bill, when for twenty-six consecutive hours the doors of the chamber were kept locked because a call of the House was in progress. If the majority were to be held responsible for legislation, it was only proper that they should have power.

Mr. Reed had the courage and the ability to frame a code of rules that made it possible for the House to conduct business in an orderly and expeditious manner. How absolutely necessary his code was is shown from the fact that his Democratic successor substantially made the Reed rules his own; and, still later, when the swing of the pendulum once more placed the House in control of the Republicans, the Republican majority saw no good reason why any change should be made in the rules. A code that has stood the test of time, that could have been easily altered but was not, that has been approved by political opponents, must possess merit. Mr. Reed's parliamentary services entitle him to the highest gratitude of the country.

Unfortunately, Mr. Reed was a revolutionist; he accomplished with one bold stroke and in a few days what, under other circumstances, would only have been brought about very gradually and after long years of discussion. The danger of a revolution is that it is apt to run to extremes; that instead of moving slowly and naturally along the line of least resistance it takes a short cut to its objective point by employing cataclysmic methods.

But further, not only did Mr. Reed feel it his duty to put an end to interminable and frivolous debate, he also regarded it as incumbent upon him to check the rapidly rising tide of extrava-

gant expenditure. Those were the days when the taunt of "a billion dollar Congress" made men turn pale. A billion dollar budget no longer affrights us.

Two important things followed from the new dispensation. One was that even vital measures were disposed of without proper consideration. When the time arrived for taking a vote the gavel fell, often in the midst of a sentence, and all debate ceased. The other was that members of the House who were unable, because of the Speaker's rigid ideas of economy, to secure appropriations in House bills, accomplished their purpose by inducing Senators to offer for them bills in the Senate in the form of amendments. Senators were not averse to doing this, as it placed Representatives under obligations to them, it increased their prestige in their States, and it added still more to the growing power of the Senate. To such an extent has the practice grown that it is now recognized, as a matter of course, that the Senate will "take care" of routine legislation to which the House is opposed or on which it is not safe to risk the chance of possible defeat in the House. Appropriations for the construction of a revenue cutter, a lighthouse tender, public buildings and other things were made by the Senate at the request of Representatives who knew the impossibility of securing favorable action by the House if the bills originated in the latter body. To preserve its own reputation for economy, the House will wink at the extravagance of the Senate. The Senate, not being so close to the people as the House, is less frightened by the charge of extravagance.

There is no way in which debate in the Senate can be abridged or terminated except by unanimous consent. The state of affairs which existed in the House prior to the election of Mr. Reed to the Speakership exists to-day in the Senate. The majority governs only by the will of the minority. It is true that it does not always suit the purpose of the minority to exercise its power, but the power is latent and not surrendered. We have seen tariff bills "amended" by the Senate so that their framers did not recognize them; we have seen a single Senator compelling a majority to come to terms with him because he threatened to make a speech which it would take six weeks to deliver; we have seen a single Senator defeat a bill carrying an appropriation of some \$70,000,000—a bill passed by the House and having a majority in its favor in the Senate—because it suited his purpose so to do.

It is because business in the Senate can only proceed by "unanimous consent" that the principle of "*Do ut des*" governs. A Senator who wants to secure an appropriation must not be too particular about some other Senator's little raid into the Treasury. Even great party measures can be brought to vote only by agreement. That is the reason why, during the course of a session, the *Congressional Record* has frequent mention of these agreements; that is why the announcement is repeatedly made that a vote will be considered as ordered on a certain bill on a definite day and hour, "if there be no objection," and no objection is ever made. A pact once made in the Senate is not broken. It is an agreement between gentlemen.

It has been shown that the Senate has equal power with the House over the control of appropriations; that it can create a tariff bill by the right of amendment; that it can prevent the enactment of any bill passed by the House; that it encourages members of the House to look for legislation in the Senate rather than in the House, where it rightfully belongs. One has never heard of Senators asking favors from Representatives.

To say that the House has been reduced to a negligible quantity in legislation would be an overstatement of the case; it is no exaggeration to say that it has become an insignificant factor. In further support of this assertion let it be said—and no greater practical proof of its correctness could be offered—that the correspondents who represent in Washington the leading newspapers of the country no longer think it necessary to consult members of the House regarding legislation; they confine their attention almost exclusively to the Senate. Time was, not many years ago, when important questions were pending, when the opinions of leaders in the House were as eagerly sought by these correspondents as were the opinions of leaders in the Senate, but to-day the mastery of the Senate is so clearly recognized that it would be a waste of time to seek for information elsewhere. When the important "Platt amendment" was under discussion last spring, scarcely a word was said, either in the newspapers or at the Capitol, about the attitude of the House. The same indifference as to the position of the House was displayed while the question was being argued whether the Philippines were to be governed by Congress or were for the time being to be left in the hands of the President.

Legislation, therefore, in Washington is represented by the Senate. Does the Senate dominate the President?

Superficial observers are always fond of talking of the ease with which the President can control the Senate because he is the fountain head of patronage, unconsciously voicing the fear of Hamilton that "sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate." Now, the fact is that the nature of the relations between the President and the Senate is very similar to the character of that *enfant terrible* of our childhood whose virtues and faults have been celebrated in rhyme:

"When she was good, she was very, very good,
But when she was bad she was horrid."

Precisely so with the Senate. When President and Senate are on good terms, there is no more amiable legislative body in the world; but when the relations are strained the Senate can be extremely "horrid." Even in its most agreeable mood it constantly gives the President to understand that, while he may propose, the final disposition of measures of consequence rests with it. Allusion has been made to a single Senator defeating a great appropriation bill, and a few words of explanation will not be out of place as illustrating the control which individual Senators exercise over legislation. In the closing hours of the last session of Congress, Senator Carter, of Montana, whose term expired with that Congress and who, therefore, was no longer bound by the obligations of "*Do ut des*," began a speech against the River and Harbor bill. That bill had already been passed by the House. Mr. Carter's opposition, it was said by some, was prompted by the President, who considered that the appropriation was extravagant; Mr. Carter, it was said by others, opposed the bill because no appropriation had been made to irrigate the arid lands of his own and adjacent States. It is quite immaterial what his motive was. In the closing hours of the night before the session terminated by constitutional limitation, Mr. Carter took the floor and began a semi-serious, semi-humorous speech against the bill. His purpose soon became obvious. Senators interested in the bill fumed and fidgeted; they implored and they even threatened; but Mr. Carter was adamant. A few minutes before twelve o'clock on the fourth of March, when the session expired, Mr. Carter gracefully yielded the floor, and the bill was decently interred.

These same superficial observers, assuming that Mr. Carter had been instigated by the President, pointed to it as another evidence of the encroaching control of the President over legislation, forgetting that it was only another illustration of Senatorial power. If Mr. Carter could defeat a bill because it was not made up exactly in accordance with his views, why cannot Mr. Carter's successor do the same thing at this or any other session? In fact, he does not even have to exercise his power; it is quite sufficient for him to threaten to use it to gain his point. Mr. Carter has reminded his former colleagues that any Senator can shape any legislative act to accord with his ideas, provided he has the required determination.

There is no more striking example of the encroachment of the Senate than the way in which the Senate deals with appointments and its interference in the conduct of foreign relations. Hamilton dismissed as idle the suggestion that the President's nominations would be overruled, or that the Senate could coerce the President into nominating a particular individual; but Hamilton could not foresee a senatorial oligarchy. Presidential nominations have been frequently rejected; no President now dares to make a nomination unless the Senators from the State in which the nominee resides have given their approval. Fitness, merit, talents are not the conclusive consideration. A man nominated to be a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States was rejected because he and the Senator from his State, although of the same political faith, had been opposed to each other; the nomination of a man seeking a commission as a paymaster in the army was prevented because this man had written certain things in criticism of a Senator. No nomination is too important or too unimportant to escape this scrutiny. Here again the principle of "*Do ut des*" prevails under the euphonious guise of "senatorial courtesy." A nominee personally distasteful to a Senator must be rejected, because the time may come when some other Senator will ask a similar favor at the hands of his associates.

This is mischievous and, at times, humiliating to the President; but it is seldom dangerous. The interference of the Senate in the conduct of foreign relations and its meddling with diplomatic negotiations are fraught with serious consequences. The Constitution gives the President the power "to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur," which has

been interpreted by some expounders of the Constitution to mean that the Senate may ratify or reject a treaty as it sees fit, but it has not power to amend. This, however, is not the judicial interpretation, and the Supreme Court has decided (*Haver v. Yaker*, 9 Wall. 35) that the Senate is not required to adopt or reject a treaty as a whole, but may modify or amend it. But the Senate has assumed an even more advanced position. It now chooses to regard a treaty as simply "a project." In a letter which Senator Lodge wrote to the Boston *Transcript*, December 29th, 1900, in which he defended the position of the Senate, he used these words: "The Senate is part of the treaty-making power, and treaties sent to it for ratification are not strictly treaties, but projects for treaties; they are still inchoate." This statement, Mr. Lodge observes, is a "constitutional truism." It is in the sense that Mr. Lodge is simply paraphrasing the Constitution when he declares that the Senate is part of the treaty-making power, and he is absolutely correct in declaring that a treaty negotiated by the President is not a consummated compact until ratified by the Senate, but whether the Senate has not encroached upon executive prerogatives cannot be so lightly answered.

As showing the assumption of the Senate, notice the remarkable change made in the wording of a recent treaty. Last year the Senate ratified a treaty with Great Britain (The Tenure and Disposition of Real and Personal Property), providing for the disposition of real estate and giving any British colony the right to adhere to the convention on notice from the British Ambassador at Washington to the Secretary of State; and, similarly, any possessions of the United States beyond the seas were to be included in the compact upon notice "being given by the representative of the United States at London, by direction of the President." The Senate amended this to read "by direction of the treaty-making power of the United States." Thus, by the addition of a few words, the Senate assumed to itself the right to conduct foreign relations, an assumption for which no warrant can be found in the Constitution.

Presidents who were more jealous of their prerogatives than Mr. McKinley have read Congress a sharp lecture for attempting to interfere in foreign affairs. Jackson vetoed an act* because

* An "act to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to compromise the claims allowed by the commissioners under the treaty with the King of the Two Sicilies, concluded Oct. 14, 1832."

"in my judgment inconsistent with the division of powers in the Constitution of the United States, as it is obviously founded on the assumption that an act of Congress can give power to the Executive or to the head of one of the Departments to negotiate with a foreign government. . . . The Executive has competent authority to negotiate . . . with a foreign government—an authority Congress cannot constitutionally abridge or increase." Would Jackson have permitted the Senate to amend the Property Treaty as McKinley did? Certainly not, as we may infer from the stinging language used in the memorable "Protest" of April 15th, 1834, in which he said:

"The resolution of the Senate presupposes a right in that body to interfere with this exercise of Executive power. If the principle be once admitted . . . the constitutional independence of the Executive Department would be as effectually destroyed and its powers as effectually transferred to the Senate as if that end had been accomplished by an amendment to the Constitution."

Grant was equally jealous that the line of demarcation between the legislative and the executive should not be overstepped. In returning to the House of Representatives a "joint resolution relating to congratulations from the Argentine Republic," which directed the Secretary of State to acknowledge a dispatch of congratulation, Grant said:

"I cannot escape the conviction that their adoption has inadvertently involved the exercise of a power which infringes upon the constitutional rights of the Executive. . . . The Constitution of the United States, following the established usages of nations, has indicated the President as the agent to represent the national sovereignty in its intercourse with foreign powers and in all official communications from them."

After quoting from the act establishing the Department of State, Grant continued:

"This law, which remains substantially unchanged, confirms the view that the whole correspondence of the government with and from foreign states is intrusted to the President; that the Secretary of State conducts such correspondence exclusively under the orders and instruction of the President."

Cleveland had no scruples about making Congress understand that it must not interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs, and that the recognition of an independent state was an executive act purely, and not one with which the legislative branch could concern itself.

Having advanced the doctrine that treaties negotiated by the

President are merely "projects for treaties; they are still inchoate," the Senate has now still further encroached on the Executive by claiming to know the details of a treaty while in process of negotiation and before the treaty is submitted to it for ratification. Minos must be admitted to the secrets of Jove. That, virtually, is what the Senate compelled President McKinley and Secretary Hay to do when it so amended the Hay-Pauncefote canal treaty as to make its acceptance by the British Government impossible. Mr. Hay, instructed by the President to reopen negotiations in the endeavor to secure the assent of the British Government to a new convention, deemed it not only politic but absolutely indispensable that he should consult with leading Senators; that he should inform them of the lines on which he proposed to negotiate the new treaty, and ascertain from them if the suggested stipulations met with their approval. This he did by the direct instruction of President McKinley; not only did he advise with Senators but also with the Vice-President, who is not a member of the Senate and cannot vote on a treaty.

That "perfect *secrecy* and *immediate* dispatch" which Jay held to be "sometimes requisite" are impossible if the Senate must be consulted in advance of negotiations. Jay, who was wise enough to see that there were persons "who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate," thought that the constitutional convention had done well in providing "that although the President must, in forming them [treaties], act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest." This is antiquated doctrine. The modern doctrine makes the President merely the agent of the Senate in framing a treaty.

"The State Department in its negotiations with foreign governments has one hand tied behind its back and a ball and chain about its leg," was the remark made to the writer by a man who has had a long experience in American diplomacy. Jay voiced the fear entertained at the time of the adoption of the Constitution "that two-thirds [of the Senate] will oppress the remaining third," but to-day it is always the one-third that has the power to oppress the remaining two-thirds and the Executive as well. A treaty is always sure to meet with political opposition, the opposition, that is, of the party antagonistic to the President;

or opposition originating in prejudice, self-interest or ignorance. As instances may be cited the defeat of the Olney-Pauncefote general treaty of arbitration (the defeat of which was caused by dislike of Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Olney, and by the general prejudice then existing against the negotiation of a treaty of that character with England); the failure to act affirmatively on the French reciprocity treaty, because it was believed it might injure certain manufacturing interests; the amendments to the Hay-Pauncefote canal treaty, inserted because certain similar amendments were found in the convention on which the new treaty was based, which were perfectly proper in the one and had no place in the other; and also because certain Senators were honest enough to say that they feared the construction of the canal would seriously injure the transcontinental railroads. Every treaty will meet with opposition from one or all of these sources, which explains the extreme difficulty of securing the ratification of a treaty in these days, and why it is so much easier for the one-third to prevent ratification than it is for the two-thirds to secure it. Lest it be said that this is a criticism of the Constitution, it may be frankly answered that it is nothing of the kind; but it is a criticism of the assumption of the Senate, and it justifies the statement that the State Department is always hampered by the ball and chain of the Senate.

The desire of the Senate to leave its impress upon all treaties is shown by trivial and absurd amendments, "the customary disfigurement at the hands of the United States Senate," to use Mr. Cleveland's vigorous language in discussing the Venezuelan settlement. Illustrative of what amounts almost to a mania, in recent years, on the part of the Senate to amend treaties, is the convention of 1896 with Great Britain for the settlement of claims arising out of the unlawful seizure by the United States of British vessels in Behring Sea. The convention as negotiated and signed by the plenipotentiaries of the contracting powers provided that "the commission may sit at San Francisco, California, as well as Victoria, provided it shall determine in any case that the interests of justice so require, due regard being had to the necessary expense and to all other considerations involved." The Senate, to make the language conform to its own ideas, changed the article to read: "The Committee shall also sit in San Francisco, California, as well as Victoria, provided that either Commissioner

shall so request, if he shall be of the opinion that the interests of justice shall so require, for reasons to be recorded on the minutes."

In 1883, a treaty was submitted to the Senate extending the life of a previously concluded convention with France for the adjustment of claims between the two countries. Defining the practice to be observed, the negotiators used these words: "If the proceedings of the Commission shall be interrupted by the death or incapacity of any one of the Commissioners," etc., which the Senate amended to read: "If the proceedings of the Commission shall be interrupted by the death, incapacity, retirement or cessation of the functions of any one of the Commissioners," etc.

An examination made by me of original treaties in the archives of the Department of State shows that, in the early days, the Senate exercised the right of amendment very sparingly and with great discretion, but of recent years, especially during the last decade, it has exerted its power with the greatest freedom, until now the treaty that is ratified without amendment is the exception.

What enables the oligarchs of the Senate to exercise their dominant power, to reduce the House to a legislative nonentity and to keep the President in subjection, is the peculiar code of the Senate, the unwritten code which is more powerful than the printed rules. The fear expressed by Hamilton, that a few of the members of the House by long experience and a mastery of public affairs would dominate their associates, finds its realization in the Senate. An *imperium in imperio* exists there. Despite the fact that all Senators are free and equal, that one man may be able to block business, and that "government by agreement" eliminates friction, all real authority is centered in a few hands; at the present time not more than half a dozen Senators have reached censorian dignity. The *Congressional Directory* of November 27th, 1900, a recent edition, gave the biographies of eighty-five Senators, there being five vacancies at that time. Of the total number, forty-eight were then serving their first term, nineteen their second, six their third, eight their fourth, and four their fifth; but even these figures are misleading, as some of the men credited with two terms have not seen six years of service; they were appointed to fill vacancies and then elected for a full term. But taking the figures as they stand, nearly eighty per

cent. of the Senate has served less than twelve years and twenty per cent. more.

In the Senate authority comes with length of service. A new Senator is placed at the foot of unimportant committees, no matter how long his experience in public life or his standing in the House of Representatives or elsewhere (Mr. Carlisle was one of the rare exceptions), and he can only reach a chairmanship of a leading committee by the retirement of Senators who outrank him. The system is so automatic that it is almost military in its operation. No matter how brilliant the attainments of a captain, he must bow to the superior wisdom of a colonel or a general. A Webster entering the Senate to-day would perforce sit at the foot of the table and find it futile to try and oppose the chairman; and a Webster would find himself on a committee of minor importance, while men his intellectual inferiors and his juniors in years, but his seniors in service, would be members of great committees. By this method power always centers in the hands of a few men, the half dozen or so Senators who are at the head of the few really important committees. No legislation can be enacted, no policy can be put into execution, unless these men are first consulted and give their consent. They are, in effect, the Senate of the United States.

At the beginning of this article was used one of Bismarck's favorite maxims. Perhaps it may not be inappropriate to close with the remark made by the Iron Chancellor when discussing the terms of peace with France, an observation that the Senate might remember with profit: "*La patrie veut être servie, et non pas dominée.*"

A. MAURICE LOW.

GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION OF RESERVOIRS IN ARID REGIONS.

BY LIEUT.-COL. H. M. CHITTENDEN, U. S. A.

LIKE many other movements of profound and far-reaching possibilities, the project for government construction of reservoirs in the arid regions has passed its infancy amid the most adverse conditions. It has constantly been thrust aside as one of the innumerable schemes for exploiting the national treasury for the promotion of local industries. But its vitality has overcome all discouragements and has won for it a place of prominence among the living issues of the country. The latest national platforms of the two great political parties expressly indorsed the project, and even if these indorsements were mere "ornamental propositions," the fact of their adoption indicates the strength which the movement has acquired; and it is important that it be thoroughly understood in the East as well as in the West if it is to receive intelligent consideration from Congress. The object of this paper is to promote an appreciation of its importance by explaining what the reservoir question is, as understood in the arid section of the United States.

The industrial growth of any country and its capacity for a high civilization depend in an eminent degree upon its agricultural development. Manufacturing and commercial interests may fluctuate, mines may become exhausted, but the progress of the seasons perpetually renews the productivity of the soil, and only the indolence of man or the perversity of government can impair this elementary source of wealth and power. The state, therefore, regards its agricultural resources with a jealous eye, and so long as these are dwarfed and stunted from natural causes it feels that it cannot reach the highest goal of prosperity and enlightenment. Of the three million square miles, more or less,

within the territorial limits of the United States, excluding Alaska and the Islands, about 1.3 millions, or 43 per cent., are not supplied by nature with sufficient rainfall during the summer season to sustain successful agriculture. In that section of the country, extreme conditions, as regards moisture, prevail. While the rainfall is deficient, the evaporation is excessive, and with each the extreme is experienced at a time when it works the greatest injury to cultivation. The result is that, throughout an area large enough to constitute a vast empire, veritable desert conditions prevail. Yet the soil over most of this area is good, over much of it excellent; and only water is lacking to make a large part of it as fine agricultural land as the world affords.

A remedy for this great drawback has been sought in irrigation, which means the artificial distribution of the waters of streams over the cultivable lands, so as to provide the necessary moisture for vegetation during the season of growth. In order to apply this remedy to any particular section of country, certain conditions are necessary. The land must be so situated, as regards its topography, that the distribution of water upon it is physically possible, and there must be a supply of water sufficient to irrigate it. No matter how much water there may be, nor how good the soil, if the land is so broken and precipitous as to make the construction of ditches impracticable, it is lost to agriculture. And on the other hand, no matter how extensive and well favored topographically a tract may be, if the water supply is deficient, a part of it, at least, must remain undeveloped. A third condition should be added to these, viz., that the land must not lie above an altitude where agricultural products can be successfully grown, and this will generally exclude most lands of an elevation of over 7,000 feet.

A low altitude, an accessible topography and the necessary water supply are the essential natural conditions to successful irrigation. While none of these conditions can be reduced to such definite figures as to give, even with close approximation, the extent of area to which they apply, it is well established that the water supply will be the determining element. In other words, there is land enough at a favorable altitude, and well adapted to the construction of ditches, to absorb the entire available water supply. It is considered by some authorities that there is ten times as much irrigable land as there is water to irrigate it with.

The simple statement of this ratio, without reference to actual quantities, is sufficient to show how vitally essential to the agricultural development of this vast section are the conservation and judicious use of the water that flows in its streams. If we estimate the total annual supply of water, in that portion of the arid regions which is capable of irrigation, at 4,646 billions of cubic feet, or 107 millions of acre feet,* and assume that $1\frac{1}{2}$ acre feet will irrigate an acre of ground for one season, the existing water supply is capable of sustaining agriculture on about seventy million acres. A possible maximum of one hundred million acres is claimed by some. On the basis of the density of population in the more highly cultivated sections of Europe, this area, under successful irrigation, will maintain as great a population as that of the entire United States in 1900.

It must not be supposed that the quantity of water stated above is available for irrigation by taking it directly from the streams in their natural condition. The regimen of flow in most streams is highly unfavorable to the economical use of their waters. Much of the water passes off in the seasons when agriculture is suspended. Other portions, the greater part, in fact, flow away in the period of the spring floods, and in such large volume as to be mostly wasted. In certain sections of the country, nearly all the rainfall occurs in the winter season and is lost; in others, the flow of the streams is spasmodic and irregular, produced by violent and sudden storms of short duration, and no dependence can be placed upon it. Nowhere does the water supply correspond to the demand for irrigation; but, generally, maximum supply meets minimum demand and minimum supply maximum demand with exasperating regularity.

Engineers variously estimate the proportion of stream flow that can be drawn directly from the streams and used in irrigation. It is determined by the amount which the stream affords when the supply, as compared with the demand, is the smallest. It is useless to take a large amount of water from a stream at a high stage and irrigate an extensive tract of land which cannot be supplied at a lower stage. The proportion of the flow that can be utilized directly varies widely with climate, locality and crops. In some places, it is as low as ten per cent.; in a few,

* This is equivalent to a depth of two inches over one million of square miles. The annual run-off from the Missouri watershed above Kansas City, based upon twelve years' observation, is 1.98 inches. The acre-foot is an amount of water which will cover an acre to the depth of one foot.

higher than fifty. It is probable that, taking the country over, not more than twenty-five to thirty per cent. of the stream flow is capable of direct utilization, and the irrigable area dependent upon it is limited in like proportion.

To utilize the two-thirds or three-fourths that go to waste, requires that a portion of it shall be stored and held until the occasion for its use arises. It is not necessary to store all in order that all may be used. If a certain amount is stored, to be used at the period of greatest deficiency, say in August, it becomes possible to draw considerably more directly from the stream in periods of excess, say in June, than could be drawn without this auxiliary supply for August. In general, it will be found that, for every cubic foot of water stored, nearly, if not quite, another cubic foot will be made available directly from the stream, so that storage will really count more than, possibly twice as much as, the amount actually stored.

Considering the fact that a portion of the flow of some streams can never be used at all, because they lie in such deep cañons or valleys that the water cannot be diverted upon the neighboring lands, it will be safe to assume that a storage equal to one-fourth of the entire run-off of the arid regions, as above computed, say 1,162 billions of cubic feet, will render available practically all of the water supply which can be used in irrigation. The value of this stored water, under a wise and conservative development of the system, will be very great. Considering that each acre-foot stored will make available probably two acre-feet, and that the value of water for irrigation, now ranging from fifty cents to three dollars per acre-foot per year, and in favored localities much higher, will certainly increase with time, it will not be extravagant to estimate the future annual value of this storage at two dollars per acre-foot, or \$46,000 per billion of cubic feet. This would give the annual value of the total as \$53,452,000, with the certainty of a constant increase.

Such, in briefest statement, is the reservoir problem of the arid section of the United States. It contains the possibility of a mighty empire in a region which nature has overspread with almost universal desolation. Is this problem one that can be successfully handled, and, if so, by what means?

As to the physical aspect of the problem, it may be a matter of doubt if reservoir sites, capable of an aggregate storage of

eleven hundred billions of cubic feet of water, can be found where they will at the same time be available for an irrigation supply. These sites exist in all manner of places. The open valley sites are mostly among the mountains and require high and powerful dams. Lake sites, so called because they occupy natural lakes, are also generally well up on the courses of the streams. They constitute the most advantageous situations for reservoirs that nature affords. Then, far below the mountains, scattered among the foothills and well out upon the plains, there are natural depressions of varying magnitude which require only feeding canals and the necessary outlets to make them the most perfect and the safest of reservoirs. This last class of sites must be considered a wise provision of nature, for they are located ordinarily far enough down to gather in the supply which must always be lost to reservoirs among the mountains. Time will give to these natural basins a value in this connection which as yet is very imperfectly appreciated. On the whole, it is probable that the necessary sites can be found. Personal observation, covering a considerable portion of the central West, leads the writer to believe that a storage system can be constructed which, combined with a properly planned system of distributing works, will absorb most of the waters that now go to waste. Should this prove not to be the case, it will simply mean that the scope of the reservoir system and the cost of its construction will be less than here estimated. There is scarcely any probability that the future expansion of the system will exceed the estimate above given.

Concerning the cost of the work, it is clearly a difficult matter to give a precise estimate. It may be said, however, on the basis of existing works in the western country, that six dollars per acre-foot, or \$138,000 per billion cubic feet, ought to cover the original cost of storage, if the work is done with reasonable system and economy. The cost of storing eleven hundred and sixty-two billion cubic feet of water will thus be in the neighborhood of \$160,000,000. This seems like an enormous sum to put into reservoirs, or any other form of public work, and it is so, if considered as a matter of the present moment. But this estimate is for a completed reservoir system—a matter, not of to-day or to-morrow, but of the distant future. The storage of water will proceed *pari passu* with the extension of irrigation, and the storage system will be complete only when the irrigation system

is complete. How long this will be, no one can foretell, but certainly not less than a hundred years. Thus the annual burden would be but one and a half to two millions of dollars, and the benefits from the work of the first few years would more than repay the cost of all that will follow.

A complete and comprehensive reservoir system throughout the arid section of the West being indispensable to the ultimate development of that section, and in all probability capable of realization, the question arises, by what agency can the work be best accomplished? As between the two broad divisions of public and private agencies, the question is not difficult to answer. Neither private individuals nor corporations can ever be relied upon to do this work as it should be done. In the first place, their resources will not ordinarily be sufficient. In the second, the immediate purpose for which a company or individual might build a reservoir will very rarely be such as to develop the full capacity of the site. When enough storage is secured to satisfy the purposes of the investment, nothing further will be done. Now, it is of the utmost importance, when the development of a reservoir site is commenced, that it be planned to secure the full capacity of the site, and that it be built in the most substantial manner. A defective work once located on an important site will be a perpetual bar to the construction of a suitable work.

Moreover, the government can profitably and properly undertake works of this character which would be ruinous to an individual. It is an erroneous idea that no public work is justifiable unless there can be collected from it a direct, tangible and profitable revenue, such as a private party would require. The public does not derive its return in the same manner as do private investors. In the case of a reservoir, for example, an individual or company will ordinarily build for a specific purpose, such as furnishing the water supply for a city, providing power to turn mills, storing water for the irrigation of land, and the like. Seldom, if ever, can all the uses to which stored water may be put be controlled by any company, and a portion of its benefits will always escape every effort to derive a revenue from them. But to the public, which builds these works from the revenues derived from general taxation, and looks for a return, not in the form of cash revenue, but in the general increase of wealth to the community resulting from these works, every use to which

the water is put is a source of gain. The public is, therefore, in a position, as regards such works, which no individual or company can ever occupy, and the legitimate benefits accruing to it from identically the same work must necessarily be greater than can be realized by a private party.

Again, the government does not build alone for to-day or to-morrow, as an individual or company must do. No private investment can wait very long for an ample return. But with the government, whose life is presumed to be vastly longer than that of any company or individual, this is not the case. Far more important than immediate return is the character of the work constructed. It is better to build in the best possible way and wait a while for the return, than to build in a less thorough manner in order to derive an immediate return.

There are other considerations tending to the same general conclusion, that an adequate reservoir system in the arid regions cannot be realized except through the agency of government. Accepting this conclusion, the further question arises, through what form of governmental agency, state or federal, can this best be done? Without entering in detail into this subject, a few of its more salient features may be referred to.

Reservoir construction, as a public work, is essentially interstate in character. Very few of the streams of the arid regions, except on the Pacific coast, are confined to the limits of one State. As a rule, they pass through several States. The many streams that rise in Wyoming, for example, flow through or along the borders of some twenty other States and Territories. There are very few reservoirs of magnitude that could be built whose influence would not cross State lines and be felt in other States than those where the works are located. There are numerous sites near State boundaries where the waters from the reservoirs which might be built would flow immediately into the neighboring States and yield no benefit whatever to those in which they are located. In fact, the interstate character of these streams is certainly destined to raise questions in the near future which only federal authority can determine.

Again, if a comprehensive system of reservoirs is ever built in the West, its influence upon the floods and low water of some of our navigable streams will be a matter of public importance of which an individual State could take no cognizance.

In the matter of cost, the present resources of the States absolutely preclude most of them from undertaking works of this character. In some, the revenues are limited by their constitutions to a fixed percentage of the valuation, and there is no obvious way of creating a fund for such work.

It must not be forgotten, either, that the government is the principal land owner in the West. In some of the States nearly ninety per cent. of the land is still public. The storage of water by which more of this land may be reclaimed and settled is a simple business measure on the part of the government for enhancing the value of its own property.

There is an economic principle involved in this question which still more clearly indicates that the general government is the proper agency for the execution of these important works. Who shall own the waters of our streams, the general government, or individuals and corporations? The answer to this vital question must be forthcoming in the near future, not alone in those regions where the rainfall is deficient, but in those where it is abundant. The people of New York State have only recently extricated themselves from a dangerous situation, into which they had unwittingly fallen by giving away to a private corporation the control of the unused waters of the State. In the West, property in running water has long been recognized. By virtue of priority of appropriation, the waters of many of the streams have been converted into a commodity which the owners sell as they would cattle, grain or lumber. There is some color of reason in this where the appropriator has gone to expense in order to deliver the water to his neighbor; for he is then, in some degree at least, receiving pay for services rendered. Nevertheless, the system is inherently vicious, as is any system which gives to private agencies a monopoly of the resources of nature. The water of the streams should be the property of the public and should never be used for speculative purposes. Priority of appropriation should give the appropriator control of only so much water as he actually uses. If this is less than he is entitled to take from the stream, he should be required to let the surplus flow on where it can be beneficially used. Construction of reservoirs by private agencies is inseparable from speculative ownership of the water stored, and this cannot be effectually prevented unless the work is done by the government.

Closely related to this question is that of the future disposition of the public lands of the West. Very few appreciate what an opportunity exists, in the public ownership of so vast a portion of the national domain, for instituting a land policy which shall avoid the evils of the existing system. Monopoly of land is a monopoly of the opportunities of nature, and is being recognized more and more as one of the evils of our social system which remain to be corrected. The public domain of the West should be forever excluded from monopolistic control or speculative ownership, yet held open to secure occupation for all legitimate purposes of improvement or use. The land and the water should remain inviolate as the common heritage of the people.

It is now in order to examine some of the objections which are interposed against the policy of public patronage of these great works. It is urged by some that this would mean government control of irrigation works as such, with the dreaded ramifications and the unseen lengths to which such a policy might lead. If this were so, it would indeed be a powerful argument against the whole project. But there is no reason why government assistance in the one case should in any way obligate it to assist in the other. The reservoir is essentially a public work, interstate in character, its influence affecting a variety of objects. The irrigating ditch is essentially a local concern, not in the ordinary case crossing State lines. One work pertains exclusively to the stream, the other mainly to the lands. It is in every way better that distribution systems, water laws, etc., should be under the sole jurisdiction of the States, which occupy a position in regard to these works similar to that filled by the central government in other countries, as Canada, France and England. The States have demonstrated their entire capacity to handle these matters. A corps of trained engineers has grown up throughout the West, qualified in every sense to deal with all questions pertaining to irrigation. Certainly, it would be a great mistake to think of turning over works of this character to the general government at the present time, if ever.

But in the matter of storing water, as in that of preserving forests, the function is so clearly interstate in character, and the cost of the best kind of work is so great, that the general government is of necessity the proper agency to execute it. But let its function be limited to this object. Let it reinforce and extend

the resources of nature and preserve them to the general use, but let that use be regulated by the same authority as at present.

It may be suggested that this is impracticable and that it will lead to clashing of authority. There is no reason why it should. Let the government, in improving a site, acquire full right, title and jurisdiction thereto. Let it build, own, maintain and operate the work itself, but let the stored water, after it leaves the reservoir, be absolutely free to the public, just as the works on rivers and harbors are free without toll or levy of any kind. The irrigator who wishes to take out a ditch from the streams below will go to the State Engineer and file his application just as he does now, and he will use his rights under the same regulations. The only difference will be that there will be more water available than there was before the reservoir was built.

Only two qualifications need be made to this statement: First, that the government should always reserve such control that it can at any time close the reservoir in case the prevention of floods* or other public emergency should require it; and, second, that the waters so stored shall be for the free use of the people and never be subject to speculative ownership.

A common argument against government construction of reservoirs in the arid regions is that it is in direct aid of private enterprise and, therefore, contrary to the spirit of our institutions. It is the policy of our government not to undertake works which can, consistently with the general welfare, be done by private agencies, nor to expend the public moneys in any work which benefits mainly or directly a private party only. So far as the

* To prevent any misconception as to the relation of reservoirs to flood protection, or any inference from this paper that the flood problem of great rivers, like the Mississippi, can be solved in this way, it may be well to state here that such flood prevention, as a motive for the construction of reservoirs, must always occupy a secondary place. From a superficial survey of the subject, it would indeed seem that in the building of reservoirs ought to be found the solution of many problems in river engineering which arise from a deficiency or excess of flow. Nature affords many examples of the effective moderating influence of reservoirs upon stream flow. The Great Lakes are an example, giving an almost uniform flow in the outlets where, in ordinary conditions, the high-water flow would be thirty times the low-water flow. Less striking examples abound over the surface of the globe. But when it comes to imitating these natural works by artificial ones, the obstacles are practically insurmountable. Very few sites of like magnitude exist, and if they did the land would be worth more in a cultivated state than the water which might be stored upon it would be in preventing floods. While, therefore, it is true that a reservoir is a perfect protection against floods for some distance in the immediate valley below, and while a great system of reservoirs might have some influence on the floods of the larger streams, as the Missouri, still these benefits will never be of sufficient importance, taken alone, to justify the construction of reservoirs. But when there exist other and more direct reasons, such as irrigation, which in themselves would warrant their construction, then the influence upon floods may very properly be given consideration as a secondary motive.

works here considered fall within this definition, they would certainly not be justifiable under our system of government. We have endeavored to show, however, that a comprehensive scheme for the conservation of stream flow is in the strictest sense a public measure; that it relates to communities rather than to individuals; is interstate in character; affects in some degree navigable water courses; and cannot, consistently with the public welfare, be intrusted to private agencies.

Finally, government construction of reservoirs in the arid regions is opposed by the Eastern farmer on the ground that under such a policy he would be taxed in the interest of competitors in his own line of business. Of all the plausible economic fallacies that find lodgement in the public mind, this has perhaps the feeblest foundation. It is like that other argument, which one hears nearly every day, that the invention of machinery restricts the field of labor. Although it has been proven, over and over again, that mechanical invention, by increasing wealth, has made possible the employment of labor on a scale that would be utterly impossible without it, still the advent of every new machine is condemned in many quarters as a new invasion of the rights of labor. So in the case here considered. The permanent establishment in the western country of a large and vigorous population would stimulate markets of all kinds in the East far more than it would depress any by reason of competition. Its agricultural products would be largely consumed at home, and it is absurd to talk of their entering the markets of the world in competition with products of the central West, where nature has lavished her favors in a fertile soil and generous climate beyond almost any other portion of the globe. If, perchance, certain products can be raised on these irrigated lands of better quality than elsewhere, is not the country as a whole the gainer by having them raised there? Does any one believe it would promote the general welfare to drive from the markets the fruits of Southern California, or the potatoes and melons of Colorado? It is one of the chief advantages of this great nation, where no custom houses restrict the free interchange of commodities between the States, that every community can enjoy what is best in every other community, and the whole country works together with a maximum of economy in promoting the public good. The agricultural interests of the East, and the narrow and provincial statesmanship

which occasionally echoes their contention in this matter, should stand on higher ground. The upbuilding of the West will promote rather than injure their prosperity.

It remains to consider the duty of the government in regard to these works as a part of its policy of internal improvements. As public buildings, military posts, etc., are built exclusively for the transaction of public affairs, works upon rivers and harbors are the only important example of internal improvements which directly affect common business interests. These works began early in the history of the government and were justified on the ground that they were in aid of interstate commerce and, therefore, properly subject to federal control. Water transportation in those days was a matter of transcendent importance. Rivers were the great highways of internal commerce, and these were extended and connected by artificial waterways. It was an era of canal building and river improvement. The policy of federal aid in these works and the assumption of federal control of nearly all the navigable waters of the country became thoroughly established. Then came the railroad and with it a complete revolution in transportation methods. The old canals lost their importance and most of them were eventually abandoned. Commerce gradually left the rivers, and many a stream which was once the theatre of a prosperous traffic has not seen a commercial boat for years. The Great Lakes alone, of internal waterways, have maintained and increased their commercial importance.

But while this change has been going on, the policy of devoting public money to internal improvements has been kept up in increasing measure; and, strange to say, on the same old lines without any attempt to adapt it to changed conditions. In theory, these works are still carried on in the interests of navigation only. In practice, however, they have, to some extent, been forced into sensible conformity with actual business conditions. The protection of the bottom lands of the Mississippi against floods, and those of the Missouri against the ravages of that stream, has absorbed a large part of the appropriations for these streams in recent years. The utilization of the splendid natural facilities for storing water at the sources of the Mississippi, whereby a perpetual benefit has been conferred upon the country in upbuilding the industrial and manufacturing interests of that section, has likewise become a part of the scheme of in-

ternal improvements. These are public works of great importance, but the singular thing about them is that they are all carried out under the old theory of aid to navigation. This is not only a singular fact, but an astounding instance of the persistence of fictions in legislation long after the reality has ceased to exist. In reporting to the House of Representatives the Rivers and Harbors Bill at the last session of Congress, the committee having the bill in charge took occasion to animadvert severely upon the fact that a large portion of the appropriations for the Missouri River in recent years has gone to the protection of the property along the banks, instead of the improvement of the river for purposes of navigation. Yet the works of protection are of far greater public utility than those for improving the channel of the river. The navigation of the Missouri, wonderful as it was in its day, is dead beyond the slightest hope of resurrection. But during the process of its decay the fertile bottom lands have become farms and gardens among the richest in the world. The river in its reckless career plays havoc with these lands, and every year destroys property by the thousands. There is no power that can properly protect these lands but the general government, for the protective works invariably extend beyond the property lines of the individual, and often beyond the jurisdiction of the town, city or State in which the property lies. There is no duty of the government more deeply grounded in justice than that of protecting property holders from the ravages of this public watercourse. And yet, if any member of Congress were to ask for an appropriation for this specific purpose, his request would be summarily rejected, although, more likely than not, he will get the money if he pretends that it is for navigation.

Such a situation is discreditable to the intelligence of the country, and so long as it continues the Rivers and Harbors Bill ought to fail. If there is to be a system of internal improvements, it should stand on a business basis and keep in touch with the progress of the country. Where navigation has ceased, but other equally important demands for public expenditures have arisen in their place, these should receive consideration upon their merits. It is from this point of view that the people of the West regard the reservoir problem. They ask for nothing unreasonable. They support those measures which are building the great canals and harbors along the seacoast and the Great

Lakes, and they expect the country to support them in building equally important works which shall help make a garden of the desert and replace its languishing settlements with a prosperous population.

The first public work upon which the writer was ever engaged was the improvement of the upper Missouri River near the head of navigation at Fort Benton, Montana. The professional problems involved were interesting and practicable; but whatever satisfaction might justly attach to their successful solution was wholly neutralized by the reflection that the work was utterly useless. It is doubtful if from that day to this, eleven years, half a dozen commercial steamboats have passed over this section of the river. In an article which the writer prepared at the time, upon the history of navigation on the Missouri River, he made the following reference to this matter:

"To see this great volume of water flowing down to the ocean while a rich prairie soil is parching in a rainless climate makes one wish that the government, instead of spending its money to contract and deepen the channel, would rather try to scatter its water upon the adjoining lands. By a strange misapplication of terms, streams are often said to *water* the valleys through which they flow, as if the exact opposite were not generally the case. But what greater boon could be conferred upon the Missouri valley than to make this misapplied expression a true one, even to the extent of draining the last drop from the river bed? * * * The question of thus utilizing the forces of nature may never, for many years certainly will not, receive serious attention. The river will flow on, undisturbed by the State, except that from year to year a few dams and dikes and shore protections will be built, a few gravel bars dredged away, and a few snags removed, all to make way for a commerce which, in sufficient magnitude to justify government appropriations, exists only in the imagination. But the dwellers of the valley being periodically pacified by these paltry pittance from the public purse, the paramount problem of making the river build up that country and convert those arid and barren wastes into productive farm lands will go on unsolved. Yet who can doubt that this is the true office of the mighty stream to the valley through which it flows?"

This opinion, somewhat exuberantly expressed, as to the proper objects for river expenditures in the Western States, the writer has yet seen no reason to change, unless it be to restrict the field of expenditure specifically to reservoirs, or to those great canals which may yet be built to distribute over vast areas the waters of the larger streams.

H. M. CHITTENDEN.

WAGNER, MINNA AND COSIMA.

BY GUSTAV KOBBE, AUTHOR OF "WAGNER'S LIFE AND WORKS," ETC.

WAGNER, Minna and Cosima; and—poor Minna! Thrown into the shade by the bright luminary that succeeded you, how many are there who realize that for nearly a quarter of a century you tried to smooth the pathway of one of the greatest and most contrary geniuses that ever lived, sharing exile, poverty and privation; slaving for him uncomplainingly; striving to create little oases of cheer in the desert of despondency; only to die unhonored and unsung and, I am tempted to add, almost unpitied?

"She was a good wife, but she did not appreciate his genius." That disposes of Minna—pretty Wilhelmine Planer, the Magdeburg actress who gave up her stage career to become Wagner's wife; who loved him and drudged for him, wearing away her youth and her beauty; and who, when after years of poverty he had become a *protégé* of a king and the favored of fortune, died separated from him, another woman having taken her place.

Yet what a wonderful part in his life that other woman played. She seems to have entered it under a decree of fate. Her father, Franz Liszt, had made championship of Wagner's art, when Wagner was still quite unknown, an almost sacred mission; and the objective point of her wedding trip with her first husband, Hans von Bülow, was Wagner's house in Zurich. Had they never met, two souls would have lived on, yearning for the unknown. But they met; and the rest is history.

When I was in Bayreuth at the production of "Parsifal" in 1882, this woman moved through the bustle and excitement attending the festival like a queen. A glance sufficed to show that she was Liszt's daughter. She was his image. Often I looked at her and thought of her remarkable career—the daughter of a great musician and of a beautiful, aristocratic and accomplished French-

woman; the wife, first of a great pianist and then of the greatest musical genius the world has known, helping him to his triumph and sharing it. For those who are in a position to know say that without her tact Bayreuth would have remained an unfulfilled dream. That, since Wagner's death, Frau Cosima has been Bayreuth is a self-evident proposition.

But, though grateful to the kind fate that led Cosima to cross Wagner's path, one cannot help pitying the woman whose sad destiny it was to share only his unsuccessful years. There is ample evidence of how well she fulfilled her duties *up to* the point of following his genius in its daring flights, but, alas for her, not *beyond*.

It was in November, 1836, that Wagner married Fräulein Wilhelmina Planer, the leading actress of the Magdeburg company. Her father was a spindle maker. It is said that her desire to earn money for the household, rather than the impetus of a well-defined histrionic gift, led her to go on the stage; but, once on the stage, she discovered that she had unquestionable talent, and played leading characters in tragedy and comedy with success.

Minna is described as handsome, but not strikingly so; of medium height and slim figure, with "soft, gazelle-like eyes which were a faithful index of a tender heart." She was quiet in speech and movement, yet quick to anticipate any wish, almost complying with it before it was expressed. Her nature was the very opposite of Wagner's. Where he was passionate, strong-willed and ambitious, she was gentle, affectionate and retiring. Where he yearned for conquest, she wanted only a well-regulated home. But she could not follow him in his art theories, and as his genius assumed more definite shape she became less and less able to comprehend it. It was almost a sealed book to her.

Doubtless, the ill success of "The Flying Dutchman" and "Tannhäuser," works which, after "Rienzi," puzzled people, engendered her first misunderstanding of Wagner's genius. Some may be surprised that this lack of appreciation did not bring about a separation sooner, instead of after nearly a quarter of a century of married life. But when a man is struggling with poverty, the woman who unobtrusively aids him in bearing it is regarded by him as an angel of light, and the question as to whether she appreciates his genius or not becomes a secondary one in the struggle for existence.

But when at last success comes, as it did in Wagner's case,

when there is time for companionship, there is also opportunity for an estimate of intellectual quality. Then it is that the man of genius discovers that the woman who has stood by him through his poverty lacks the graces of mind necessary to his complete happiness, and the self-sacrificing wife who has been his drudge, in order that he might the better meet want, and who has perhaps lost her youth and her looks in his service, is forgotten for some one else. The worst of it is that the world forgets her and all she has done for the great man in her quiet, uncomplaining way. The drudge never finds a page in the "Loves of the Poets." The woman who comes in and reaps where the other has sown, does.

During a hard struggle which lasted many years, Minna's homely love was all Wagner's; and this in spite of the fact that, although Wagner appreciated her and even loved her, he loved his art better, making—fortunately for the world, perhaps—sacrifices for it which kept him in a continual state of semi-poverty. The real secret of the unhappy lives often led by wives of men of genius is this: The wife of a genius must always admit a rival—her husband's art. The struggles, the poverty, which result from his devotion to it, she must be prepared to bear without a murmur. She must be ready, when they need bread, to see him deliberately turn his back on the means of securing it, because those means are unworthy of his genius. No woman should enter marriage with her eyes as wide open as she who becomes the wife of a man of genius. Yet how few women, wedding such men, know what is before them; and how many are there who are not doomed to disillusion?

Wagner's friend, Ferdinand Praeger, has much to say of Minna's fine qualities. But he also tells several anecdotes which completely illustrate how absolutely she failed to comprehend Wagner's genius and ambition. Praeger visited them in their "trimly kept Swiss chalet" in Zurich in the summer of 1856. One day when Praeger and Minna were seated at the luncheon table waiting for Wagner, who was scoring the "Nibelung," to come down from his study, she asked: "Now, honestly, is Richard really such a great genius?" Remember that this question was asked about the composer of "Rienzi," "Flying Dutchman," "Tannhäuser" and "Lohengrin." If she was unable to discover his genius in these, how could she be expected to follow its loftier flights in his later works?

On another occasion, when Wagner was complaining that the public did not understand him, she said: "Well, Richard, why don't you write something for the gallery?" So little did she understand the man whose genius was founded upon unswerving devotion to artistic truth, and who would sooner have gone to the grave unknown than have dishonored himself by catering to the public.

During Praeger's visit, an old Magdeburg singer and her two daughters called on Wagner. They sang the music of the Rhine-daughters from "Rheingold." When they finished singing, Minna asked Praeger: "Is it really as beautiful as you say? It does not seem so to me, and I'm afraid it would not sound so to others."

Wagner was not slow to discover her inability to understand him, but "her good qualities and domestic virtues" greatly endeared her to him. Her economy in itself was most invaluable, as a brake on such thoughtless extravagance as Wagner was apt to indulge in if left to himself. There are numerous examples of her devotion to him.

During their sojourn in Paris, from 1839 to 1842, they often had to face actual want. At these crises, Minna always tried to help her husband to the best of her ability. Once, when it seemed utterly impossible to him to procure even the amount necessary for their daily food, he suggested to Minna to pawn her few trinkets. Only then did he learn that she had already done so, and that, in fact, they had been living for some time on the proceeds. While making such sacrifices she did everything she could to curtail the expenses, hiding from her husband as much of the discomfort of their poor home as possible. She cleaned house, stood at the wash-tub, did the mending and cooking, willingly and cheerfully. She was a little heroine, and well might Wagner in after years speak of her sacrifices at this time, as he is said to have done, with tears in his eyes.

Wagner was always sensitive regarding his personal appearance; and during these years of poverty in Paris his wardrobe had become sadly in need of replenishing. Yet money wherewith to do this was lacking. Before his birthday came around in May, 1840, Minna, in order to give him special pleasure on that day, hunted through Paris until she found a small German tailor who, moved by her persuasiveness, made a suit of clothes in time for Wagner's birthday, agreeing to wait for payment until a more

favorable opportunity. To Wagner's credit be it said that, however much in later years her lack of appreciation for his genius may have estranged him from her, he never, even after their separation, hesitated to acknowledge her devotion to him during the most trying periods of his life.

There is another pretty birthday episode which shows Minna's forethought for her husband. Wagner was in London, filling his engagement with the Philharmonic, on his birthday in 1855. We have seen with what touching devotion, fifteen years earlier, Minna had managed in the midst of their poverty in Paris to procure for him a new suit of clothes for a birthday present. During his London engagement she remained in Zurich; but she timed her birthday letter so carefully that he received it on the very morning; and in it she apprised him that she had despatched a birthday present for him—a dressing gown of violet velvet, lined with satin of the same color, and a biretta to match. Wagner was delighted, the gift being just after his own heart. Minna also knew her husband's fondness for animals, and her birthday letter gave him information about Peps, the dog, and about the parrot which had been taught to repeat, "*Richard Wagner, du bist ein grosser mann!*" If poor Minna herself could not appreciate her husband's genius, she was at least determined that some member of the household should appear to.

July saw Wagner back in Zurich again, and although it was May, only two months before, that Minna had presented him with a new dressing gown, she had another waiting for him when he reached home. Moreover, she had made for him what Wagner in a letter to Praeger describes as "wonderfully fine silk trousers for home wear, so that all the work I do is to loll about in this costume first on one sofa and then on another."

There is no doubt that during a long period of their married life Wagner fully appreciated Minna's homely virtues, and that her devotion deeply touched him. He was attentive to her in many ways, and he appears to have done all he could to make her happy—except that he would not swerve from his artistic ideals to provide the individual comforts of life. A heart trouble, from which she suffered, caused him great anxiety. "Her ever-increasing ill health makes me very sad," he wrote to Praeger in September, 1855. "Worried and troubled, I resume work. I struggle at it, as work is the only power that brings to me oblivion."

As illustrating the pleasant relations which existed between Wagner and his wife in 1856, Praeger relates that, during his visit, if Minna was not about at the early rising hour, Wagner would go to the piano and play first softly, then with curious harmonies, "full orchestral effects as it were, 'Get up, get up, thou Merry Swiss Boy.'"

But as Minna's heart trouble increased, she began to fret over their uncertain material condition. The fact is that she had been tried beyond her strength, and, not sharing her husband's enormous confidence in his artistic powers, she had not the stimulus of faith in his ultimate success to sustain her. Wagner himself once summed up her side of the case when he exclaimed: "Poor woman, who was called upon to get along with a monster of a genius!" Her irritability resulting from her illness was accentuated by jealousy of several of the women who, as Wagner's genius became better known, entered the growing circle of his ardent admirers.

And so the last years of their married life were stormy, until the crisis came in 1861, when they separated, Minna retiring to Dresden, where she died in 1866. Wagner contributed to her support and always acknowledged the debt of gratitude he owed her, but—"my inspiration carried me into a sphere she could not follow, and the exuberance of my heated enthusiasm was met with a cold douche." Nevertheless he expressed the belief that everything might have been arranged between them. "It would have been better had it been so. Now there is a dark void, and my misery is deep." This was just before the message from the King of Bavaria, which formed the turning point in his career, reached him. But even after he was installed in luxury, he had "no one to realize and enjoy with me this limitless comfort."

An incidental tribute to Minna's worth came from a wholly unexpected source twenty years after her death, and several years after Wagner's, when there were published the memoirs of Count von Beust, Saxon Prime Minister, who was in office when Wagner was banished from Saxony for taking part in the revolution of 1849. Many years later, when Wagner had been pardoned, he called on von Beust, who in his memoirs gives a highly interesting account of the interview. The Prime Minister had known Minna, and, although the interview in no way referred to her, he goes out of his way to speak of her as "an excellent woman."

In a letter written by Wagner in June, 1864, there occurs this significant sentence: "There is one good being who brightens my household." The "good being" was Cosima Liszt von Bülow, who, from now on, was destined to fill his life with the sunshine of love and of devotion to his art.

"Since I last saw you in Munich," writes Wagner to a friend, "I have not again left my asylum, which, in the meanwhile, has also become the refuge of her who was destined to prove that I could well be helped, and that the axiom of my many friends, that I 'could not be helped,' was false! She knew that I could be helped, and has helped me: she has defied every disapprobation and taken upon herself every condemnation."

This was written in June, 1870, a year after the birth of their son, Siegfried. In August, 1870, the following announcement was sent out:

"We have the honor to announce our marriage, which took place on the 25th of August of this year in the Protestant Church in Lucerne.

Richard Wagner.

Cosima Wagner, *née* Liszt."

August 25, 1870.

In the following November Wagner wrote to Praeger: "Often do I think of you because of your love for children. My house, too, is full of children, the children of my wife. [These were the daughters of von Bülow.] But, besides, there blooms for me a splendid son, strong and beautiful, whom I dare call Siegfried Richard Wagner. Now think what I must feel that this at last has fallen to my share. I am fifty-seven years old." There is a volume of pathos in that last sentence. He had waited so long for the joy which at last was his.

This extraordinary woman, who brought Wagner so much happiness and as to whom it may be said that none ever played so important a part in the history of music, came to her many graces and accomplishments by right of birth. She was the daughter of Liszt and the Countess d'Agoult, a French author, better known under her pen name of "Daniel Stern."

The Countess's father, Viscount Flavigny, was an old Royalist nobleman. While an *émigré* during the Revolution, he had married the beautiful daughter of the Frankfort banker, Bethman. After the Flavignys returned to France, their daughter, an extremely beautiful blonde, was brought up partly at the Flavigny château, partly at the Sacré Cœur de Marie, in Paris. Talented beyond her years, her wit and beauty won her much admiration.

At an early age she married Count Charles d'Agoult, a French officer, a member of the old aristocracy and twenty years her senior.

When she first met Liszt she was twenty-nine years old, had been married six years and was the mother of three children. She was still beautiful, and in her salon she gathered around her men and women of rank, *esprit* and fame. In 1835 Liszt left Paris after the concert season there. The Countess followed him, and the next heard of them they were in Switzerland. They remained together six years, Cosima, born in 1837, being one of the three children resulting from the union. In the Countess's relations with Liszt there appears to have been a curious mingling of *la grande passion* and hauteur. For when, soon after she had joined him in Switzerland, he urged her to secure a divorce in order that they might marry, she drew herself up and replied: "*Madame la Comtesse d'Agoult ne sera jamais Madame Liszt!*" Certainly none but a French woman would have been capable of such a reply under the same circumstances. Equally French was her husband's remark when, the Countess's support having been assumed by Liszt, he expressed the opinion that throughout the whole affair the pianist had behaved like a man of honor.

After the separation of Liszt and Countess d'Agoult, he entrusted the care of the three children to his mother. During a brief sojourn in Paris, Wagner met Cosima, then a girl of sixteen, for the first time. She formed with Liszt, von Bülow, Berlioz and a few others the very small, but extremely select, audience which, at the house of Liszt's mother, heard Wagner read from the last of his "Nibelung" dramas. In 1855, the burden of the care of the children falling too heavily upon Liszt's mother, the duty of looking after the daughters was cheerfully undertaken by the mother of Hans von Bülow, who resided in Berlin. The girls were highly talented.

In a letter written by von Bülow in June, 1856, he speaks of them in these interesting terms: "These wonderful girls bear their name with right—full of talent, cleverness and life, they are interesting personalities, such as I have rarely met. Another than I would be happy in their companionship. But their evident superiority annoys me, and the impossibility to appear sufficiently interesting to them prevents my appreciating the pleasure of their society as much as I would like to—there you have a confession,

the candor of which you will not deny. It is not very flattering for a young man, but it is absolutely true." Yet, a year later, he married one of these girls whose "superiority" so annoyed him.

Was it fate which led the von Bülow on their wedding trip to Wagner? For, from a letter to his friend, Richard Pohl, which von Bülow wrote the day before his wedding to Cosima Liszt, the "Wagnerstadt," Zurich, is mentioned as the aim of their journey.

They arrived at Zurich early in September. "For the last fortnight," writes von Bülow, under date of September 19, 1857, "I and my wife have been living in Wagner's house, and I do not know anything else that could have afforded me such benefit, such refreshment as being together with this wonderful, unique man, whom one should worship as a god."

On his side Wagner was charmed with the von Bülows. In one of his letters he speaks of their visit as his most delightful experience of the summer. "They spent three weeks in our little house; I have rarely been so pleasantly and delightfully affected as by their informal visit. In the mornings they had to keep quiet, for I was writing my 'Tristan,' of which I read them an act aloud every week. If you knew Cosima, you would agree with me when I conclude that this young pair is wonderfully well mated. With all their great intelligence and real artistic sympathy, there is something so light and buoyant in the two young people that one was obliged to feel perfectly at home with them."

Wagner allowed them to depart only under promise that they would return next year, which they did, to find a household on the verge of disruption and to be unwilling witnesses to some of the closing scenes of Wagner's first marriage.

When the von Bülows came to visit him again, after he had separated from his wife and was living in Biebrich, opposite Mayence, engaged in the composition of "Die Meistersinger," he was not so favorably impressed with their marriage. In a letter, after speaking of von Bülow's depression owing to poor health, he writes: "Add to this a tragic marriage; a young woman of extraordinary, quite unprecedented, endowment, Liszt's wonderful image, but of superior intellect."

That this woman, who so impressed Wagner, was in her turn filled with admiration for his gifts, appears from two letters which she wrote from Biebrich to her father. In one of these she speaks enthusiastically of some of the "Tristan" music, which she had

heard Wagner rehearsing with the tenor Schnorr and the latter's wife. The other letter concerns "Die Meistersinger":

"The 'Meistersinger' are to Wagner's other conceptions what the 'Winter's Tale' is to Shakespeare's other works. Its fantasy is found in gayety and drollery, and it has called up the Nuremberg of the Middle Ages with its guilds, its poet-artisans, its pedants, its cavaliers, to draw forth the freshest laughter in the midst of the highest, the most ideal poetry." It is evident that two such artistically sympathetic souls could not long remain in each other's proximity without craving a closer union.

The history of art has no more beautiful union between kindred souls to chronicle than this. One who had ample opportunity to observe their everyday life says that Wagner adored Cosima and that she worshipped him. "All his wishes were anticipated with an ingenuity known only to the unselfish love of woman. To her he could impart all his plans, talk over his projects, knowing that they would be appreciated."

Since death, early in 1883, sundered this happy union, she has devoted herself to the continuance of the Bayreuth festival plays. Her grief when Wagner died was profound, and one act of hers over his coffin was as beautiful and touching as it was, I believe, unique. She cut off her long hair, which her husband had loved to have her wear loose over her shoulder, and placed it under his head as a cushion to be buried with him.

No one who realizes what Wagner is in the world of music can fail in a sense of gratitude to Cosima for the happiness with which she surrounded him during the latter part of his life. Yet, through it all, it is impossible not to see at times the tragic figure of the woman to whom pitiless fate assigned the lot of being his companion in those long, dark years of ill success. And so, when we speak of Wagner, Minna and Cosima, we involuntarily add, "Poor Minna!"

GUSTAV KOBBE.

WHY NOT OWN THE PANAMA ISTHMUS?

BY FREDERIC C. PENFIELD, FORMERLY UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC
AGENT AND CONSUL-GENERAL TO EGYPT.

For half a century the Nicaraguan was the only isthmian canal route believed to be available by the United States. Foreigners controlled the Panama route. Hence generations of Americans have been reared under the influence of Nicaraguan preference, and it was inevitable that a national prejudice should obtain against the project of our rival in Central-American canal construction.

Popular opinion within the past few weeks has been undergoing rapid readjustment, however; and the French company, aware that its undertaking could not survive the competition of a governmental waterway—that in time might be thrown open to free navigation, as rivers and harbors are—has offered us its franchise, rights, and the partially dug canal at Panama for the sum our governmental commission reported these to be worth to us, \$40,000,000; and the commission has made a supplemental report to the government, in view of the reasonableness of the offer, favoring the adoption of the Panama route. The Colombian authorities assure us that they will gladly transfer to the United States all the privileges possessed by the French. These radical changes should mean that our government will build at Panama. Piercing the isthmus at its narrowest point, the engineering advantages of this route have long been obvious; and it is the estimate of the Walker Commission that, possessed of the French concession and of the work completed by the French company, at a cost to us of \$40,000,000, we could construct a canal at Panama for \$38,130,704 less than by way of Nicaragua.

Any one taking the trouble to compare the rival routes dispassionately, must decide in favor of Panama. Nature has pro-

vided there a good harbor on either side of the isthmus; the Panama canal could be maintained for \$1,350,000 per annum less than the Nicaraguan, the Walker Commission informs us—an amount equivalent to three-per-cent. interest on \$45,000,000; a ship could steam from ocean to ocean *viâ* Panama by the light of one day, as against thirty-three hours by the Nicaraguan route; and Panama would be a shorter route between our Atlantic and Gulf ports and the west coast of South America, which is, admittedly, a fruitful field for the development of commerce with the United States.

The chief claim of partisans of the Nicaraguan route is that their canal would bring our Atlantic and Pacific ports one day nearer each other than the Panama canal possibly could. These advocates array figures showing how much time ships bound from New York or New Orleans to San Francisco would save by using the Nicaraguan canal; but they fail to mention the important advantage that Panama would offer to American vessels trading with Callao, Valparaiso, and other South-American ports. In its commercial aspect the object of an interoceanic canal built by the United States must surely be the bringing to us of new and foreign markets, not the acceleration of intercourse between harbors on our own two ocean coasts. Four perfect systems of transcontinental railroads, more or less in competition, leave nothing to be desired in the matter of serving domestic trade. It is foreign trade we should bid for. Ships from Asiatic ports would reach the Atlantic by way of Panama as quickly as by Nicaragua, assuredly. Navigators are slow to accept as a fact the claim that the Nicaraguan canal could be traversed in thirty-three consecutive hours; and few owners of deep-draught ships, bearing valuable cargoes, would risk their property by steaming at night in a canal leading over mountain ranges, with sharp curves everywhere, as well as numerous locks. Three days' canal insurance of vessel and cargo would offset any possible profit accruing from the use of such a canal.

The United States should build no such waterway. The Panama route, allowing for its faults, is ten-fold more feasible than the Nicaraguan.

The words "hard up" cannot adequately suggest the present financial condition of the republic of Colombia. Twenty-six months of revolution have reduced the country to worse straits

than curse any other land in this hemisphere. A traveller may pass weeks there without seeing a coin of gold, silver, or copper; and if he brings away any of the "emergency" paper dollars, it will be to illustrate the poverty of Colombia, through unrestricted inflation; for the dollar (*peso*) will be found to have an exchange value of but two cents.

Colombia cannot hope to raise more money by bond issues, by the granting of concessions, or by pledging taxes and customs receipts. She will consequently be compelled to sell something, and she will not be overparticular what that something may be.

In no country, however wretched, can a proposal of territorial alienation meet a popular reception. Such a proposition would doubtless be scouted at Bogota, and statesmen there would be chary of committing themselves to it. But a people impoverished by a prolonged rebellion, and with an empty treasury, cannot be expected to resist the inevitable.

At our capital, Colombia is represented by her ablest diplomatist, Señor Don Martinez Silva, as astute a negotiator as the present generation of South Americans has known. However startling the suggestion might at first appear, Minister Silva is too practical not to consider at this time a proposal by the United States Government to purchase for an equitable sum Colombia's sovereignty to the so-called State of Panama. Absolute ownership of the soil should be a prerequisite to America's building of a canal. We should not construct public works of any character in territory that we cannot govern untrammelled. As "tenants" of Colombia or Nicaragua, we would be obliged to pay a considerable sum each year.

We could afford to pay Colombia outright all that her rights in the isthmian territory are worth, and there should be no more disposition to drive a sharp bargain with her than with the thousands of countrymen of Lafayette and Rochambeau who are now proffering us their privileges and property at Panama at a figure more than reasonable. This country has no need for profiting by the necessities of any person or nation. A canal is going to be a costly enterprise. Let us go about it in a practical manner.

Public discussion, if logical and earnest, never retards wise public action, and national policies must have their origin in individual minds. I modestly suggest, therefore, that every con-

dition is favorable for the United States taking a step in practical expansion that would leave its impress for all time upon the scroll of great achievements—the purchase outright of the State of Panama, worth comparatively little to Colombia, but of inestimable value to a powerful nation constructing a waterway to unite the Atlantic and Pacific. A potentially important word might well be incorporated in the popular slogan, and we should aspire to *own*, as well as to construct and control, an isthmian canal.

We could not buy territory of Nicaragua if we tried, for her constitution expressly forbids the alienation of soil. She has signed a protocol to give us a long-time lease of the region through which a canal might pass; but there is a mighty distinction between proprietorship and lesseeship. The proposal to assign us permanent jurisdiction of a six-mile strip is meant to be generous. But the policing by this government of a “zone” of this character could have but one outcome, perpetual and vexatious argument with Nicaragua as to boundaries and the right to execute laws of our making. Better a “zone” six yards wide, or none at all.

The people of Panama have no affection for their home government, and would acclaim the coming of American authority. A plebiscite would be practically unanimous. Colombian currency is disavowed in Panama, and postage-stamps used in every other State of Colombia have there no value. More than once petitions have been circulated on the isthmus memorializing the Washington authorities to annex the region, while for years it has been the habit of isthmian families to shun the name of Colombians, preferring to be called “Panamaans.”

It is twelve days’ journey from Bogota, the seat of government, to Panama. Remoteness from the capital may furnish a reason for the popular belief throughout the State that it is poorly governed, that its destinies are controlled by men who have no sympathy with the Panama people, and who grind from them, under the guise of taxes, all the reward coming from their various industries, agriculture, mines, and fisheries. The fact that our government is pledged by treaty to preserve order on the isthmus, and recently sent armed forces there, should greatly assist a movement at this time looking to the ownership of Panama by the United States.

This strip of territory joining North America with South America is not without value, if regarded from other points of view than canal-building. Its resources are varied, ranging from mines to pearl-fisheries, and most of these are but partially developed. Three-fourths of the capital invested in the State is American. With our rule the isthmus might be made to pay its way, independently of the canal.

Could any one object to the transference of Panama to this government? No one. Would not every government in the list of nations indorse a movement which would give to the isthmus an administration that would secure property and life and equal rights to every dweller there and to every user of the canal? It would, certainly. From no source came a note of disapproval over our reported negotiations for the Danish West Indies.

Under our proprietorship, marauding at Panama, whether it were a colony like Porto Rico or a territory like Hawaii, would be as unlikely as in Philadelphia.

Secretary Hay's achievement in causing the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with Great Britain stamped him as a great Secretary of State. But as a triumph of diplomacy that achievement would become insignificant compared with the acquisition of Panama by the United States. Public sentiment is favorable to expansion, and the extension of our territory by judicious purchase could have only the moral approval of every patriotic citizen not committed to the Nicaraguan project. President Roosevelt's policy is a constructive one, and such an enlargement of the national map under his incumbency would make his administration memorable.

There must be, in any case, important negotiations between the Department of State and Colombia, as the period for which the French company's concession is to run — ninety - nine years — is too brief to satisfy any responsible government venturing upon canal construction. The United States must insist upon a franchise and control practically perpetual, obviously. Negotiating for the franchise of Panama outright would in every way be simpler, but time might be required to bring it to a successful conclusion. Haste in adopting any terms for the building of a canal not based upon the ownership of the soil through which the canal will run, will saddle upon posterity a condition more unfortunate than if there were no canal at all.

Diplomacy of the Hay type can do more towards making a canal a lasting success than the efforts of all the civil engineers in the country. The Suez Canal was a triumph of financial resources, as well as of engineering genius. Let America's canal be founded upon America's practical diplomacy.

With the Stars and Stripes destined to float over half the West-Indian islands, as in time it will, the ownership of the natural gateway between two oceans should be vested in the nation which has power enough to cause the Monroe Doctrine to be recognized throughout the wide world as valid law. Great Britain, France, and Holland reap no pecuniary benefit from their possessions in the Bahamas and the Windward Islands, and in time many of these will naturally come under the control of the United States. We have never purchased a foot of soil but it has turned out that we made a fortunate venture. Bleak Alaska, costing \$7,000,000, could be sold to-day for many times that sum.

The greatest material success of Disraeli's career was his action in buying Ismail's shares in the Suez Canal company. With Continental agents at Cairo ready to purchase the discredited Khedive's shares on the following day, Disraeli, without the formal sanction of his government, stepped in one night and captured the securities by cable for \$4,000,000. England has ever since controlled the canal, and her shares have now a market value of £20,000,000. It will be recalled that nearly every public man in Great Britain, Disraeli included, opposed the building by the French of the Suez Canal, pooh-poohing the suggestion that it was demanded by commerce, or that it could ever be made to pay. Since Disraeli's day British statesmanship has woven around the country through which the Suez waterway runs a control amounting to colonial rule. Had not the canal of de Lesseps developed into a convenient short-cut for Europe to Britain's richest treasure-house, India, England would never have gone to Egypt with her civil servants and her army of occupation.

FREDERIC COURTLAND PENFIELD.

THE MILITIA FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

BY J. D. WHELPLEY.

THE Secretary of War recently completed his allotment of one million dollars to the militia of the United States and Territories. Under the present law, this is the amount allowed to the States each year from the national treasury, and it is distributed according to the representation in Congress and upon a certificate from each State testifying to the existence in it of a State military organization. The law of 1887 appropriated \$400,000 a year for this purpose; but in 1900 Congress increased the amount to be distributed annually to \$1,000,000. There is a well-established precedent, therefore, for the support of State militia organizations by the federal government, and it has never been questioned.

Military experts are fully convinced that the maintenance of a national militia is one of the proper functions of this government, and that Congress has made a mistake in the past in not assuming the organization, control, and expense of the volunteer army in times of peace. The power to do this was granted to Congress by the Constitution, but this power has never been exercised, the present small contributions to the expense of equipment in each State being the nearest approach to federal interference.

Paragraph 16 of Section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States defines one of the powers vested in Congress to be:

“To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

In this paragraph Congress is distinctly given the power to organize a national militia, equip the same, and appropriate all

necessary money to carry on the work, without a dollar being contributed by the individual States for the support of their respective military organizations. Congress is also authorized thereby to make such rules and regulations for the conduct of this militia as may be deemed advisable.

Throughout the country, and in Congress as representing the entire population, can be found two distinct schools of thought in regard to the proper treatment of the State militia by the federal government. The difference between the two schools is fundamental; and the theory of one or the other must be adopted by a decided majority of the people before any general plan for a national militia organization can be presented. One school takes the position that the militia force of the United States should become entirely a matter of federal concern, that it should be organized, equipped, trained and supported from the national treasury and under national direction, with the purpose of creating a great army of the people, which, in times of peace, should not be in evidence to a burdensome degree, but which, in time of war, could be quickly mobilized and sent to the defence of the frontier and the coast, thus allowing an interval of safety during which the regular army could be expanded or a volunteer army organized for war purposes.

The other school opposes the idea of national control of the State militia. These people believe that the question of States' rights is involved, and that the matter of local military organizations should be left entirely to local authorities—these authorities possibly to be assisted financially to a small degree by federal appropriations, in view of the fact that the training received by the troops is expected to redound in time to the benefit of the entire nation. The theory adopted by this school is, that the militia should never be looked upon as anything more than a training-school, from which can be drawn by volunteer measures as many soldiers as may be needed to create an emergency army.

The wide difference between these two schools of thought makes it necessary that the sense of the people, and incidentally that of Congress, should be ascertained before any work can be done towards formulating new legislation. Immediately after the Spanish war, there was a decided public sentiment in favor of taking the organization of the militia out of the hands of State gov-

ernments. While some of the States had kept their national guard up to the standard, and were able to turn over to the general government well-equipped and well-drilled military organizations of great strength, other States were found to be woefully deficient in their resources. Several unfortunate controversies between State and federal authorities originated from the status occupied by the militia in 1898, which status still remains in effect. As the recollection of the war and of these difficulties with the volunteer organizations fade from the public mind, the demand for reform loses much of its acuteness; and many members of Congress now go so far as to predict that it is impossible at present to secure new legislation on the subject, despite the apparently unanimous demand of two years ago that such reform should be immediate and drastic.

It is interesting to compare the condition of the militia before and since the war with Spain. In 1896 there were 9,376 commissioned officers and 106,251 non-commissioned officers and privates, or a total of 115,627. In 1899, immediately after the signing of the treaty of peace, this force was apparently reduced to 7,521 commissioned officers, and 98,818 non-commissioned officers and privates, or a total of 106,339. In 1900 the militia force had increased to 8,246 commissioned officers, and 105,721 non-commissioned officers and privates, or a total of 113,967. The total number of generals and general staff officers was 1,162, 804, and 806 for the three years respectively.

All the States now have a smaller militia force than in 1896, with the exception of Michigan, which shows an increase of 700 men. Fifteen of the States have about held their own during the past two years, or show a slight decrease. Twenty-four of the States show an increase over 1899. The States showing the greatest gain in the past two years are Indiana, Iowa, Virginia, and Ohio.

It was freely predicted at the close of the war with Spain that in the future much greater interest would be taken in military affairs by the young men of the country, and that this would result in a heavier enlistment in local military organizations. This presumption is not justified by the present condition of the militia. It is undoubtedly true that the decrease in the militia force noted in 1899 was due to the enlistment of many men for Philippine and other service. A large number of such

enlistments were from the class which took an interest in military affairs, and from which the ranks of the militia have always been recruited. The slight gain made by the militia in 1900, as compared with 1899, would apparently prove this to be true; but the fact that the militia is not at present recruited up to the strength of five years ago, when there was no war spirit abroad in the country, is a matter of considerable comment among military men. It cannot be assumed that there are more men in the regular army at the present time who, if not so engaged, would become militiamen, than would be sufficient to bring the total militia force up to the strength of 1896.

This condition should allay the fears expressed by politicians that the war spirit is becoming rampant with the younger generation of American citizens. The local military organization is evidently no more popular to-day than it has been for years past, notwithstanding the experiences in the Spanish war. A decided check to militia enlistment was also given by the unfortunate complications, dissensions and disputes which arose during the organization of the American volunteer army for use in our most recent war. In short, the experience of many of the volunteers who went to the front as members of State regiments was not such as to encourage further service or to create enthusiasm for recruiting. This is especially true in New York, Missouri, and one or two other prominent States.

In the war with Spain, however, the State military organizations had wide recognition. Of the 9,376 officers in the State troops, nearly 7,000 received volunteer commissions. The military schools furnished 275 officers, the governors of States gave 250 commissions, 750 militia officers were commissioned by the President, and only about 650 were commissioned who had never served with the State troops.

The record of New York State is as creditable as that of any State in the Union, if not more so. At the outbreak of the Spanish war there were 800,000 men liable to military duty in New York, and the authorized strength of the militia was 18,000. On April 20th, 1898, the actual organized militia strength in New York State was 13,990 men, and the annual appropriation by the State was \$575,000, as against the federal appropriation of but \$31,000. New York promptly added \$1,500,000 to this for war purposes, and furnished 20,418 men to the volun-

teer army of the United States. Of these men 11,100 were from the National Guard. Of the officers of the fifteen regiments, two troops of cavalry and three batteries, when organized for national service, less than ten per cent. had not served in the State militia.

The federal government now contributes \$1,000,000 each year to be distributed among the States according to their representation in Congress, so soon as each State shall prove that it has at least 100 enlisted men for each representative. In the year 1900 the total appropriation made by all the States for militia purposes was a little less than \$5,000,000. This appropriation, however, so far as the States were concerned, was not at all uniform—as, for instance, in California, where the federal appropriation was less than \$8,000 and the State appropriation about \$155,000. In Kentucky, the federal appropriation was nearly \$12,000, and the State appropriation only \$7,000. State appropriations are governed by public sentiment and politics, local conditions thus interfering with any uniformity so far as the country as a whole is concerned. An appropriation of ten million dollars annually from the national treasury would give each State a respectable allowance, and provide for an effective reserve military force for the nation. The various departments of the regular army would furnish the drill-masters and equipment, and by thus nationalizing the institutions add largely to the effectiveness of the appropriations.

Those who have given much time to the study of reserve military organizations throughout the world, and especially to the incongruities and inconsistencies of the organization now in vogue in the United States, are unanimously in favor of radical legislation upon the subject, as soon as Congress can be convinced that the people will endorse such legislation. They propose that the entire burden of the expense of the State troops and their training be put upon the federal government, thus relieving the local authorities of the responsibility. It is pointed out that under this plan every tax-payer would contribute in proportion to the cost, uniformity of discipline would be secured, and extensive plans could be made for the training of troops in divisions as well as by regiments or brigades. Under such a plan preparation could be made for war in time of peace, not only in the direction of fitting men for the service, but in securing uni-

form equipment and supplies in sufficient quantity to be available upon short notice. The effect would not be to create a great army subject to direct federal and possibly political control, as is feared by some; but it would simply make the present militia force more effective and valuable, not only to the country but to the individual citizen. The limitations of the Constitution effectually safeguard the use of this force; and, as the basis of all military service in the United States is the volunteering of the individual, the people as represented by Congress would forever jealously resent any encroachment upon this idea. For over one hundred years Congress has held the power to nationalize and support the militia forces, but has failed to exercise this power except by making a trifling appropriation during the past three or four years.

It was evidently the intention of the founders of this government that the home defence should be organized and controlled by Congress, and not by the individual States, as is now the case. Legislation to that effect will be proposed this winter in Washington. It will meet with strong opposition from those who cling to the now nearly obsolete doctrine of States' rights, and by those who, for political reasons, desire to hamper all effort to improve the public service. The principle underlying the suggestion, however, is practical, scientific, and democratic, and will control in time the organization and maintenance of the great reserve military forces of the United States.

J. D. WHELPLEY.

THE NATIONAL DEBT OF JAPAN.

BY YASUFUMI SAWAKI, SECRETARY OF THE FINANCE
DEPARTMENT OF JAPAN.

IN the year 1868 a great event happened in Japan. The feudal system which had existed so long in the country was abolished, and the Emperor was restored to his hereditary and rightful authority. The country was thus united again under one central government.

The task which lay before the new régime was not an easy one. There were many innovations to be made, many improvements after the European style to be introduced, many abuses to be eradicated. Both civil and military administration had to be re-organized and the national finance and currency rearranged. To defray the expenses incidental to these undertakings, the government had recourse to public loans. Thus were originated the Old Loan, the New Loan, the Voluntary Capitalized Pension Bonds and the Pension Bonds. Since then, various causes—such as natural calamities, war, rebellion and disturbances, as well as new enterprises and improvements—have led to successive new loans.

Prior to the Restoration there existed in the country several hundred feudal princes, who enjoyed absolute power over their provinces. The systems of administration were more or less irregular and differed from one another. This was especially noticeable in the matter of finance. When a prince had a deficit and could not meet it in the ordinary way, he usually borrowed the money required from wealthy merchants and gave them notes in exchange. These notes were legal tender only in the respective provinces where they were issued, and made a considerable aggregate amount. Soon after the Restoration, the imperial government took over all liabilities contracted by the princes, and pro-

mulgated "the New and Old Loan Act" of 1873. The bonds thus authorized were given to those merchants who had advanced money to the princes. The bonds carried interest at four per cent., and were redeemable by twenty-two annual drawings, commencing in the fourth year of their issue.

The total national debt from the Restoration till the present day is as follows:

I. DEBTS ALREADY REDEEMED.

DESIGNATION.	AMOUNT.	RATE OF INTEREST.
Voluntary Capitalized Pension Bonds..	\$8,282,925	8 per cent.
Shinto Priest Pension Bonds.....	167,025	8 "
Nine per cent. Foreign Loan	4,880,000	9 "
Seven per cent. Foreign Loan.....	11,712,000	7 "
Currency Redemption Bonds.....	7,299,575	6 "
Civil War Loan.....	7,500,000	5—7½ "
Industry Bonds	6,250,000	6 "
Nakasendo Railway Bonds	10,000,000	7 "
Supplementary Railway Bonds.....	1,000,000	5 "
Total.....	\$57,091,525	

II. DEBTS STILL OUTSTANDING.

DESIGNATION.	AMOUNT.	RATE OF INTEREST.
Old Loan	\$2,414,000	5 per cent.
Pension Bonds	12,714,325	5 "
Naval Bonds	4,398,300	5 "
Consolidation Bonds	84,346,800	5 "
Currency Redemption Loan.....	11,000,000	0 "
War Bonds	58,288,225	5 "
Industry Bonds	10,775,650	5 "
Railway Bonds	17,021,350	5 "
Hokkaido Railway Bonds.....	1,709,975	5 "
Foreign Loan of 1899.....	48,815,006	4 "
Total.....	\$251,483,625	

I. DEBTS ALREADY REDEEMED.

I. *Voluntary Capitalized Pension Bonds.*—The object of these bonds was to help the princes and their former retainers to gain the means of livelihood by enabling them to engage in agricultural, industrial, and commercial pursuits. Many of them were in need of capital to start in different enterprises, and were willing to obtain it by surrendering their hereditary pensions. In accordance with their desire, the government proposed to convert the pensions into bonds. The number of persons who availed themselves of this plan was 135,883, and the bonds given amounted to \$8,282,925. The principal of the bonds was to be paid off by annual drawings, commencing in the third year. The redemption began in 1876, and was completed in 1883.

2. *Shinto Priest Pension Bonds*.—In former times, the priests lived on the income derived from landed property granted to them either by the imperial court or by feudal princes. On the Restoration, however, all these properties were taken up by the government, a measure which threw many priests into idleness and poverty. It was with the object of providing these priests with the means of livelihood that the bonds were authorized and issued. The term of redemption and the rate of interest were the same as in the case of the Voluntary Capitalized Pension Bonds. The redemption was consummated in 1886.

3. *Nine per cent. Foreign Loan*.—This loan, the first ever raised by Japan in a foreign country, was negotiated in London in 1869, for the purpose of developing the national resources by facilitating means of communication and transportation within the Empire. The total amount was £1,000,000, and the issue price was £98 for every £100 bond. The principal was to remain unpaid for three years, and then to be redeemed in ten years by annual drawings. By the aid of this loan the first railway was built and many improvements were carried out. The loan was paid off in 1882 as originally arranged.

4. *Seven per cent. Foreign Loan*.—The object of this loan was to furnish funds to those feudal princes and their followers who wished to start certain enterprises of public utility. The loan was also raised in London, and was negotiated by the imperial government directly with some banks in London, which formed a syndicate to take up the whole sum. The financial credit of Japan in those days did not stand high in foreign markets; yet, in spite of numerous objections and difficulties which had to be overcome, the loan proved a great success. The total sum required was £2,400,000. The issue price was £92 10s. for every £100 bond. The principal was to be paid off by annual drawings in twenty-five years after the date of issue. The amount subscribed reached £9,500,000. The sum of £216,000 was to be paid annually for principal and interest, and the amount of interest saved on the redeemed principal was to be added to the amount for the reduction of the outstanding principal. In this way the whole was redeemed in 1897.

5. *Currency Redemption Bonds*.—The object of these bonds was to redeem and cancel the new paper money issued after the Restoration. The bonds were either registered or unregistered.

The operation was successfully carried out, and the paper money cancelled amounted to \$7,299,575. The principal of the registered bonds was redeemable in twelve years, and that of the unregistered bonds in thirty years. When, however, the Consolidation Bonds were issued, the outstanding amount of the bonds was exchanged for these new bonds at the request of the holders.

6. *Civil War Loan*.—This loan was contracted with the Fifteenth National Bank to defray the expenses incurred in suppressing the rebellion in the southwestern territories in 1877. The disturbance lasted more than seven months, and seventy thousand soldiers were engaged in the fighting. Altogether, it was estimated that the incidental outlay aggregated about \$21,000,000. Such an amount could not be defrayed out of the ordinary income, and recourse was had to other expedients. Just at this time different national banks were being established, and one of them, the Fifteenth National Bank, was willing to provide money. The government finally resolved to borrow \$7,500,000 at interest of five per cent. per annum. In 1883, \$2,500,000 were repaid; but, in consideration of the great service rendered by the bank at a critical moment, the rate of interest for the remaining amount was raised to seven and a half per cent. per annum. The principal was repaid in three instalments, namely, \$1,000,000 in 1895, \$2,000,000 in 1896, and the balance in 1897.

7. *Industry Bonds*.—This loan was raised from the general public, and was for the amount of \$6,250,000. The issue price was fixed at eighty yen (\$40) for every 100 yen (\$50) bond, the rate of interest being six per cent. per annum. This being the first attempt on the part of the government to raise an internal loan from the general public, the Finance Department was rather anxious as to its results. On the closing day of the subscription, however, it was found that the total sum subscribed had reached \$12,387,625, nearly double the amount of the loan to be raised. The principal of the loan was to be redeemed by drawings within twenty-three years; but, when the Consolidation Bonds were issued, the holders of Industry Bonds voluntarily exchanged them for the new bonds.

8. *Nakasendo Railway Bonds*.—The object of this loan was to provide funds with which to construct a railway along the Nakasendo, to connect the two great cities of the Empire, Tokio

and Kioto. The total amount of the bonds issued was not to exceed \$10,000,000. This loan was to be issued at ninety yen (\$45) for every 100 yen (\$50) bond, and the rate of interest was seven per cent. per annum. The loan was raised from the general public, and was the first public loan to which foreigners were allowed to subscribe. A careful survey showed that the construction of the Nakasendo line would be very difficult. Moreover, the primary object being to connect Tokio and Kioto, it was decided that the railway along the Tokaido would do just as well as the Nakasendo line, and the fund was appropriated to that purpose. Some years afterwards the "Consolidation Bonds Act" was promulgated, and in the course of a few years the bonds were converted into the Consolidation Bonds.

9. *Supplementary Railway Bonds.*—This loan was raised for the purpose of meeting a deficiency in the Tokaido Railway construction fund, caused by the addition of branch lines. The principle adopted in this case was to sell the bonds to the highest bidders among the general public. The total amount of the issue and the lowest issue price were announced by the government, and the bonds were allotted to subscribers, beginning with the highest bidders, until the total amount required was obtained. The total subscription reached \$2,721,175, thus surpassing the amount to be issued by \$1,721,175. When the Consolidation Bonds were issued, these bonds were also converted into them.

II. DEBTS STILL OUTSTANDING.

1. *Old Loan.*—This loan was raised with the same object as the New Loan. The bonds are terminable annuity bonds. The present outstanding sum is \$2,414,000, and it expires in 1921.

2. *Pension Bonds.*—These bonds were issued for the purpose of converting the hereditary pensions of princes, their retainers and common people, and also the pension given them in recognition of special merit. They were of four classes—namely, bonds bearing interest at ten per cent., seven per cent., six per cent., and five per cent. per annum, respectively. The principal of the bonds was to be redeemed by annual drawings, commencing in 1882. In 1886, a part of the fund raised by the Nakasendo Railway Bonds, which was not immediately needed for the work, was used for the immediate redemption of the bonds carrying a higher rate of interest. The money thus paid out was subsequently refunded by regular annual appropriations for the ser-

vice of the national debt. In this way, the work of redemption was vigorously pushed on; so that the ten per cent. bonds were entirely paid off in 1887, the seven per cent. bonds in 1891, and the six per cent. bonds in 1893. The outstanding amount of the five per cent. bonds is 25,428,650 yen (\$12,714,325).

3. *Naval Bonds*.—For the purpose of increasing naval efficiency, a sum of \$13,320,000 had been appropriated, to be paid off in eight fiscal years, 1883-1891. To meet such an extraordinary outlay, however, from the ordinary revenue was very difficult.

Accordingly, it was decided to issue bonds to an amount not exceeding \$8,500,000. The bonds were unregistered, bearing interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum. The allotment was made to the highest bidders, and the actual receipt by the government was \$8,622,082 for the face value of \$8,500,000. The principal of the bonds is to be repaid by drawings which take place at the discretion of the government within thirty years. The outstanding sum is \$4,398,300.

4. *Consolidation Bonds*.—Consolidation Bonds or consols were to be issued from time to time, at the discretion of the Finance Minister, when the state of the money market was favorable, in order to convert and consolidate all internal debts bearing interest over six per cent. per annum. The total amount of the bonds was not to exceed \$87,500,000.

The public debts negotiated before 1886 had been governed by various acts and regulations, and this had resulted in much variety in names, in rates of interest, in terms of redemption, and in methods of management. This had caused great confusion; and the expediency of consolidating these various debts into one became apparent. Meanwhile, in January, 1886, specie payment was resumed; and general prices and the rate of interest had been considerably changed, owing partly to the development of credit institutions, but chiefly to the improved currency system, which thus made possible not only the consolidation of the national debt, but also conversion on a large scale. The government was not slow to take advantage of this opportunity. In October, 1886, the "Consolidation Bonds Act" was proclaimed, and thus a new era was opened in the management of the national debt. The most important provisions in the act are the following: the rate of interest of the bonds is to be five per cent. per annum; the

bonds are unregistered, but may be registered at the request of the subscribers or the holders; the principal of the bonds is to remain unpaid for five years, and is to be paid by drawings within fifty years from the sixth year of the issue. By successive operations, all bonds bearing an interest over six per cent. per annum have been converted into these bonds.

5. *Currency Redemption Loan*.—This loan was raised with the object of withdrawing the government paper-money. In 1890, the amount of government paper-money in circulation was 40,065,256 yen (\$20,032,628), of which 32,000,000 yen (\$16,000,000) were the notes with denomination over, and 8,065,256 yen (\$4,032,628) the notes with denomination below, one yen; and 10,000,000 yen (\$5,000,000) in silver was held as the reserve for the former. The government then made a contract with the Bank of Japan, which advanced 22,000,000 yen (\$11,000,000), thus making the total reserve 32,000,000 yen (\$16,000,000). For the withdrawal of the latter notes the government provided \$500,000 annually in the budget. In this manner, the redemption of the government paper-money was consummated. This loan bears no interest, and is to be repaid within twenty years, at the option of the government.

6. *War Bonds*.—These bonds were issued to meet the expenses incidental to the war with China in 1894-95. In 1894, Parliament was summoned to assemble at Hiroshima, the temporary residence of the Emperor, and a bill authorizing the government to raise a war loan, not exceeding \$75,000,000, was passed. In the session of 1895, another bill authorizing the government to raise the second war loan of \$50,000,000 was passed. Thus the authorized amount of the war loan was \$125,000,000 in all, although the sum of the bonds actually issued was far below that amount. The rate of interest and the term of redemption, etc., are the same as those for the Consolidation Bonds. In the first issue of the bonds for 30,000,000 yen (\$15,000,000), the subscribed sum was 47,000,000 yen (\$23,500,000), the highest price offered being 114 yen for 100-yen bond. Each subsequent issue of the bonds resulted satisfactorily.

7. *Industry Bonds, Railway Bonds, Hokkaido Railway Bonds, and the Foreign Loan of 1899*.—In 1892, the "Railway Construction Act" was promulgated, and the law provides that the government may raise a loan of \$30,000,000 to meet the expenses of

railway construction within the first period (1892-1903). Under this provision the sum of 34,000,000 yen (\$17,000,000) has been raised.

After the war with China, commerce and industry suddenly expanded, and the construction and improvement of railways, the establishment of steel works, the extension of telephone service, etc., became necessary. As to the Industry Loan, the government raised \$10,775,650 in the home market, and £10,000,000 in London. The latter is known as the Imperial Japanese government four per cent. sterling loan of 1899.

The Hokkaido (northern provinces of Japan) being still a thinly populated and undeveloped colony, an improvement in the means of communication with it is considered necessary. For this purpose an issue of Hokkaido Railway bonds for \$16,500,000 was authorized, of which \$1,709,975 were already raised. The rate of interest, and the term of redemption, etc., of these bonds are the same as those for the consolidation bonds.

Conclusion.—The present outstanding debts of Japan amount to 502,967,249 yen (\$251,483,625), of which 191,143,650 yen (\$95,571,825) are devoted to remunerative objects. The population being forty-four millions, the amount of non-remunerative public debts per head is little more than seven yen (\$3½). The system of currency is based on the gold standard. Imports and exports are increasing year by year. The total imports and exports, which were 143,494,000 yen (\$71,747,000) in 1891, rose to 435,330,000 yen (\$217,665,000) in 1899. Wine, spirits, tobacco, etc., so heavily taxed in other countries, are still subjected to a very light tax in Japan; while silk, tea, beer, and many other articles are wholly exempt from taxation. Thus it will be seen that the government still has many untouched sources of revenue; and, judging from the figures given above, the country can easily bear, if needful, a much heavier public debt than it does at present.

YASUFUMI SAWAKI.

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GERMANY'S POLITICAL TURNING-POINT.

BY WOLF VON SCHIERBRAND.

For years past Germany's policy, domestic and foreign, has been vacillating. It has now arrived at a point where irresolution becomes impossible. There must be decision, and there must be a break with the past. She must change her foreign policy, and she must modify her fiscal policy. The Dreibund is crumbling before our very eyes, and the important tariff bill now before the Reichstag is a clinching proof that Germany intends to alter her policy in that respect. Count von Bülow's recent declarations before the Reichstag showed, as plainly as the words of a statesman of purely diplomatic training can do, that reliance is no longer placed on the international confederation composed of Germany, Austria, and Italy; and these declarations have been so understood by the entire German press. The Kaiser's advances during the last few years both to this country and to England, of which the mission of his brother, Prince Henry, is but the latest and most striking illustration, clearly point out the direction which he means to give to Germany's foreign policy in the near future.

In the chapter of Bismarck's Memoirs which is devoted to a discussion of the genesis and the probable duration of the Dreibund, the matter is treated without any reserve. Bismarck there makes it plain that the understanding with Austria was based,

primarily, on the assumption that a war with Russia was likely to come, not one with France; and the admission of Italy was designed to vouchsafe that country and Germany against French aggression. That Bismarck, when he wrote that chapter, not long before his death, had begun to have strong misgivings as to the intrinsic and lasting force of this tripartite agreement, is evident from the concluding paragraph, in which he says:

"The Triple Alliance is a strategic position which, in view of the dangers threatening at the time of its conclusion, was advisable, and was the best that could be attained under existing circumstances. It has from time to time been prolonged, and we may succeed in prolonging it again; but no lasting treaty of this kind is possible between great Powers, and it would be unwise to regard it as a secure foundation for every kind of possibility, which may change in the days to come the conditions, needs, and sentiments which once made it possible."

He winds up with a sceptical expression of even a more decided cast. Since Bismarck's death, conditions have altered more rapidly than could have been foreseen then. Russia under Nicholas II. has become eminently peaceful. The Panslavic movement has been arrested. More friendly relations than existed for fifty years past have been established between Russia and Austria. There is no longer any fear on Austria's part of Russian aggression. For Austria, then, the reason which controlled her in becoming a member of the Dreibund no longer exists. On the other hand, Austrian internal politics have simultaneously changed in a manner more and more hostile, or at least more averse, to the alliance with Germany. The Czechs, the Poles in Galicia, and all the other Slavic populations of the polyglot empire, have gained political ascendancy; they have been, from the first, opponents of the Dreibund, and they are more opposed to it now than ever. The Polish question in Prussia has of late greatly embittered the Poles against Germany, which they regard as a persecutor of their race. The pending German tariff bill adds new fuel to this feeling. In Italy, the situation is similar. Italy no longer fears French hostility, and the recent Italian naval demonstration in French harbors was intended and accepted as an outward sign of mutual good-will. The long Franco-Italian tariff war is over, and an amiable understanding between the two nations as to the Mediterranean question, and as to Tunis and Tripoli, has removed the last inflammable material. Therewith the chief reason which

induced Italy to join the Dreibund has disappeared, and she, too, looks upon the proposed German tariff legislation as inimical to her fiscal interests. The alliance with Austria was always unpopular in Italy because of the *Italia Irredenta* movement, which was handicapped under Dreibund auspices; and of late the Francophiles, always a large and very influential part of the nation, have gained enormously in Italy.

In a word, then, so far as the other two members of the Dreibund are concerned, no important reason obtains any longer for their remaining in it; and a number of important reasons tell against the further continuance of this alliance. But for Germany, too, several potent factors have come to the surface which make against the Dreibund as the pivotal point of Germany's foreign policy. The chief one, perhaps, is the military weakening of both Austria and Italy, whose resources, in the event of a future big war, both on land and sea, are, relatively speaking, much smaller now than when the Dreibund was formed. Aside from that, however, with her taking a front place as a "World Power," Germany has had to reckon, and will have in future to reckon, with other Powers which are strong in commerce, in colonies, and in naval force, these being England and the United States. Neither Austria nor Italy has been in a condition, or willing, to further Germany's vital interests as a sea-power, and as an expansive, commercial and colonial empire. With France and Russia more closely than ever allied in Europe and abroad, and with Germany's inability to attain to the rank of the first naval power, it is manifestly her interest to put herself not only on a thoroughly friendly footing, but on terms of intimate friendship, if not on those of a formal alliance, with the only two powers that are, so to speak, open to such an engagement. This would not mean that Germany would entirely relinquish her long-continued friendship with Italy and Austria. As far as she is able to do so she will tenderly nurse those good relations; but the character and importance of them, nevertheless, will undergo, has even now undergone, a very great change. They will henceforth be of secondary consideration, and by no means the determining factor in her foreign policy.

Now, as to England, the anomaly is presented that, while the German Emperor and his government are anxious to tighten the political affiliations with that country, and while, particularly,

the Kaiser's strong sympathies and desires go out in that direction, the overwhelming public opinion of Germany is averse to this. It is within the truth to say that a sentiment of downright, bitter hostility, of a strength seldom equalled in his usually placid bosom, rages in the breast of the average German against his English cousin at the present moment. Sentiment counts for something in that. The war against the Boer republics has all along been strongly condemned in Germany, largely for sentimental reasons; and that feeling has been so widespread and powerful that even the Kaiser, on one or two occasions, and the Imperial Chancellor, had to take it into account. Other sentimental reasons lying farther back there also are; and there is, besides, the fact that England for a time took a somewhat unfriendly attitude towards Germany's colonial aspirations, and that England has been Germany's chief commercial rival, and not always a generous or fair one. At any rate, there is no doubt that an Anglophile foreign policy is just now unpopular with the larger, and the politically dominant, part of the German people. The Liberal political parties in Germany, who traditionally favor such a policy, are not the determining factors in her political life.

But, while all this is true, it does not mean that a foreign policy friendly to England is impossible in Germany, even at this moment. For the Kaiser practically shapes her foreign policy. The Imperial Chancellors since Bismarck's retirement have, virtually, merely carried out their imperial master's behests, and have vouchsafed only that measure of explanation to the Reichstag and Bundesrath, for the steps taken or decided upon in Germany's relations with other countries, which they saw fit and considered safe. It is idle to discuss here the question whether this is in strict consonance with the constitution of the Empire. Certain it is, that such has been the unvarying practice since the Kaiser, twelve years ago, took hold of the helm himself and became, to use Bismarck's expression, his own Chancellor. And that the Kaiser is strongly in favor of an Anglophile foreign policy, there is not the shadow of a doubt.

As to the United States, things in a measure are similar. When the war with Spain broke out, in the spring of 1898, the German people violently, and almost altogether for sentimental reasons, sided with Spain; indeed, until the close of that war, the torrent of popular abuse of the United States flowed as fiercely and was

fed from as many sources as that which is now directed against England. The German government, however, took a consistently friendly attitude toward the United States—a fact which recent publications have brought out clearly. This, it may be admitted here, was due at first more to Count von Bülow—then still Secretary of Foreign Affairs under Prince Hohenlohe—than to the Kaiser personally, whose sympathies for a time rather leaned to Spain. But the Kaiser is, after all, Bismarck's pupil, and as such he considers concrete facts as of paramount importance. He quickly came to see that the United States was bound to be victorious, that Spain represented a lost cause, and that the United States would emerge from the war much stronger and more ambitious than ever, and become a new and leading factor in the process of reshaping the world. He saw clearly that Germany's interests bade her remain the best of friends with the United States; and, once he had recognized this, he frankly and without reserve accepted the new situation, and shaped his policy accordingly. The relentless force of logic told him that the closer Germany's relations became with the great American republic, the better chance would there be for a friendly understanding with it at all those points where its new political or commercial interests might clash with those of Germany. His foresight has since been proven true in the settlement of the Samoa difficulty, in the acquisition of the Carolines, and during the recent troubles in China.

In his political calculations, he took into account the policy of expansion to which the dominant party in this country stands committed, and he has since given adherence to the American definition of the Monroe Doctrine. Is he sincere in this? Has Germany absolutely relinquished those old, but never more than half-formed, designs upon West Indian and South American territory? Does Germany consider herself bound, under all circumstances, to abide by that interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which rests, not so much upon the vigorous yet withal conservative enunciation quite recently made by President Roosevelt, as upon that somewhat hazy yet tangible and more far-reaching idea of it held by the larger half of the American people? Time alone will show. At any rate, neither the Kaiser, nor the German government, nor the even more important public opinion of Germany, any longer defines the Monroe Doctrine as Bismarck did in my hearing, on May 26th, 1898 (two months before his death),

as "a species of arrogance peculiarly American and quite inexcusable." True, the Pan-Germans and the colonial enthusiasts in Germany continue to rail against this "species of arrogance"; and in a late issue of the leading German colonial organ, the "*Koloniale Zeitschrift*," Dr. Rudolf Breitscheid declaims against it and against the alleged, unholy designs of the United States upon South and Central America, and calls upon Count von Bülow to quicken the pace of German colonization in South Brazil and Argentina. But he and his kind do not influence the German foreign policy. There is no manner of doubt that Germany—Kaiser, government, and people—is at present honestly desirous of close and friendly relations with the United States.

Apparently at variance with this statement is the fact that there is now before the Reichstag, after approval by both the imperial government and the Bundesrath, a tariff bill whose provisions, so far as the more important agricultural and industrial articles of import are concerned, are evidently largely aimed at the United States. Yet only apparently. For one thing, this bill is by no means sure of passage; and then—and that is the main point—the Kaiser and the government can hardly help themselves. In other words, the Agrarian Party, so-called, which is the *spiritus rector* of this highly important tariff measure, has government and Kaiser by the throat. I am aware that this sounds like a paradox, after what has been said about the Kaiser's controlling influence upon the foreign policy of the Empire. But it is, nevertheless, true. And that needs some explanation.

The party which for want of a better name is called the Agrarian Party in Germany is, politically considered, made up of the entire Conservative faction—nearly the whole Centre (or Ultramontane Party), the small Antisemite faction, the German Husbandry Federation, and the small Yeomen's League, besides a number of representatives of the Polish, the Guelph, and the Alsatian factions. This statement carries the reader right into the midst of German petty factional strife; and, to make my meaning more plain, let me put it in this way: The Agrarian Party is made up of the representatives of the landed proprietors of Germany in the Reichstag. Out of a total of 397 members of that body, they claim to have over 200 on their side, enough to carry the bill. Inasmuch, however, as the bill, if passed at all in the Reichstag, will be considerably amended, it must go back

to the Bundesrath for approval. It is quite safe to say that that body will not ratify the bill in its altered form, in which case the measure will have miscarried. A new bill will then have to be prepared by the government and the Bundesrath, to be in turn submitted to a Reichstag, either the same one, or, if the present one be dissolved and new general elections ordered, the new one; and the new one would be sure to be, in view of the unmistakable temper of the electors, very different in its composition. Thus it will be seen that the fate of this bill is, at best, very uncertain, and that before there is any chance of its becoming a law both government and Bundesrath, and the nation at large, will have considerable time for reflection and sober second thought.

The reasons for the introduction of this tariff bill are complex. Between 1892 and 1894, a number of important commercial treaties were concluded by Germany, at the instance of Count Caprivi, Bismarck's successor, with some of her chief customers, viz., Austria, Russia, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Roumania. The United States had to be left out of this list, because, like France (by the Treaty of Frankfort-on-Main), the United States shared, under the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty of 1828 with Prussia, at once and without any intervening negotiations, in all the benefits and tariff reductions which these new treaty nations had acquired, on the principle of give-and-take, by these special agreements with Germany. Now, the agriculturists of Germany, but especially the large and influential landed proprietors, claim that these commercial treaties, which will expire on December 31st, 1903, have done them incalculable harm, not alone because they have brought into the country the cheaper agricultural products of the new treaty states, but more particularly because they have admitted, on the same terms, the even cheaper ones of the United States, without corresponding benefits from the latter. And, in a measure, this is true. Of course, under the treaty of 1828, the position of the United States in this matter has been impregnable; and how largely this country has profited from the chances thus afforded for a much larger trade with Germany, the ever-increasing balance of trade in favor of the United States has shown year after year. According to German official statistics, this country sold to Germany in 1900-01 nearly three times the amount it took—a proportion vastly greater to Germany's disadvantage than was the case with any other country that the Empire

had dealings with. Agricultural conditions in Germany (and more especially in the eastern provinces of Prussia, where large estates are the rule, not the exception, as in the western provinces and in South Germany), have grown steadily worse since the commercial treaties of 1892-94 went into effect; and many titled estate-holders had to abandon their paternal acres, impoverished and embittered. It is true, on the other hand, that these same commercial treaties have been the chief means of increasing German industries and commerce, and the unparalleled rise of the Empire as an exporting centre has been due to them.

Now, one view of the matter is, that Germany has become a country where industry and commerce predominate; that she is passing through an agricultural crisis similar to that through which England passed several decades ago, and for similar reasons; and that, inasmuch as the industrial and commercial interests of the country have now become the paramount ones, and three-fifths of her total population (as the imperial census of 1895 showed) are now engaged in industrial or commercial pursuits, the interests of the larger part of the nation must rule, that low-priced foodstuffs are of the first importance to this majority, and that this view must prevail, even if agriculture suffers. That, of course, is the view taken by the industrial and commercial classes, who fear the ruin of Germany's young industries if the bill should become law; and it is also the view of the laboring masses. But there is still another view, and its adherents are both numerous and influential. They argue that, after all, agriculture is the backbone of a nation, and that, with that backbone broken, the country, impotent to nourish its own people, with foes all around, would be at the mercy of its neighbors and enemies, a ready prey in war. They further argue that Germany draws from the small but traditionally powerful class of her landed and titled proprietors the brain and brawn of her army, of her whole governmental machine, the larger part of her legislators, and the *personnel* of the imperial court and of the courts of all her smaller sovereign rulers. This latter view is held, too, by the Kaiser, by Count von Bülow, by Count Posadowsky, and probably by nine-tenths of all the persons with whom the Kaiser comes in contact. Add to this that the papers which support the Agrarian cause skilfully and unceasingly are the only German papers that the Kaiser reads, and that that part of the press has persistently

and with great cunning waged a campaign of calumny against the United States, and it will readily be seen how powerful is the cause of Agrarianism in Germany, and above all in Prussia.

The Agrarians believe that their hour is come, that they can force this greatly amended bill through to suit their wishes, and that they can make the Kaiser and the Bundesrath accept it. In this they are, nevertheless, probably mistaken; but that they hold an unusually strong position there is no doubt. The negotiations between Germany and the United States, which were carried on for a number of years past, mostly in Washington, in a desultory way, came to nothing, presumably because the United States was quite satisfied with the existing state of affairs, which gave her, without lifting a finger or incurring the slightest sacrifice, all and more than she could obtain by special treaty. The Agrarians now hope to do away entirely, by means of this bill, with American competition, and thus restore their old-time prosperity. Of course, they are bitterly opposed to any such close *entente* with the United States as the Kaiser and the larger part of the nation dream of. How the Kaiser will finally get out of this predicament is matter of conjecture. The effort to disentangle him will test the justice of Count von Bülow's claim to the name of statesman.

There is, however, still another consideration which makes the Kaiser, his government, and a number of the sovereign rulers of the other German states, so willing to show favor to the Agrarian claims; and that is the belief that they, composed largely of the landed nobility of the Empire, are the main bulwark against the rising flood of socialism, against revolution, against the designs, as they believe, of the proletarian rabble to upset throne and altar and to plunge the country into bloody civil strife. This faith—which, of course, the Agrarian press and party do everything in their power to foster—strengthens the Agrarian hold upon a large and misguided part of the upper middle-class as well. And by pressing this argument, the Agrarian press has succeeded in beclouding many minds and in befogging the real issues.

There is a strong probability that, if the majority of these mortgage-ridden lords of the soil, who are now putting all the blame for their gradual impoverishment upon the competition of the United States, were to give up their careless and spendthrift mode of living, their haphazard methods of managing their estates, and to introduce rigid economy, modern methods of tilling the

soil, and give their undivided attention to agriculture, they might succeed within a number of years in putting their estates on a paying basis, without much aid from the government. But they find it easier and pleasanter, of course, to get government help in the shape of higher import duties on all agricultural products, larger internal taxes on beet-sugar and spirits, and bigger export bounties on both. Besides, land for agricultural purposes is to-day too high in Germany, and estates seldom yield more than from two and a half to four per cent., after all expenses and the interest on the mortgages and floating debts have been paid.

Of special interest is the growth of Socialism as a political factor in Germany. It must be borne in mind that Germany is the birthplace of Socialism, and that it has attained a higher development there than anywhere else. First, as to its numerical development. In 1877, the Socialists cast 493,000 votes at the Reichstag elections, as against the Centre's 1,341,000, for instance, and against the National Liberals' 1,468,000. In 1878 and 1879, owing to Bismarck's repressive measures, the Socialist vote dropped to 312,000. But from that time until the last general election, that of 1898, the Socialist vote rose steadily and rapidly, and in 1898 it attained to 2,107,000, while the vote of all the other parties gradually went down, and to-day some of these parties poll barely one-fourth of their former strength. The Socialists to-day are, in point of numbers, by far the largest party; and at the next election they will reach the two-million-and-a-half mark, and possibly exceed it. But even in 1898, when the total vote was something above seven millions, they represented two-sevenths of it. The National Liberal Party, for many years the strongest and most influential one, to-day represents but half the voting strength of the Socialists. And it must be remembered that this phenomenal growth has been brought about in the teeth of all the repression to which existing laws would lend themselves, and despite all the disadvantages in life to which, in a country like Germany, the Socialist cohorts are subject. It is a curious record, and it becomes intelligible only if the circumstances which led up to it are understood.

Let it be said, then, that Germany is a country where legislation is class legislation in a unique degree. This is a strong charge to make against a country otherwise so enlightened as Germany. But the charge is amply borne out by the facts. Be-

fore going into that, however, one or two other things may be referred to. The political development of Germany, and to a minor degree her social and commercial development, have brought it about that the "fourth estate"—the laboring man, the mechanic, the small shop-keeper, the farm-hand—has never been able to acquire what the same class of the population has acquired in France since the great Revolution, in England during the course of the nineteenth century, on social and political lines, and what has been the birthright of every man in the great American Republic since its foundation. The only revolution that ever took place in Germany, that of 1848-49, proceeded from the middle-classes, and had purely political reform for its aim. It lasted, besides, too short a time, and was not successful in the end. When its waves had rolled back, things returned much to their old level. Thus it was that the status of the lower classes, and of the poorer middle-classes, had virtually not changed when Lassalle and Marx and the other earlier Socialist leaders began to make their appeals to the "proletariat"; and, excepting the political and social awakening for which the Socialist Party is responsible in Germany, there has come no other to the masses of the lower strata. They are still, even where the leaven of Socialism has worked, rather behind their fellows in countries more favored politically, so far as self-respect, maturity of convictions, and sturdy independence are concerned.

These reasons alone explain, to some extent, the remarkable rise of Socialism as a political power in Germany. But there is, as pointed out above, the further fact that legislation there, more than elsewhere, is class legislation, and that the poorer classes, from which, of course, the Socialist army mainly recruits itself, are in many ways discriminated against. This fact obtrudes itself upon every impartial observer in Germany, and it is this which gives the Socialist agitator most of his ammunition. For proof of this claim, one has not far to go. Take, for example, the tax question. The German imperial budget for 1898-99 was 4,980,000,000 marks, or about 1200 million dollars. Of this sum 14 per cent. went to the army and 10 per cent. to the navy. About twenty dollars *per capita* is what the German imperial government required. This, be it noted, does not include all the taxes raised by the separate states, towns, and provinces for their own support. Of course, the laboring population has to pay its full share for

the support of both navy and army, about seventy-three out of every hundred serving belonging to that class. Now, where does a large part of the taxes come from? The tax and revenue system in Germany seems to be gotten up so as to lie with crushing force upon the weary backs of the poor. As witness these German official figures for 1900-01: The whole sum from import duties for 1901 is 478,978,000 marks. Of this the duty on cereals was 131,557,000 marks; on petroleum, 70,913,000; on coffee, 64,503,000; on lard, 12,540,000; on cotton, yarn and finished, 8,804,000; on meats, 8,459,000; on rice, 5,365,000; on salt herrings, 3,045,000; on cheese, 2,991,000; on tea, 2,856,000; on eggs, 2,793,000; on cattle and sheep, 2,666,000; on butter and margarine, 2,608,000; on table fats, 2,382,000, &c. It will be noticed that these articles, which are so greatly enhanced in price in Germany by high duties, are all articles for the poor man's consumption. Then, as to the internal revenue taxes. Three of the principal ones, viz., on tobacco, sugar, and on salt, and the tax on home-made spirituous liquors, figure in the returns for 1901, respectively, as 11,960,000 marks, 111,380,000, and 48,943,000; and liquor, which is twice taxed for internal consumption, is put down as 109,768,000 and 18,087,000, while the brewing tax amounts to 31,136,000. The government which thus raises the price of nearly every foodstuff the poor require, encourages the distiller (who is nearly always owner of a big rural estate) in every possible way.

This record of sins of commission and omission on the part of the German government towards the lower classes, could be greatly lengthened by speaking of the anti-strike laws; of the manner in which justice is habitually strained to the injury of the poor; of the shame and anomaly of the *lese majeste* trials; of the laws in large districts of Germany which render marriage difficult for the poor man (and resulting, for instance, in Bavaria in the enormous illegitimate birth-rate of twenty-six out of every hundred); of the practical denial of the constitutional "right of association"; of the police practices of enforcing antiquated contract laws in a one-sided manner against the rural and city laborer, &c. But the above will suffice to illustrate the point.

The Polish question in Prussia has of late again become acute. It will continue to vex not alone Prussia but Germany as a whole, and it is exerting a seriously disturbing influence upon the foreign policy of the Empire. No doubt, the largely Polish provinces of

Prussia—Posen, West and East Prussia—are now in every way, material, intellectual, and social, in a much better condition than when they still formed part of Poland; and the gradual rise of a “third estate,” of a middle-class, the want of which probably contributed more to the downfall of Poland than any other single factor, is wholly due to Prussia’s wise administrative measures and to compulsory education. But the two and a half millions of Poles dwelling under Prussian rule, have not ceased to think of themselves as Poles, and their race and religious hatred of their masters has in nowise abated. Nor have their aspirations for national independence and for a regeneration of Poland. Their methods in resisting the process of amalgamation have been effectively systematized, so much so that, in spite of the severe measures of the Prussian government, and despite the lavish use of the so-called colonization fund, now amounting to a round 100,000,000 marks—one of Bismarck’s latest schemes to stem the Polish tide—the Poles during the last ten years have begun to recover a good deal of lost ground, and are successfully forging Posen, parts of the other two provinces, and the eastern portion of Silesia, into a homogeneous Polish whole. The Poles in Prussia look longingly across the Austrian frontier, where their brethren in Galicia have been granted autonomy, and across even the Russian border, where they are the intellectual superiors of their Muscovite fellows, and conspire more or less openly in the sense indicated. There is no intention of immediate revolution, but they are biding their time, cautioned by past failures; and, in the meanwhile, they are knitting together, more and more closely, the bonds of race between the three fragments into which they were rent.

The enormous decrease of political Liberalism in Germany, which has been one of the most marked symptoms of the past decade, is that feature in the political life of the young Empire which fills the friend of Germany with deepest sorrow and with direst forebodings. During the sixties, the Liberals were the dominant party, and the government of old Emperor William I. had to reckon with them as a most serious factor. Since then, the National Liberals have gone down from 1,468,600 votes to 971,300, and they have ceased to be Liberals in the political sense of that word, and now include the most violent jingoes in Germany. The other three Liberal sections, the old Progressive Party,

the Liberal Association, and the People's Party, have come down to 862,000 votes, combined. All the Liberals elected either to the Reichstag or the Prussian Diet are numerically too weak to undertake a policy of their own, and they lack cohesion and a community of political aims and interests. Thus, they shift about and are barely able, now and then, to defeat a specially obnoxious measure by filibustering tactics; but they cannot create any legislation of their own. Under such dispiriting influences, they have become merely negative. This decrease of Liberalism has occurred since jingoism was injected into German politics, since a blatant and ill-directed greed for colonies took hold of a large part of the nation. Of course, it is too early to surmise what, if anything, will come of those colonial dreams. Riper experience may bring greater wisdom and skill. But it is a fact that Germany's colonies have not thus far proved a blessing to her in any sense. They do not, above all, afford her a channel for her commercial enterprise nor for the surplus of her population, and merely looked at as financial ventures they have proven unmistakable failures. Nevertheless, the present temper of the great majority of the nation is to hold on to the present colonies, and to acquire new ones.

As for the process of welding together the different states of Germany into a more homogeneous entity, that is going on steadily though slowly. The process has already gone to that point where it is safe to say it would take more than one political hurricane to tear the component parts of the Empire asunder again. Germany is now in the full sense of the word a nation, one and indivisible. Nevertheless, the spirit of separatism, always very powerful since the dawn of German history, is still quite strong. It crops out, now and then, when least expected. But it is now a subordinate influence in German political life. Even the Bavarian, who holds most firmly to his idea of a "narrower fatherland," is now an imperialist first. No serious danger threatens Germany's future from that source, once so prolific of internal strife and bitter dissension.

WOLF VON SCHIERBRAND.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE.

BY HANNIS TAYLOR, AUTHOR OF "INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW."

THE world movement which has for its object the speedy establishment of some kind of a practical working system of international arbitration, has been greatly advanced by the proceedings of the Peace Conference begun at The Hague in 1899, and by those of the Pan-American Conference begun in the City of Mexico in 1901. It is a fortunate circumstance that the last outpost in the march towards the solution of the supreme problem of modern international law, should have been fixed in the capital of a country which stands as a natural mediator between the United States and Latin America. In order to grasp fully the significance of all that has been so far achieved, it is necessary to look backward from that outpost over the immense field traversed before it was reached.

During the last fifty years, international law, as a living and growing organism, has passed through a more marked and rapid development than in any other single epoch in its entire history. Within that time the awakened conscience of the world has drawn the states composing the family of nations into a closer concert, which has been active in its efforts to improve the existing system of international relations, through a re-examination and re-statement of the rules by which they are regulated. On its scientific side, this movement has been promoted by a new school of publicists, representing nearly every nationality, whose tireless investigations into every branch of the subject have assumed the systematic form of corporate thought under the guiding hand of the Institute of International Law. On its practical side, this movement has been applying the fruits of that kind of research and reflection to the solution of the vital questions presented in

rapid succession to the series of international congresses and conferences begun at Paris in 1856, and ended in the City of Mexico in 1902. When the records of the proceedings of those notable assemblies are read as a connected whole, it is impossible not to hear the outcry for a higher and more stable international life, to be based upon some kind of a code more precise and definite than that embodied in existing rules, and for some kind of an international tribunal with a jurisdiction more comprehensive than that usually vested in voluntary courts of arbitration. Whether or no such an ideal is attainable is purely a tentative question, to be solved only by patient and persistent efforts made in the light of actual experience. The hope of even partial success rests not only upon the Utopian dream that the passions and self-interest of mankind will grow less acute, but upon the fact that, as nations become more perfectly organized, they perceive that stability, comfort, and economy may be promoted by a transition from the reign of arms to the reign of law.

The struggle for the establishment of an international reign of law, the struggle for the subjection of the independent and co-equal sovereignties that constitute the family of nations to the voluntary yoke of legality, began with the wreck of that strange creation known as the Holy Roman or Mediæval Empire, which rested upon the magnificent notion of a vast Christian Monarchy whose sway was absolutely universal. The chiefs of that comprehensive society were the Roman Emperor and the Roman Pontiff, the one standing at its head in its temporal character as an empire, the other standing at its head in its spiritual character as a church. The highest aspiration of the Pope in his struggle with the Emperor was so to establish his supremacy over all princes, including the Emperor himself, as to enable him to offer to Europe the arbitrating power it demanded. Thus it was that the Roman Pontiff assumed the office of supreme judge of appeals in all causes arising in the ecclesiastical courts of Christendom, especially in matrimonial causes involving the validity of a royal marriage, where the result might affect the legitimacy of the issue, and indirectly the peace of the nation. On the other hand, those who, like Dante, maintained the independence of the Empire, and who wished to substitute for the canonical system secular Roman jurisprudence, attempted, when it was too late, to find in its temporal head an international judge and mediator, who, by

reason of his severance from local associations and interests, might, as "*Imperator Pacificus*," prevent wars between the states of Europe by hearing complaints and redressing injuries inflicted by sovereigns or peoples on each other. As the direct heir of those who from Julius to Justinian had moulded the jurisprudence of Europe, he was to be not only peace-maker, but the very embodiment of legality and, as such, the expounder of justice and the source of positive law. The very extravagance of such pretensions rendered their realization impossible. The wars which such a dominion was designed to check rather increased than diminished in intensity; the theory of the Empire's political and legal supremacy never ripened into reality. And yet, no matter to what extent the Mediæval Empire may have failed as an international power, whether arbitrating on its spiritual side through the Pope and the canon law, or on its temporal side through the Emperor and the Imperial law, the fact remains that for centuries it was the one bond of cohesion, holding Europe together under the spell of a theory that assumed to provide a complete system of international justice, and a supreme tribunal adequate for the settlement of all controversies which could possibly arise between Christian nations.

Not until the ancient and imposing theory of a common and irresistible superior, as embodied in the Mediæval Empire, was wrecked by the Reformation, did the emancipated nationalities, which had crouched so long at its feet, begin to realize, first, that each state or nation is sovereign and independent, and as such co-equal with all the rest; second, that territory and jurisdiction are co-extensive. After the establishment of that common basis of equality, the difficulty that remained was how to subject sovereign states, through their own volition, to the yoke of legality. No more novel or difficult problem was ever presented for solution than that which confronted the publicists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when they were called upon to furnish rules adequate, by virtue of their intrinsic weight and dignity, to compel the obedience of the freshly emancipated European nationalities, without the coercive force of any recognized central authority. From that day to this, the jurists and statesmen of the world have been striving to complete the vague and imperfect result then reached, by the establishment of some kind of an international tribunal to be armed with the power to define the existing

system of international rules, and to enforce them against the refractory, through some kind of pressure, moral or legal.

So firmly was the idea fixed in the minds of men that the right to arbitrate between European states was vested in the Mediæval Empire, that Leibnitz, as late as 1693-1700, proposed the Pope and the Emperor of Germany as joint public arbitrators. In 1713, the Abbé St.-Pierre came forward with a project to secure perpetual peace between the European powers, which was circulated shortly after the conference that led to the Peace of Utrecht, at which conference the Abbé was present. The aim of that project, more fully developed in 1729, was to perpetuate the settlement embodied in the treaties of Utrecht through an alliance or league of European states, which should renounce the right of war, and submit their differences to the arbitration of a diet representing twenty votes, three-fourths of which was to be final. In 1786-89 followed the scheme of Jeremy Bentham, in which he undertook to formulate a plan to secure universal and perpetual peace through a league of European states to be governed by laws enacted by a federal legislature, and enforced through a federal judicature. In 1795, that grand conception was recast by Immanuel Kant in his essay "Touching Perpetual Peace," in which he maintained that international law should rest upon a confederation of free states, guaranteeing untrammelled intercommunication through the establishment of a world citizenship, under the direction of a congress to be called and dissolved at the pleasure of the members of the confederation. In 1838, the New York Peace Society, in a petition to the House of Representatives of the United States, proposed a board of international arbitration; and in 1842 James Mill went a step farther, by insisting, in a treatise, that delegates from the several governments should not only constitute an arbitral court, but should formulate a code for its guidance. In order to give practical effect to that idea, David Dudley Field published in 1872 "Outlines of an International Code," defining the constitution of "A High Tribunal of Arbitration"; in 1874, Dr. Goldschmidt drafted a complete code of "Proposed Rules for International Tribunals of Arbitration"; and in 1875 the Institute of International Law, at its meeting at The Hague, adopted a scheme of arbitral procedure. As additional evidence of the growth of the tendency to submit controversies to arbitration, the statement may be made that, according

to a recent estimate of an eminent authority,—after subtracting numerous cases of mediation, ordinary boundary surveys, domestic commissions, direct treaty settlements, and pure diplomatic negotiations, often improperly included in such estimates,—the whole number of international arbitrations during the last century, exclusive of cases now pending and incomplete, was one hundred and thirty-six. Of these, fifty-seven are credited to the United States; thirty-three to Great Britain; and twelve to France.

Such was the process of evolution through which the increasing effort to establish some kind of a working system of international arbitration had passed, prior to the meeting in May, 1899, of the Peace Conference at The Hague, the results of whose proceedings may mark a turning-point in the international relations of the world, just as the making of the second constitution of the United States marked a turning-point in its political history. The uncritical enthusiasts, who looked upon the framers of that unique federal experiment as demigods and not as men, and who held up their work as a spontaneous creation produced under the effects of intellectual inspiration, unwittingly put upon it the gravest reproach to which it could possibly have been subjected. Just because it was no such thing, it has been able to survive all the trials and vicissitudes through which it has passed. All political history proves that Sir James Mackintosh was right when he said that “constitutions are not made; they grow.” Every viable constitution must be the natural outcome of progressive history; it must be the result of the welding together of pre-existing elements just at the moment when such elements are being impelled towards union by their own momentum. Only because the statesmen and publicists who met at The Hague, for the purpose of laying the foundations for a federal constitution for the United States of the World, were guided by that all-important truth, is there any hope whatever that the results of their labors will endure as a permanent and cohesive force.

The original rescript of August 24th, 1898, in which the Emperor of Russia initiated the Peace Conference, was supplemented by a circular letter of Count Mouravieff, dated January 11th, 1899, defining more precisely the several subjects to be submitted for international deliberation. Foremost among such subjects were those involving agreements among the Powers “not

to increase for a fixed period the present effective of the armed military and naval forces, and at the same time not to increase the budgets pertaining thereto;" "to apply to naval warfare the stipulations of the Geneva Convention of 1864, on the basis of the additional articles of 1868;" "to revise the Declaration concerning the laws and customs of war elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels, which has remained unratified to the present day;" "to accept in principle the employment of good offices, of mediation and facultative arbitration in cases lending themselves thereto, with the object of preventing armed conflicts between nations." After The Hague had been selected as a meeting place, the Netherlands government, on April 7th, 1899, issued a formal invitation to each of the invited Powers, requesting it "to be good enough to be represented at the above-mentioned conference, in order to discuss the questions indicated in the second Russian circular, as well as all other questions connected with the ideas set forth in the first, excluding, however, from the deliberations everything which refers to the political relations of states, or the order of things established by treaties." In response to that invitation, more than one hundred delegates from twenty-six Powers assembled in the "House in the Woods" on May 18th, 1899, of which Powers twenty were European, four Asiatic, and two American, each Power having one vote. After permanent organization had been completed, President de Staal stated in his opening address: "We shall also undertake in a special manner to generalize and codify the practice of arbitration, of mediation, and of good offices. These ideas constitute, so to speak, the very essence of our task."

It was, certainly, a hopeful sign for the peace of the world when, at a very early stage in the proceedings of an assembly called by the chief of the great empire of the east of Europe, the first plenipotentiary of the great empire of the west, Sir Julian Pauncefote, formally proposed, in a notable *mémoire*, the question of the creation of a permanent court of arbitration. The delegation of the United States submitted at the same time a similar proposition, expressing the desire that arbitration might become a normal method of adjusting international disputes. While the delegation of the German Empire objected, and no doubt wisely, to obligatory or compulsory arbitration, as a step too far in advance of existing conditions, they subsequently expressed the cordial adherence of Germany to an international court of arbi-

tration, Professor Zorn declaring that his government "fully recognized the importance and the grandeur of the new institution." It is safe to say that all was done that could have been wisely attempted in a meeting necessarily preliminary and tentative. The strength of the Conference was in its patience and moderation. M. Martens, one of the Russian delegates, tells us: "It is a happy token to note, the longer the labors of the Conference at The Hague lasted, the more fully views were exchanged among the representatives of the different Powers, the more pronounced grew the mutual respect, the more friendly grew the personal relations, the more palpable became the desire to do something for the future." How differently the Conference would surely have ended, had there been a premature attempt to force a result for which even the most civilized nations are not yet prepared! Clearly perceiving that the question of questions to be solved was that involved in the construction of just such an arbitral tribunal as would embody the advance so far made in that direction by sovereign states unwilling to bow absolutely to any common superior capable of subjecting them to positive law, the delegates wisely resolved to attempt only a voluntary system of arbitration, depending upon the moral sentiment of the world for coercive authority. As an American member of the Conference has well expressed it: "The only other alternative to a voluntary system of arbitration must necessarily include a sanction, in the shape of an executive power or authority with sufficient force to compel adherence to an agreement for arbitration. . . . They were careful to leave the sovereignty of each state absolutely unimpaired, and trusted exclusively to the force of public opinion and the public conscience for a sanction to enforce the mandates of the newly established court."* In organizing the Permanent Court upon a purely voluntary basis, the Conference simply systematized and supplemented the results of the world's experience on the subject. Apart from the establishment of the court itself, the two notable additions made were embodied in a definite code of procedure,—the lack of which had been recognized as a serious drawback to international arbitration as early as 1874 by the *Institut de Droit International*,—and in the statement in that code of the principle that "the tribunal is authorized to determine its own jurisdiction."

* Holls. "The Peace Conference at The Hague," p. 356.

In dealing with the delicate subject before them, the delegates clearly understood that the practical application of international arbitration had been hindered by three obstacles: first, by the necessity of constituting a special court in each particular case; second, by the lack of power in such a court to define its own jurisdiction; third, by the lack of a settled code to regulate its procedure. In the effort to remove the first of these obstacles, the Conference undertook "to organize a Permanent Court of Arbitration accessible at all times, and acting, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties, in accordance with the rules of procedure included in the present convention." In furtherance of that design, it was agreed that "each Signatory Power shall select not more than four persons, of recognized competence in questions of international law, enjoying the highest moral reputation and disposed to accept the duties of arbitrators. The persons thus selected shall be enrolled as members of the court, upon a list which shall be communicated by the Bureau to all the Signatory Powers." In order to provide the Court with an administrative organ, it was stipulated that "an International Bureau shall be established at The Hague, and shall serve as the record office for the Court. This Bureau shall be the medium of all communications relating to the Court. It shall have the custody of the archives and shall conduct all the administrative business." It was further provided that, "whenever the Signatory Powers wish to have recourse to the Permanent Court for the settlement of a difference that has arisen between them, the arbitrators selected to constitute the Tribunal which shall have jurisdiction to determine such differences, shall be chosen from the general list of members of the Court. If such Arbitral Tribunal be not constituted by special agreement of the parties, it shall be formed in the following manner: Each party shall name two arbitrators, and these together shall choose an umpire. If the votes shall be equal, the choice of the umpire shall be entrusted to a third Power, selected by the parties by common accord. If an agreement is not arrived at on this subject, each party shall select a different Power, and the choice of the umpire shall be made by the united action of the Powers thus selected. The Tribunal being thus constituted, the parties shall communicate to the Bureau their decision to have recourse to the Court, and the names of the arbitrators. The Tribunal of Arbitration shall meet

at the time fixed by the parties. The members of the Court, in the discharge of their duties, and outside of their own country, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities." It thus appears that the members of the Permanent Court constitute a general staff of judges, under the protection of international law, out of which an arbitral tribunal may be constituted in each particular case by any one of the methods indicated. As stated heretofore, the Conference was careful to leave the resort to arbitration purely voluntary, unless a kind of moral coercion was contemplated by the following provision of Article 27:

"The Signatory Powers consider it their duty in case a serious dispute threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind these latter that the Permanent Court of Arbitration is open to them. Consequently, they declare that the fact of reminding the parties in controversy of the provisions of the present convention, and the advice given to them, in the higher interests of peace, to have recourse to the Permanent Court, can only be considered as an exercise of good offices."

No invitations to attend the Peace Conference at The Hague were sent to the Holy See or the South African republics; and no delegates came from Central and South American republics. The only American Powers present were the United States of America and Mexico. Mr. Holls says:

"No official explanation of the principle upon which invitations were issued or withheld was given, and any discussion of the causes which led to the exclusion of the South African republics, as well as the Holy See, would have to be based on surmises. The government of the United States regretted the absence of the delegates from the sister republics of Central and South America very sincerely. . . . The American commissioners at The Hague did not fail to remember that, with the exception of the Mexican delegates, they were the sole representatives of the Western Hemisphere, and in the entire course of the Conference, and especially in the discussions in the *Comité d'Examen*, careful efforts were made to safeguard the peculiar interests of Central and South America."

Under such circumstances it is not strange that the delegates of the United States should have qualified their acceptance of Article 27 of the Arbitration Treaty, by the following Declaration:

"Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not entering upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign state, nor shall anything contained in the said convention be so construed as to require

the relinquishment, by the United States of America, of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

Thus was the Monroe Doctrine first officially communicated to the representatives of all the great Powers in such a way as clearly to indicate to them that, not even in the interest of universal peace, was this government willing to sacrifice any part of that system which rests upon the conviction that "our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe." In view of such principles and conditions it was manifestly necessary and proper that all of the American states, Northern, Central, and Southern, should meet together, and, after due deliberation, determine the final form in which they would accede, as a whole, to the humane scheme of peace and good-will embodied in The Hague Conventions.

After President McKinley, in his message to Congress in 1899, declared it expedient that the several American Republics, constituting the International Union, should be invited, at an early date, to hold another conference, in the capital of one of the countries that had not already enjoyed that honor, the Mexican Government promptly accepted the suggestion, and officially invited the states composing the Union to attend a conference to be convened in the City of Mexico, on October 22d, 1901. President Roosevelt, in his message of the following December, said:

"We view with lively interest and keen hopes of beneficial results, the proceedings of the Pan-American Conference, convoked at the invitation of Mexico, and now sitting at the Mexican Capital. The delegates of the United States are under the most liberal instructions to co-operate with their colleagues in all matters promising advantage to the great family of American commonwealths, as well in their relations among themselves, as in their domestic advancement and in their intercourse with the world at large."

Such were the conditions under which assembled, in the Pan-American Conference of 1901, the delegates of the United States of America, of the United States of Brazil, of the United States of Mexico, of the United States of Venezuela, and of the republics of Argentine, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Equador, Guatemala, Hayti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, and

Uruguay. The first serious difficulty that arose in the body thus constituted grew out of an attempt, made by an influential and aggressive group, to force the adoption of a scheme of compulsory arbitration. But this danger was averted; and the Conference was saved from failure through a compromise, resulting in a general adhesion to The Hague Conventions. The abandonment thus secured of the attempt to establish compulsory arbitration in its wider form, did not, however, deter the delegates from making a subsequent effort to secure the compulsory plan, within a certain narrow sphere. In the original Russian scheme submitted at The Hague, it was proposed that:

"Arbitration shall be obligatory in the following cases, so far as they do not affect the vital interests or the national honor of the contracting states:

"I. In the case of differences or conflicts regarding pecuniary damages suffered by a state or its citizens, in consequence of illegal or negligent action on the part of any state or the citizens of the latter.

"II. In the case of disagreements or conflicts regarding the interpretation or application of treaties or conventions upon the following subjects:

"(1) Treaties concerning postal or telegraphic service and railways, as well as those having for their object the protection of submarine telegraphic cables; rules concerning the means of preventing collisions on the high seas; conventions concerning the navigation of international rivers and interoceanic canals.

"(2) Conventions concerning the protection of literary and artistic property, as well as industrial and proprietary rights (patents, trademarks, and commercial names); conventions regarding monetary affairs, weights, and measures; conventions regarding sanitary affairs and veterinary precautions and measures against the phylloxera.

"(3) Conventions regarding inheritances, extradition, and mutual judicial assistance.

"(4) Boundary conventions or treaties, so far as they concern purely technical, and not political, questions."

After objection had been made to a part of this Russian scheme by the delegates of the United States, it was rejected as a whole upon a motion made by a delegate of the German Empire. The battle thus lost at The Hague in favor of compulsory arbitration, even when limited to the settlement of rights purely legal, as contradistinguished from such as are political, was revived in the Pan-American Conference in the proposal there made for the establishment of an international court of claims. The committee introducing the project said:

"The difficulties at present existing, in the opposition of some of the

delegations to the conference in the way of negotiation of a general treaty of compulsory arbitration, do not exist in the case of the subject matter of this proposed convention. The questions enumerated in Article I. are independent of those political and social issues which arouse the passions of nations, or which are connected directly with their vital interests. Moreover, these questions are, as a rule, merely of a legal character. It is now proposed to submit such cases to The Hague tribunal in accordance with the tendencies of which this assembly has given such unanimous evidence."

Under the terms of Article I. it is provided that:

"The high contracting parties agree to submit to arbitration all claims for pecuniary loss or damage which may be presented by their respective citizens and which, in accordance with international law, can be submitted through diplomatic channels and cannot amicably be adjusted through such channels, provided such claims exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars in gold; and provided, further, that such claimants shall not have voluntarily served or aided, subsequently to the ratification of this protocol, the enemies of the government against which the claim is presented."

Thus, at last, a beginning has been made, by a considerable group of nations, in their effort to establish compulsory arbitration in reference to the settlement of a certain class of legal claims which should be adjudicated between states as between individuals. If the experiment is successful, as it no doubt will be, the compulsory jurisdiction of The Hague tribunal will, let it be hoped, gradually widen, until everything is embraced within it, except such controversies of a political character as "affect vital interests or the national honor of the contracting states." The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Señor Mariscal, was therefore justified in declaring at the close of the Pan-American Conference, that it had ended in triumph; and that, as he said:

"That triumph is undoubtedly the unanimous agreement of all the delegations, in spite of their apparently radical divergence as to the application of that great principle, to submit for settlement to the permanent arbitration court of The Hague all controversies that may arise among the governments of America due to the claims of private individuals for indemnities and damages. As those claims, at least in America, and in cases where powerful nations are involved, are without question the most frequent source of international controversies, the importance of this achievement cannot be doubted. When the convention in question once comes into force, those complaints and claims which most inflame the minds of statesmen and embitter international relations will be settled peacefully, in the manner dictated by equity and the highest considerations of expediency."

HANNIS TAYLOR.

MUSCOVITE DESIGNS ON MANCHURIA.

BY L. MINER.

FOR half a century, Manchuria has been the Naboth's vineyard upon which Russia has cast covetous eyes. In 1851, Russia obtained possession of "the sparsely populated but widely extended districts of the Amur." Since then she has been watching across the breadth of the continent of Asia for opportunities to creep southward. And at the close of the war between China and Japan, she made a leap toward her goal. Japan's presence in the Liaotung Peninsula was a menace to the balance of power. Therefore, Russia ousted her and took her place! Count Cassini was then Russian Minister in Peking, and soon the world had reason to suspect that something very private but very momentous was going on at the Chinese capital. Russia smilingly denied it at the time; but now, when her right to build railroads in Manchuria and to guard them with soldiers is questioned, she holds up the Cassini Convention, and asks with an air of injured innocence why no objections were raised at the time when the treaty giving the rights in question was made! Li Hung Chang could have given the history of the Cassini Convention. Perhaps, it would have been the history of his own dishonor. These concessions were Russia's reward for "saving" Chinese territory from the clutch of Japan. China's "face" was saved by the promise that the railroad should revert to her after a long term of years, a promise easy to make, as easy to break for the perfidious Muscovite, who determined that long before this term expired the country through which this railroad passes should be as completely Russianized as the territory about St. Petersburg.

These gains were all supposedly commercial, giving Russia the open port on the Pacific which was her "ultimate destiny." Close to this port of Talienwan or Dalny was China's Gibraltar, Port

Arthur. It had been the pride of the empire previous to its ignominious fall before the Japanese, who unfairly approached it from the rear instead of from its impregnable front! In the winter of 1897-8, Germany acquired her foothold on the coast of Shantung by standing on the graves of two Catholic missionaries. This was the prelude to the disappearance of the dragon-flag from Port Arthur; for soon the symbol of the Russian Empire was floating from its battlements. The transformation was made in a thick cloud of mystery, which, to this day, has not cleared away. Perhaps the historian will never record whether it was force or gold or hypnotism which transferred this key of North China to the hand of her insidious foe.

Li Hung Chang represented China at the coronation of the Czar, and returned a more pronounced Russophile than ever. What is there about the Russian that enables him to cast a spell over ruler, diplomat, college professor, senator, editor, the best and wisest who venture to enter his domain and submit to his blandishments? Certain it is that many are bewitched to see with Russian eyes, and to speak in Russia's favor. But this illusion is temporary. Long residence dispels it. If the traveller would learn the language either of the Russian Moujik or the Chinese people, he would see beneath the glamour of surface-prosperity brought by railroads and the iron administration of the Muscovite Empire. He would see a great open sore. He would sympathize with the indignation of every patriotic Chinese at the alienation of valuable territory through Russian duplicity and the intrigues of selfish Chinese politicians. Righteous wrath at foreign aggression, true patriotism standing at bay, played their part in the convulsion of the closing year of the century, a small part, perhaps; yet let us give even the devil his due and admit that wild infatuation, greed, and cruelty were not the only factors in the Boxer outbreak.

The mad war with the world began. Far up in the north, where the great Amur flows, deluded Chinese bombarded the town of Blagovestchensk, killing three Russians. A tragedy followed. A picture will ever haunt the memory of those who read the story, a picture of the great river half choked with the bodies of thousands of men, women, and children, of desolated homes, of barbarities to put a savage to the blush. Sir E. Ashmead Bartlett, speaking in the House of Commons, described

the crimes committed by the Russians against the Chinese in Manchuria as far more atrocious than the revolting butcheries of Armenians by the Turks. They were stirred to this swift, terrible vengeance, you say, by Chinese treachery? Can the attack be called treachery, when for a month war had been raging in North China? Would the treachery of the Chinese soldiers give a Christian nation the right to dye a river with the blood of the wives and children of her foe? The Russian government cannot wash its hands of this crime, for the War Office was in direct, telegraphic communication with the Amur region, and there is evidence that General Gribsky was acting under explicit orders. General Orloff received similar orders, but telegraphed to St. Petersburg, "I entreat to be allowed to spare the peaceful inhabitants." It is a significant fact that General Orloff was subsequently degraded by the War Office, but the Czar commuted the punishment to that of an "Imperial reprimand."

Blagovestchensk was not an isolated instance of cruelty. It is ever Russia's policy thus to strike terror to the hearts of those who venture to affront her. In the summer of 1900, the path of Russian troops from the sea to Tientsin, from Tientsin to Peking, was marked by a trail of blood. The Russian occupation of a portion of Peking and its vicinity was brief, but it was long enough for cruelty and lust to claim their victims by thousands, and the name of the Russian soldier will ever be execrated in North China. Defenceless women could not escape the Cossack brutes, even by fleeing from their homes and hiding in the high grain. Their pursuers formed a long cordon, circling about them in ever narrowing lines, and the scenes which followed no pen can describe. Those who lived in China during this reign of terror, and day after day heard heart-sickening tales directly from the lips of the sufferers, will understand, if Russia some day reaps a dread harvest of hatred. The fame of some other nations is stained, too, but the universal testimony was, "The Russian soldiers are the worst of all!" Why record these revolting facts? Because the time may come when they will be needed to explain other facts.

The next act is comedy, not tragedy. A week after the Allies relieved Peking, the Powers were informed, through an official communication, of Russia's purpose to withdraw both her legation

and her troops from Peking. The reasons given for this strange movement were that she was not at war with China, and that negotiations could be carried on more conveniently from Tientsin. The true reason was that Russia *was* at war with China in Manchuria on such an extensive scale that she was reluctant to spare any troops for Peking. Arguments and persuasions having failed to move any of the legations from Peking, Russia tried the power of example. Late in September, the Russian legation received a telegram which sent it post-haste to Tientsin. The ruse failed; no other legations followed; and soon the Russian legation domiciled itself once more in the capital.

But Russia really withdrew her troops from Peking, with the exception of the legation guard, and took no further part in the policing of Peking during the year of occupation. A native paper took the ground that this was done largely to curry favor with the Chinese, especially with the corrupt government of the Empress Dowager. It was interesting to see Russia, with her blood-stained hands, posing as the humanitarian friend of China. She played the same rôle during the treaty negotiations. The Powers at first demanded severe punishment for the leaders who were responsible for the Boxer atrocities. Through the influence of America, Japan, and Russia, more lenient measures were adopted. But long before the change had been accepted by all of the Powers, Russia had told Li Hung Chang that *she* was proposing the lightening of penalty. Thus she gained a reputation for clemency, to aid her in winning golden concessions in the future.

And, without doubt, Russia helped to throw the mantle of charity over the biggest villain of all. The events of 1900 incriminated no one more deeply than Jung Lu. When he fled with the Court, he might well have felt that the noose was already around his unworthy neck. There has not been one word of censure against him in Imperial edict or foreign communication; and to-day he stands first in the councils of the Empress Dowager. Why has Russia strengthened the party of Reactionaries, the power of the corrupt Empress Dowager? Because she had bought them; they were Russophiles; with them in power she might work out her deep, dark plots undisturbed. She does not favor the Emperor; she does not want China to be strong, any more than she wants Turkey to be strong; she wants China to

fall to pieces by slow, moral leprosy, that she may pick up the pieces one by one. This would be more to her liking than immediate partition, for that would compel Russia to share her destined victim with other Powers. The Chinese history of the past few years cannot be understood, unless these ulterior motives of the great Land-devourer are known.

During the last months of 1900, it was vaguely felt that occult influences were working in Peking. Late in September, Li Hung Chang had appeared in the capital, escorted by his dear friends, the Russians. In Shanghai and Tientsin, frequent interviews had been held with Russian civil officials. In November, Prince Oochtomsky, who had been the host of Li Hung Chang during his stay in St. Petersburg, visited Peking to make sure that the Chinese plenipotentiary was still securely hypnotized. Russian diplomacy was also working in Hsian, and it is uncertain in which capital the terms of the Manchurian Convention were first discussed. The Powers might take alarm if it were known that negotiations with Russia were being carried on in either city, so the agreement was secretly concluded between Russian officers and the Tartar General at Moukden. But it had still to be ratified. Li Hung Chang had a helpmate in the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg, and all went merrily along in the communications between Peking, Hsian, and St. Petersburg. Then the secret began to leak out. That unimportant, little argument between Russian and Chinese officers in Moukden for the temporary adjustment of local matters began to assume ominous proportions. It was dimly suspected that Russia, while uniting with the other Powers in the public peace negotiations, was playing her own quiet, little game with China. It was hard to accuse her of such duplicity, for she had cordially assented to the terms upon which Great Britain and Germany had agreed in October, "not to make use of the present complications to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions." Russia had asserted that, "from the commencement of the present complications, she was the first to lay down the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire as a fundamental principle of her policy in China." Yet at this very time she was forging chains about Manchuria! The London *Times* of the third of January, 1901, contained the first definite news of the Russo-Chinese Agreement, the full text of which was soon in the

hands of Lord Lansdowne. Russia, ignorant of the fact that this incriminating document was in the possession of England's Foreign Minister, continued her subterfuges, and the Russian Foreign Office assured the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires that nothing was known of the alleged agreement. Two or three weeks later, Russia was compelled to admit that there were negotiations with reference to guaranteeing her territory against the recurrence of attacks on the Manchurian side. "These arrangements would not involve any territorial acquisition, or the exercise of protectorate by Russia." When one reads the terms of this agreement, which the North China *Herald* well says "gives Manchuria back to China with one hand, and takes it away again with the other," the term "disingenuous" seems too mild to apply to Russia. Let us quote from the admirable summary and comments of the North China *Herald*:

"The preamble states that Chinese officials are allowed to assume their functions at Moukden and throughout the province of Fengtien, on the conditions that follow:

"(1) That General Tseng pacifies the province and helps Russia to build her railway. (2) That General Tseng provides board and lodging and kind treatment for all Russians in military occupation of the province. (3) That General Tseng disarms all the Chinese soldiers in the province, and hands over to the Russians all his munitions of war. (4) That General Tseng dismantles and destroys all fortresses, defences, and powder-magazines which the Russians do not require for their own use. (5) Russia will give up Newchwang, and any other places in Manchuria occupied by her soldiers, as soon as she is satisfied that peace and good order have been restored in the province. (6) The Chinese are to employ local police to restore peace and good order in the province. (7) The Tartar General is to have a Russian Political Resident at his side to control him. (8) If, while the local police are restoring peace and order, an emergency occurs beyond their powers to cope with, the Tartar General shall ask the Russian Resident for reinforcements. (9) The Russian text of this agreement is the standard text.

"It does not need much ingenuity to show what a mockery this is. Manchuria is to be restored to the Chinese as long as they keep order in a turbulent province, full of armed and mounted bandits, without soldiers, arms, arsenals, forts, or powder stores; and, meanwhile, they are to prove their humiliation to the people by providing board and lodging for all the troops the Russians send in to permanently occupy the province. The Chinese are to keep peace and order and protect the railway—under pain of losing the province altogether—with unarmed local police; and, while the Tartar General will be responsible for what he does or leaves undone, he is to do nothing without consulting the Russian Political Resident, who will have at his disposal the only armed

force in the province, except the bandits. This is what Russia calls maintaining the integrity of the Chinese Empire."

England and Japan had early raised their voices in protest against this treaty. At one time, war between Russia and Japan seemed imminent unless the treaty were withdrawn. Minister Wu was instructed to appeal to America, and on the fifteenth of February Secretary Hay sent warning to China that it would be unwise and dangerous to have separate and secret negotiations with any single Power; and he gave notice that the United States would not recognize the validity of such treaties. Similar communications were sent to all of the Powers, and Russia was asked to furnish the United States with an official copy of the agreement. To refuse was awkward for Russia after the assurances which she had given; to comply was still more awkward since it would prove her a liar and foil her plot. So no copy was furnished.

Meanwhile, what of the attitude of China? The Emperor had already sent his appeal for help to other lands. According to a native paper, he also wrote a letter to the Czar in answer to one received from that potentate. This letter states that, although His Majesty of Russia assures the Emperor of China that this treaty will not interfere in the least with China's sovereignty and full rights in Manchuria, and that the Chinese administration will be restored to the *status quo ante* (that is, prior to occupation by Russian troops), still a careful inspection of the treaty leads one to fear that all things will not be as of yore. Then, in a very polite way, the Emperor hints that the exact words of the treaty will in the long-run prove more weighty than the assurances of the Czar. He goes on to say that the granting to Russia of the privileges asked in Manchuria would stir up other countries to make demands, and would lead to the downfall of China. So an appeal is made to the friendship and benevolence of the Czar, to withdraw all demands, and thus earn the warm gratitude of the Emperor of China and his millions of people.

The Viceroy, Lin Lui Yi and Chang Chih Tung, strongly protested to the Throne against the agreement, prophesying the destruction of the Empire and dynasty if it were sanctioned. Chang Chih Tung alone presented eight memorials on the subject. Other Viceroy and governors sent remonstrances. Public opinion waxed hot. Mass-meetings were held. Telegrams

began to fly through China and to St. Petersburg. Two telegrams sent by a Shanghai mass-meeting are given as samples:

"To Prince Ching and Grand Secretary Li Hung Chang, Peking:— If the treaty with Russia be ratified, China will be a lost country at once. Great indignation and opposition fill the hearts of the gentry and common people, and we pray that you will sternly oppose the ratification in accordance with right and reason, and so save the critical situation."

The telegram to the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg read:

"The knowledge of the agreement with Russia has created immense excitement and stirred up great indignation amongst the gentry, *literati*, and common people of the Empire, and the aspect of affairs is now entirely changed. A great calamity now threatens China. We pray you to use your utmost exertions to prevent the accomplishment of the treaty."

High provincial authorities in the south also sent a telegram to the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg, requesting the Minister to explain on their behalf to the Czar that the ratification of the treaty would be against the wishes of more than nine-tenths of the officials, *literati*, and common people of China. For months the native press poured out its philippics against Russia. Throughout the length and breadth of the Chinese Empire, there was not one paper which spoke a word in favor of the agreement. Some of these polemics of the press, and fiery speeches delivered at mass-meetings, would prove instructive reading to the lecturers and writers on the Manchurian question who have broadly asserted that the Chinese were indifferent to the loss of Manchuria, and that Russia, by her sympathy for China and fair treatment of her, had won concessions which she was unwilling to grant to any other country. A few sentences from one of these mass-meeting speeches give the lie to such representations:

"Our Conservatives have felt grateful for the support they receive from Russia; hence a strong friendship has been formed between the two governments. Russia is very successful in deceiving China with her wicked yet pleasing ways, and that is how the secret treaty, now in question, has come into existence."

There follow strong words of dissuasion against leaning on the help of other nations, and the exhortation:

"We, the sons of China, are solely responsible for the future of our country. It has nothing to do with foreign nations. If we fear the destruction of China, if we are ashamed of becoming inferiors or slaves to foreigners, then let us unite our strength, morally and physically, to

protest against the ratification of the Manchurian Treaty. Although Russia is powerful, it matters not if we firmly determine not to submit to her. Such a movement will show that there is such a sentiment as love of country in China."

The Viceroy in their telegrams to Hsian said that, if it was necessary for the Court to choose between offending Russia and offending the other Foreign Powers, it would be safer to offend Russia. The matter was referred to Li Hung Chang, who replied, "If you have to make such a choice you had better make friends with Russia and offend the other Powers." This coincided with the views of the Empress Dowager, who had been persuaded that the only path of safety lay in securing the protection of her mighty neighbor. By what seductions was she made to believe that the safest place for the Manchurian Lamb was within the stomach of the Bear, to overlook the fact that when once the Lamb was digested the hunger of the Bear would prove a menace to the capital of the Empire?

The movements on the chess-board in March were of special interest, and ended in checkmating Russia for a time. The full text of the treaty had been sent from St. Petersburg to Li Hung Chang, and by him forwarded to Hsian. While he was waiting for his answer, the Powers, with the notable exception of France, were objecting to this *tête-à-tête* game between Russia and China, and demanding that the treaty be produced for public inspection. About the twelfth of March, it was rumored that an answer had come from Hsian refusing to ratify the treaty, and that the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg had telegraphed to Li Hung Chang that the Russian government would reconsider and modify the treaty. Within a few days, these modifications were forwarded to Hsian, with the assurance that the treaty as modified did not interfere with China's sovereignty. But public opinion had made itself felt in the refugee court, and the protests of England, America, and Japan had put iron into the blood of China. She still refused to sign the treaty. It was rumored in Peking that, when the modified treaty was presented from St. Petersburg, it was accompanied by a vague, veiled threat that unless it was ratified within two weeks something unpleasant would happen. When the time expired, the Russian Minister called on Li Hung Chang, pressing him to sign the treaty immediately. Li replied that he had not received an edict authorizing

him to do this. Then it was reported that Russia had extended the time a few days, threatening that if this treaty was not signed she would force the original text, which practically cedes Manchuria to Russia, with an additional article, which lets the camel's head into the tent of Chihli province, to the effect that: "China shall not employ subjects of any other Power in training naval and military forces in the northern provinces."

At this point the Japanese Minister called on Li Hung Chang to try to stiffen China's backbone. On the second of April, Li and his associate plenipotentiary, Prince Ching, sent a communication to the Russian Minister, asking that further changes be made in the treaty; rumor said that this was refused, and the communication returned. The air of Peking was electric for several days, as another telegram came from St. Petersburg stating that, unless the seal of state were quickly affixed to that important document, Russia would proceed to seal Manchuria as her own peculiar possession. But by the eighth of the month it was known that neither the Emperor nor the Empress Dowager would sign the treaty. Russia was busily occupied assuring Japan that the treaty did not interfere with China's sovereignty, or with the rights of any other Power. The interesting lie gained credence in Peking that England was sending ninety gunboats to the Far East! Before the middle of April, it was generally known that the Bear had decided to postpone dining on Lamb. Russia made the following announcement:

"In consequence of the obstacles opposed to the Manchurian Agreement, whereof the object is gradual evacuation, the said agreement being still unsigned, Russia maintains her present organization in Manchuria, and continues in occupation until conditions in China are completely restored and a central government established in the capital capable of guaranteeing a non-recurrence of disturbances."

The direful vagueness about this time-limit throws the old-fashioned Delphic oracle completely into the shade. Still, for once, Russian diplomacy had been thwarted. She must bide her time for riveting the chains, until Foreign Powers and Chinese Progressives could be caught napping again.

Early in the summer, when the withdrawal of the Allies from China was under discussion, Viceroy Li and Chang petitioned the Throne to insist upon the recovery of Manchuria. The Emperor issued an edict stating that Manchuria is the home of the reigning dynasty; that if it is given up to a foreign country,

the important province of Chihli will become a borderland, and the integrity of the Empire will be threatened. This edict, of course, had no effect on the Russians, who remained in Manchuria on the withdrawal of the Allies.

Russia was unwilling to wait long before renewing her effort to obtain permanent control of Manchuria. Li Hung Chang was old and feeble, the Reactionaries might lose power at court, and the Progressives would grant no favor to Russia. As early as June, it was reported that Li Hung Chang had sent a lengthy cipher despatch to St. Petersburg resuscitating the Manchurian question. Definite negotiations, however, were not resumed until after Russia's new Minister, M. Paul Lessar, arrived in Peking late in September. The first half of October the usual secrecy was maintained. Then copies of the following agreement began to be circulated:

"(1) Russia agrees to return the whole of the three Eastern provinces comprising Manchuria to China; but, owing to the disturbed condition of the said provinces at present, Russia cannot withdraw her troops at once from Manchuria. At the end of two years, should conditions become fairer, Russia will withdraw one-half of her troops, in accordance with circumstances. Should the province at that time be already pacified, then by the end of three years Russia will withdraw all her troops from the country.

"(2) All the railways in Manchuria shall be constructed by Russia alone; China consents not to use the services of any other nationality in that respect, nor permit any other nation to hold railway privileges in said provinces.

"(3) All mines and mining privileges in Manchuria shall be given to Russia alone. China shall not allow any other nation to exploit the said provinces.

"(4) Only such Chinese troops as have been drilled and disciplined by Russians alone shall be permitted to garrison Manchuria. Troops that have not been drilled in Western fashion and troops that have been drilled and disciplined by other foreign nationalities shall not be allowed to be stationed in any part of Manchuria.

"(5) The railway between Shanhaikwan and Newchwang shall be returned to China, but in doing so China shall grant some other compensating privileges to Russia for the act."

This treaty begins with such a conciliatory tone, and the language throughout is so carefully guarded, that the casual reader can easily be hoodwinked. Still, Russia carefully guards her essential point, the withdrawal of her troops; and as she is to be the judge of whether the "conditions are fairer," this treaty

would practically grant to Russia all for which she was striving. She has provided that there shall be no troops in Manchuria which shall not work out her will, and "conditions" would doubtless be just what she desired them to be. Her plot might be foiled if she consented that the foreign-drilled troops of Yuan Shih Kai pacify the country. They might make a success of it, as they have done in Chihli!

While this treaty was under discussion in Peking, Jung Lu wrote to Li Hung Chang that the Empress Dowager wished to come to an agreement with Russia, believing that she could trust this powerful country to avert further foreign aggression, and also to give her personal protection on her return to Peking. But the Viceroys had taken the alarm, and again the voice of protest was heard. Lui Kun Yi telegraphed that it would be better to declare war on Russia than to sign the treaty. Some of the Powers made themselves disagreeable again by asking for an official copy of the treaty. On the first of November, Li Hung Chang received a communication from the Empress Dowager stating that the Viceroys had opposed the treaty so strongly that she had decided to denounce it. The Emperor also wrote in praise of a memorial submitted by Chang Chih Tung, and ordered that the scheme be matured by deliberate consultation in obedience to the honest promptings of his conscience. Li Hung Chang was thunderstruck. M. Lessar was furious. There was a stormy interview, but the Chinese Plenipotentiary insisted that he could not sign the treaty without the authority of an Imperial edict. The aged minister had received his death-blow, and as he lay unconscious on the morning of November seventh, M. Lessar called at his home, making one last desperate effort to get the signature of the man upon whom Russia had long depended.

Negotiations must now be carried on with Prince Ching and Wang Wen Shao. Prince Ching, though previously associated with Li Hung Chang as Plenipotentiary, had early resigned all negotiations with Russia, disgusted by the pro-Russianism of his more powerful colleague. Over these two Ministers Russia had failed to cast the spell either of her witchery or of her gold. So she tried terrorizing. On the eighth of November, a secret despatch from the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg gave the warning that Russia fully intends to retain Manchuria or to impose terms which menace China's independence. For three weeks

the treaty lay in abeyance, for neither of the Chinese Ministers was in Peking. Prince Ching renewed negotiations with M. Lessar after he had returned from his conference with the Court at Kaifeng-fu, but asked that he might have time for consideration, as important interests were involved. Up to the present time, Prince Ching and Wang Wen Shao have refused assent, Russia has refused to withdraw her claims, and matters are at a deadlock.

It is unnecessary to describe at length how, regardless of her assurances to the Powers, regardless of the fact that China refused to sign even the modified treaty, Russia has strengthened her grasp on Manchuria, exercising every right of sovereignty, leaving to Chinese officials far less power than they had in Chihli during the year of occupation by the Allies. Russia has now over two hundred thousand soldiers quartered in Siberia and Manchuria. Her estimates provide for the maintenance of a hundred thousand men to guard the Manchurian railway. Did the granting of a concession to build a railroad and control it for a limited period, carry the right to seize a country larger than France, rich in resources, because in a time of war this railroad was damaged? The railroad from Peking southward, which is being constructed by a Belgian syndicate, has for months been guarded only by Chinese soldiers. Russia allows no Chinese soldiers in Manchuria, and refuses to withdraw her own because the country is not yet tranquil! No wonder that for years China objected to railroads, claiming that they would be the forerunners of complete foreign occupation, chains which would ultimately bind the land which they traverse to some foreign Power. It has been said that Russia understands perfectly the use of the "iron horse" in place of the war horse. America has just as good a right as Russia to invade Manchuria with a vast army, for her commercial interests have suffered more than Russia's. Of course, there are brigands in Manchuria. There are more to-day than when it was under Chinese rule. The longer the Allies stayed in Chihli, the more brigands there were. A few months of return to Chinese rule have worked wonders in quieting the province. But China is powerless to subdue brigandage in Manchuria as long as Russia requires her to do it with unarmed police. It is not true that the population of Manchuria consists largely of bandits and "ne'er do weels." Certain mountain regions have frequently been dis-

turbed by brigands, but law-abiding, industrious people, many of them from North China, compose the bulk of her population. Some of these people have been driven from their homes by the oppressive taxation of Russia. The *Universal Gazette*, a Chinese paper, reports that the inhabitants are being cruelly treated in every way, and ground down to the earth, apparently with the object of driving them out of the country to make way for Russian colonists.

Another consideration ought to carry some weight in America and England. There is no part of China where Protestant Missions have been more prosperous than in Manchuria. Gladly would the stricken survivors of Boxer massacres welcome back their missionary pastors. But Manchuria under Russian rule is not the place for Protestant Missions. The country which tolerates no proselyting in her home domains will suppress it in her foreign dependencies. Must the patient work of years, which has done more than Russia's much-praised railroad to introduce civilization and banish the darkness of Manchuria, be lost now? Must the native Christians be forsaken by those who persuaded them to abandon their ancient religion?

Let us summarize briefly the reasons why Russia should not be allowed to retain Manchuria. First, stands the eternal principle of right, supported by International Law. Russia has no moral claim on Manchuria. She has no legitimate commercial claim to be expressed by the glib term "Manifest destiny." Her exports and imports, like those of England and America, can pass through Manchuria without the presence of a single Cossack soldier to interfere with China's sovereignty. The commercial interests of the world demand her withdrawal. Missionary interests demand it. The peace of the world demands it. The good of China demands it. The world has decreed that China shall have one more fair chance to redeem herself. Russian rapacity menaces her peaceful development and prosperity.

L. MINER.

THE BANKING AND TREASURY SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES.

BY J. H. WALKER, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING
AND CURRENCY IN THE FIFTY-FOURTH AND
FIFTY-FIFTH CONGRESSES.

IN every department of public and private enterprise except banking, the ways and means of accomplishing beneficent results simply, speedily, and economically, have been enormously developed and improved to their very highest known efficiency. This country has taken the lead in all such things, but it is a singular fact, and one exceedingly mortifying to our pride, that its Treasury and Banking System still remains in the crude, unscientific, and wasteful condition into which it fell forty years ago, saving only that our money has been restored to the world's standard of value.

That we maintain this unique and most wasteful system is **not** because its deficiencies and empirical methods are not known, but because of an inertia that no patriotic and intelligent effort has been able thus far to overcome. The men in this country whose opinion on financial questions is known to be of value, are practically unanimous in condemning the system. The highest authorities in Europe are amazed that the acknowledged primacy of our people in the genius of improving and developing to its highest efficiency every appliance for advancing educational, commercial, industrial, social, and moral conditions, has not been attained in banking, that we should tolerate for a day a financial system so wasteful of resources and so threatening to stable economic conditions.

It has been declared in reports from the Committee on Banking and Currency of the House, and in public addresses by economists, that the waste to the people—without one cent's advantage

to the United States Treasury, to the banks, or to any individual—in interest on the enormous sums in the Treasury, in administering our clumsy Treasury Department, and in higher rates of discount than would prevail under proper conditions, is approximately seventy-five million dollars annually. Secretary Gage in addresses has challenged any one to controvert this statement successfully, and it has not even been questioned.

The wonderful progress of this country is in spite of, and has been in no way promoted by, our financial system. It is believed that our system intensifies, if it does not breed, monetary panics and industrial depressions. Doubt, fear, and unnecessary panic are a part of it; they inhere in it. The kinds of monetary depressions that are constantly occurring here are unknown in Europe. Panics and industrial depressions arising from natural financial causes will continue, as will blizzards and earthquakes. But nine in ten of our financial disturbances arise from a condition created by the national banking and treasury laws. It is a strange thing in finance that our banks are now under no legal obligation to maintain at a parity with gold one dollar of the paper money they issue.

Again, neither the United States Treasury nor the banks have any means of protecting a dollar of the gold they hold. The banks in England, Germany, France, and every other civilized country but ours, have a well-regulated banking system, and in it an absolutely sure means of protecting their gold.

Pierre Des Essars, Chief of the Bureau of Economics and Statistics of the Bank of France, and author of the historical survey of banking, "*The History of Banking in all the Leading Nations*," whose opinion is shared by every authority on banking in Europe, says in an article on American banking:

"The discount rate has a very direct effect upon the rate of exchange. By increasing it sufficiently, the bank raises the value of gold, of which it is the chief reservoir, and so decreases the demand for it; at the same time, it attracts foreign gold by affording it an opportunity for advantageous investment in commercial paper paying a high rate of interest. These effects always follow as here indicated, but only on condition that the banks of issue are sufficiently powerful (in the head institution) to be able to fix the discount rate. The Bank of England, the Bank of France, and the Reichsbank are in this category; their action shows the condition of the general money market, and the other banks are obliged to follow. But a very different condition of affairs arises

wherever there are several banks of about equal importance acting at cross purposes. There is then no official discount rate, no means of preventing the outflow of gold or keeping down the rate of exchange; and such is precisely the situation of the National Banks of the United States."

The law of March 14th, 1900, was the final step in the process of completing the existing system of our national banking and coinage laws. There is no further relief possible, through legislation, to the National Banking and Treasury System, except by bringing it into harmony with natural financial law:

First, by relieving the United States Treasury from the current redemption of any form of paper money—a function which is assumed by no other public treasury;

Second, by devolving upon the banks the obligation of maintaining parity between all kinds of money—a function which is normal to banks, and is required of them by law in every other country;

Third, by allowing banks to issue true bank currency, that is, currency against their general assets—which is one of the chief functions of banks of deposit, loan, and discount, and is performed by banks in every other country;

Fourth, by securely uniting all the commercial banks in the country, through the existing clearing-houses, into a solid union to maintain parity, by crowning them with a National Clearing House, but leaving them in as independent a position as now for every other purpose.

Nearly every person urging the reform of our Treasury and Banking System, who has submitted a bill having to do with the whole subject of financial and banking reform, has left untouched the vital errors in it. In fact, the bills which have been submitted would have injured the good in the system and made the bad worse.

The functions of a bank are:

First, to keep safely for its customers, until it is needed, the capital they do not need to-day;

Second, to make safe loans of its own capital and that of its depositors on short-time notes;

Third, to furnish to the people at all times a safe and sufficient amount of circulating notes, varying in volume, from time to time, according to the demands of trade. The doing of this

has been proven to be impossible where banks are required to buy United States bonds equal in amount to the currency issued. To require this buying of bonds is tantamount to forbidding banks to issue currency, and thus restricts the right to use banks to those persons whose operations are large enough to warrant their keeping deposits in banks and issuing checks in their business. Deposits in banks and circulating notes issued by banks against their assets, are identical in substance. Every man who has the note of a bank in his pocket has in it a deposit certificate of the bank to the amount of the note. He can go to the bank and get the amount of his deposit in legal tender money, or pass his deposit certificate (circulating note) along to the next man. In passing the bank notes along, he passes along his deposit as really as the man with a technical deposit in that bank passes his deposit along by making a check, and going to the bank and getting legal tender money for it, or by passing the check along to the next man. The truth of what has been said as to banks being forbidden to issue currency, is made apparent by the fact that the currency notes of all the national banks in the country are only 28 cents to each dollar of capital, while the currency notes of the Bank of Germany are \$8.96 to each dollar of capital, and the Bank of France currency in circulation is \$17.84 to each dollar of capital.

The time has now come when something must be done to correct the errors in our system, and the only course that will command the confidence of the people is to do the right thing bravely, and complete the business. It is far easier to explain and justify to the people our action in a completed work, than it is to secure their approval of a half measure.

The Act of March 14th, 1900, cleared the way for bringing our Treasury and Banking System into obedience to the natural laws of finance, as is the system of every other country. I am sure I am not stating the defects of the present system too strongly. On the foundation afforded by the many excellent features of the present national law, and by the banks and clearing-houses, our system may be made the best in the world, instead of the worst, as it is now declared to be by the Hon. James H. Eccles, the Hon. Lyman J. Gage, the Hon. Charles S. Fairchild, and the other Ex-Comptrollers and Secretaries of the Treasury, as well as by every acknowledged financial authority.

Again, it is a sound principle in legislation to legislate along the lines of least resistance, to make as few changes as possible in anything with the use of which the people are familiar, to offend the prejudices of no class of persons if the end sought can be accomplished by any other means. Every practice and the substance of every existing thing that the people are accustomed to, should be retained. But the financial institutions of the country should be unified and brought under an improved national law, and the whole made to conform to normal financial and banking principles and practice.

All responsibility for maintaining parity should be transferred from the United States Treasury to what should be the head of our financial and banking system, viz., a National Clearing House, which should, in our system, be equivalent to the official head of the banking and financial systems of France, Germany, and England, and every other first-class country. Every country in the world finds it absolutely necessary to make a head institution an integral part of its banking system, as the National Clearing House should be made,—not “a head outside of the system,” as we have attempted to make the United States Treasury.

The things proposed to be done in amendment of the National Banking Law are of vital importance to the country. This question is liable to assume potential importance any day. It will surely become prominent when least expected, like every great crisis. It is our duty to settle this question wisely, while we may deal with it free from the passion and excitement of a great war; otherwise we shall have to deal with it in the midst of the disturbance of a serious crisis, and then it will probably be settled unwisely.

Under existing, empirical national law, a normal “country bank” cannot exist. The national banking act is as fatal to the existence of strictly country banks as would be a positive prohibition of them in the body of the law. There are banks in the country, but they are obliged to use city methods, and to do their business as if under city conditions. That a “country bank” does not and cannot exist is certain. Country banks such as existed in 1860 would furnish now circulating notes to one-quarter of our people, who occupy one-half of the territory of the country. These banks were as sound in their methods, except in not currently redeeming their currency in large commercial

centres, and as safe, in most of the States, as national banks are to-day. For a quarter of a century previous to 1862, all banks in the New England States issued circulating notes against their general assets, to the amount of their capital. They currently redeemed these notes in Boston, as well as over their own counters. No banks ever existed that served the people more safely and efficiently than they, or that gave proportionately lower rates of discount. Our national banks should be allowed the same right of issuing true bank currency that the New England banks then enjoyed. It is passing strange that the Government should insist upon forbidding to banks the exercise of this natural function, in view of its being so successfully used by banks in every other country—and in this country, as has been said, in the New England States and most of the others, for a quarter of a century. Is there one man who will venture to assert that the Bank of Germany is not in as safe a position, in case of a monetary panic, with nine dollars of currency and three dollars of deposits to each dollar of capital, as it would be with three dollars of currency and nine dollars of deposits to each dollar of capital? Can any one successfully maintain the proposition that the Bank of France, in case of a monetary panic, with eighteen dollars of currency issued against its assets and four dollars of deposits, is not in a far safer position than it would be had it only four dollars of currency in circulation and eighteen dollars in deposits to each dollar of capital? Will any one dispute the general proposition that banks, in case of a panic, are far safer with any amount of circulating notes outstanding issued against their assets, however large, than with the same amount of deposits, in view of the fact that, in every country, depositors clamor for their money in case of a panic, while holders of the currency hoard it and clamor for more of the currency obligations of the banks? It is the experience of every country that, instead of the solvency of the banks being threatened by holders of currency, it is the depositors who embarrass it in case of a panic. A bank is strengthened by an increased demand for its circulating notes.

Again I quote Pierre Des Essars, who says:

“After a thorough study of this question, I have arrived at the conclusion that the true bank note is unknown in the United States. . . . Side by side with the Treasury, which has transformed itself into a bank of issue, to the serious detriment of the whole system of circulation, are

the National Banks. Their right of issue is wholly illusory, because their notes represent United States bonds, that is, a debt of the state; and because the volume of their circulation is regulated by a fixed limitation, without regard to the needs of commerce or the wants of the money market. Such a combination is entirely lacking in elasticity; besides, the restrictions are so severe that the issue of notes is really a burden to the banks."

To realize what great injustice is being done to at least one-quarter of the people of the country, who inhabit more than one-half the area of the United States, we must compare the accommodations that were furnished the people by state banks in 1860, poor as they were, with those furnished by the national banks of 1900. There is not the slightest difficulty in granting those people, under our national law, every facility of banking that they enjoyed from 1840 to 1860 under state law. It is susceptible of absolute proof that the people in rural districts are either absolutely deprived of all banking privileges, or are made to pay fifty to one hundred per cent. more than normal rates, because of abnormal conditions which are wholly caused by the unnecessary restrictions of the national law upon the issuing of currency. If the law is amended, it should be so done that each bank will be as independent as it is now, except that it shall be united with all others for doing the one thing necessary, viz., maintaining the parity of all kinds of money.

Financial panics should be made impossible, excepting from industrial depressions, as they are impossible to-day in France or Germany. The normal workings of the banking systems in those countries check and alleviate a panic immediately upon its inception. They do not have a panic unless it be initiated by an aggravated industrial situation, arising from very great over-production or under-consumption, as you may choose to express it, and such panics are minimized.

Again, the amendments to the present law should be so written as to balance equally, as far as it is possible to do so, the powers of the people over the banks—represented in the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Comptroller of the Currency—and the powers of the banks themselves in combination, in managing the National Clearing House. It has been proven that a certain degree of unity of all banks in a country is absolutely necessary to sound banking, in the present state of civilization. The law should be so amended as to put the United States Govern-

ment practically into the same necessary relations with the banks in the United States as the Government of England maintains with the Bank of England, the Government of Germany with the Bank of Germany, the Government of France with the Bank of France, only substituting a National Clearing House for the United States Treasury. The security of the people (that is, of the United States Treasury), in dealing with the National Clearing House, would be the total banking capital of the whole country. The failure of the National Clearing House would be as impossible as the destruction of the whole body of the American people.

All of the northern States are now so thoroughly filled with manufacturing and mining, that a comparison of those States with the agricultural portions of the country, now and in 1860, cannot be fairly made. The southern States are practically in the same condition, as to the occupations of their people—or they were when the census of 1890 was taken—as in 1860. The figures are given on pages 234 and 235 of the "Hearings before the Banking and Currency Committee of 1898-99." It is just as certain as anything can be that cannot be absolutely proven, that the States of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia, are about \$300,000,000 short of the banking funds they would be using to-day, if proper legislation had been passed by Congress allowing the issue of asset currency under national law, under proper restrictions, any time between the close of the War and 1870. Their personal property, *per capita*, is larger to-day than it was then. What is true of them is true of all the agricultural sections of the country.

Nine loans in ten made by all bankers are what are known as "character loans"—that is, loans that are made because the character of the man borrowing is thoroughly known to the lender. Not one in a thousand of the men financially responsible, living in the country districts, is personally known to capitalists or bankers in the cities.

The grievous oppression inflicted by the National Bank Act upon a very large portion of the eighty million people in this country cannot be realized, except by giving longer time and more patience to comparing it with the systems of France, Germany, England, etc., and with the Suffolk banking system of

the New England States from 1840 to 1862, than most people can be induced to give. It is more influential in depopulating country districts, by sending people into cities, than any other single law ever enacted by Congress. Not a business enterprise can live that does not have the friendship and confidence of the managers of some bank. Some bank is potentially a "special partner" in every business undertaking, furnishing a very large share of the capital in it, in discounting commercial notes. A man can borrow only of persons to whom he is personally known. As normal banks cannot exist in the country, every man who wishes to enter into the business of manufacturing, in large or small degree, and to employ his neighbors, must move into some city and take his neighbors with him, that he may thus secure the special partner absolutely necessary to him, viz., a bank; and a bank, as I have said, cannot exist in the country unless it may issue currency against its assets. In no other cities in the world have the citizens such an unfair and oppressive advantage over their fellows in the country districts in securing bank discounts, as in this country. This practical inhibition of country banks is of no advantage to the cities. Doubling the rate of discount in country districts does not lower the rate in cities by the smallest fraction, but it gives the citizens of cities a monopoly of opportunity to do business. Make all the changes suggested in the banking law, and the rates of interest or discount will be surely reduced in the country districts from one-third to one-half, and the rates in the cities will not be increased by a farthing. The law, as it now works, is one of oppression to the country districts, pure and simple, with no advantage to the cities.

I have carefully examined the official figures to verify the statements made in this article; and I have the authority of the most thoughtful and patriotic men in the whole body of financiers to justify such of my statements as are not furnished by the Treasury Department, or are not matters of calculation.

J. H. WALKER.

SOME NEGLECTED NAVAL LESSONS OF THE SPANISH WAR.

BY A FRIEND OF THE AMERICAN NAVY.

THERE are few evils that have not some mitigating good accompanying them, and the so-called Sampson-Schley controversy, unfortunate as it is for the navy and the country in many respects, has not been without its advantage. It has aroused intense interest in the navy all over the country as hardly anything else has done. The recent court of inquiry, indeed, had a certain educational value, inasmuch as it gave occasion for exploiting a good many features of naval life which are ordinarily unknown to the public. Many friends of the navy, however, have regretted that the purview of the court of inquiry could not have been extended so that all the features of the war, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific, might have been thoroughly investigated. Some of the most important lessons to be learned from the war were not even touched upon in the inquiry, and they have received little attention from the authorities or from the public at large. And, should we be plunged into another naval war, with an efficient navy pitted against us, disaster might result from neglecting the warnings to be derived from the Spanish war, particularly from the Santiago campaign.

It is the more remarkable that the most important lesson of the late war should have been overlooked, because the vessel which emphasized it in such a marked way is continually spoken of in the press. We read a great deal about the magnificent performance of the "Oregon," but such explanations as are given us of the agencies to which that performance is to be attributed are couched in terms of the naval conventions of an era that is past. Yet if, among these agencies—apart from the individual qualities of the ship itself—there be any which can be made operative in

other ships, it is of the utmost importance that we know what they are, as a recognition of them will enable us to enhance the efficiency of the entire navy. Let us, therefore, consider briefly the record of the "Oregon," and see why she distinguished herself in so signal a manner.

Before war had been declared, but when the naval authorities felt that it was almost certain, it was believed that the "Oregon" could render little service in the Pacific, while she would materially increase the strength of the North Atlantic Fleet, and orders were accordingly sent for her to come around to the Atlantic coast. During her voyage war was declared, and it will be remembered that there was great anxiety lest she might be attacked by the entire Spanish fleet, and that great relief was felt when she safely arrived off the Florida coast. She had made the voyage of 14,500 miles in about fifty days, never losing an hour for repairs or overhauling anywhere, all such necessary work being done at the ports where she stopped to coal. Ordinarily, at the end of such an extended trip, it would have been considered entirely reasonable that the vessel should have a rest of at least two weeks for a complete overhaul, but the "Oregon" went immediately to the blockade off Santiago. It might have been expected that, when the day of battle arrived, a vessel which had just passed through such a severe ordeal would be at a disadvantage compared with the other ships; but, as is well known, the "Oregon's" performance at Santiago on July 3d, 1898, excelled that of any of her consorts in the fleet. Not only did she completely outdistance her sister ships, the "Indiana" and "Massachusetts," but her speed even rivalled that of the "Brooklyn," which was reckoned as being at least five knots faster. The commander-in-chief says in his official report:

"The fine speed of the 'Oregon' enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the 'Cristobal Colon' did not give up until the 'Oregon' had thrown a thirteen-inch shell beyond her. This performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battle-ship, and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her class."

One does not have to be an engineer to see that the phenomenal record of the "Oregon" from beginning to end was due to the skill and unremitting care of the chief engineer; and yet it is

highly probable that very few Americans know his name. It is but simple justice to this officer—Chief-Engineer Robert W. Milligan—that his name should stand high on the roll of the men who rendered distinguished service to their country during the Spanish war.

For the “Oregon’s” performance, her builders deserve great praise. No amount of skill would have enabled such a record to be made unless the machinery had been well constructed. But those who know the facts of Milligan’s remarkable zeal, skill, and far-sighted intelligence understand that the results are due to him in an unusual degree. There were practically no leaks to waste the precious fresh water, but losses cannot be entirely prevented even by the greatest care; and at an early stage of the long trip around South America he insisted that the boilers must receive first consideration, even at the expense, if necessary, of putting officers and crew on a short allowance of water. He found, soon after reaching the Atlantic, when he fell in with one of our colliers, that the coal he had last obtained on the west side was of a very much higher quality than that sent down from home. Accordingly, at the first opportunity, he had this best coal moved into “the fighting bunkers,” adjacent to the boilers; these he then locked, and he kept the key in his own possession. On the day of battle the doors were unlocked, and this superior quality of coal had much to do with the “Oregon’s” splendid exhibition of sustained high speed.

When the “Oregon” arrived at Key West, and again while on the blockade, but a few days before the battle, it was proposed, for reasons of economy, that some of the four boilers should be shut off, and that the ship should be kept under reduced power, as had been done on all the other vessels in the fleet except the “Texas.” To this Chief-Engineer Milligan strenuously objected, pointing out that if the Spaniards came out they would come out when they were not expected, and with their own ships ready for the highest speed, so that the blockading vessels should also be prepared for the highest possible speed. Fortunately, the chief engineer was permitted to have his way, and to maintain the ship in readiness for full speed at a moment’s notice—the duty for which, at such time and under such circumstances, the ships of our navy are presumably constructed. Suppose this course had not been followed. Under the most favorable con-

ditions, it takes more than an hour to raise steam in such large boilers as those of the "Oregon," and such rapid work involves decided risk to their integrity; but we can see what would have been the result if, instead of going at a speed of seventeen knots within twenty minutes after the Spanish fleet was sighted, an additional hour had been required to attain that speed. On the "Oregon," not only was steam maintained in all the boilers all the time, but fires were spread, so that, when the signal came for full speed, all that was necessary was to start the forced-draft blowers, close the fire-rooms, and throw on the coal.

The "Brooklyn," nominally of over twenty-one knots speed, was able to use only half power, because her forward engines were uncoupled, and time could not be spared to connect them; besides, half of her boilers were out of use, some of them not only having neither water in them nor fires under them ready to kindle, but actually having man-hole plates off. A similar state of affairs existed on all the other vessels in the squadron except the "Texas." While the trip of 14,500 miles would, of itself, have distinguished the "Oregon," her celebrity is really due to her magnificent speed during the battle, immediately following this long trip. Had not Chief-Engineer Milligan's advice been acted upon, the "Oregon" would probably have attracted no more attention than the "Indiana," whose captain found it necessary, in a communication to Admiral Sampson, dated August 6th, 1898, to call attention to the fact that his ship was present during the battle, in view of the slight notice which the "Indiana" had received in the reports of both Schley and Sampson. As for the part played by the "Iowa," it will probably be remembered that the "Oregon" went past the "Iowa" so rapidly, that the chaplain of the former, not being a naval expert, and being deceived by the similarity of the two ends of the vessel, actually thought that the "Iowa" was running away. Too much credit cannot be given to Chief-Engineer Milligan for the unrivalled achievement of the battleship which was made famous by his persistent and faithful performance of duty; yet, in the official report of the part taken by the "Oregon" in the battle of Santiago, his name is lost in the long general list of officers of the ship, which extends from the executive officer down to the lowest warrant officer, all of whom got exactly the same amount of praise as the man who made the "Oregon's" record for her.

We have gone at some length into this history of the "Oregon" to emphasize the point that the vital factor in the Santiago battle was engineering—a point which is forcibly illustrated, in a negative way, by the utter absence of engineering on the Spanish ships. These vessels were all of excellent design and construction, and none of them was over four years old, the "Colon," indeed, being less than a year old. All of them had made nineteen knots or more on their trial trips; and, had their engineering departments been efficient, they could have run away from our vessels. The great lesson, therefore, to be drawn from the battle of Santiago, is the vital importance of engineering to the efficiency of the modern fleet; yet, during the Schley Court of Inquiry this matter appeared only incidentally, and received so little attention from the court that, although it did transpire that most of the vessels were not capable of working at more than half power, the question was never asked: Who was responsible for this condition of affairs? A commander-in-chief is supposed to have such a thorough grasp of all the elements of victory under his control, that he shall see to it that nothing is overlooked which will maintain them all in the highest efficiency. If the vessels had half their guns disabled, knowledge of that fact would raise a tremendous outcry, but the permitting of the machinery to be reduced to such a condition that it could only give half power is an oversight of even graver character. Great attention was paid by the Schley court to the question of coal; yet the much more important matter of keeping the machinery which was to use the coal in readiness to use it to the fullest extent seems to have been utterly ignored. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, had the blockaded fleet been composed of vessels of almost any other nationality than Spanish, most if not all of them would have escaped at Santiago. Our people generally have been so blinded by the completeness of the victories at Manila and Santiago, that they have failed to realize the actual facts of the situation, and they are in great danger of forgetting that the victory was due, less to our superior efficiency, than to the utter inefficiency of the Spaniards, both as engineers and as gunners.

One lesson which we ought to learn has been urged upon public attention for years, namely, the necessity of keeping our naval and military resources in a condition of efficient preparation for action. In this respect, both the army and the navy failed in im-

portant particulars, although, fortunately for us, the utter inefficiency of the Spaniards saved us from the punishment due to our neglect. For example, while careful students of events had realized that a war with Spain, the theatre of which would be in the West Indies, was highly probable, nothing had been done to put Key West, the only naval base we possess in that vicinity, in a state of efficiency. Even the modest recommendations of Admiral Melville, the Engineer-in-Chief, that the ramshackle shops there, which were nominally under his control, should be equipped with a few modern tools, had been overruled. After the destruction of the "Maine," Admiral Melville took the matter into his own hands, and he did, by vigorous action, put the shops into such condition that they were a great help in the maintenance of the blockading fleet. Not only should Key West have been made an adequate naval base, but the fitting out of a repair-ship, which had been planned as far back as the time of the Chilean imbroglio in 1892, should have been completed before the actual imminence of hostilities, instead of only being commenced at that time. This repair-ship, which was obtained by converting the merchant steamer "Chatham" into a floating machine-shop called the "Vulcan," proved of the greatest value to the fleet off Santiago, where she arrived just after the battle, when her facilities for repairs, as well as her splendid outfit of stores, were almost invaluable. She would have been of very much greater service, however, had she been able to accompany the fleet from the very beginning, as should have been the case.

As showing the lack of appreciation of the importance of the engineering side of the modern fleet, it will be a surprise to most people to know that when it was proposed after the destruction of Cervera's fleet to send the "Vulcan" out to Manila—where the large number of our vessels and the almost utter absence of facilities for repairs would have made her extremely valuable, and where she would have also saved the Government a large amount of money which was spent for repairs at Hong-Kong—Admiral Dewey, for some unaccountable reason, did not want her, stating that he had a navy-yard of his own at Cavite. But there is so little water at Cavite that only the smallest vessels could get up to the navy-yard there, a fact which has been emphasized recently by the recommendation of a naval board that, if an adequate navy-yard in the Philippines is to be laid out,

it should be at Olongapo on Subig Bay. The Department itself failed to grasp the importance of having such a vessel as the "Vulcan"; so that, when Admiral Dewey refused her, she was ordered to the League Island Navy Yard, and there her splendid equipment of machine tools was removed, thus making it necessary for us again to make a repair-ship from the beginning in case we have a fleet operating away from our own coasts.

The failure to realize the importance of engineering to the modern fleet has not been due to lack of foresight on the part of the naval engineers; for, besides the repair-ship "Vulcan," Melville planned and equipped two other vessels known as "distilling ships," whose office was to furnish fresh water for the boilers and, in case of necessity, for the crews, thereby obviating the necessity, which Milligan felt, of asking to have the crew put on an allowance.* Owing to the irrational practice of putting off everything to the last minute, these distillers could not be started until after the war began, and there was great delay in getting suitable vessels; but one of them, the "Iris," was completed in time to have her services offered to the camp at Montauk Point. Even there, however, red tape deprived our men of the full advantage of this opportunity; for, on account of some quibble as to authority between the army and navy, it was deemed better to let the soldiers take their chances with water of uncertain quality rather than utilize the pure distilled water from the "Iris."

A very natural question, which will occur to any one who reads the foregoing with attention and with sincere interest in the efficiency of the navy, is: What efforts are being made in the navy to profit by the experiences of the Spanish-American war in general, and particularly as to the vital importance of engineering to the efficiency of the modern ship. To this, the answer at present is very discouraging. For over fifty years there had been a steady growth in the importance of machinery and engineering on war vessels, with a constant effort on the part of engineers to secure adequate recognition of the value of their services. In 1897, when President Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he took hold of the question with the determination to settle the so-called "line and staff fight," and in-

* To preserve marine boilers it is necessary to provide them with fresh water, which is obtained by condensing the steam made in the evaporators. Salt-water deposits scale and rapidly reduce the steaming power of the boilers. Hence, the vital importance of the matter referred to.

crease to the utmost the efficiency of all branches of the personnel. Under his chairmanship, a committee of officers, known as the "Personnel Board," met frequently during the month of November, 1897, and devised a bill, commonly called the "Personnel Bill," which was forwarded to the Secretary with an admirable report by Mr. Roosevelt as Chairman. The great feature of this bill was the plan to make all the officers of the navy engineers and gunners at the same time; as it was expressed by Chairman Foss of the House Naval Committee, "the naval officer of the future must be a fighting engineer." Mr. Roosevelt himself tersely described the condition which called for this central provision of the bill, when he said: "On the modern war vessel, every officer has to be an engineer whether he wants to or not." He elaborated this proposition by pointing out that the functions of the two classes of officers, those on deck and those in the engine-room, had been gradually getting nearer and nearer to each other, the former having more engineering, and the latter more executive duties, until there was but a short step, and a logical one, to having them all trained alike, so that any officer would be equally competent to take charge of the machinery or of a gun division. This scheme was not the outcome of the dreamings of a doctrinaire, but was the result of the suggestion of a well-known deck officer, Captain (now Admiral) R. D. Evans; and it received the unanimous approval of the Personnel Board, which consisted of seven line officers and four engineer officers.

More than this, when the bill was considered by the naval committees, and when there was ample opportunity to point out any defects in this scheme, practically not a voice was raised against it. In the pages of this REVIEW for December, 1898, there was a symposium on the subject, consisting of five articles—by Admiral Philip, representing the line officers; Admiral Melville, representing the engineers; Colonel Roosevelt, the man who had brought the scheme to fruition; Ex-Congressman Francis H. Wilson, who had really fathered it by presenting it to Colonel Roosevelt; and, finally, Congressman Foss, to whom more than to any one man the bill owes its passage. These articles discussed the measure very thoroughly, and so convincingly that, their influence supplementing that of the admirable report of Congressman Foss, the bill became a law on March 3d, 1899. The bill contained many features besides this amalgamation of the line

and engineer corps, with its accompanying interchange of duties. All of the other provisions of the bill have been carried out. Strangely enough, the absolutely vital provision of the bill, and the one which caused it to be passed, was not for a long time carried out at all, and only within the last few months has even a feeble effort been made to do so. Many friends of engineering, both in and out of the navy, have not hesitated to say that this failure to put into practice the interchange of duties was simply due to bad faith, and that there had never been any intention on the part of the line officers to make this experiment a success, their proposition for amalgamating the engineer corps with the line being simply intended to get the engineers out of the way, so that a scheme, which had been proposed at other times, for having the real engineering done by warrant officers, might be effected. The haste with which a corps of warrant machinists was formed lends color to this view. Admiral Melville has repeatedly called attention to the failure to enforce the law calling for an interchange of duties between the officers of the deck and of the engine-room, and it is now worthy of notice that, while he, as a member of the Personnel Board, voted for amalgamation, and while he has repeatedly, both in his annual reports and elsewhere, stated his unshaken belief in the correctness of the plan of the Personnel Bill, he has always guarded his statements by saying that the scheme is undoubtedly a good one, and will undoubtedly give efficiency *if it is administered with a desire to make it a success.*

London *Engineering* for November 15th, 1901, speaking editorially about the result of the change in the American navy, refers to the matter in a very hopeless way. The writer speaks of the present condition of affairs as: "The disaster that has overtaken their efforts towards improvement." The editor goes on to say:

"Engineering is not to be learned without practical object-lessons carried out by the student himself. No man can become a mechanical engineer without dirtying his hands, and also without devoting to the subject several years of hard study, accompanied by practical work. It is a matter of long and special training, both in theory and practice. No country that cannot command a body of men willing to undergo the disagreeable features incidental to engineering training, will be able to maintain its position as a first-class naval power under the stress of war, however many ships and guns it may possess. Neither Great Britain

nor the United States lacks such men, and it will be only the ruling powers of either country that will prevent their employment. . . . The chief danger is that the warrant machinists will be accepted as efficient stop-gaps, although we think there is too much engineering knowledge abroad in the United States for the foolishness of that course not to be seen. If, however, such a plan is accepted, the American navy will be thrown back at least a quarter of a century in its personnel. The old round will be trodden once more; the old fight fought again. In the mean time, the efficiency of the American navy will suffer; and if it should be put to the ultimate use for which all navies are supposed to be built, a very unpleasant awakening may result."

These are the remarks of a clear-headed student of naval affairs, who is not only competent to judge of them, but who has only friendly feelings for the United States. The time has long since passed when intelligent men in either country have believed it possible for war to occur between Great Britain and the United States; and, indeed, the feeling among such men is that in any war where both countries are involved they would be found fighting side by side. It is, therefore, a matter of keen regret to the thoughtful Englishman that anything should occur to reduce the efficiency of the American navy.

It may occur to some who read this article that the writer, in criticising the navy, is fouling his own nest; but he has believed that, as a patriotic citizen, the time had come to use very plain language, in the hope that the efficiency of the service, to which many years of his life have been devoted, may be maintained at the highest point. We have made a distinct change in our relation to the rest of the world, and have now started out as a world power, with possessions thousands of miles from our own coast, and with hopes of a greatly increasing commerce. If we are to maintain these foreign possessions and to protect this increased commerce, we must have a navy of the utmost efficiency; and as the day of Nelson's sailor-ships has passed, never to return, modern naval efficiency must be derived not only from the quarter-deck but also from below—the domain of the engineer. It is because of his affection for the navy that the writer has penned this criticism.

A FRIEND OF THE AMERICAN NAVY.

THE QUALITY OF EMOTION IN MODERN ART.

BY CLAUDE PHILLIPS.

THE keynote to the art of the Nineteenth Century, the art which is neither official, fashionable, nor commercial, is sadness, heart-searching, misgiving, melancholy—now spiritual, now sensuous—revolt against surrounding circumstance. It is the vain aspiration to realize the ideals of other ages, inevitably checked, saddened, and distorted by the unfriendly atmosphere in which it must force its way up. It is the striving to fuse the poetry of the written word with that of the painted vision, resulting sometimes in a true inter-penetration, but more often in an imperfect transposition, which obscures one form of beauty and fails to attain to the other. It is the sweeping into the domain which has not hitherto held them of a thousand visual and mental impressions, of a thousand subtleties of thought and feeling. But it is also, and above all, the attempt to create a new ideal of truth, heroic in fearless sincerity as in all-embracing sympathy. It is the effort, partly, it may be, out of resentment and rebellion, but mainly out of pity and love, to face the grimmest, saddest aspects, the most heart-shattering problems of modern life; to force them, not always with due regard for æsthetic fitness or unfitness, into art; to intensify the atmosphere of tragic horror which surrounds them, to drive into the flesh the thorns which pierce those of humanity, to bleed with its wounds, to curse with its curses, to despair with its despairs.

If there be an element of worship in the art of the century now expired—and great art can lack this element as little as great poetry—it is the worship of humanity, the worship of Nature. For the ideal of beauty, of serenity, of religious gravity, which was that of the Greeks in the great times; for the ideal of spiritual loftiness and detachment from human things—of the

soul dominating and crushing the despised body—which was that of the Middle Ages; for the ideal of things divine and super-human plastically realized with the passionate intensity and the analytical truth of things purely terrestrial, which was that of the Fifteenth Century; for the ideal of intellectual freedom, splendor, strength, grace, and suavity revelled in to excess—of passion tempered by, and transposed to, æsthetic beauty and fitness—which was that of the Renaissance at its zenith: for these things, the Nineteenth Century, in its most characteristic, its most sympathetic and appealing phase, has substituted the worship of humanity as it is, with all its gaps, its weaknesses and imperfections, its spiritual and bodily diseases; but also with its pathetic appeal, its element of what must be called the human-divine, its claim, that will not be denied, to infinite pity and infinite love. The greater realists in art of the modern time—not necessarily those who place their offal, their rags, and their vermin in the foreground, and see of humanity nothing but its warts and wrinkles—have gripped it as it is, with something of the passionate sympathy, conquering repulsion, that uplifts St. Julian the Hospitaller, in Flaubert's beautiful tale, when, clasping the leper in his arms, cherishing and consoling him with all the vital warmth of his body, he sees the loathsome crust drop off, the poor sunken eyes turn to suns, the form and features merge into those of Christ, in Whose arms, pardoned and clean of sin, he is borne triumphant to the heavens. The human-divine element is here always, without any such figurative metamorphosis as this; and those are the greatest in modern art, as in modern letters, who, perceiving it, have with the artist's power, correcting and completing that of the seer, shown through the miserable human tenement—fissured, it may be, and ruined—the light burning steady and clear on the altar within.

And the worship of Nature, too, has not been so much the worship of those divine, awe-inspiring appearances which throughout the ages have been recognized, as the perception in her of mysterious moods which to the modern man appear to run parallel with his own, never failing in response, whether of pity, yearning tenderness, joy, or terror, to him who from the depths of his being appeals to her as the Mother. It is the recognition of these mysterious responses, of the human element imported into or inherent in Nature, giving new color, new poignancy to her

most familiar aspects, which—apart from technical considerations, into which for once it is not proposed to enter—has made the schools of landscape of the Nineteenth Century the greatest that the world has known. I well know that, with a somewhat cheap and superfluous scorn, this view of the inter-connection of man and Nature has been called “the pathetic fallacy”; the obvious and common-sense view being urged that Nature is but the inanimate lyre, resonant only when the hand, the heart and soul of man strike *his* music and not *hers* from her depths. Does it matter so much, after all, if this be so? If to us, the children of to-day, Nature speaks more intimately, more tenderly than to her worshippers of the preceding ages, it is that we embrace her more closely, that we pour all ourselves into her, that we mingle our joys with the radiance of the sunlight transfiguring land and sea, our sighs with the moanings of the winds and the whispers of the woods, our tears with the flow of the waters. Not only do we know her form and outer vesture, her ever-shifting aspects, better than the greatest of the painters of the preceding centuries, but we—that is the great ones in art who speak for us who are of their time—are heart to heart, soul to soul with her. And this is why a Turner, a Bonington, a Crome, a De Wint, a Cotman, a Corot, a Rousseau, a Millet, a Troyon, a Diaz, a Daubigny, a Böcklin, say something to us which even the greatest masters of landscape of the preceding centuries have not said, and cannot be made to say. They touch certain chords on Nature’s lyre to which the ears of our forefathers were not attuned; they unveil, to those who are prepared to contemplate them with love and reverence, her subtler and more secret beauties; they evoke, under what the passer-by deems, or has deemed, prosaic, unpaintable ugliness, beauty of another order, the beauty most suggestive of every-day humanity itself, with its humble, pitiful effort, its patient wrestle, ever renewed, with Destiny, impassive and crushing.

All these distinguishing marks are without doubt to be found in the work of great precursors, who by reason of their artistic predominance have given in isolated instances such overpowering expression to the very characteristics which have just now been differentiated as modern as even the greatest among their *epigoni* of to-day cannot be said to have achieved. What world-melancholy can be likened to that of Michelangelo? Like Atlas, he bears the weight of the earth, all its crushing weight of woe, on

his mighty shoulders! Yet, in these Titanic embodiments of human effort and human anguish overborne by the power of a resistless Fate, he lifts us so high above the mere earth, above its every-day incidents and the toiling ants who people it, that we perceive nothing but gray empty space, through which resounds his loud and bitter cry; and, sick with dismay, long to descend from the sublime heights to which we have been transported on the whirlwind of his genius. And Tintoretto, the mighty Venetian, who in truth, as he boasted, united the color of Titian to the terrible majesty of Michelangelo! Can he not, while showing with a tenfold intensity the human-divine element in beings divine and men the humblest, draw us amazed and unresisting into his sombre dreamland, as sublime as that of Michelangelo himself; and bring before our eyes all the familiar scenes of the great Sacred Drama, without distortion of their true character, yet as world-events, awful in magnitude and in significance? And there is another and an infinitely captivating, a very modern, side to his complex artistic individuality. He tempers on occasion his overwhelming power of direct dramatic representation with an element of poetry, literary rather than purely pictorial, such as gives back indefinitely the glamour of Ariosto and his fellows, the Italian Romanticists. He evokes a whole world of chivalry and romance in such a scene as the "St. George delivering the Princess from the Dragon" of the National Gallery; or in that wonderful piece "The Rescue" of the Dresden Gallery. The vision in this last is of young knights strong in valor, in love, and in chastity, as they come, armed *cap-à-pie*, to the foot of some enchanted castle "opening on the foam of perilous seas in fairy lands forlorn," and there reverently receive into their arms fair, drooping women, as pure in their nudity as the foam which, threatening, curls its huge crests over them. Dosso Dossi, that chartered libertine of the Renaissance, whose very vagaries we smilingly and lovingly pardon, comes yet nearer in such inventions as the so-called "Circe" of the Borghese Gallery to Ariosto, and is even more directly inspired by him.

Rembrandt is as indubitably the father of modern art in the one sense as Velazquez is in the other. If in the latter our greatest masters of the brush find an influence so potent that they are still, to the partial extinction of their own individuality, dominated by its overpowering attraction, Rembrandt's authority

is exercised in higher regions. He is the first, as he remains the chief, exponent of that "religion of humanity," of that gospel of pity, which it is momentarily the fashion to deride as a symptom of decadent weakness, but which, as we shall see, has forever left its impress on all that is noblest in the art of the century now passed. He is the greatest, as he is the first, of those who have seen the human element in the divine, the divine in the human; of those who, embracing humanity with a passion of brotherly love and forgiveness which excludes nothing, make all its joys and sorrows, all its perfections and imperfections, their own. With the magic of his genius, served by an incomparable technical power, but served obediently, as the hand-maiden should serve the mistress, he evokes under the coarsest material envelope the loftiest, the most consoling, visions; he gives the scenes of Bible history and the Life of Christ—painted and told ten thousand times already, ere he saw them anew—with a penetrating pathos, with an appealing truth and simplicity such as no artist, whether of his own or any other time, has hitherto equalled, or approached. Modern sacred art would scarce have had a basis, would scarce have had a starting point, were it not for such inspired creations as the "Pilgrims at Emmaus" and the "Good Samaritan" of the Louvre, the "Manoah" of Dresden, the "Woman taken in Adultery" of the National Gallery, the great cycle of the "Passion" in the Alte Pinakothek of Munich. And who shall say that, with these examples of a realism heroic and sublime in its unflinching adherence to the truth which it transfigures with the glow of an all-penetrating love, Rembrandt does not attain to an ideal as lofty in its way as that of a Pheidias, a Leonardo da Vinci or a Raphael? These ideals, of a superhuman beauty and gravity; of a mysterious suavity crowning and tempering the power that holds the whole world in its embrace; of a beauty and harmony composing and ordering to its own ends, and yet preserving undiminished, all the mighty passions, all the intellectual loftiness, of mankind at its highest: these, the world may never hope to see realized again. But can we in truth maintain that even such exalted ideals as those of the solemn Greek or of his Italian children of the Renaissance are higher than that touched by the great Dutch Master, when, with perfect simplicity, yet with a higher intuition than has yet been vouchsafed to any painter, he interprets anew these sacred scenes just now recalled; or puts

forward the portrait of some wrinkled old woman, who, with all her past history and her present hopes written in her face, fronts the spectator, patiently and confidently awaiting death. Or again, can we recognize anything greater, loftier, more moving in art than those many portraits of the master himself in his solitary old age: the bloated features stamped with the evidence of a tragic and incomprehensible destiny, with the infinite pathos of the unconscious appeal, "What is this that ye have done unto me?" but yet speaking unmistakably of one of the great ones of the earth, one who remains through all this squalor and misery "the captain of his soul"! It is Rembrandt above all who makes us feel that humanity, the most humble, the most abject in its physical imperfection, is greater than anything that we mortals, idealize as we may, can put in its place.

To say that the intense expression of artistic and human personality, coloring and individualizing artistic production, is a main and peculiar characteristic of modern art would be, again, to exaggerate a truth. All great art is the outcome of a supreme power of artistic presentment at the service of a great personality, thus enabled to express itself to the full. What is it that is the chief element of sublimity in the colossal inventions of Michelangelo, if it be not the personality of Michelangelo? What is it that has chiefly held and fascinated the world in the life-work of Leonardo, if it be not the impenetrable mystery that envelopes the personality of Leonardo, the solitary watcher, face to face with the wheels of the world, as they silently move?

It would be approaching nearer to a true definition to say that what in the art of the preceding ages is true in certain main and commanding instances is in modern art true of the majority. The personality of an artist from whom radiates influence is not only an intense, a complete, expression of self, but, with rare exceptions, a summing up of the time from which he issues, and of which, from the very fact that he is of it in his essence, he can develop and bring to maturity the dominant characteristics. Now, the personality of the modern artist can radiate, can communicate itself to widening and ever-widening circles with a rapidity and completeness which it was not given even to the greatest of the preceding centuries to achieve. The reason is to be sought in the fact that from day to day the barriers of feeling, of usage, of language which divide the nations are being oblit-

erated; that diversity of standpoint is becoming unity; that the unity, in the great essentials, of modern life is, for good or evil, bringing about all over the world unity of thought, of sentiment, of aspiration. A Leonardo, a Giorgione, a Michelangelo, a Raphael, a Rubens, a Rembrandt, a Velazquez, all of them indubitably exercised a far-reaching influence. Their fame penetrated all over Europe; and their schools, their imitators, were not confined to their own country or to their own nationality. But outside their own natural confines of nationality they were admired rather than understood, imitated in externals, yet not truly assimilated. To take for examples four masters of the Seventeenth Century, all of them contemporaries, and each a great artistic centre in his own land: Rembrandt in Holland, Rubens in Flanders, Velazquez in Spain, Guido Reni—how lamentable a descent!—in Italy. The highest celebrity fell to each, even beyond the limits of his own centre and his own land. But can it be truly said that they had any vital element in common; that the art of Rembrandt, apart from the appreciation that great technique commands, could then make a true and direct appeal to Italy and to Spain; that Velazquez could then be sure of comprehension as well as admiration in Holland and Flanders? Beyond the fact that they met occasionally in the unavoidable use of formula consecrated by usage, these four famous masters stood at hardly any given point on common ground.

Now, in modern art, with an infinite divergence of aim and feeling, with a variety of outer aspect and technical standpoint that is absolutely bewildering, there will be revealed to the patient and sympathetic investigator, lurking everywhere beneath the surface, these modern characteristics of sadness, sensuous and spiritual melancholy, misgiving, revolt against surrounding circumstance—this effort to import into it what it never before held or expressed. And in the greatest art of the time, but in that only, will be found this noble, transfiguring realism, this worship of humanity in its humblest as in its most exalted phases, of which Rembrandt is the precursor; this worship of Nature, too, not as the awful mystery, cruel and impenetrable as Fate, but as the consoling Mother, into whose bosom we pour our secrets, to receive her own in return. And this is why—to take a commanding instance—a Jean François Millet appeals to the whole civilized world, and evokes by the largeness of his human sympathy corre-

sponding sentiments now common to the whole human race. The Flanders of Memling might have admired, but would not have understood, Botticelli, his aims, his half-literary, half-artistic temperament, with its excess of nervous passion and its want of balance. But the true temperament, the true standpoint, of a Burne-Jones, whether his art strongly repel or irresistibly attract, is readily perceived and judged in contemporary France, Flanders, Germany, and America. Even Rembrandt, in the Italy or the England of his time, would have been admired for the grandeur of his chiaroscuro and the sombre richness of his palette, rather than as the apostle of humanity, as the interpreter of the great scenes of Bible history, who dared to tear from them all the outer accretion accumulated by the ages, to present them in their pristine simplicity and purity. But a minor Rembrandt of to-day, Herr Fritz von Uhde, imagines the "Last Supper" with a Christ full of gentleness and pity, surrounded by rugged Bavarian peasants, His Disciples—or the "Nativity," with a choir of quaint little urchin-angels of to-day pouring out their song from the eaves, and overshadowed by them, rough shepherds from the Bavarian Highlands reverently considering the Infant Christ. This much discussed artist, the sincerity of whose art even those who will have none of it cannot deny, at once obtains a hearing, just because the human-divine element of pity and love awakens at once responsive chords not in the breasts of his own fellow-countrymen alone, but in the whole human race.

Seeing that this is so, and why it is so, it is not as strange as it may seem at first sight that those few great artistic personalities of the modern era whose peculiar qualities are exclusively their own, not taken from their surroundings, not drawn from the atmosphere of their time, to be given back to it with a tenfold intensity—a Turner, for instance, in England, an Arnold Böcklin in Germany—that some of these isolated giants, who suffice to themselves, have taken long to break down the barriers of nationality, weakened though they are now by international intercourse. Though they have forced their way to the hearts of their fellow-countrymen, is it surprising that they still beat in vain against the strong wall which shuts them out from the rest of the world?

The most questionable form of artistic emotion in which the Nineteenth Century has indulged is that of pathetic anecdote and lugubrious genre. Such painters as Frank Holl in England,

Josef Israëls and his followers in Holland, and a whole host of capable painters of the modern Munich school, have revelled in scenes where the sufferer humbly and patiently awaits death, in death-bed partings, funerals, and lamentations over the departed. The emotion thus obtained is but a transient, and not in the highest sense an artistic, emotion. Death is after all so unimportant a moment as compared to all the rest! It is merely the colophon to the chapter of life; and it is surely in the undeciphered text of that chapter, not in its ending, that lies the vast world-tragedy! Death may be represented in art as it is in the "*Trionfo della Morte*" of the Pisan Campo Santo, or in the "Dances of Death" of the Middle Ages, and later on of Holbein; or again with the august and consoling symbolism of a Watts. It is there the personification of the all-engrossing problem which every human being has perforce before his eyes. But the fading out of life of the individual, the burning down of the feeble light, may evoke a limited, a superficial and transient emotion; it is not a theme in which great art can ever be profitably engaged. We are for the moment thrilled with the dramatic force and fire of a Gérôme in such famous pieces as the "*Morituri te salutant!*" the "Death of Maréchal Ney," the "Duel in the Snow." But they thrill us just as a stage-scene well presented might do; the impression made—and it has never been more than skin-deep—as easily fades away. If some singularly rare and beautiful example of purely historical or legendary representation more permanently move us, it is because deeper chords have in this instance been struck, chords more surely vibrating to the very heart of humanity. Take but one example: the famous painting "*La Folie du peintre Hugo van der Goes*," by Emile Wauters, in the Museum of Brussels. The poor, distraught master sits with glaring eyeballs gazing into vacancy, with features all marred by the bitterness of his agony; and to soothe him the pitiful monks, his brothers, have brought with them a band of youthful, sturdy choristers. Obedient, yet, in their innocence, without any thought of what it is they do, the children quietly range themselves at his side and pour forth from sweet lips streams of high, clear song, stainless in purity as that of the angels. As he listens, the staring eyes, scorched with the agony of many days, soften and fill with tears, soon to descend in a healing rain and for one blissful moment quench these fires of hell that burn within. Here we are

moved not so much by the woes of the great painter, whose light went out more than four hundred years ago, as by the pathetic contrast between the sinless purity of childhood and the agony of distraught manhood, the empty shell from which sorrow has chased reason away; by the suggestion of the consoling power of music as the world-moving power that can penetrate where words no longer find an entrance.

One exquisite and essentially modern phase of artistic emotion is that which results from a true inter-penetration, a true fusion of the literary imagination with the pictorial: not a translation or attempted translation of poetic literature and the loveliness of words into painting, such as Burne-Jones and his school have too often given us; but such an appeal to the eye, and through it to the brain and soul, as shall without conscious effort evoke, enveloping the image thus definitely and pictorially presented, the luminous atmosphere of that dreamland that completes and transfigures it. Such an artistic emotion as this is communicated by the early works of Rossetti, so pathetic in their imperfect yet expressive realization of form and their tragic splendor of color: inventions in which the painter is no more to be dissociated from the poet than is—to use Rossetti's own phrase—the body from the soul. It emanates, too, from such purely human and concrete, yet genuinely imaginative, conceptions as the "Death of Ophelia" and the "Ferdinand and Ariel" of the young Millais, painted in his first freshness, when the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood still held him. And, again, it is the quintessence of the charm that holds us in the visions, so overwhelmingly mournful and pathetic in their very exquisiteness, in their very singularity of strange and superhuman magnificence, of the French Master, Gustave Moreau. The preceding ages have brought forth much art that is greater, franker, more deeply rooted in Nature than his; but nothing precisely like this essentially modern product—the more characteristic of one special phase of modernity in that modernity is so resolutely shut out from it. Limitations of space stand in the way of an analysis of the great pages of Gustave Moreau's life-work, the "Œdipus and the Sphinx," the "King David," "The Apparition," "The Fair Helen," the "Galatea," and the "Fables of La Fontaine." Nothing could be more characteristic of the man than the lurid atmosphere of disquietude, mystery and terror in which he has, consciously or unconsciously, wrapped even these

famous apologues of the bright, humorous Louis-Quatorzian poet. "The Fair Helen" is a vision of her whose fatal beauty caused the horrid din of war to ring round doomed Troy, awful in its suggestion of a havoc-working Fate controlling her, its impassive instrument and victim. Where Marlowe in his "Faustus" makes her radiant as a celestial appearance—a very constellation in the skies—Moreau shows her an apparition, beautiful, indeed, yet inspiring a vague terror, and claiming that worship which is rendered to the Infernal Deities, rather than the equal passion of love. The little picture, "The Death of Sappho," of which a good many versions exist, exhales something of the vibrant passion and melody of the singer's own immortal verse. She goes to her death in beauty; and as, lyre in hand, she springs from the Leucadian rock, the shores seem to echo her rhythmic plaints, and the welcoming sea to meet them with its own deeper harmonies. It was left for Moreau's pupil and ardent admirer, the much-regretted Ary Renan, to show her with an infinite subtlety of pathos as she lies dead at the bottom of the sea, softly bedded on the nameless things, "rich and strange," that ocean carries at its heart—august still in loveliness, and in this last resting-place sheltered and at peace.

A great exception comes in here, however. This is the lately deceased Swiss painter, Arnold Böcklin. He is at once tragic and serene, boisterous, exuberant, unbridled in the expression of joy and physical delight, yet perfectly healthful, never swept away by his own passion. As audacious in realism, as intoxicated with the *joie de vivre* as a Rubens or a Jordaens—a veritable realist in the regions of the ideal in which he dwells—he is at the same time romantic without the lyrical pessimism of the true romantic school, and in a sense classic, too, in the extraordinary felicity with which he embodies in living, palpitating human form the primeval forces of Nature. The emotion of joy he can express as no modern has expressed it: as in the exquisite "*Frühling's Reigen*" (Spring Revels) of the Dresden Gallery—a perfect embodiment of the pure rapture that attends the re-clothing of Earth in her vesture of spring beauty; or in that wondrous "Sea Idyll" of the New Pinakothek at Munich. Something of the languor and misgiving of the time does appear, indeed, but in their most attractive shape, in the beautiful, melancholy "Villa on the Sea" (Schack Gallery at Munich); but this is melancholy, lofty,

self-contained, full of resignation to the inevitable. Another jewel of Böcklin's art, perhaps the brightest of all, is in the same collection. In a simple "Italian landscape," wholly without extraneous incident—a villa placed on a gentle slope made bright with its thick carpet of spring flowers, from which we look down upon the rich plain beautified with an imperceptible veil of diaphanous haze—he has indefinably, yet with the most penetrating pathos and beauty, suggested the passionate worship given by the child of the North, as the modern Italian himself cannot give it, to Italy. His serenity, his control over his artistic and human self, do not even leave him in such a tragedy as "The Murderer whom the Furies await" (Schack Gallery), or those tremendous "Combats of Centaurs" in which are embodied the colossal and uncontrollable energies of Nature in eruption.

Whom shall I single out from the great array as the exponents of the human-divine in humanity as it is? Two names suggest themselves at once—those of two artists whose productions, absolutely divergent in outward aim and in technical process, have this in common, that through every manifestation of creative genius goes out a great heart-beat to Man, and to the Nature that speaks of him; that they seek to evolve from the ardent and loving contemplation of Man, as he is, in his place in Nature, a great synthetic picture of the one indissolubly bound to the other, which shall be vast in its generalization, in its aspiration to the higher, the less individualized, truth; yet shall never seek to replace it by the false ideal of freezing conventionality, or lose the consoling human warmth which sends its inward rays straight from the eyes to the heart of the beholder. I refer to Mr. Watts amongst Englishmen, to Jean François Millet among Frenchmen.

No master of the century had painted so great a gallery of portraits, has re-created and interpreted anew for the world so many noble men and gracious women, as Watts; and I venture to say this, bearing in mind the achievements of David, Ingres, Franz von Lenbach, Elie-Delaunay, Bonnat, John Everett Millais, and J. S. Sargent. Physical vitality, the actual moment of being, of volition—these things have been much better represented by others. But the entire man, his past, present, and future, enveloped by the painter in the glow of brotherly love and sympathy, this thing has never been so given in art since the great Venetians painted in the Sixteenth Century, since Rembrandt painted in the

Seventeenth. Watts's crying sin is that, in the very excess of his yearning love for his fellow man, he must needs play the preacher, must needs step into the pulpit and thence address alternately warnings and consolations to the world. Still, his greater, simpler allegories, "Love and Death," "Time, Death and Judgment," and "Hope," are immortal; and with them I would class for greatness of conception such noble pages of didactic art as "The Repentance of Eve" and "The Death of Cain." How can the world ever forget the white-robed, resistless Death, too mighty for violence or haste, that with majestic gesture thrusts away into nothingness bright, rose-laden Love, who weeps as he drops his burden of earthly joy, but obeys? Or "Hope," the most appealing figure in modern art? Robed in the paler colors of the sky, she is seated on the globe; all about her palpitate the azure heavens, and, set in their clear depth, there thrills the radiance of a single star. Blindfolded and submissive, she weeps as she bends over her lyre, all the cords of which, save the one only, have snapped. But yet she harps on, in patience; for the one string vibrates still, and the star's brightness is still above her. But if the cord snap, or the star be lost in the heavens? What then? This is, indeed, a modern yet a noble "Hope," the creation of one who faces all the mis-giving, all the suffering, of mankind, yet refuses to desist from striving, or to despair.

Jean François Millet has assuredly not deliberately reasoned out his view of Man and Nature, as he has so often been accused of doing. His peasants are not consciously "ambitious," as Delacroix once called them. With a synthetic power like to that of the Greeks, and built, much in the way that they built, on the basis of a resolute and sustained study of Nature, Millet has evolved all the rhythmic beauty of outline and movement that is in the humblest human creatures; so setting them, moreover, in their right place in Nature that the one cannot be conceived of without the other. But much more than this. Not, like Watts, by attempted argument, but by the irresistible impression on the eye, the heart, and soul of the beholder of the painted image, enlarged to the proportions of heroic truth, he has presented, through the individual peasant, the type, not only of the rustic, but of Man; he has shown humanity perpetually tied to, perpetually grappling with, Nature, sometimes a mother, sometimes, alas! a cruel stepmother. He has shown man face to face with the

simplest, the vastest, problems of life and eternity. If the "Gleaners" of the Louvre has all the noble, sweeping movement of a fine Greek relief, there must be placed high above it the famous "Sower," the splendid rhythm, the solemn conception, of which suggest mysteriously, beyond the patient endurance, beyond the mortality, of the individual, the eternity of life, the everlasting "*werden*" or progression of the world. The spiritual beauty of the "Angélus" has with such irresistible appeal made its way to all hearts that it need not here be analyzed afresh. But "The Shepherdess"—surrounded by her quiet flock of sheep looming large against the sky—face to face, as she knits, with the great, insoluble problems of the universe unrolled before her, yet undecipherable! Or the peasant mother watching over her child by candle-light in the quiet night! Or the shepherd bringing his flock to the fold under the deep, mysterious azure of the starlight! Millet rises, perhaps, higher still when he depicts the limitless plain at sunrise or sunset, giving, with its gentle, never-ending undulations and its final merging into the sky, a conception of sublimity far higher than that which could be evoked by the loftiest mountain with its peaks aspiring to the very heavens! "*L'Homme à la Houe*," with "*Le Vigneron*," is an exception in the life-work of the French master, since it is full of conscious revolt, of conscious protest. This strong repellent rustic, who, beneath the gray skies, laboring far from his fellows, strikes his hoe into the earth, and rests for one moment—beyond hope as he is beyond despair—has the power to endure, yet not with uncomplaining acquiescence to accept the crushing load imposed by Fate. A bitter note of revolt, an arraignment of Providence, seems to ring through the air as we gaze—the protest, less of the suffering creature, too stolid to challenge his enemy, than of Millet himself, who for once deliberately sets to work to disquiet and affright us with the very simplicity of a terrible truth.

Puvis de Chavannes stands alone among his contemporaries as the monumental decorator who, in modern times, has first broken away from the formula of the Sixteenth Century, worn with too constant usage; as the master who, while seeming to emulate the large and expressive simplicity of Giotto and the Sienese of the Fourteenth Century—a simplicity arrived at, however, by an entirely different and, indeed, an absolutely opposite process—has maintained a standpoint entirely lofty and noble, and, for all its

resolute selection of the essential only, entirely modern. Comparisons have often been drawn between Puvis de Chavannes on the one hand and Burne-Jones on the other; but none could possibly be less fruitful, unless they be made to show that in spirit the art of the one is absolutely the antithesis of the art of the other. The life-work of Burne-Jones is a protest against what seems to him dreary, sordid, and unlovely in the world into which he is born. His art suggests a lifting of garments in sadness, in aversion and disgust, so that the thorns and the thistles which sting and disfigure humanity may not cling to them. He will make for himself a paradise of glowing, shifting color, of delicate fancies, the reflection of the poet's dreams—a paradise in which, to stimulate the appetite jaded by the fulness of perfection in art, the forms shall be those of the Florentines and the Paduans of the Fifteenth Century; with a step forwards on occasion toward Leonardo da Vinci, but as frequently with a great step backwards toward the Twelfth Century and the great stone images of Chartres. But how sorry and empty a paradise is this world of his, which knows neither joy nor sorrow, but only the overmastering languor of exhaustion and despair! In the "*Chant d'Amour*" Burne-Jones has sought, and not wholly without success, to combine the beauties of Botticelli and Giorgione. Yet within the golden casket so fair to the eye what mournful emptiness, what a lack of all true passion and vitality! His great "Fortune," a magnificent piece of work of its kind, is a huge, looming Fate, sleeping the world-sleep, as, unmindful and unconscious, she moves the immeasurable Wheel on which king and beggar alike are whirled through space. Of Hope—even the Hope of Watts, sister to Despair—there is no question. Doubts or misgivings in connection with the destiny of man do not even suggest themselves; they are, save as quaint conceits and emblems, outside the interests of this curious and consummate master.

Puvis de Chavannes, even though these generalized and rhythmically harmonious compositions of his, with their muted yet incomparably effective harmonies—of blue, purple, violet, lilac, palest yellows, and silver whites—are in their vaporous ideality of no place and of no time, bases his entire art on the worship of humanity throughout the ages; but above all *he* dwells in his *own* time. He sees it from above, so that its smallnesses and disfiguring blots vanish, and expresses his great conception in

visions of pure and consoling beauty, in which the belief in the human race and its destinies triumphantly asserts itself. Though in his life-work the appealing note of doubt and despondency is not wholly wanting—we recognize it, for instance, in the pathetic "*Pauvre Pêcheur*" of the Luxembourg—the great French master looks forward resolutely and with a noble serenity, from which, all the same, close kinship and a kind of watchful sympathy with humanity are never absent. In this, as in many other respects, he stands almost solitary in his century.

Nothing is more disappointing than the absence of the deeper human note in the work of one of the greatest living masters of the brush—the greatest, I had almost said—Mr. J. S. Sargent. He descends from two of the most admirable, yet two of the coldest and most self-possessed, of masters—from Velazquez on the one side, from Sir Joshua Reynolds on the other. Of the one he has the singular power of expressive and wholly unconventional pictorial statement which makes every subject that he approaches his own, and, moreover, the wonderful strength and certainty of execution; of the other he has the audacious momentariness, the delight in the exterior graces of womanhood, the delight also in the vigor of intellectual manhood. They strangely misunderstand him who read into his work sarcasm, contemptuous cynicism, the deliberate effort to bring to the surface hidden defects of mind and body. He prefers, as we must infer, to keep humanity at arms' length; to sum up its physical and mental characteristics, without any diving into hidden depths such as only the intuition born of a patient and loving sympathy can lay bare; to study its outward appearances with a keen but never malevolent curiosity; to fasten upon those points which he deems vital and expressive, and by emphasizing them, to amuse himself, and relieve with a sharp and stimulating accent of his own the monotony of the human individuality in its modern aspects and developments. Mr. Sargent appears feverish in the excess of his vitality; yet, beneath this purely exterior characteristic, he is serene and unruffled. But from this serenity no vivifying warmth goes out; and there is in this very want, this very incapacity to get to the heart of things, on the part of one of the most strenuous and brilliant artists of the time, something intensely pathetic. We are surprised, astonished, delighted by unceasing displays of inventiveness and power in his vast gallery of portraits; but never

deeply moved, as at their best a Watts, a Lenbach, a Millais have power to move us.

And now come the worshippers of Nature, a great band, who have expressed more, if more vaguely, than even those among their fellows whose study has been Man, or Nature chiefly as the setting of Man. Landscape art at its highest is in this akin to music, that it can evoke a thousand impressions, a thousand emotions, which evaporate altogether when we strive to crystallize them into words. Thus, to attempt in a few bald phrases a definition of the artistic idiosyncrasy, the power to move, of a great master of landscape, of a great nature-worshipper, is to be overbold, and, I fear, to court failure. The earlier half of the century is overshadowed in England by the gigantic individuality of Turner—no figure representing and summing up his own time, but a colossus rising solitary from the plain, and cloud-crowned round its summit. He is ever, even in his first period, the high-priest of Nature, approaching her simplest and most familiar aspects with a kind of religious gravity and awe. In his second period, he takes great joy in the myriad beauties of the world, as they unfold themselves in every direction to his astonished and delighted gaze. It is the last and greatest period, however, that shows the true Turner, the Titan oppressed by an overwhelming world-sadness. He is then no longer content to interpret Nature, to revel in every detail of her loveliness, but aspires to mould her to his own ends, to fuse her in the crucible of his genius, to extract from her appearances, that but serve as the starting point for his fiery conceptions, dream-visions as radiantly beautiful, in their dazzling vesture of light and color, as they are infinitely mournful; and mournful with a sadness that is not of humanity, but, as it were, of some archangel brooding over infinite beauty and infinite woe. To this final phase of Turner's production the much-abused phrase "*Le paysage est un état d'âme*," may, nay must, be applied, if it is to be understood. Even in this period—in such miracles of the brush, for instance, as "The Burial of Wilkie" and "Rain, Steam, and Speed," at the National Gallery—he pauses, on occasion, to represent, to evoke, to suggest, as no landscape painter ever did before. It is here, indeed, that he is the arch-impressionist; but he begins, let us remember, where the impressionists of a later day leave off, inasmuch as, beyond the shifting appearances, beyond the mere outward phenomena of the

world, he, half lifting the veil, shows the hidden depths that through the eye make indelible impression on the imagination. But, more often, the painted vision serves less to reveal sublime beauties of earth and sky—of those that none but he has attempted to fix on the canvas—than unconsciously to lay bare the yearnings of a great human soul, whose pain, having no human origin, can by no means be assuaged.

It is among the poet-painters of France, and chiefly among those whom, for the sake of convenience, we still class roughly as of the Barbizon school, that we find the truest interpreters of Nature, those who most pathetically and reverently draw to the surface the mysterious analogies between her moods and those of man. With Jean François Millet we have already dealt. Corot is among the most serene of moderns; he has something of the contemplative melancholy of a Claude, but none of the world-sadness of a Turner. For him the hum of the world, the turmoil, the storm and stress of life are not, indeed, put away, but put a little on one side. His are the moments of exquisite pause, when Man and Nature are one in a gentle and reposeful harmony, when he, resting in her bosom, dreams beautiful, soothing dreams, disturbed by no harsh note of struggle or suffering, yet suffused with the human warmth without which there is no true nobility, no true beauty. Daubigny is nearer our hearts. It is he above all who in these humble, everyday scenes, of no awe-striking or romantic majesty, pictures human life as it is, and shows Nature the Consoler, the Mother. With no forced note, with no distortion of natural truth, he expresses youth and hope in some orchard-scene in the blossom-laden spring; foreboding or despair in some lurid, fitful moonrise over unfruitful fields; calm, resignation, the pathetic acceptance of the inevitable, in those appealing river-scenes in which the quiet stream flows, familiar and confiding, through banks green to the edge, bearing on its slope some village hamlet with its crown of church towers. Théodore Rousseau, more various, more dramatic in his interpretations, has expressed in almost every phase of Nature almost every mood of man—the serene, the reposeful, the tragic alike. Troyon is the coldest, the most composed, of the group, and his too unruffled serenity, his absolute self-control, but rarely appeal to the beholder. There are great exceptions, however, in his life-work, and among *them that* beautiful morning scene in the Louvre,

"Boeufs se rendant au Labour," which breathes forth in all simplicity a spirit of hope, of thanksgiving and prayer. Claude Monet, the greatest living landscape painter of his school, the *chef-d'école* of the elder impressionists, looks at Nature from a wholly different standpoint. He delights in her beauty for itself, and not for anything that it suggests. He is content to stand as the admiring onlooker, to note—as he does with a magic skill that few, if any, have possessed before him—the rush of the wind through the shining leaves and over the cornfields blazing with their red and gold; the snow-scene of gray-green, black and silver, lovely in its very nakedness; the sparkle of the winter air and the prismatic radiance of the clear winter sunset. Humanity indefinitely at the heart of all these lovely appearances, which he is content to admire for themselves and to present with dazzling brilliancy, but which he cannot assimilate and interpret anew, as one would who had them in his very soul: this is what Monet does not suggest. And this is why his art, epoch-making as it is as regards technique, has obtained no greater hold on the world.

Mr. Whistler, with that splendid arrogance of his, so nearly akin to that of Lucifer himself, would, no doubt, scornfully repudiate any interpreter or any interpretation of his work. And yet his art is for the world, and by the world he must ultimately be judged. It is not alone the subtlety of vision, the certainty of hand, the reticence in beauty, shown in these "Nocturnes in Blue and Gold," these "Symphonies" and "Notes" of his, that make them memorable things. It is also a certain harmonious and moving beauty in the presentment, which, omitting everything unessential from the artist's point of view, yet leaves a vision no less soothing to the soul than to the eye. He is the poet-painter who has taught us to see the loveliness of the Thames at night, the fairness of the great throbbing city wrapped in her luminous veil and put to rest; as Wordsworth was the poet who taught us to see its unsullied morning beauties. Save that the bard sings of sunrise, and the painter loves to depict the pale azure of evening, with its accents of golden light, we might perfectly well apply to some of Mr. Whistler's "Nocturnes" the famous lines:

"Ne'er saw I, never felt, a calm so deep.
The river glideth at his own sweet will:
Dear God! the very houses seem asleep;
And all that mighty heart is lying still!"

It is too early to indulge in prognostications as to the future of art in the new century, at the very threshold of which we still stand. That the art will be as the life may be accepted as certain, judging from the past. Unless by standing still it is to freeze, and become meaningless in its repetition of pictorial ideas and formulas, of phases of feeling and modes of expression, which in the Nineteenth Century evolved themselves naturally out of a period of extraordinary change and extraordinary perturbation. The attempt has here been to show this period as one of doubt and despondency that has yet not been content with mere negation; of heart-searching and of struggle, no less internal than external; of pathetic striving after new ideals and new objects of worship. The art of the Nineteenth Century may compare, if not in the greatness of its protagonists, or in the artistic worth of the treasure left behind, yet in the wonderful variety of its productions, in the intensity of its passionate effort in every direction, with that of any preceding period. In one respect it has an interest to which that of even the greatest epochs cannot pretend in the same measure. To those who know how to read it reveals every shade of feeling, every shade of thought, every aspiration of the time which it represents; it constitutes an invaluable commentary on what we may call the psychical history of the human race during the period which it covers—that history which can never in its subtlest phases be exhaustively set out in words. The true glory of this art, when it is seen from the right distance by those who are to come after us, will surely be that, in its noblest and most vital aspects, it has been colored throughout with an ardent love and sympathy for humanity as it is, with a true sense of the beauty that is in it, not because it may be lifted by genius, by heroism, by spiritual or physical beauty, to heights sublime above the common level of man, but just because it is human, and therefore partakes of the Divine. If it be asked what divinity, above all others, is worshipped in this art, the answer will be the "*Deus Caritatis*," the God of Pity and of Love.

CLAUDE PHILLIPS.

CHINESE EXCLUSION IN AUSTRALIA.

BY HUGH H. LUSK.

THE first legislation of the first Parliament of the Australian Commonwealth has taken the form of two statutes intended to secure what is called "A White Australia." To people unacquainted with the circumstances and politics of the new Anglo-Saxon Federation the name may need some explanation, and it may even be a matter of surprise that such a subject should have been the first to occupy the attention of the Legislature. But at the election of the first Commonwealth Parliament no question, unless it might be that of the fiscal policy of the Federation, was more hotly debated, and on none at all was there so strong a feeling displayed. To understand this, it is necessary to appreciate fully the position of Australia as a country, and something at any rate of the political conditions of its people.

In some respects, the circumstances of Australia to-day greatly resemble those of America at the beginning of the last century. In both countries we have the spectacle of a very small population, settled along the sea-coast on one side of a country so vast in area as to seem ridiculously out of proportion to the number of its inhabitants. In both cases the wealth of the country is enormous, but its extent wholly unascertained, and perhaps on that very account all the more likely to prove attractive to adventurous spirits from older and more thickly peopled countries. So far, Australia to-day might seem almost a repetition of America at the opening of the century just completed. At this point, however, the parallel ceases in some most important respects. A century ago America opened her arms wide to welcome all comers to assist in the task of colonizing her unexplored territories, and developing the as yet hardly dreamed of resources of the country; Australia feels that she cannot follow this ex-

ample with any prospect of the same success. The reason lies principally in the different geographical positions of the two countries, but to some extent also in changes which a century of development has brought forth.

Europe, and especially the British isles, was the natural feeder of the population of America a century ago. There was little cause for apprehension as to the class of immigrants likely to be attracted; in Australia to-day the case is entirely different. Not Europe but Asia is the densely peopled continent which may be said to adjoin Australia, and it is a continent which experience has already shown to have no emigrating classes likely to prove a permanent benefit to the country in which they might settle. India, China, Japan, these are Australia's nearest neighbors among nations possessed of surplus population; and it is not surprising that the English-speaking people who possess and propose to develop the continent of the South Pacific are unwilling to accept them as partners in the undertaking. Both China and Japan have already shown themselves something more than willing to offer themselves for the work. For the last twenty-five years there has been a steady stream of immigration from China to the settled districts of all the colonies now united in the Commonwealth, which various legislative expedients have served only very partially to check. The influx of Japanese has been much more recent, and up to this time no attempt has been made to control it, though it has been looked on with uneasiness during the last three or four years. In the case of India, there has been no spontaneous emigration to Australia, but for some years there has been a legalized traffic in contract labor between the Madras Presidency of British India and the colony of Queensland, and several thousand laborers have been introduced every year.

Thus the settled districts of Australia have been exposed, for a good many years past, to what has seemed to the settlers of European races a serious danger of deterioration, owing to the introduction of Asiatic races, with wholly different ideas and traditions from their own, and accustomed to entirely different standards of living. This danger has been increased by the fact that the unsettled part of Australia was that which lay nearest and was by far the most accessible to Asiatic intruders, a circumstance which has been brought home to them because the gold

fields along the northern coasts have been largely, indeed mainly, occupied by Chinese. The situation in Australia, accordingly, has been, in effect, very similar to what it would have been in America fifty years ago or more, had the surplus millions of China and Japan been possessed by the spirit of enterprise which has seized them of late, and had there been no overland route available when the gold discoveries were made in California. The risk of a wave of Asiatic colonization sweeping over America's western coasts would in such a state of things have been greatly increased. This is the danger which has been apprehended in Australia of late.

Two difficulties have confronted the Parliament of the Australian Commonwealth in dealing with the question of Asiatic exclusion, and the legislation introduced has been directed to dealing separately with Asiatic peoples. There was, first, the general question of warding off the wholesale introduction of immigrants likely to lower the standard of the future population of Australia; and, next, the putting an end to the traffic in labor by the settlers in Queensland which was calculated to have a similar result in a form even more objectionable. It may be said with regard to the first question that there was nothing that could be called a difference of opinion throughout the country. There are already a good many Chinese in every one of the states of the Commonwealth, forming a percentage of the population at least five times as great as it does in America, and they are popular in none. That they are hard-working, frugal and, on the whole, fairly inoffensive and law-abiding people, is admitted everywhere; but they are essentially a people apart, incapable of really adopting, or adapting themselves to, the standards of the white race which holds the continent, and the feeling may be said to be universal which demands their exclusion. The Japanese are more popular in Australia than the Chinese, but the same objections are felt to apply to them; and it is even probable that they owe any advantage they have in popular estimation rather to their smaller numbers than to anything else.

The question which had to be met, therefore, in dealing with the proposed exclusion of the Mongolian races from Australia, was not the propriety of their exclusion, but the method of giving effect to it. The re-enactment of a Chinese exclusion act in America is a simple thing. There is, of course, the question of

Chinese or Japanese sensibility to be considered; but if the public sentiment is in favor of risking any loss of popularity at Peking or Tokio which may be involved, there is an end of the matter. China may feel that America is, after all, not so very much more sympathetic than other foreign devils, and Japan may feel offended to think that even now her people are regarded as less desirable than certain European peoples whose arrival in Japan would hardly be esteemed a benefit. Yet, if Congress thinks fit to exclude them, little will be said on the subject. The position of Australia is different. It is one of the inevitable drawbacks of incorporation in an Empire so extended as that of Great Britain that questions of primarily local concern in one of its divisions cannot be dealt with independently of the interests of the other divisions. The Commonwealth of Australia has been accorded the fullest possible powers of self-government; yet, when its Parliament proceeded to legislate for the effectual exclusion of undesirable emigration a difficulty presented itself.

The desire of the people and Parliament was to put a stop to the introduction of Chinese or Japanese immigrants by a statute that should say so in plain and unmistakable language. Other methods had been tried by the separate colonies already, such as the imposition of special poll-taxes, and the requirement of capital in the hands of the immigrants; but all had been cleverly evaded. When the promised bill was brought before Parliament by the Government, however, it was found that it contained no mention of either of the countries intended to be specially affected by its provisions. Instead of this, it took the form of an act which applied, or at any rate might in the discretion of the Executive be made to apply, to immigrants from Germany, France, Italy or America, as well as from China and Japan. A very simple educational test is, in fact, the only safeguard provided. It is required that every immigrant shall be compelled to make a written application for admission in one of certain European languages, or in English, before the proper official.

To the natural criticism, which was offered in no uncertain way by the Opposition, that it could certainly be evaded with ease by any smart Chinese or Japanese immigrant, the reply was that, in the interests of the trade of the Empire—which means, of course, of Great Britain—it was considered most unwise to antagonize either China or Japan at present. It was admitted by the Com-

monwealth Government that this was, in fact, the result of consultation with the Imperial Cabinet, and that if it were ignored by the Federal Parliament the assent of the Crown—which is required for every statute calculated to affect in any way the external relations of the Empire—might, and probably would, be withheld from it. Not a few opinions, both in and out of Parliament, were in favor of passing an act really calculated to give effect to the mind of the country, and, in case it should be disallowed, passing it again until the British Ministry should give way. It is even probable that nothing short of the appeal made by the Cabinet against taking any step to embarrass the Imperial Government at a time of exceptional difficulty would have induced the majority to accept the measure as proposed.

The Government, however, profess to be confident that the statute will answer every practical purpose of exclusion. They maintain that the demand of a written application in one or other of four or five European languages will prove as effectual a barrier to the Mongolian as heart could wish, and there is little doubt it could be made so. On the other hand, there are many objections to a system which relies for its success on what may well require a strained interpretation of the law; and it may even be doubted whether in the end the outrage to national sentiment involved may not prove quite as great as the more straightforward course approved by the public opinion of Australia. One thing, moreover, is certain: if the statute is to remain it must justify itself by proving effectual.

It is recognized that Australia has at present very little interest in any mere educational test for immigrants. It is certain, indeed, that the experience of a single month of the European arrivals at the port of New York, if it could be transferred to Sydney or Melbourne, would create an overwhelming sentiment in its favor; but of this there is at present no chance whatever. While America is open to receive the ignorant classes of Europe with little or no restraint upon their admission, these classes will certainly come here. As long as the standard of affluence which entitles the Italian, Russian or Czech immigrant to escape the charge of pauperism is so modest that it is less than the difference between the passage rates to this country and Australia, so long the number of very poor and illiterate Europeans seeking admission to any part of Australasia will be trifling

indeed. The statute just passed is, therefore, a pretence so far as the purposes which on its face it appears to be designed to effect are concerned, and like all such pretences it is only too likely to result in failure, and to lead to trouble.

There is, however, a second, and in some respects even a more important, respect in which the ideal of "a white Australia" is in danger. Fully one-third of Australia is situated within the tropics, and another third of it may be said to be sub-tropical in its climate. The problem how white labor is to be utilized for agriculture under such conditions is one which cannot be answered from experience. This problem has not been pressing in any part of Australia except the colony of Queensland. Tropical Australia is as yet practically unoccupied, much of it indeed unexplored, in the great states of West and South Australia, and for years to come this is likely to be the case, owing to the comparative smallness of the rainfall in those districts of the continent. In Queensland the position is entirely different. Possessed of a larger proportion of tropical country than any of the other states, it has also the most fertile land, and, at any rate in its eastern districts, a heavier rainfall than any other part of Australia. It is now nearly a generation since the settlers began to pursue the special lines of agriculture for which the soil and climate appeared suitable, and from the first they have done so by the use of what may be called servile labor. The natives of Australia itself were never available as laborers. But a traffic was set up in what was called Kanaka labor, for the supply of the sugar, cotton and other tropical and sub-tropical industries that were established. This traffic was, and still is, recognized by law, and was carried on subject to regulation and official oversight by the government of the colony. The Kanakas were the natives of all or any of the island groups that lie scattered widely over the South Pacific within the tropics, but particularly those lying within easy reach of the eastern coast of Australia; and only within the last six or seven years has it been necessary to go farther afield.

When these sources failed, steps were taken to supply the tropical labor market by a system of contracts under which the Government of India was prepared to sanction the deportation of natives of southern India to Queensland as laborers for definite periods, subject to a Government guarantee for their good treatment and return at the end of their term of contract. This sys-

tem has certainly served to supply the tropical labor market of Queensland with whatever number of hands might be required.

It is probably needless to enter at length upon the objections to its continuance, as most of these lie on the surface. It is not necessary to suppose that what may be termed serious abuses of the system exist, to understand that it is viewed with intense suspicion and dislike by the settlers in every one of the other states of the new Commonwealth. That there have been some abuses is undeniable, indeed, but not more, probably, than are inseparable from any such system of servile labor. The feeling in every part of Australia outside the borders of Queensland has been in favor of its complete abolition, and even in Queensland there is a division of opinion. There, as elsewhere in Australia, the influence of organized labor is powerful, and indeed it was this alone that secured a majority vote in favor of joining the Federation. Yet the obstacles in the way of its speedy and complete abolition have been found to be very considerable. The fact that it had been established and fully recognized by law for many years, and that large and important industries have grown up dependent upon it, gives it on a small scale a curious resemblance to the old slavery problem of this country. It was understood, indeed, that an act would be passed to make provision for the extinction of the traffic in contract labor by degrees, and it appeared at first that no more would be proposed than a gradual diminution in the number that might be annually imported. This, it soon became evident, would not satisfy the Labor party, which constitutes fully one-fifth of the voting power in the Representative Chamber, and the Cabinet brought in a bill absolutely prohibiting the further introduction of contract laborers.

The effect of the statute will be to compel the deportation of all the present contract laborers, whether Kanaka or Indian, immediately on the termination of their existing contracts, and to absolutely forbid the introduction of any others to take their places in the future. As might have been expected, the form which the act has taken has created very strong feeling and strenuous protest in Queensland. It is stated that its effect will be utterly to destroy the special industries in which the Queenslanders have been encouraged by their own Legislature to embark much capital, of which the sugar-cane industry is by far the most important; and feeling has run so high that threats of forc-

ble withdrawal from the new Federation have been made. It is alleged that under the law, if strictly interpreted, there would not remain an imported colored laborer in the state in three years' time, and that this would mean inevitable ruin to thousands in the country, as well as the total loss of much English capital embarked in the business. It is argued, on the other hand, that experience shows that colored labor is not essential to the sugar industry at any rate, as it has been prosperously carried on in the coastal districts of northeastern New South Wales for a good many years, where no colored labor has ever been introduced. But it is also asserted without compromise by the very great majority in the other five states of the Commonwealth that, even if need be at the cost of great financial loss, the contract labor traffic must cease, and must cease now.

There can be little question that Australia has done wisely in dealing with this question at once, as it was one that must have become only the more serious and difficult the longer it was delayed. The continued existence of any arrangement that cast a doubt upon the doctrine that Australia was to be essentially a country of free men, possessed of equal rights—which necessarily means of white men—must have sown the seeds of future trouble, more even than in any country less accessible to colored races, and offering fewer inducements for their employment. It may well be that justice may demand some special concession or compensation to the people of Queensland for the financial sacrifice they are called on to make for the sake of the Federation, but this can hardly be dealt with till it is ascertained that the industries cannot be successfully carried on by means of white labor. Should it be found that such is the case, it may be safely asserted that compensation in some form will be made to the people of Queensland by the people of the Commonwealth, who will consider any reasonable sacrifice cheap which rids the country of a serious danger. Should it prove, as has been confidently asserted, that European labor can be successfully used for such pursuits in tropical Australia, a most important fact will be ascertained which may well have a wider application and a more important bearing on the world's future than even that of securing for the continent of the South Pacific the unquestionable destiny of being, and remaining, a White Australia.

HUGH H. LUSK.

THE TUBERCULOSIS PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES.

BY S. A. KNOPF, M.D.

PERHAPS at no epoch in the history of phthisiology, or, for that matter, in the history of medicine in general, has the singular disease called consumption or pulmonary tuberculosis been so much written and talked about as at the present time. Every civilized country has its anti-tuberculosis movement. In our own country, there has been of late a great awakening in the minds of all public-spirited men and women, inside and outside of the medical profession, to the importance of this question. The recent declaration of the United States government, through the Surgeon-General of the Marine Hospital Service, that pulmonary tuberculosis is a dangerous, contagious disease, and that all immigrants and visitors to this country, whether paupers or not, must be debarred from our ports when suffering from tuberculosis, has added to the intense interest taken in the matter by millions of American citizens. Whether themselves ill with the disease or having a consumptive friend or relative, whether having consumptives in their employ, or being simply interested from a humanitarian sentiment, all thoughtful people realize that, if the government is right and consumption is really contagious, the solution of the tuberculosis problem must be much more difficult than has been supposed.

Happily this is not so. In the light of our present knowledge pulmonary tuberculosis is not a dangerously contagious disease, but only a communicable one. To be in contact with a tuberculous individual who takes care of his expectoration or other secretions which may contain the bacilli, is not dangerous. In sanatoria for consumptives where the precautions concerning the sputum are most strictly adhered to, one is perhaps safer from

contracting tuberculosis than anywhere else. The great danger from infection lies in the indiscriminate deposit of sputum containing the bacilli, which, when dry and pulverized, may be inhaled by susceptible individuals and then cause the disease to be developed. The communication of the germ of the disease is, however, less obscure to us in its process, and far more easily guarded against, than the contagion arising from such maladies as diphtheria, scarlet fever, or small-pox. The contact alone of a consumptive does not convey the disease; herein lies the difference between communicable and contagious. Therefore, to consider the careful, conscientious consumptive an individual afflicted with a dangerous, contagious disease, is unscientific, unjust, and inhumane.

Pauper immigrants should not be allowed to land, whether tuberculous or not; but there should be some discrimination when well-to-do tuberculous immigrants or foreign consumptive visitors come to our shores. But this new law makes no distinction. The Immigration Commissioner, Hart H. North of San Francisco, who had some doubt about the ruling, communicated with the authorities in Washington, and received the reply that in regard to barring consumptives from American ports there was to be no class distinction, but that all must be treated alike. Will we not by such measures subject ourselves to retaliation on the part of other governments? Wealthy American pulmonary invalids who have been in the habit of seeking restoration to health in the various European health-resorts, may no longer have this hospitality extended to them.

The new regulation classifying tuberculosis as a dangerous, contagious disease has only been in operation for a few months, but consequences have already followed. It has increased the fear of people to associate with consumptives. Healthy employees have been discharged, because it had been reported that they were living with a consumptive relative. Whole communities, located in especially favorable climates, which formerly permitted their unsupervised boarding-houses to be crowded with consumptives—which was unwise and unsafe—go now to the opposite extreme, and will not permit well-conducted sanatoria in their vicinity. Yet sanatoria are not only healing institutions, but veritable schools of hygiene, and serve as examples to the community in which they are located. Thus, carefully kept statistics, covering

a period of fifty years, conclusively prove that, since the establishment of sanatoria for consumptives, the mortality from tuberculosis among the villagers of Goerbersdorf and Falkenstein—two places where five of the most flourishing German sanatoria now exist—has actually been decreased by one-third of that which it was before the establishment of the institutions.

If we exaggerate the danger of the transmissibility of tuberculosis, we only create a new disease which we may justly call phthisiophobia. As the distinguished editor of the *New York Medical Journal*, Dr. Foster, very properly puts it:

“What the people need to be taught—and they have already partly learned the lesson—is not that tuberculosis is a monster to be fled from, but that it is a danger which can be effectually overcome.”

Of all communicable diseases, pulmonary tuberculosis is the most easily prevented. With what comparative ease this prevention can be accomplished by educating (not frightening) the masses into obedience to sanitary regulations, has been shown by the splendid work done by the New York Board of Health, under the direction of Dr. Hermann M. Biggs. In spite of the great lack of hospital facilities, it has been possible during the past few years to reduce the mortality from tuberculosis in New York in a most remarkable degree, and that through preventive measures alone. These consisted in instructing the family with whom the consumptive was living, verbally through health inspectors, and by the distribution of appropriate literature; yet Dr. Biggs insists in all his writings that pulmonary tuberculosis is only a communicable disease, and not a contagious one. In the circular issued by him for the New York Board of Health, which circular has since served as a model to many European and American health boards, he goes so far as to say:

“If the matter coughed up be properly destroyed, a person suffering from consumption may frequently not only do his usual work without giving the disease to others, but may also thus improve his own condition and his chances of getting well.”

At the last London Congress of Tuberculosis, no less an authority than Professor Koch endorsed this view most heartily, speaking in words of highest praise of Professor Biggs's effective methods of combating tuberculosis.

It may not be without interest to mention here the opinions of some other leading American medical men on the subject in gen-

eral, and on the Treasury Department's action in particular. Professor E. G. Janeway, Dean of the New York University and Bellevue Medical College, distinctly declares pulmonary tuberculosis a communicable and not a dangerous, contagious disease. Dr. Geo. F. Shrady, Editor of the *New York Medical Record*, Dr. Geo. M. Gould, Editor of *American Medicine*, and Dr. Geo. B. Fowler, ex-President of the New York County Medical Society, express the same opinion and utter a warning against the dangerous consequences of the spreading of exaggerated fears concerning the transmission of tuberculosis.

The writer of this article presented some weeks ago to the New York Academy of Medicine the following resolutions, which were adopted at the regular meeting of the Academy on February 6th, 1902:

"Whereas, The Treasury Department of the United States, upon recommendation of the Surgeon-General of the Marine Hospital Service, has recently decided to classify pulmonary tuberculosis with dangerous, contagious diseases, be it

"Resolved, That the New York Academy of Medicine deeply deplores this decision, which is not based either on clinical experience or on scientific experiments;

"Resolved, That the Academy considers the exclusion of non-pauper tuberculous immigrants and consumptive aliens visiting our shores, unwise, inhumane, and contrary to the dictates of justice.

"Be it further Resolved, That, while the Academy is convinced of the communicability of tuberculosis and urges all possible precautions against the spread of the disease occasioned by sputum and tuberculous food, the Academy is opposed to all measures by which needless hardship is imposed upon the consumptive individual, his family, and his physician."

Professor Geo. L. Peabody, of Columbia University, Professor Andrew H. Smith, of the Post-Graduate Medical School, and Professor Wm. H. Thomson, of Cornell University, supported these resolutions, and urged their adoption in the interest of science and humanity. Dr. T. Mitchell Prudden, Professor of Pathology and Bacteriology at Columbia University, who was detained from being present at the meeting, wrote to the framer of the resolutions as follows:

"I regret that I cannot be present at the meeting of the Academy of Medicine on Thursday evening, and so shall not be able to speak, as I should like to do, in favor of the resolutions concerning the ruling of the Treasury Department on tuberculosis. I think that the resolutions admirably cover the ground of a dignified and earnest protest. It is, indeed, discouraging that the advice upon which the Treasury Department

of the United States appears to have acted in this matter, in this period of growing enlightenment regarding infectious disease in general and tuberculosis in particular, should ignore the revelations of two decades of beneficent research, and imply so crude a conception of the solution which modern science has to offer to this serious problem of preventive medicine."

Dr. Alvah H. Doty, the Health Officer of the Port of New York, who was likewise prevented from being present at the meeting, expressed himself in a letter to the author of the resolutions in a similar strain, and added:

"I shall be glad to have you mention my name in your introductory remarks on February 6th, and also state that, while in Washington next week, I shall do all I can to bring about a repeal of the obnoxious ruling recently made by the Commissioner of Immigration."

Lastly, a letter was received by the writer from Dr. Geo. H. Simmons, the Editor of the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, wherein he says:

"The resolutions presented to the Academy of Medicine are to the point, and express the opinion, I believe, of about ninety per cent. of the best men in the profession who have given thought to the subject."

If we impose unnecessary hardship on the tuberculous patient, the result will be that individuals feeling themselves in the earlier stages of the disease will shrink from seeking advice until they can no longer hide their condition, and then it may be too late.

Consumption is almost never inherited; on the other hand, predisposition to the disease may be inherited as well as acquired. It is one of the most frequent of all diseases. Though the mortality from it has been decreased in localities where preventive measures have been in vogue, and where sufficient hospital facilities have been provided, the average mortality from tuberculosis is still very high, every seventh death being due to that disease.

Consumption is most frequent among the poor, the badly housed, the underfed, the intemperate, and individuals debilitated by other excesses, disease, or certain occupations.

In the poorest quarters in New York the yearly mortality from tuberculosis is not less than 72 per 10,000 inhabitants. In the districts populated mainly by artisans of moderate income, it is 35 per 10,000, and in that portion of the city inhabited by the better class of workingmen the mortality is considerably lower (about 20). Among the residences of the wealthy people of New

York, the mortality from tuberculosis varies according to the density of population from 5 to 16 per 10,000 inhabitants.

Pulmonary tuberculosis is the most curable of all chronic diseases. The sooner the patient submits himself to the doctor's care, the greater are his chances for a lasting recovery. Consumption, or pulmonary tuberculosis, is to-day cured not by quacks, patent medicines, nostrums, or other secret remedies, but solely and exclusively by the scientific and judicious use of fresh air, sunshine, water, abundant and good food (milk, eggs, meat, vegetables, fruit), and by the help of certain medicinal substances when the hygienic and dietetic means just mentioned do not suffice in themselves to combat the disease. Patients can be cured in nearly all climes where pure air is obtainable and where the extremes of cold and heat are not too pronounced.

There is no specific climate for consumption, and we have as yet no specific medicinal remedy. The thorough and constant medical supervision of the pulmonary invalid, immediate intervention when new symptoms manifest themselves or old ones become aggravated or do not disappear rapidly enough, the prescription of proper food and drink, can only be done by the thoroughly trained physician, either in a well-equipped sanatorium, or, if circumstances permit, in a suitably arranged private home.

With knowledge of the fearful prevalence of consumption, its cause and prevention, and the means to cure this the most dreaded of all diseases, what can and what should we do in our country to combat it? I shall endeavor to answer that question.

First, there should be in every city a tenement-house commission to improve the dwellings of the poor by making them habitable, sanitary, and safe.

Secondly, there should be a commission on factories and workshops to see that such places are sanitarily constructed and conducted, that the eight-hour law is obeyed, that a sufficient number of well-kept spittoons are placed throughout the buildings, that expectoration, except in spittoons, is punished, first by a fine and when repeated by dismissal.

Thirdly, there should be decently kept places of amusement where light beers and non-alcoholic beverages should be sold at reasonable rates, and all rational movements to diminish alcoholism, which is one of the strongest predisposing factors of tuberculosis, should be encouraged.

Fourthly, there should be a special tuberculosis commission to prevent the development of tuberculous and scrofulous diseases in children. Its work should consist (1) in disseminating knowledge by lectures and the distribution of literature to young mothers, to prevent the development of the disease in infants; (2) in the supervision of public nurseries, orphan asylums, schools, and colleges, in regard to their sanitary construction and management; (3) in supervising the curriculum of schools to prevent too much mental work to the detriment of the physical development of the children; (4) in creating gymnasiums, playgrounds, and small parks, particularly in the densely settled districts; (5) in providing the school-children of poor parents with a substantial lunch at noon-time;* (6) in preventing child labor; (7) in caring for and educating tuberculous school-children in special school-sanatoria, situated near the seashore or in particularly healthy inland localities.

Fifthly, there should be, of course, in every locality a board of health, whose special duty in regard to tuberculosis should be (1) to disinfect the premises inhabited by a consumptive, upon the request of the physician or family; (2) to distribute literature teaching the prevention of tuberculosis; (3) to keep statistics regarding the morbidity and mortality of tuberculosis; (4) to supervise slaughter-houses, dairies, and milkshops, to prevent the spread of tuberculosis through infected food substances. Each case of tuberculosis should be reported to the health board by the attending physician; and, if the latter desires, a sanitary inspector should be sent to the patient's residence to give verbal instructions concerning prophylactic measures. The board of health should distribute gratuitously, or at cost price, pocket spittoons for the use of tuberculous invalids, and should also have under its observation the keeping in order of large fixed spittoons which should be abundant throughout the city. These latter could be arranged so that they might be constantly flushed by running water, and would thus neither offend the æsthetic taste nor become a source of infection.

* In Berlin, where the children of the poor, when attending school, are provided with meat sandwiches and a glass of milk for lunch, carefully kept statistics show that they gained from two to three pounds within two months, and did better intellectual work than ever before. In Boston, a similar experiment has been tried with most satisfactory results; there, however, the children receive a warm lunch, for which they pay from five to ten cents.

Sixthly, each city should have a special tuberculosis commission for adults, composed of physicians and laymen, whose object should be to investigate all reported indigent cases of tuberculosis, to ascertain the financial standing of the patients, their sanitary and general environments, whether or not they should be treated gratuitously, and whether or not through the removal of the patient the family would become destitute, in which case the municipality would, of course, be obliged to care for them. Through this commission, the other members of the family should all be examined, so that, in case infection has taken place, the patients may be treated as early as possible.

Seventhly, every American city should have a sanatorium association or society for the prevention of tuberculosis. These societies should have for their object, besides the dissemination of knowledge through lectures and the distribution of literature concerning the prevention of tuberculosis, the furthering of the sanatorium movement—that is to say, to combine with the authorities in helping to create sanatoria for the consumptive poor adult and for those of moderate means in the various stages of the disease, seaside sanatoria for tuberculous and scrofulous children, and special tuberculosis dispensaries where ambulant pulmonary invalids can be treated.

Eighthly, the physicians, statesmen, philanthropists, and thinking citizens should combine their efforts to counteract the ever growing tendency of people to emigrate from the healthy rural districts and small cities to the crowded metropolises of the country. The family physician in particular has a great mission to perform in this connection. He should urge the younger members of a family, where there is a tendency to tuberculosis, to emigrate from city to country and take up outdoor occupations rather than remain in, or come to, large cities and pursue sedentary occupations.

Lastly, we need a general, federal tuberculosis commission, such as exists in England, France, and Germany, with its seat in Washington. This commission should be in touch with all the boards of health and sanatorium associations and societies for the prevention of tuberculosis. It should constitute the supreme head of the anti-tuberculosis movement in the United States. To it should be submitted for consideration and decision such subjects as: "Is bovine tuberculosis transmissible to the human race,

and *vice versa*?" "What measures should be inaugurated to stop the spread of tuberculosis from cattle, if this source of infection exists?" "Is pulmonary tuberculosis a dangerously contagious, or only a communicable disease?" Such a commission should, of course, be composed of trained sanitarians, general practitioners, specialists, and competent statesmen.

These are the things which we will have to do if we ever hope to master this deadly foe, so happily named by Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes "the great white plague."

But where shall we obtain the money to create such a thorough system of commissions, and enough sanatorium and hospital facilities for the thousands and thousands of consumptive poor who are in need of treatment? New York city alone has about ten thousand poor consumptives who ought to be treated in institutions. The existing hospitals can accommodate about eight hundred. No city in this country, nor in any other, is able alone to cope with the tuberculosis problem. In Europe, the royalty and the aristocracy of birth and finance have created hundreds of sanatoria, and these institutions have made their influence felt already in a marked reduction in the mortality from tuberculosis. We have no emperors, no kings, no aristocracy of birth in this country, and let us be grateful for it. We have something better. We have an array of philanthropists whose generosity has never been equalled. According to Dr. Rossiter Johnson, \$107,360,000 have been given by American citizens for educational, religious, and general philanthropic institutions during the single year of 1901. All previous records have been outdone by this aggregate, the highest total for any previous year having been \$62,750,000. It is a good augury that the first year of the twentieth century should have distinguished itself so remarkably. Our Carnegies, our Rockefellers, Vanderbilts, Morgans, Pearsons, our Helen Goulds, Phoebe Hearsts, Jane Stanfords, (Mrs.) Emmons Blaines, have given us fortunes for universities, colleges, and libraries, and have thereby made us and our children their lasting debtors.

It is but natural that those familiar with the needs of the consumptive poor in this country, should look for help, in solving this difficult tuberculosis problem, to the large-hearted American men and women who make such noble use of their wealth. There are now, perhaps, plenty of libraries and colleges, and even gen-

eral hospitals, everywhere; but there is a penury of good, model tenement-houses, where the average wage-earner could enjoy a cheery pleasant home without paying an exorbitant rent. There is a penury of public baths, which should for a moderate price be at the disposal of the people winter and summer, and for some hours in the evening. There is a penury of decently kept places of amusement, open all the year, where the laborer and his family may spend a pleasant Sunday afternoon and partake of non-alcoholic drinks. There is a penury of children's playgrounds, large and small parks. There is a penury of hospital and sanatorium facilities for thousands of poor consumptives who could be cured if only taken care of in time. Sanatoria for consumptive adults, as well as seaside sanatoria for scrofulous and tuberculous children, are a crying and urgent necessity for the majority of our large American cities. Such sanatoria are schools of hygiene and sobriety, besides being institutions for the prevention and cure of tuberculosis. A dozen such sanatoria for the city of New York would render thousands happy and healthy, and make them bread winners and useful citizens. As the conditions are now, the majority of these are doomed to a certain and lingering death; and, if they are careless or ignorant of the necessary precautions, they will infect some of their own kin and neighbors. Could I but picture in these pages the dark, dreary rooms of the consumptive of our tenements, as I have seen them so often; could I but describe the sufferings of mind and body of these people, who must suffer and die, not because their disease is incurable, but because there is no place to cure them; could our generous and wealthy fellow citizens but see for themselves these conditions; instead of more new libraries, universities, and colleges, we would soon have better tenements, more playgrounds and parks for children, and an abundance of sanatoria and hospitals for our consumptive poor. May this appeal to our large-hearted and generous philanthropists not be in vain.

S. A. KNOPF.

CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE SENATE: A REPLY.

BY WILLIAM H. MOODY, MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

MR. A. MAURICE LOW, in his article in the February number of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, would reduce the government of the country to exceedingly simple terms. It is, in his opinion, an "inner circle" of Senators who are "in fact the government of the United States," and enabled "to reduce the House to a legislative nonentity and to keep the President in subjection." This opinion is sufficiently startling to challenge examination.

The conclusion thus expressed is reached by three propositions, which, if true, substantially prove the case—first, that the House of Representatives has become an insignificant factor in legislation; second, that the Senate dominates the President; and, third, that a limited number of Senators control the Senate. Certainly not one of these propositions will meet with universal or even general assent.

Whether the Senate has entrusted its powers to the control of a limited number of its own members, can be more intelligently discussed by some member of that body. Doubtless, experience, knowledge, ability, and those indefinable qualities which constitute capacity for leadership, count for much in the Senate, as they do elsewhere. Nevertheless, it has been supposed that there, to a degree unknown in any other legislative body, the individual members enjoy an equality of rights and powers. The ordinary observer of Senatorial action is less inclined to criticise the Senate for entrusting the control of its business to a few leaders, than for permitting by its rules and usages any one of its number, no matter how unimportant, to nullify the will of all the others. Such criticism is abundantly justified by Mr. Low's own observa-

tions. The ability of a single Senator, of which Mr. Low cites illustrations, to obstruct and defeat a measure which he opposes, or to reject a nomination to office which is distasteful to him, has little tendency to prove that he is subject to an oligarchy of his own creation.

It is idle to deny and useless to exaggerate the importance of the Senate in our political system. It is to-day the most powerful of all conspicuous legislative bodies, with the single exception of the British House of Commons, where practically absolute legislative power is joined with executive power.

Nevertheless, the present power of the Senate is due not to encroachments upon the executive on the one hand or the popular branch on the other, but rather to its constitution and the functions which it lawfully exercises. Its importance can be accounted for as a natural result of legitimate authority, without resorting to the theory of usurpation.

The legislative power of the Senate is the exact equivalent of that of the House, with the single exception that the former cannot originate "bills raising revenue"—that is, bills providing for the laying and collecting of taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. With the unlimited right of amendment which the Constitution confers upon it, the Senate suffers little practical loss by the denial of the right to originate revenue bills. No Senate amendment to a revenue bill can be written into the law without the concurrence of a majority of the House of Representatives; and, whatever the importance of the right to originate revenue bills may be, it is a prerogative which the House has always jealously preserved, and even now is engaged in defending against the attacks of individual members of the other house. It has sometimes been hastily said that bills appropriating money must originate in the House, and apparently Mr. Low gives countenance to that opinion. Clearly, however, an appropriation may originate in the Senate and, in point of fact, frequently does so. Although by an almost unbroken usage the general appropriation bills which carry the great body of public expenditures originate in the House, the Senate constantly originates bills appropriating money for specific objects, such as pensions, claims, public buildings, and the like, and in doing so is entirely within its constitutional right.

In view of the powers of the Senate in which the House has no share, it may be regarded as unfortunate that the plan originally

determined upon in the Constitutional Convention, by which full control of all bills raising and expending money was vested in the House, with a simple negative in the Senate, did not prevail. If the Convention had appreciated the importance of those special Senatorial powers, that plan doubtless would have prevailed, in the hope that thus a just balance between the two branches of Congress might have been preserved. It was intended to ensure such a balance, but experience has demonstrated that the importance of the right vested in the House to originate bills raising revenue was then overestimated, while the peculiar authority of the Senate was underestimated.

We must, however, accept the Constitution as we find it, and recognize that by its terms there is a practical equality between the two branches considered as mere legislative bodies. If there is any legitimate superiority of the one over the other, it must be sought elsewhere. It can be readily found in the two important respects in which the Senate shares in the executive power.

The framers of the Constitution, in their anxiety to guard against an excess of power in the President, required that all treaties should receive the assent of two-thirds of the Senate, and that the Senate should consent to the appointments of diplomatic officers, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointment is not otherwise provided for by the Constitution and laws. It was not seen clearly how important these functions would prove to be, nor was it appreciated how much they would tend to exalt the position of the Senate in our political system. As history has shown that the right to originate revenue bills has availed the House little in the contest for supremacy, so it has shown that, by its part in the treaty-making power, the Senate secures a firm grasp on the foreign policy of the country, and by its part in the selection of public officials materially affects domestic administration. It was from the first inevitable that the Senate, through the exercise of these powers, should grow great in comparison with the House which is denied all participation in them. In the exact proportion that our foreign relations become more extensive and far-reaching, and our domestic administration broader and deeper in its scope, the distance between the two houses will be widened. It is not at all strange, in these days when there are so many national questions touching foreign relations, that public interest centres upon that

branch of Congress which has the right to deal most effectively with them. Nor is it to be wondered at that, as appointments to office become more numerous, and the offices themselves are sought with greater eagerness, the body which in so large a degree distributes patronage should attract the public attention.

It may be admitted, once for all, that, with the allotment of powers between the two houses which the Constitution makes, it is a hopeless aspiration for the House to expect to equal the Senate in authority and distinction. At least two of the most far-sighted members of the Constitutional Convention apprehended the great weight which the Senate would have in our political system, Colonel Mason of Virginia, and Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania. The latter, when it was proposed that the Senate should elect the President in addition to its other functions, said on September 6th:

"They are to make treaties; and they are to try all impeachments. In allowing them thus to make the executive and judicial appointments, to be the court of impeachments, and to make treaties which are to be laws of the land, the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers are all blended in one branch of the government. . . . With all those powers, and the President in their interest, they will depress the other branch of legislature, and aggrandize themselves in proportion."

Hamilton, on the same day, pointed out a more subtle influence which would tend to magnify the Senate, and which has done so to a degree understood only by those who observe the working of our Constitution at close range, when he said that the "mutual connection and influence" of the President and Senate would aggrandize both.

But, with all the advantages which have been described, the Senate has not dominated the President nor reduced him to "subjection" to its will. The contrary assertion has a strange sound, at the close of the administration of William McKinley, who, to an extent unknown since the days of Jefferson, exercised an influence over the legislative action of both houses of Congress. As Mr. Low shows, the Senate has jealously guarded its right to join in the making of treaties and the appointment of officers. Nevertheless, if a conflict should arise, the President, in a just cause, would have every advantage in an appeal to the ultimate source of political power, the people themselves. In spite of the indirect method of his election, the President seems to the people to be in an especial sense their representative, defender, and

guardian. To this, the lives of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and McKinley bear witness. If the Senate has seen fit from time to time to amend the treaties which have been submitted to it by the President, it has been entirely within its constitutional right in so doing. If the independence of the Executive in making appointments has been diminished on the one hand by the constitutional requirement of approval of the appointments by the Senate, on the other the legislative independence of that body has been invaded by the President through the influence which pertains to the giver of such gifts. If there has been an unjust invasion of the rights of either, it is the legislative right which historically has suffered. Instances might be multiplied to prove this. Without resorting to recent times, it may be said that the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment were accomplished by the use of the Presidential patronage; and the life of Hannibal Hamlin records that he spurned the offer of President Pierce of the control of all the New England patronage in return for his vote for the Douglas Kansas-Nebraska Bill. The Presidential office is to-day more powerful than ever in our history.

Mr. Low's assertion that the House has become an insignificant factor in legislation deserves some attention. Mr. Low says:

"It has been shown that the Senate has equal power with the House over the control of appropriations; that it can create a tariff bill by the right of amendment; that it can prevent the enactment of any bill passed by the House; that it encourages members of the House to look for legislation in the Senate rather than in the House, where it rightfully belongs. One has never heard of Senators asking favors from Representatives."

Suppose this all to be true, then what of it? It means nothing. It may be said with equal truth that "the House has equal power with the Senate over the control of appropriations; that it can originate a tariff bill; that it can prevent the enactment of any bill passed by the Senate." It is true enough that the more rigid rules of the House, framed in the interest of economy in expenditures, have a tendency to send Representatives to their Senators to obtain amendments to an appropriation bill which would not be in order in the House; but no member of an important House Committee will ever assent to the accuracy of the statement that "one has never heard of Senators asking favors from Representatives." The quotations which have been made show

not a superiority of one house over the other, but an equality; and the case is not strengthened by the fact, if it be a fact, that the correspondents of the newspapers no longer care to know the opinions of the members of the House on legislation. It would be invidious to cite the instances of members of the present House of Representatives; but it may be said with perfect safety that the correspondent who was indifferent to the opinions of Dingley and Reed in their day, would be likely to find some inaccuracies in his forecast of national events.

The power of the House remains to-day where it always has been. It has less authority than the Senate, but it has the authority which the Constitution confers upon it. The individual importance of its average member has diminished, and there are reasons for this that are not occult. They grow out of the constitution of the House, its physical environments, and the rules—miscalled “Reed rules”—which result from these conditions. The Senate has ninety members, the House three hundred and sixty-one. The unlimited liberty of speech which prevails in the one body, with its ninety members, and so much enhances the importance of the individual member, impedes and impairs legislation. If the same liberty existed in the other body, with its three hundred and sixty-one members, it could and would, unless controlled by public indignation, arrest legislation altogether. The individual importance and independence which are possible to a member of a House numbering ninety, are impossible to a member of a House numbering three hundred and sixty-one. In fact, the Senate permits to its members the passage of many a bill, by unanimous consent or without opposition, in the confident and assured belief that it will be defeated by the House; and if for one session the House should enact all the bills which pass in the Senate by the mutual courtesy which Mr. Low has described, the courtesy would cease forever.

The authority of the House, as a co-ordinate branch of the national legislature, exists unimpaired as the Constitution created it, but the authority of those who compose the House is sadly diminished. They have surrendered it to their leaders, in the supposed interest of the people and of effective and wise action. The limits of this article forbid much description of the process by which this surrender has been accomplished, of its reasons, and of the justification for it which is claimed but not universally

admitted. The subject is extremely interesting, and deserves a consideration beyond the mere suggestions here possible.

There is proposed to every Congress more business than it can do. The twelve thousand bills and resolutions already introduced in the House will be largely added to before this Congress ends; and, of the total number, eighty or ninety per cent. cannot reach even the stage of consideration. In some manner, a selection must be made of those measures upon which action of some kind shall be taken. It is obvious that they who make the selection, who decide what shall be done and what omitted, are all-potent in directing the public business. In the House, this decision is not left to chance, but is guided by the operation of rules which may fairly be said to have grown out of the experience of a century—rules which, in their present form, were adopted ten years ago, during the first Speakership of Mr. Reed, and, except during the Fifty-second Congress, have been retained in substance by both parties since.

Certain business is privileged. In the words of the rules, the Committees having it in charge "have leave to report at any time," and the measures thus reported have the right of way over the legislative railroad. The privileged business of constant public importance relates to the right of members to their seats, the raising of revenues, appropriations for the maintenance of the government, civil and military, and for the improvement of rivers and harbors. After the disposition of privileged business, and of such other matters as may be acted on by unanimous consent or in some manner provided for by the rules, there are left a large number of bills touching subjects of great public interest. It is by the disposition of this class of business that the Committee on Rules obtains its importance, for it is by them that the selection out of it for action is made. That Committee determines, subject to the approval of the House, which is never refused, what bills shall be considered, how long they shall be debated, and how far, if at all, they may be amended.

Who, then, are the Committee on Rules, and why should such authority be vested in them? Mr. Reed, who did more than any other man to create this authority, called them when in opposition, "The Speaker and his two assistants," rightly dismissing from consideration the minority members, who are, in latter days, a useless survival of conditions which have passed away. The

Speaker is elected, not because of abilities as a presiding officer, although he usually has them, but because of the qualifications he has shown as a leader of men. He becomes the real leader of the majority party which is responsible to the country for legislation; he has and he should have the power necessary to such a position; and he is and he should be responsible to the House and the country for its exercise. He selects his two assistants upon the Committee on Rules, because he has confidence in their wisdom, capacity, and discretion. He and they are in effect the House Cabinet, leading and directing, although not always controlling, the policy of the dominant party. Their power has grown out of conditions similar to those which developed the modern ministry in England out of a Committee of the Privy Council, and which have required, even in the Senate, the creation of the unofficial "Steering Committee"; for universal experience has shown that a numerous legislative body, no matter how respectably composed, without direction and leadership debates and disagrees, but does not effectively act.

The Committee on Rules does not ordinarily act arbitrarily, but rather after conference with members, with due regard to public opinion, and sometimes under the direction of a caucus. Nevertheless, that discontent exists among members regarding present conditions, cannot be denied. Very likely, the Committee is in a transitory stage and has not reached its full development. But, in the opinion of the writer, when that Committee is increased in number, brought into closer touch with all the members, and made more clearly representative in its character, even greater powers will be entrusted to it, with the corresponding responsibilities; and it will prove the best method of guiding and leading the action of a body as numerous as the National House of Representatives, working under the system of government by parties.

Such a system accounts for the lessened consideration that attaches to the office of Representative, which Mr. Low has mistaken for a decrease in the power of the House itself.

That the power of the House, as a co-ordinate branch of Congress, is undiminished, is abundantly proved by recent history. Long and irrelevant discourse is not permitted. It would not be possible, during the consideration of a Philippine tariff bill, for instance, to spend several days in gravely discussing what part of the country contributed the greatest number of soldiers to the

Revolutionary War. But quick, sharp, pointed, compact, and relevant debate still flourishes in most admirable degree. The House acts, and it acts in quick response to the will of the country. It exercises a firm control over public expenditures, while giving respectful consideration to the amendments proposed by the Senate. Its Committees prepare appropriation bills with great care and after protracted consideration, and much the larger part of the bills are written into law exactly as they leave the House. Let the Sundry Civil Bill of the last session serve as an illustration. The bill of one hundred and thirty-six printed pages went to the Senate, carrying appropriations amounting to \$59,605,908.21; and it returned with one hundred and fifty-six Senate amendments, adding \$9,675,272.70 to the total. As the result of conference and action in the two houses, the Senate receded unconditionally from fifty-four, and conditionally from twenty-eight, amendments, and by mutual concessions the Senate amendments were reduced in amount to \$2,190,000, and thus the bill became law.

During the period preceding the Spanish War, the House, under the lead of Mr. Reed, though against the wish of many of its aggressive members, supported the President against the Senate, and obtained for him the delay he desired and the country needed. Finally, in the contest over the crucial question of the recognition of the Cuban Republic proposed by the Senate, the House was victorious. Instances might be multiplied, but no good purpose would be subserved by enumerating the victories of one body over the other. The truth is, that each body gives and receives its fair share of the concessions, without which concurrent action would be impossible.

A critical examination of the legislative annals of recent times would demonstrate that the House is neither a negligible nor an insignificant factor in legislation, but, on the contrary, is manfully doing its share of the public work, and without usurpation or abdication faithfully performing the duties confided to it by the Constitution.

WILLIAM H. MOODY.

THE QUESTION OF THE THEATRE.

BY BRANDER MATTHEWS, PROFESSOR OF DRAMATIC LITERATURE IN
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

AT the close of the memorable journey of the Comédie-Française to England in 1878, Matthew Arnold wrote a characteristic essay on the "French Play in London," in the course of which he took occasion to declare that "the pleasure we have had in the visit of the French company is barren, unless it leaves us with the impulse to mend the condition of our theatre." He asserted that the desire for the drama is irresistible, and that, therefore, we should "organize the theatre"; and he held up as model the organization of the Comédie-Française. He advised that a company of good actors be formed in London, and that to this company a theatre should be given, and also a grant of money from the Science and Art Department. He proposed that the condition of this grant should be an agreement on a repertory chosen out of the works of Shakspeare and of the best modern British dramatists; and he added that it would be needful to appoint a government Commissioner to see that the terms of the agreement were carried out.

It is now nearly a quarter of a century since Matthew Arnold urged these suggestions with all his playful eloquence; and as yet, neither in Great Britain nor in the United States has anything been accomplished toward such an organization of the theatre as he had in view. But the subject has been incessantly discussed. Many and fervent have been the appeals of zealous and youthful spirits, first, to that intangible entity, the State, for a subsidy, and, second, to that alluring personality, the benevolent multi-millionaire, for an endowment. Fervent these appeals were, no doubt, but also not a little vague; and, perhaps, this is a chief reason why they have failed to persuade. Indeed, it is not un-

fortunate, even for those having a reform at heart, that the man who holds the purse-strings should never be seduced by empty declamation, that he should be hard-hearted and slow-moving, and that he should be won over at last only after careful consideration of all the facts of the case.

Now, what are the facts in this case? What are the reasons which led Matthew Arnold to call upon his countrymen to "organize the theatre"? Why is it that there is in England and America an insistent demand that the theatre shall be either subsidized by the State or endowed by the wealthy? What are the conditions of the theatre in the English-speaking countries which call for amelioration? Apparently the theatre is flourishing; never were there more playhouses than there are to-day, and never were these various places of amusement more thickly thronged with playgoers, pleased with the entertainment proffered to them. There is no denying the sumptuousness, the propriety, and even the beauty of the scenery and costumes and decorations set before us on the stage nowadays. There is no doubt that we have many opportunities for observing acting which attains to a high level of technical accomplishment, even if actual inspiration and indispensable genius are as rare in the twentieth century as they have been in all its predecessors.

Even in the plays themselves there has been of late a distinct advance. Chatter about the decline of the drama there is now, as there always has been, and always will be. Euripides was still alive when Aristophanes declared the decadence of Attic tragedy; and Ben Jonson never hesitated to express his low opinion of those wonderful contemporaries of his, whose bold dramas have made the Elizabethan reign the noblest epoch in the history of English literature. Of course, there is no period which would not be crushed by a comparison with that illumined with the genius of Sophocles and with that irradiated by the genius of Shakspeare. It is unprofitable ever to overpraise the plays of our own time; but it is unwise also to depreciate them unduly. Even if the acted drama of the English language at the beginning of the twentieth century is not equal in range, in skill, in power, to the acted drama of the French language in the middle of the nineteenth century, it has at least freed itself from the disheartening insincerity which characterized the plays in English that had been adapted from the French.

As Matthew Arnold pointed out, the result of the effort to adjust a plot caused by French social conventions to the conditions of English life, was to produce in the attentive observer "a sense of incurable falsity." So long as the prevalent plays were adaptations of so fantastic an unreality, it was very difficult to take the theatre seriously, or to expect that the dramatist should observe life faithfully or deal with it honestly. In the quarter of a century since Matthew Arnold made his plea for organizing the theatre, this reproach has been taken away from the English-speaking stage. Adaptations from the French have almost disappeared; and when a foreign play is now presented in English, very rarely does it masquerade as an English play. It remains French or German; it retains its native atmosphere; it is a translation, not an adaptation. This is an immense gain; this is the first necessary step towards a revival of public interest in the drama of our own language. Our acted drama may be a poor thing, even now, but it is at least our own; it is no longer borrowed from our neighbor. Whatever criticism we may pass upon the "Aristocracy" of Mr. Bronson Howard, the "Gay Lord Quex" of Mr. Pinero, the "Liars" of Mr. H. A. Jones, the "Alabama" of Mr. Thomas, or the "Shore Acres" of the late Mr. Herne—and no one of these plays is an impeccable masterpiece—we must see in each of them a sincere effort to deal with life at first hand.

If the theatre is thus prosperous wherever the English language is spoken, and if the dramatists are again striving to handle the stuff out of which alone literature can be made, what need is there for any modification of the situation? Why cannot the stage be let alone to take care of itself? What call is there for subsidy or endowment? The answer to these questions is to be found in the statement that the theatre is now governed too much by purely commercial considerations, and that the art of the drama is the only one of the arts which is compelled to pay its own way, and which is forced to make its own living under conditions which limit its exertions to what is immediately profitable.

It is not bad for the artist that he has to earn his own bread, and that he is bound to satisfy the taste of his fellow-man; and it is not good for any art that those who practise it should be sheltered and coddled. No disadvantage has it been to us that the two greatest of modern dramatists, Shakspeare and Molière, were

each of them managers with a direct interest in the takings at the door. No advantage was it to anybody that Goethe was, by the grace of the Grand Duke, made independent of the public and allowed to do what he liked on the stage of the Weimar theatre, since the result of Goethe's independence of the public was that the Weimar theatre brought forth little worthy to live on the German stage. The arts are democratic, all of them; but none more so than the drama, since it is inconceivable without the assistance of the people at large. If any proof were needed of the insanity of the Bavarian King, it could be found in the fact that he liked to be the sole spectator of performances in his opera-house.

Yet the experience of history seems to show that it is unwise to leave any art wholly at the mercy of the money-making motives. Even in the English-speaking countries, where more is abandoned to private enterprise than is thought advisable among the Latin races, galleries have been built for the proper exhibition of the works of living painters and sculptors; and concert-halls have been erected for the proper performance of orchestral music. In New York, for example,—and only a stone's-throw from each other,—stand the Carnegie Music Hall and the Vanderbilt Gallery (of the Fine Arts Building), visible evidences of the aid willingly extended by the wealthy to the other arts. In Carnegie Hall, in the course of the season concerts are given by three or four different symphony-orchestras, the continued existence of which is conditional upon a large subscription or on a guarantee fund, substantially equivalent to a subsidy. And during the same winter months, a series of performances of grand opera, in Italian, in French, and in German, is given at the Metropolitan Opera House,—performances made possible only by a very large subscription from the box-holders, and by a reduction of the rental from the figure which the owners of the building would demand if they sought simply for a proper return on the money invested.

If men of means had not chosen to sink their money in the Metropolitan Opera House and in Carnegie Hall; if Major Higginson were now to withdraw his support from the Boston Symphony Orchestra, and if the public-spirited music-lovers of Chicago and Pittsburg were to refuse any further subsidy to the orchestras of which they are justly entitled to be proud; if music were to be deprived of all artificial assistance and forced to de-

pend for existence solely upon the working of purely commercial motives—then, music would be exactly in the same position in which the drama is now. Good music would still be heard, it is true; but we may be certain that there would not be so many performances as there are now; and, what is more important, the performances would not be so adequate or so satisfactory, and the programmes would be more in accordance with the prevailing taste of the less cultivated portion of the public. The managers of concerts would be less likely to risk upon their programmes either the more austere of the classic composers or the more aggressive of the younger musicians; and they would tend to confine their selections to a small list of established favorites.

Much has been done for music; just as much has been done in other ways for painting, for sculpture, and for architecture. Nothing at all has been done for the drama. It is wholly dependent upon the law of supply and demand, and so long as this is the case, the manager will naturally seek to produce the kind of play likely to please the most people. He will perform it continuously, seven or eight times a week for as many weeks as possible. He will proclaim its merits as vehemently as he can; and he will advertise it very much as a circus or a sensational novel is advertised. He will be prone to turn away from any kind of play which is not so likely to please the largest portion of the public, which cannot be forced to a long run, and which cannot be boomed as a freak-fiddler is boomed. His aim will be to give the public what it wants.

In this last phrase there lurks a fallacy. There is no such entity as "the public" wanting a definite thing; or else we should not see the Irving-Terry company and the Weber-Fields company both playing to crowded houses in the same city at the same time. There are as many separate publics as there are separate attractions; these several publics intersect, and every individual probably belongs to more than one. For example, there is a very large public for Buffalo Bill's Wild West, and there is a far smaller public for the symphony concerts; but of a certainty there are a goodly number of persons with a catholicity of taste which will enable them to enjoy both these entertainments. The public which delights in melodrama and in musical farce is enormous; whereas the public which would care to see a performance of the "Oedipus" of Sophocles or the "Ghosts" of Ibsen,

is very restricted—probably it is not more than enough to fill a small theatre two or three times in the course of a season. The public capable of a severe joy in the beholding of “*Oedipus*” or of “*Ghosts*” may be taken as one extreme; and the public which laughs hilariously at musical farce and which thrills sympathetically at melodrama may be taken as the other; and between these there are publics of all sorts and of all sizes,—a limited public for “*Pelleas and Melisande*,” a public less limited for the “*School for Scandal*” and for “*As You Like It*,” a public fairly large for “*Hamlet*,” and a public extensive beyond all belief for “*Uncle Tom’s Cabin*.” The public for broad farce is larger than that for the comedy of manners; and the public for the comedy of intrigue, relieved by sentiment, is larger than the public for tragedy.

But the fallacy in the phrase “what the public wants” really matters little. Whether there is one homogeneous public or whether there are any number of smaller and intersecting publics is of no importance, so long as the theatre is controlled solely by the law of supply and demand like any other business. The manager has to present the kind of play which is calculated to please the largest number of possible spectators, and he will be likely to shrink from the kind of play which would appeal to a small public only, which cannot be forced into a long run, and which does not lend itself to circus-methods of booming. In fact, the conditions of the theatre being what they are now in New York and in London, the wonder is that the level of the stage is not lower than it is actually, and that the more intelligent playgoers ever have an opportunity to see anything other than spectacle and sensation. That we have a chance now and then to behold more plays of a more delicate workmanship and of a more poetic purpose, is due partly to the courage and the liberality of certain of the managers, and partly to the honorable ambition of certain of the actors and actresses, seeking occasion for the exercise of their art in a wider range of characters.

To those managers and to these actors and actresses we owe also casual presentations of a limited number of Shaksperian plays, tragic and comic, and also of a few of the old comedies. But these performances of the classics of English dramatic literature are infrequent; and, moreover, they are not altogether satisfactory, since it is rare to find the smaller characters in the hands of trained and competent performers. In the days of the two

patent theatres in London, when Drury Lane and Covent Garden had a monopoly of the serious drama, the cast of a Shaksperian comedy was extraordinarily strong; and even in New York, a quarter of a century ago, the late Mr. Augustin Daly had a company so large that on one occasion it presented the "School for Scandal" at the Fifth Avenue Theatre, while the performers not needed in that play went over to Newark to perform "London Assurance." But the monopoly of the patent theatres in London was abolished long ago; and the large companies, such as Mr. Daly kept together for a score of years, have been broken up. Plays are now presented by companies, every performer in which was specially engaged for the specific part he has to act; and although this practice has advantages of its own, it does not tend to facilitate the reviving of the masterpieces of our older drama.

Thus the drama is at a grave disadvantage as compared with the other arts, owing to the absence of all outside aid. There are public libraries for the preservation of the masterpieces of literature, and there are public galleries and public museums for the proper display of the masterpieces of painting and of sculpture. There is no public theatre where the masterpieces of the drama are presented for our study and for our stimulation. It is true that we can read the great plays of the great dramatists; we can read them by ourselves at our own firesides; but how pale is a perusal compared with a performance, how inadequate, how unsatisfactory! Perhaps a mere reading may enable us to appreciate some of the purely literary beauties of the play; but it will hardly help us to apprehend its essential dramatic qualities,—the very qualities which give the play its true value, and which stand revealed at once when the play is presented in the theatre.

A true drama, comic or tragic, witty or poetic, is always conceived by its author in terms of the theatre; he means it to be played by players, in a playhouse, before playgoers. And every true drama loses more or less of its power when it is deprived of the theatre, of the actors, and of the audience. Recent revivals have proved that many a Greek tragedy and many a Latin comedy, remote as these may be from our modern modes of thought and disestablished as their technic may seem to us to-day, can shake off the dust of the book-shelves and start to life again with surprising vitality, when it is set before us on a stage by actors of flesh and blood. Whatever the impression produced upon the

reader in the library by "Macbeth" and "As You Like It," by the "Alchemist" and "A New Way to Pay Old Debts," by the "School for Scandal" and "She Stoops to Conquer," it is not so deep, not so varied, not so lasting as that produced upon the spectator in the theatre. The frequent and liberal revival of the masterpieces of dramatic literature, English and foreign, ancient and modern, would be very expensive. In a pecuniary sense it would not pay,—any more than the exhibition of Rembrandt's "Gilder" would pay as a private enterprise.

So long as the theatre is governed chiefly by commercial considerations, we have no right to expect managers to take great risks for a very doubtful reward. Most of the managers will go on appealing to the largest public with melodrama and with musical farce; they will strive to make money out of sensation and spectacle; and in so doing they will be wholly without blame. From a minority of the managers, men of a wiser liberality and a finer taste, and from actors of a lofty aspiration, we shall get now and again a modern play of a subtler significance and an old play of a more poetic beauty; and for these guerdons we ought honestly to be grateful. So long as the theatre is left to the operation of the law of supply and demand, it is idle to look for a manager who will make it his business to produce plays which he knows cannot be forced into a long run, and who will take pleasure in presenting the masterpieces of dramatic literature as they ought to be presented. Without a subsidy or an endowment or financial support of some kind, he could hardly hope to pay his expenses.

A subsidy from the State was what Matthew Arnold proposed, and he suggested the establishment of a British Theatre on the model of the *Théâtre Français*. Most of the Parisian theatres are private enterprises, but four of them are more or less supported by the national government, two for music, the *Opéra* and the *Opéra-Comique*, and two for the drama, the *Théâtre Français* and the *Odéon*,—the official title of the latter being the *Second Théâtre Français*. The *Théâtre Français* is a sumptuous playhouse owned by the State and assigned rent-free, with a large annual subsidy also, to the *Comédie-Française*, a commonwealth of the chief actors and actresses, who govern themselves more or less under the control of a director appointed by the government. The associates elect their successors; they engage the subordinate performers on salary; and they divide among

themselves the annual profits of their enterprise. They are expected to remain members as long as they are fit for service; and then they can take a farewell benefit and retire on a pension. They have various committees of their own; but they generally leave abundant power to the director, who is the executive, and who is also a sharer in the profits.

Although it has had its ups and downs, the Théâtre Français is the foremost theatre of the world; and its company is incomparably large and gifted, most of the actors and actresses having been trained at the Conservatory, and having been chosen because of their skill in interpreting the tragedies of Corneille and Racine and the comedies of Molière and Beaumarchais. It gives seven or eight performances a week, and the newest play is never repeated more than four times in that period, and rarely more than three. One or two performances a week are always devoted to the classical drama, comic or tragic; and any one spending a single winter in Paris would have occasion to see half of the acknowledged masterpieces of the French stage. Upon the remaining nights are presented modern plays chosen from a vast and varied repertory. Comparatively few of the best plays of the last half-century were originally produced at the Théâtre Français, which, however, took them over after they had proved their value in other theatres. Although the Théâtre Français is continually experimenting with new pieces, in prose and in verse, by the foremost living French dramatists, its chief function is rather to be a museum of the French drama, ancient and modern; and its main reliance is more upon its repertory than upon its novelties.

The Comédie-Française is an institution which we may easily envy, but which we should find it very difficult to imitate. It is what it is, because it is a growth of more than two centuries. It is one of the only two institutions of the Monarchy which survived the Revolution with undiminished prestige; the other is the French Academy. It was not a creation of the King's, even when it was founded; it was only the consolidation, under royal control, of three companies of actors already existing as private enterprises. Even now, it is not so much governed by its statutes as it is ruled by its traditions; and we cannot hope to extemporize traditions. If it did not now exist, we may doubt whether it would be possible to establish it to-day, even in France, where everybody is educated to expect governmental supervision and

support for all the arts. Still more may we doubt whether the result would not have been sadly disappointing if the British had taken Matthew Arnold's advice a score of years ago and had formed a company of actors, assigning to this body a theatre in London, a grant from the Science and Art Department, and a government Commissioner. As Bismarck said, "you cannot ripen fruit by setting lamps under the tree." No worthy rival of the *Comédie-Française* could be created off-hand by mere fiat.

But Matthew Arnold must have known how very unlikely it was that any attention would be paid to his advice. Indeed, we who speak English need not waste our time in asking for aid for the theatre from the government. We shall not get it, no matter how insistent our demand. And if we in America are wise enough to consider the situation carefully, we shall not seek government aid; because, if we were to get it, the last state of the drama might be worse than the first. In the one art in which the government has had to take an interest, and upon which it may even have exerted some influence, the result has only too often been sadly unsatisfactory, as all will admit who recall the pitifully pretentious United States Building set amid the beautiful palaces of the Chicago Exhibition. Although, as a people, we Americans seem to have a remarkable aptitude for art, we are as yet untrained to appreciate it; and we are as yet unwilling to pay proper respect to expert opinion.

The civil service of the nation and of many of the state governments is now highly efficient; but the civil service of most of our cities is in a less satisfactory condition; and it is from the city, rather than from the state or the nation, that a state-aided theatre would expect its support. It is true that, even in the cities, the outlook is encouraging; and the foul atmosphere of the spoils-system is lifting; but it has not now been lifted entirely; and no lover of the drama would face with composure the prospect of a municipal theatre in New York, where Tammany could turn it over to the control of some uncultured spoilsman. But no more words need be wasted in considering the advantages and disadvantages of a theatre supported by the government, as the *Théâtre Français* is in France. Such a discussion is academic only, since in the present state of opinion among the peoples that speak English, the debate can hardly have any practical result.

It is not by seeking government aid that the problem of the

theatre can be solved in the United States or in Great Britain. Those who wish to do something for the drama must rely on themselves, taking pattern by those who have been able to accomplish wonders for the elevation of music. When this decision is once reached the question is easier of answer. What is it we really want, after all? We want to find a retort to the manager who tells us that he cannot afford to attempt certain more delicate forms of dramatic art, or to present the masterpieces of the drama as they ought to be presented. We want to help this manager to accomplish that which the existing purely commercial conditions of the theatre prevent him from attempting. What has to be done is to come to the aid of the drama, just as the owners of the Metropolitan Opera House came to the aid of the opera. The opera in New York is still a private enterprise, but it would be impossible to present the music-drama, with all the parts taken by singers of wide renown, if the manager were not sustained by the heavy subscriptions, and especially by the release of the rental which the owners of the edifice would expect if they had been governed solely by the desire to get the largest possible return for the money invested.

The same problem presented itself in Vienna and in Berlin, in spite of the fact that there were state-aided theatres in both cities; and the solution discovered by the Germans is at the service of the Americans and the British. It is very simple, but it is perfectly satisfactory. A body of subscribers raises a sum of money sufficient to pay the rent of a theatre, and they then turn the theatre over rent-free to a manager who will pledge himself to conduct it along certain lines, and to accord certain privileges to the subscribers. The manager will try to make the theatre pay him a profit, and he will try to attract the public; but it will be rather the smaller public that likes the better class of play than the larger public that is more easily pleased by sensation and by spectacle. With a subsidy equivalent to his rental, the manager would bind himself to give up the habit of unbroken runs,—the practice of acting the same play six and seven and eight times a week. He would be able to return to the earlier custom of the English-speaking theatre,—that of a nightly change of bill, such as we still expect at the opera, and such as we find at the Théâtre Français in Paris, at the Lessing Theatre in Berlin, and at the Volkstheater in Vienna.

Under these conditions a play might still have a very long run, but its run would not be compacted within a brief period. Every new piece and every important revival would at first appear on the bills for three of the seven performances or even for four; and then as its attractive power waned, it would drop down to two performances a week, perhaps, and finally to one a fortnight. Thus two or even three different plays might be running at the same time, as is the case now at the Théâtre Français, where the "*Monde où l'on s'ennuie*" attained its five-hundredth performance about ten years after it was first produced, and where it can still be seen every winter. Thus it would be possible to bring out plays of delicate texture or of historical interest, certain to attract for a dozen or a score of performances, but not likely to draw full houses for a month at a time.

If the manager were wisely chosen and if the contract with him were for a term of years, three at least, or five, with the understanding that it would be renewed certainly if his management had approved itself to the subscribers,—then much should be left to his discretion. The contract would debar him from performing the more violent melodrama or the lightest forms of farce; and it might require him to revive every season two or three Shaksperian plays, either comic or tragic, and two or three of the older comedies of our language. He would not be required, or even expected, to mount these plays as elaborately or as expensively as is the custom when the appeal to the love of spectacle is an approved method of pleasing the unthinking crowd. And these standard plays, once produced with scenery and costumes and properties, sufficient but not extravagant, would be kept in stock ready for performance at any time during the season at a week's notice. At first, of course, the repertory would not be large, but it would become more varied and richer year by year. The manager would be ever on the lookout for the best modern plays, American and British, French and German. He would be able also to select from the large stock of pieces written in our language during the past twenty years which are unfamiliar to the latest generation of playgoers. His aim would be to get together a repertory of plays, old and new, which would make him somewhat independent in case the actual novelties he produced should not prove attractive. A solid repertory is invaluable to a manager; it is to him what a reserve-fund is to a banker.

To do justice to so varied a repertory, a large and competent company of actors and actresses would be required,—not stars, of course, but ambitious and accomplished performers. There would be no need to pay extravagant salaries, as an engagement in such a theatre would soon be esteemed an honor. Furthermore the actors would be spared the wear and tear of a succession of “one-night stands”; and they would also enjoy the luxury of a home. The frequent change of bill would tend to decrease the unwillingness of young actors and actresses to appear in parts they might deem unworthy of them, an unwillingness which has some justification under the existing conditions, when a character may have to be sustained for a hundred times in succession. But when the bill changes every night, a performer sure of a good part on Monday and on Wednesday is less strenuous in his objection to performing a part not so good on Tuesday. The accumulation of a repertory would thus tend to strengthen the casts of the more important plays; and there might even be developed in time a disinterestedness like that displayed in the famous Meiningen company, where the foremost actors were accustomed to appear in the smallest parts.

If such a theatre were to be established in New York, its season should be at least eight months long. Perhaps the manager might be allowed the privilege of taking the company to other cities during the summer months; but the wisdom of this may be doubted, and perhaps a part of the rental might be earned by leasing the playhouse itself during the summer months to some other manager for the performance of lighter summer plays. But, if possible, it would be best to keep the theatre closed except when its own company was playing in it, and not to let the company play anywhere else. If possible, also, it would be desirable to build a special theatre as soon as the success of the scheme was assured,—a special theatre more spacious and more comfortable both before and behind the curtain than any now existing in New York. The house should not be too large for the subtler passages of comedy; but its lobbies and its aisles and its seats should all be upon a generous scale. If the theatre could succeed in accustoming a certain body of constant playgoers to feel at home within its walls, special nights might be set apart for the subscribers, like the Tuesdays of the *Théâtre Français*, to attend which is a point of honor in the fashionable world of Paris.

Those who undertake to carry out any such scheme as is here suggested will have to face one serious difficulty, and they will have to avoid one grave danger. The difficulty will be that of finding a fit manager, who must be a man of taste, of tact, of experience, of executive ability, and of sufficient means to support the enterprise. The danger will be that of yielding to the assaults of the cranks and of the freaks, who will denounce any effort to come to the aid of the drama which does not promise to satisfy their demands. To appeal successfully to the intelligent public, the promoters of a scheme like this must avoid all pretentious affectation of "elevating the theatre" and of encouraging the poetic drama. They must refrain from all promises to bring out the more or less dramatic poems of Browning and of Maeterlinck, or to push forward the darker pictures of life shown in the dramas of Ibsen and Hauptmann. They must not expect to discover new dramatists; and they need count on no aid from the mere men of letters, who, as such, have no more knowledge of the theatre than the painters have. In other words, the promoters of this scheme ought to be practical men, taking a common-sense view and trying to improve the conditions of the actual theatre. They should look upward, but they should not aim too high at first.

These suggestions may seem very commonplace; and it may be confessed at once that they are not epoch-making. They do not point toward any theatrical Utopia, nor do they promise any dramatic millennium. They propose to make an easy beginning, in the belief that the best way to get the attention and the assistance of the public-spirited is to show that an improvement is actually possible. When interest is aroused by the realization of a modest programme such as is here set forth, then it will be time to be more ambitious. If the theatre here outlined were successfully established in New York and if it had proved its utility, the first step would have been taken along the right path,—at the end of which there might loom an American rival of the *Théâtre Français*. This is a prediction which one need not be afraid to make, in spite of George Eliot's remark that, "among all forms of mistake, prophecy is the most gratuitous."

BRANDER MATTHEWS.

THE PHILIPPINES—AFTER AN EARTHQUAKE.

BY STEPHEN BONSAI.

THE purpose of the following paragraphs is, not to add to the many and various opinions current as to the present condition of the Philippines, but to state plainly a few facts which I believe I ascertained during a tour of three months through the archipelago. In my journey I reversed the order of travel usually observed, in devoting but two weeks to Manila and the rest of my time to the more remote provinces and less accessible islands; and I did not confine my itinerary to those points which are touched by the inter-island steamers. The opportunity arising, I crossed Batangas, the disturbed country near Manila, on horseback, and visited the stockades of Samar where the outposts of our pacified possessions are living in an almost constant state of siege. Having travelled extensively in Malay countries, and having lived for months at a time among Malays, I venture to believe that I am more able to understand, or rather less likely to be deceived by, their somewhat subtle modes of expression, than the average American who has not enjoyed this preliminary experience. I think I know when they love and when they hate, when they are reconciled to existing conditions and when not, and under this impression I have no hesitancy in asserting that there is no fraction of public opinion, such as it is in the Philippines, that is pleased with our administration, not even the Federal Party, a puppet of our own creation. Consequently there exists no group of men upon whom we can shift our burden of responsibility, or ask to share it. The thinking Filipinos are war traitors from the highest to the lowest, and that very great majority who do not think at all follow their leaders blindly.

What was wanting to a perfect understanding of the situation, even after I had seen many phases of it at close range for myself,

was an official statement of our status in the islands, divested of the diplomatic phraseology in which such statements are usually enveloped. This note of sincerity was at last sounded, but only as a consequence of a great convulsion of nature. On the morning of December the fifteenth, Manila was visited by an earthquake of longer duration and of greater force than any which has occurred within the memory of the present generation. It lasted for a minute and twenty seconds, during which the massive mediæval walls that surround the city cracked like gingerbread, the great stone monument to Magellan swayed to and fro like a sapling, the lofty images fell from their vaulted niches, and the bells in the church towers tolled their peals of alarm with no assistance from the bell-ringers. Fortunately, the earth vibrations increased and diminished gradually, there was no jolt at the end or counter current met with, and consequently we had few casualties to deplore. When the excitement was over, I joined a launch party skimming over the placid mirror of Manila Bay, and it struck me upon the moment that some barrier not of masonry had been broken down and that men spoke with a frankness I had missed before.

A certain well-known Pacificator of Provinces confessed that, though not a cruel man, if a tidal wave had to follow upon the earthquake, he hoped it would sweep with overwhelming force over a certain district where, despite frequent announcements of peace, the rebellion rages. "We might drown them out, but this rubbing-out process is proving too expensive." And a certain civil administrator, not to be outdone in candor, confessed for his part that civil government had been a mistake; that the thirty civil governments of provinces did not rest upon the consent of the governed, but upon the bayonets of our soldiers; that the decrees of the civil administration, despite the roaring force of type-writers which fill the palace, and the subtle agency of the card catalogues, are not honored beyond the range of our rifles; that every Filipino in government employ, either out of misguided patriotism or from fear of assassination, contributes part of his salary to the insurgent treasury. "In conclusion," he added, "despite the prognostications of peace and prosperity from Manila, varied by announcements that they have already arrived, and the hopeful far-sightedness manifested in Washington, the only change that I observe in the situation during the last year is that the rebellion has become chronic, and that, through the

treason of native civil servants, our Government has become saddled with the support of the insurrection, as well as with the expense of combating it."

The following pictures of the state of the islands, the condition and efficiency of the military and civil governments, must, owing to the exigencies of space and time, be superficial and far from comprehensive; yet, if they invite a closer study of the situation, which is serious though by no means desperate, by those who alone can relieve it, they will serve a useful purpose; and the writer may yet live to journey through the pacified Philippines and report upon their prosperity—a commission given him last September, which, for obvious reasons, he was unable to execute.

In the archipelago, we have forty or fifty thousand soldiers divided up into between five and six hundred scattered garrisons and flying columns. Owing to the short time of service and the vicissitudes of an exasperating form of warfare, these men are continually moving about. The very great majority of them, despite incessant "hiking" through jungle and morass, have never seen an insurgent "plain," though all have seen here and there a comrade fall, shot or even stabbed in the back, by an unseen, elusive foe. This has been the story of our military activity since the day when, despite their fairly good conduct, the Tagals were swept off the field, their more or less organized army only surviving as guerilla bands. Since then, our State troops have been succeeded by the national Volunteers, the regulars of the old army by the new regulars of the enlarged establishment. While the conduct of all our troops and their morale throughout all these changes, under most demoralizing conditions, have been good, our military success has not been so uniform or so overwhelming as is generally believed. In adopting guerilla warfare, the insurgents put into operation tactics the most suitable to the country and for bringing into play their own best fighting qualities; and the result has been that they have met with some few successes, upon which we certainly have laid no undue emphasis. There is nothing analogous to the kind of warfare thus imposed upon our troops in the recent experiences of the army. It has had to be learned and at great cost; and, as always in tropical warfare, experience is bought by a corresponding loss of vigor. Our system remains the same to-day as it was three years ago. We send into the field but two combinations, either fresh troops and green officers, or ex-

perienced officers and worn-out men. It is a thousand pities that, up to the present, no way has been devised, under the army regulations printed or unwritten, of putting columns of fresh troops in the field under officers experienced in Philippine warfare.

Coincidentally with the proclamation of civil government in certain provinces, there have taken place a revival of the forces of rebellion and a falling off in the number of districts under complete military control. I believe this change in the situation is due, in a great measure, to our premature change of policy, which may have been devised to meet political conditions at home, certainly not to meet those existing in the islands. To illustrate the disadvantages of the dual administrations—for in no province has the civil government entirely superseded the military rule—I will state at length some of the conditions existing in war-ridden Batangas, when I rode across Malvar's country last November. Batangas, where the most savage phase of uncivilized warfare is in progress, is surrounded on all sides by provinces which we have been pleased to place under civil government. In these provinces, the respective spheres of influence of the military and civil authorities are the same as those which exist between the Governor of New York and the commanding officer at Governor's Island. The Governor may be, and often is, an insurgent only a few weeks in from the bush, while the commanding officer may be, and often is, a veteran of three wars fought in the defence of our country. When a band of insurgents in Batangas is hard pressed by our soldiers, when they have bushwhacked an army train, shot down teamsters, cut to pieces a small detachment, or murdered a lonely signal-corps man, there intervenes between them and the protection of a slow-going civil administration only a short hike of five, ten, or fifteen miles. So they store their guns in bamboo logs, put on amigo clothes, and, once beyond the borders of Batangas, amuse themselves with cock-fighting and fiestas, like all the other *hombres*. The arrest of a man upon suspicion or for military reasons, in one of the so-called civilly administered provinces adjacent to Batangas, is met with a great outcry at such tyrannical procedure, and it is not seldom stopped by writ of *habeas corpus* issued, may be, by that judge who has recently been caught, though not exposed, by the authorities in helping to smuggle insurgent arms and literature into the country. It is undeniable that the insurgents of Batangas avail themselves of the circumstances

favorable to their cause, as above outlined, in a large measure. They establish their store-houses, their powder-mills, and their hospitals in these provinces, and, above all, their rest-houses and *cuartels*. In Malvar's country, I learned a very curious circumstance which I have not heard mentioned before. It is not merely because he is acclimated that the Filipino withstands the arduous work and the hardships of active campaigning better than our men. It is because when he has been "out" for two weeks he rests for six; and, if he does not feel quite secure in or near his own home, he journeys along the Batangas Highway the few miles that lie between the region where war wears its most murderous face and the Alsatia of the civilly administered provinces.

During my stay in Lipa, the capital of the most civilized district of Batangas, and indeed of the whole island, I received a very forcible object-lesson of how conditions such as these are costing us the flower of our army, besides making our colonial administration and ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the Eastern world. Of the twelve officers forming the mess at Lipa during the five months preceding my visit in November, five had been killed—all shot in the back from ambush—and three had died of fevers resulting from active campaigning in the rainy season.

That warfare of a particularly savage description prevails in Samar is now notorious; on the other hand, the general impression that peace prevails in the other provinces is entirely erroneous. Hardly a day passes without a fight in Tayabas or in Laguna; and the lists of casualties that appear from time to time, finely printed and obscurely placed in the columns of the daily press, tell to those who care to learn how wide is the range and how high the cost of our desultory guerilla war. A private letter that reached me only a few days ago from Mindoro, the large island off the Batangas coast, gives a graphic picture, from an unimpeachable source, of conditions there, where according to some accounts peace reigns. My informant says:

"The people here are becoming more and more *insurrecto* every day. Acting under the orders to destroy every town and village from which we are fired upon, or where we discover insurgent *cuartels*, we have burnt down all the towns and collections of houses that were standing when I saw you last, with the exception of two. Under a strict interpretation of our orders, these two should be destroyed; but then we would have no shelter ourselves."

The casualties in the Sixth Infantry testify to the fact that,

now and again, there is plenty of fighting in Negros, though that rich island has been pacified time and again on paper. Just at present, many plausible schemes for developing the resources of Negros are being placed before the American investor—schemes for building railways through valleys of wonderful fertility; for digging out harbors that, when the digging is over, will be capable of sheltering all or nearly all the merchant vessels afloat; for electric trams to bring within easy reach of commerce the ore from the mountains, the hardwood from the forests, and the cane from the fields. These schemes are, possibly, all as good as they are plausible; they may pay posterity, but no one should invest under the impression that Negros is pacified, without knowing that, in a sense, our control and our government of at least half the island are merely nominal. If I were investing in Negros, I would like to know how Ruffino and Papa Issio feel towards the enterprises in which I was interested. These gentlemen are certainly magnates of the first rank in Negros, and would, doubtless, resent not being consulted. After an infinite amount of labor and many casualties, we have succeeded in capturing Padre Juan, who, together with the above-mentioned patriots or brigands, ruled Negros for many years under the Spaniards, as they are ruling it to-day. It should be understood exactly what the American occupation of Negros means. We have installed a civil government that confines its activity to the coast towns, where it rests upon the rifles of a few scattered companies of the Sixth Infantry. The officers and men of this gallant regiment have done wonders, but even leaders like Byrne and Kennon cannot work miracles. Half of this island has never been occupied or even traversed by American troops, and it remains in the almost undisputed possession of Prince Ruffino and Papa Issio.

The surrenders in Cebu, Panay, and Bohol, which characterized the last days of General Hughes's command over the department of the Visayas, are much too recent to warrant the expression of an opinion as to their value. In the Philippines, surrender is inspired by many and wonderful motives, and the act itself is often misunderstood. At times, the surrender seems to be merely a tribute of personal regard to the departing American commander. Sometimes, the insurgents come in to secure the thirty silver dollars which we pay for almost any kind of rifle they may bring with them. Not seldom, the jungle patriot has a good time

in town, where the creature comforts he craves are cheap, and then returns again to the mountain or the jungle with a new rifle more in keeping with the requirements of modern warfare than his former one, and which he can easily purchase with the premium paid for his discarded weapon.

If Panay, where it seemed to me the inhabitants were more peaceably inclined, remains quiet for the next few months, it may be fairly regarded as pacified; but at the present writing, northern Luzon is the only part of the archipelago where peace prevails or where the work of subjugation seems to have been complete. Here not a single hostile shot has been fired for ten months, except by a handful of notorious ladreses. This result is due to the severe but just rule which Major-General Wheaton has exercised over these provinces, with inflexible purpose in peace as in war. I had several conversations with General Wheaton touching the permanence of these conditions in his original department of northern Luzon, which General Chaffee has quite recently extended to embrace the new department of the northern Philippines. The impression I took away from these conversations was, that General Wheaton does not regard his achievement as permanent, so long as there are bands of insurgents roving about almost at will in the provinces of Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas, who may at any moment strike northward into the recently pacified district, with results which no one can foresee.

The conditions prevailing among the Mohammedan people of Mindanao, of Jolo, and the other Moro islands, should not be confused with the foregoing picture. Their government presents a problem that is quite distinct, one that for the moment, fortunately, is not very pressing. We seem to have won their sympathies from the first by the fact that we expelled the Spaniards, and from their impression, based upon observation and report, that we are not Christians. Almost without exception, the officers charged with the difficult task of meting out "unequal laws" to these savage people have acquitted themselves well, and the result—peace such as has not been known in this part of the world for generations—has not been secured at the expense of principles. No attempt has yet been made to free the domestic slaves, because there is reason to believe that they themselves would resent this interference with their present careless existence, as did the slaves of Zanzibar who protested to the English on the occasion of their

recent emancipation that they could not long survive the reproach of being masterless men; but the crime of kidnapping and the marauding expeditions made for the purpose of securing slaves have been almost entirely suppressed. Much of our success in this quarter is due to the happy isolation of the Moro islands, which has made interference from Manila and Washington almost impossible. The recent completion of the cable has given rise to many dark forebodings, not, let us hope, to be realized.

The Moros are quite as secretive as the Tagals and the Visayans. They can keep their own counsel well, and it is hard to tell what they are planning, or whether they are pleased or displeased on the whole with American sovereignty. To judge from appearances, they are so divided amongst themselves by family and tribal jealousies, that a combined effort on the part of all would seem out of the question; still, as we are learning farther north, the hatred of the white man is a great dissolvent of ancient animosities. I came away from Mindanao, where I enjoyed the unusual advantages of a visit to some of the Great River sultans, and a glance at members of the redoubtable Lake Lanao Confederation assembled at Malabang on market day, with more cheerful views, both as to what has been done and what may be done in the future than are entertained by most observers. The Moros certainly have many rifles, those of Mindanao alone at least ten thousand. It is held by those responsible for the maintenance of law and order that we may be confronted any day by an uprising, which it would require an army of ten thousand men to suppress, and to-day there is not a third of that force available. If the missionaries of many sects who are assembling in Manila are permitted to invade the Moro country, the green flags will be unfurled, and we shall have a Holy War on our hands in a minute.

Certainly, I did not escape the thrill of pride which ran through the American people at the announcement made last spring of a liberal educational policy for the Filipinos. It was confidently predicted that the perverse sympathies of the natives would be won over by this great and magnanimous stroke. Simultaneously with the gift of civil government, public schools were to be opened throughout the archipelago; and, as a matter of fact, in an incredibly short space of time, over a thousand college and normal-school graduates were engaged and shipped across the Pacific to begin their labors. Their appearance upon the scene, we were as-

sured upon the highest authority, would immediately inaugurate an era of good feeling and quench the last embers of rebellion.

I regret that my conscience does not permit me to say that these dreams have been realized up to the present writing. Zorilla, who was certainly not a clerical, once said in the Spanish Cortez, that a single friar was worth more in the matter of preserving the sovereignty of the Philippines than a regiment of cavalry. Might we not reasonably hope to obtain beneficent results by the powerful instrument of our public-school system, where brute force, as well as vague promises and honeyed words, had alike proved futile? The idea was so promising that it is a pity greater care was not exercised in the manner of putting it into execution. As a matter of fact, our educators were hastily selected, hurried on transports like troops mobilized to meet a military emergency, and landed upon coral strands scattered all over the archipelago, where not the slightest preparation had been, or in such a space of time could have been, made for their reception. That our educators did not starve in the first days of the intellectual campaign is due to the generosity of army officers and members of the Civil Government.

Before the transports even reached Manila, it was found, as was to be expected, that a minority of the teachers so hastily gotten together were not qualified, at least in the important matter of character, to inculcate American ideals in our little brown wards, and on one transport at least, the behavior of eight of the selected teachers was such as to justify the authorities in refusing to allow them to land, and they were sent back to San Francisco. What legends would have sprung from these regrettable incidents had our frail educators of both sexes been friars! If but a few of the stories which are discussed in Manila, and even appear from time to time in the island-press, are true, the casual investigation as to character which the unfortunate eight failed to pass might with advantage have been extended and made more rigorous.

Whatever may have been the faults of the religious corporations which under Spain had such a large share in the government of the islands, such mistakes as these could never be brought home to the friars, whose activity and efficiency, in one direction at least, even the radical Zorilla praised. No friar was ever sent to a distant, isolated station in the Philippines, until he had undergone a searching examination in the matter of morals, as

well as in the humanities. Before his appointment to a parish, your friar had not only to show a good command of the Spanish language, which a large proportion of the people throughout the islands speak and understand, but he had to speak and preach fluently in the language of the particular people with the care of whose souls and education he was charged. Little wonder that, when, thus equipped, the friar reached the field of his life's labor, the people worshipped him as a god.

I was so much pleased with the generous impulse that inspired this educational movement, that I quite lost sight of the fact, I think we all did, that after all it is the Insular Treasury, and consequently the Filipinos, who are meeting the expenses occasioned by our generosity. But, when I began to investigate the effect of our educational programme, I saw that the Filipinos had not lost sight of this important fact for a moment. Their attitude, so far as ascertainable, seems to be that of a man who has his feelings under good control, but who at the same time sees no particular reason why he should pretend to be pleased with people who have taken his money and squandered it in a way he was far from desiring, and without paying him even the empty compliment of consulting his wishes merely as a matter of form. Undoubtedly, it is true that a large number of the Filipinos grudge the salaries paid to a majority of these American teachers. They, usually so cautious in expressing themselves on the acts of their government superiors, do not hesitate to say that the importation of teachers *en masse* was against their wishes, as it was against the advice of the highest educational authorities of the American Government in the islands, who favored the sending of a smaller and a more carefully selected corps and their employment in normal schools to educate native teachers. They assert that the American teachers are paid five and six times the salaries of such of the native teachers as are still retained, without being able to do the same amount of work. With the money that is now going to Americans, they claim that from five to six thousand Filipino teachers could have been much more advantageously employed; and, though they admit that this number of native teachers, eligible and competent, could not have been secured immediately, they argue that, by means of the normal schools which they desired and the educational advisers of the government recommended, the deficiency could soon have been made good. With these impressions preva-

lent, it is not strange, however disappointing, that our educational programme, from which we expected such great and pacific results, should be regarded as the entering wedge, perhaps the advance agent, of an era of carpet-baggers.

Of the thousand and odd teachers who are now in the Philippines, I had the advantage of visiting only some twenty in their school-houses. These, with possibly one exception, were worthy and creditable appointments, at least for school work at home. Though my personal experiences range over all the islands where the educational work is in progress, and though the school-houses were visited without plan and at random, it may be dangerous and not wholly justifiable to generalize from the experiences of the few to the many. But I can say that, of the teachers I saw, all seemed discouraged, and not a few frankly admitted it. This was not due entirely to the uncouth and wholly undesirable surroundings in which they were called upon to live, but also in a measure to the rapidity with which the Filipino's thirst for knowledge is assuaged. Two weeks after the schools were opened, many of the teachers told me, the attendance dropped off as much as thirty and forty per cent. Of the truants, some admitted frankly that they were disappointed. They had expected to learn English in ten days or two weeks. The girls averred they had to wash camisetas and sarongs for their mammas, the boys that they had been sent out to gather cocos for their papas, which stories and many others amounted simply to the fact that they were tired of school; and they never came back to it. Many of the teachers did not hesitate to say that they came out to the islands under a misapprehension of the circumstances; and some were living, and with good reason, in daily fear of being killed. In many I noticed strong commercial proclivities; and the expression, "There ought to be money in this, or that," with reference to nearly all the products of the islands, was on many tongues. One fair teacher, who with me was watching a Visayan boy impale blue butterflies upon a long darning needle, remarked: "There ought to be money in them." The Filipinos, too, hear these observations so naturally made, and perhaps attach undue importance to them. They notice that a considerable number of teachers have already resigned, some to enter upon business pursuits; and idle words, coupled with incidents like these, serve to keep alive the mistrust of the native, and to renew his fears of that com-

mercial exploitation of the islands which his leaders assert will follow immediately upon the final overthrow of the insurrection.

Down in Leyte, the educational campaign is being carried on under the superintendence of a man of exceptional capacity. I met him on returning from the scenes of the massacres in Samar; and, I confess, I grudged him to Leyte. I would have preferred to see his energy and ability employed nearer home, where they would, I am sure, bring greater and more solid results. He has translated into Spanish and Visayan all the choicest legends in our history. One day, I was brought into the great nipa school-house at the history hour, when the Malay children are inoculated with the virus of American history and American ideals. The lady teacher was recounting to the rows of stolid little boys (with the low foreheads and the shifty, roving eyes of their race) the immortal story of George Washington and the cherry tree. For a moment, I succumbed to my surroundings, and a pleasurable thrill ran through me. After all, this was the real thing. It might not go down very far, or stay very long, but this is what we came to the Philippines for.

Behind the bench of stolid-looking boys sat three mothers, all dressed in starched camisetas, come to see how their offspring progressed.

" 'Who cut down the cherry tree?' " read the teacher, while her Visayan assistant put it as best she could into that poverty-stricken, Malay dialect, and the boys began to show signs of interest.

" 'I cannot tell a lie, father, I did it with my little hatchet.' "

As the Visayan interpreter worked away on the idea, brighter and brighter rays of intelligence shone from the faces of the little Malay boys; and one of them shouted out: "*Chunkoi!* the booby! he could not tell a lie!" and all the others chorused their contempt, while one of the mothers leaned over toward me to show that she had not missed the point of the story, and said: "*Pobre madre!* poor mother, to bring into the world such a booby son!" There are certainly not many Visayan mothers who have to bear this cross.

For a moment the lady teacher maintained her academic composure and vocabulary.

"The superintendent says this little book contains everything necessary for American citizens to know. Sometimes I think it

is rather beyond the boys..." Then, interrupting herself: "Say, ain't it fierce? Well, I wrote to Manila yesterday asking for transportation home immediately; and if I can only get a boat *viâ* Suez, when I get home I will have girdled the globe anyway."

Truly that would be something of great value, to the teachers especially; but it is hardly all we expected to accomplish when we undertook our generous educational campaign at the expense of the Filipino treasury.

I have touched only upon a few of the more striking aspects of this perplexing situation, which has already cost us five hundred million dollars and many thousands of lives, without our having even a policy to show for it. I believe that in all history no instance can be found of another nation, however young, however full blooded, permitting itself such an extravagance with such poverty of results. To-day, able men are working in the Philippines to make the archipelago a white man's country; others, with equal authority, derived from the war powers of the President, are striving to make of the islands a closed preserve, a kind of brown man's paradise where no Caucasian may dare to show his face. Which shall it be?

Certainly, without unity of action no permanent results can be achieved. Undeniably, the conditions in the islands to-day are unsettled to the verge of anarchy. This our colonial house, divided against itself, cannot stand for long, because some day the at present indispensable support of the army will have to be withdrawn. What is needed in the Philippines is a policy, to be steadfastly adhered to and carried out without fear or favor—a policy based, not on the discordant views which are proclaimed on every side, especially by those who have never visited the islands, but inspired by a statesmanlike survey of the situation and a dispassionate study of the mass of as yet undigested data supplied by those who lived amid, and not merely visited, the scenes they describe. The selection of this policy is a privilege that falls to the present Congress. For the sake of our prestige and our peace it cannot longer be postponed.

STEPHEN BONSAI.

THE PUBLIC DEBTS OF THE BRITISH POSSESSIONS.

BY HAROLD COX.

THE most important of all British Possessions outside the United Kingdom is the Indian Empire. This proposition is true whether the question be looked at from the point of view of population, of revenue, of trade, or of military efficiency. The population of the Indian Empire on March 31st, 1901, was 291,600,000 people, as compared with a population of about 5,300,000 for the Dominion of Canada, and 3,800,000 for the Commonwealth of Australia. The public revenue of British India alone, apart from the revenues of the Native States, in the year ending March 31st, 1900, was £69,000,000, as compared with £29,000,000 for all the six Colonies of the Commonwealth of Australia in the corresponding fiscal year. The public revenue of Canada cannot fairly be brought into this comparison; for, in Canada, most of the railways are privately owned, and the amount of public revenue is *pro tanto* diminished. The actual revenue of Canada in the last fiscal year was £10,000,000. The value of the total external trade of India, imports and exports together, in the same period was £151,000,000, as compared with £141,000,000 for Australia, and £79,000,000 for Canada. In the year 1900, the value of the British exports sent to India was £30,000,000, to Canada £7,600,000, and to Australia £21,600,000.

As regards military efficiency, so far as the Colonies are concerned, no precise figures can be given; for the colonial armies are still in a rudimentary condition. The figures for India are striking. The Indian government maintains a British army of 75,000 men and a native army of about 140,000. Both forces are constantly kept in a high state of efficiency, entirely at the expense of the inhabitants of British India. In addition, several of

the Native Princes maintain small armies, trained and officered by Englishmen. These forces can be drawn upon for the general service of the Empire. As far as numbers are concerned, the volunteers sent to South Africa by Canada and Australia were barely a fourth of the trained white troops supplied by India. In the case of the British operations in China, the burden of the campaign fell almost wholly upon native Indian troops.

Lastly, it may be added, in no spirit of paradox, but from deliberate reflection, that the devoted loyalty of the dark-skinned races of India to the occupant of the throne of England, is not less valuable as an asset of the Empire, than the loving allegiance of colonists of British blood to the countries they still call Home.

With this preface, to explain the relative position assigned to India, it is possible to proceed to examine the Indian Debt.

India.—That debt dates back to the time when the government of India was still in the hands of the Honorable East India Company. In the early part of the nineteenth century, the constant wars waged by the Company for the extension of its dominions rendered considerable borrowings necessary. By the year 1821, the total registered debt of India stood at £33,000,000, taking the rupee as being then equivalent to the tenth part of a sovereign. The greater part of this debt had been raised in India at the rate of six per cent. The policy of borrowing in India rather than in England was continued until after the Mutiny, but the credit of the East India Company so greatly improved that in 1854 the rate on the greater part of the debt was only four per cent. In the year immediately preceding the Mutiny, the total debt was £49,000,000, of which the greater part was due to military expenditure. The expenditure incurred in the suppression of the Mutiny involved a further and a rapid increase of the debt, nearly doubling the total in the course of six years. The growth of this older portion of the Indian debt can best be shown in tabular form:

DEBT OF INDIA UNDER THE COMPANY AND FOR THE FIRST SIX
YEARS OF CROWN RULE.

	Registered		Total Debt.	Interest.
	In India.	In England.		
1820-1	27,300,000	5,700,000	33,000,000	1,900,000
1856-7	45,500,000	3,900,000	49,400,000	2,000,000
1862-3	63,800,000	31,800,000	95,600,000	4,300,000

It will be noticed that the annual payment for interest in the six years following the Mutiny increased even more rapidly than

the capital borrowed. Practically the whole of the new debt due to the Mutiny had to be borrowed at enhanced rates.

Until 1850 the East India Company did very little to develop the resources of the country by constructing either roads or canals, and still less railways. A considerable improvement was effected under the governor-generalship of Lord Dalhousie, but progress was abruptly stopped by the outbreak of the Mutiny. That event convinced the most doubting of the importance of improved means of communication; and as soon as peace was restored a vigorous policy of public works was undertaken by the government. In defence of the action of the Indian government in this respect, it is only necessary to add that, unless the state had itself undertaken, or initiated, these works, they would never have been attempted. Even so the government of India shrank in many cases from the full responsibility of itself managing great undertakings, which in England were and are habitually left to private enterprise. The government, therefore, in the case of many of the more important railways, attempted a compromise, by inviting private companies to construct the necessary lines, subject to a guarantee from the state. Other great works, such as canals and trunk roads, and also several railways, were from the outset constructed by the state itself. The principle was laid down that roads and public buildings should be constructed out of revenue, while railways and canals, which would themselves yield a direct revenue, were to be constructed with borrowed money. In addition, as the loans of the guaranteed railways have fallen in, the companies have been bought out by the state with money borrowed for that specific purpose.

It is impossible to trace the increase year by year with any satisfaction to the reader; because part of the money was borrowed in rupees and part in sterling, and the relation between the two standards of value was so constantly changing, during most of the period under review, that no simple method of showing totals can be devised. In the figures given above, the rupee has been uniformly taken at one-tenth of a sovereign, and this method gives sufficiently accurate totals until about 1873. After that date, the rupee dropped rapidly, until it became in 1894 worth little more than one-twentieth of a sovereign. The free coinage of silver at the Indian mints was then abolished; and, by reducing the supply of rupees, the value in exchange was gradually raised

to one-fifteenth of a sovereign. Further measures have since been taken to fix the rupee as nearly as possible at that point, and in the published accounts of the Indian government the sovereign is now officially reckoned as the equivalent of fifteen rupees. On this basis, it is possible to give a statement, in pounds sterling, of the position of the Indian debt on March 31st, 1900.

INDIAN DEBT (IN POUNDS STERLING).

		Annual charge for Interest.
Permanent	67,300,000	1,593,000
Unfunded	4,500,000	
Railways	104,500,000	4,184,000
Irrigation	22,800,000	897,000
Other obligations, including savings-bank deposits, etc.....	13,100,000	355,000
	<hr/> £212,200,000	<hr/> £7,029,000

If these tables be compared with the table given above showing the state of the debt in 1863, it will be seen that, in the course of the past 37 years, the ordinary indebtedness of India has been very considerably reduced, namely from about £90,000,000 to about £70,000,000, and that the interest charge on the debt during the same period has been reduced by more than half.

The only question that remains is, whether the profits obtained from the railways and irrigation canals do really cover the interest upon the money borrowed for their construction or purchase. The answer is in the affirmative. The state lines in India have proved, on the whole, a most profitable investment.

On the other hand, the guaranteed railways, though working at a profit to the companies that own them, have involved the state in a loss, because of the high rate of interest guaranteed, and because of the fall in the rate of exchange since the date when the contracts were made. Up to 1900, the loss on the guaranteed railways more than wiped out the profit on the state railways; but in that year the state realized a net gain upon the whole system. So that the Indian railways are in no sense a burden on the taxpayer, but contribute a substantial sum to the revenues.

The financial results of the irrigation works undertaken by the Indian government are even more satisfactory. On some of the larger works, the profit realized amounts to nearly ten per cent. on the capital outlay; on the smaller works, it amounts to an average of about five and a half per cent. The figures for the year

ending March 31st, 1900, show that the net gain to the state from the canal system was £640,000.

To sum up: since the re-establishment of order after the Mutiny, the government of India has appreciably reduced its ordinary debt, and has built up a magnificent system of state railways and canals, which give a handsome return upon the cost of construction. The net revenue they earn amounts to £1,090,000. If this be subtracted from the cost of the ordinary India debt, it will be seen that the net cost of the whole debt of India to the taxpayers of the country is just over £500,000 a year. This sum is more than covered by the present loss upon the guaranteed railways. In the year 1907, that loss will altogether cease, and the Indian government will probably then be in the happy position of possessing a debt which costs its taxpayers less than nothing.

The Dominion of Canada.—The federal government of the Dominion of Canada upon its formation in the year 1867, immediately took over most of the debts of the constituent provinces, and has since taken over other provincial debts. It has also spent freely out of capital upon works of public utility. The Dominion government has also lent money on interest to various commercial undertakings, principally railways, and these assets appreciably reduce the gross indebtedness. The government further possesses certain assets amounting to about £4,000,000 on which no interest is paid; and these also are officially claimed as an offset against the debt. The broad position may be stated as follows:

	DOMINION OF CANADA.		
	Gross Debt.	Assets.	Net Debt.
1867.....	£19,400,000	£3,500,000	£15,900,000
1900.....	£72,100,000	£16,900,000	£55,200,000

In the above statement, the term "assets" is officially limited to floating assets, which may be presumed to be realizable. Practically, however, the whole of the money borrowed by Canada has been spent upon public works of a productive character.

Prior to Confederation, there had been expended on railways and canals £11,000,000, and on other public works £2,300,000. Since Confederation, the Dominion government has spent on railways £27,500,000, on canals £12,700,000, and on other public works £9,600,000. Thus on railways and canals alone the total expenditure is £51,200,000, as against a net debt of £55,200,000. Unfortunately, this expenditure is, for the most part, only indirectly profitable. The government railways in Canada are only a

small part of the total railway system—1,511 miles out of a total of 17,657—and they are not the most profitable part. The realized profit on the government lines in the year ending June 30th, 1900, was only £22,700, on a paid-up capital of £13,330,000. The large sums paid by way of subsidy to the Canadian Pacific Railway also appear to yield little or no direct return; and the expenditure upon canals seems to be in the same category.

In order to ascertain the net cost of the Canadian debt to the Canadian taxpayer, the railway and canal receipts and expenditure must be brought into account, and also the receipts and expenditure (apart from capital expenditure) upon public works. Taking all these items into account, the cost of the debt for the last fiscal year works out to about £2,580,000, of which £514,000 represented payments to the sinking-fund. Deducting this, the net annual cost of the Canadian debt may be stated in round figures at £2,000,000. The tax revenue of Canada in the same year was just over £8,000,000; so that the annual cost of the debt was one-fourth of the tax revenue.

In addition to the Dominion Debt in Canada, several of the provinces have debts of their own, namely: Quebec, £4,631,000; Nova Scotia, £565,000; Manitoba, £573,000; British Columbia, £1,202,000. In the other provinces, the assets exceed the debts.

The Commonwealth of Australia.—The task of ascertaining the indebtedness of Australia is rendered comparatively simple by Mr. Coghlan's admirable annual volume on the Seven Colonies of Australasia, namely, the six colonies of the Continent of Australia (including Tasmania), and the island colony of New Zealand. As the six are now federated into one Commonwealth, and as the seventh has expressed an emphatic decision to remain outside, it will be more convenient here to treat the Commonwealth of Australia and the Colony of New Zealand separately.

When the Commonwealth was constituted, by an Act of the Imperial Parliament which came into force on January 1st, 1901, the federal government did not, as in the case of Canada, take over the debts of the constituent colonies, nor has it yet had time to incur any debt upon its own account, though a loan of a million sterling was announced last year. The indebtedness of the Commonwealth is, therefore, only the aggregate of the debts of the separate states. The growth and present magnitude of these debts are shown in the following table:

DEBT OF THE SEPARATE STATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH (IN MILLIONS
STERLING).

State.	1861	1871	1881	1891	1899-1900
New South Wales.....	4.0	10.6	16.9	53.0	65.3
Victoria	6.3	12.0	22.4	43.6	49.3
Queensland1	4.0	13.3	29.5	34.3
South Australia9	2.2	11.2	20.3	26.1
West Australia	—	—	.5	1.6	11.7
Tasmania	—	1.3	2.0	7.1	8.4
Aggregate for the Commonwealth.	11.3	30.1	66.3	155.1	195.1

The increase of indebtedness here displayed is enormous; and, unfortunately, the population has not increased at anything like the same rate. In the year 1861, the aggregate indebtedness of the colonies that now make up the Commonwealth worked out to £9 13s 8*d* per head of the population; in the year 1899-00, that figure had risen to £52 2s 2*d*. Even such an increase as this would not be a matter for regret, if the borrowed money had all been profitably invested. This is not the case. Some of the money that was so easily borrowed on the London market has certainly been spent with more regard to the demands of politicians than to the economic needs of the country. As Mr. Coghlan gently remarks: "The plethora of money has been harmful in many ways, the most apparent being the construction of not a few branch railways in outlying and sparsely settled districts, which do not pay even their working expenses."

The construction of such lines has been plausibly defended on the excuse that they help to develop the country, and render possible the settlement of a large population. That plea may have been reasonable in the early days of colonial development, when it was so far the policy of the colonial governments to encourage immigration that they even borrowed money for this express purpose. But at present the policy of the Australian states is largely controlled by labor leaders, who—in the supposed interests of the working classes—wish to keep that huge, undeveloped Continent barren of people. In those states where this policy prevails, there is no immediate prospect of the so-called pioneer railways ever repaying the money spent upon them, for the natural increase in the Australian population has now become extremely slow.

Nor are the main lines of railway in Australia sufficiently profitable to cover the loss upon these subsidiary lines. The following table shows the financial results of state railway building:

AUSTRALIAN RAILWAYS.

	Length of line open. Miles.	Capital cost.	Net loss or gain on capital cost after paying interest.
New South Wales	2,811	£38,500,000	—0.14
Victoria	3,218	39,600,000	—1.12
Queensland	2,801	19,300,000	—1.34
South Australia	1,736	13,000,000	+0.04
Northern Territory	145	1,200,000	—4.91
Western Australia	1,355	6,900,000	+2.35
Tasmania	438	3,600,000	—2.68
Commonwealth	12,504	£122,100,000	—0.60

It will be seen from the above table that, out of the total Australian debt of £195,000,000, the sum of over £122,000,000 is accounted for by the cost of building railways, and that on this sum a net loss is realized. The remainder of the debt has been incurred for such purposes as water supply, telegraphs, roads, bridges, and harbors. These works are, doubtless, all beneficial to the country, and some of them yield a small direct revenue to the state; but in no case do the investments appear, as yet, to be profitable in the commercial sense. There is thus a net charge for interest, which the taxpayer has every year to make good. In round figures, the account appears to stand as follows: The gross annual charge for the interest and management of the Australian debt was, in 1899-00, £7,590,000. From this gross charge must be deducted the contribution towards interest charges obtained from the working of the railways, water supply, etc.—namely, £4,540,000. Thus, the net charge on the Australian taxpayer for the Australian debt was just over £3,000,000. In the same year the revenue derived from taxation was just over £10,000,000. In other words, thirty per cent. of the taxes raised in Australia is spent in meeting the annual cost of a debt which was incurred—not to meet the expense of great wars—but to construct works intended for the most part to be in themselves profitable.

New Zealand.—The indebtedness of the Colony of New Zealand has increased even more rapidly than that of the colonies now federated in the Commonwealth of Australia. The figures are:

NEW ZEALAND'S DEBT.

Year		Per Head.
		£ s. d.
1861	£601,000	6 1 4
1871	8,901,000	33 6 9
1881	29,659,000	59 4 2
1891	38,845,000	61 5 3
1899-1900	47,874,000	63 2 5

A considerable portion of the debt incurred is due to expenditure upon railways—namely, £17,000,000 out of £47,000,000. A further sum of nearly £5,000,000 has been expended upon other public works—namely, telegraphs, light-houses, harbors, and water supply to the gold fields. The remaining £25,000,000 of the New Zealand debt is accounted for by revenue deficiencies in various years, and by the military expenditure incurred in the suppressing of the Maori risings.

The New Zealand railways (2,104 miles open) show a net loss of 0.37 per cent. on their capital cost. Some of the other provinces give a balance of receipts over working expenditure, but the relationship of this balance to capital outlay is not shown. The gross annual charge for the New Zealand debt is £1,750,000. Deducting from this the contribution available from railway receipts and kindred sources, there remains a net charge of, roughly, £1,100,000. The tax revenue of New Zealand is £2,900,000; so that the annual cost of the New Zealand debt to the taxpayer is as much as thirty-seven per cent. of the total tax revenue of the colony. In comparing this figure with that for the Commonwealth, it must be borne in mind that part of the New Zealand debt was incurred in suppressing the Maori risings.

It is interesting to recall a forecast made by Sir Francis Dillon Bell in 1882. Speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute, he then estimated that the population of Australia and New Zealand in 1900 would be 7,000,000 persons, and he added:

“It would require our debt to be £230,000,000 in the year 1900 to maintain the same proportion to population as it bears now, and it is, of course, quite needless for me to say that there is not the remotest chance of our adding 135 millions to our debt in the next eighteen years, or anything like it. I am well within the mark in saying that 150 millions will be the outside we shall then owe; while, even if our progress should be no faster than during the last ten years, our revenue will not be far from 50 millions, and our commerce nearly 270 millions.”

It is dangerous to prophesy. The total debt of Australasia has increased by far more than the figure which Sir Francis Dillon Bell regarded as impossible, and it now stands at £243,000,000, instead of his estimate of £150,000,000. The population is not 7,000,000, but 4,600,000; the total revenue is not £50,000,000, but £34,000,000; the total trade is not £270,000,000, but £161,000,000. These are contrasts over which Australasian politicians would do well to ponder.

Cape of Good Hope.—The debt of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on January 1st, 1900, was £27,884,000; and, in addition, the colonial government was surety for a debt of about £3,000,000, raised by various corporate bodies within the Colony. On the other hand, the government was the owner of 1,990 miles of railway and other valuable public works.

Taking the last fiscal year before the outbreak of the war, namely the year ending June 30th, 1899, the comparison between debt charges and railway and other similar receipts works out as follows:

Net revenue from services rendered.....	£1,432,000
Charge for debt	1,310,000
Profit to the taxpayer.....	£122,000

This very satisfactory result was largely due to the handsome revenue obtained from the main Cape Railway, which was then the principal route for passengers and goods passing from and to the Transvaal. In the future, it is possible that a considerable part of this lucrative traffic may be diverted to the Natal and the Delagoa Bay railways, and that possibility has long been the cause of some anxiety to Cape financiers. In the present condition of South Africa, however, it is impossible to speculate with any advantage upon what may happen in the future.

The tax revenue of Cape Colony in the year under review was £2,359,000, and the population about 1,600,000, only about 400,000 being whites.

Natal.—The public debt of Natal on June 30th, 1899, was just over £9,000,000. The cost was fully covered by the railway profits.

The West Indies.—The British possessions in the West Indies comprise almost as many separate Colonies as there are separate islands, and some of the islands are smaller than an average English or American county. It would, therefore, be merely tedious to enumerate their debts separately. Nor is the total indebtedness very serious. Including in the term "West Indies" both British Guiana and British Honduras, the total debt for all these Colonies comes to £5,300,000. Out of this total, Jamaica alone accounts for just over £2,000,000, and British Guiana and Trinidad for nearly £1,000,000 apiece. The total public revenue of the same group of Colonies amounts to £2,576,000; so that the public debt is just equal to two years' revenue. It is worth while to add that these Colonies are subject to the close control of the

Home Government, exercised through the Colonial Office, a fact which probably explains the comparative smallness of their debt.

Other Colonies.—The same consideration applies to other Colonies under the direct rule of the Crown, in whatever part of the world they are found. Ceylon, for example, has a debt of only £3,662,000, as compared with a revenue of £1,727,000, and the debt is entirely covered by profitable public works. The debt of Mauritius is about £1,200,000, as compared with a revenue of £560,000. The debts of Hong-kong, Malta, and Gibraltar are insignificant; and Singapore, Cyprus, and several other small Colonies have no debts at all. On the other hand, the little Colony of Newfoundland, which possesses full rights of self-government, has succeeded in piling up a debt of £3,610,000, against a total revenue of £350,000. Nor have the inhabitants of Newfoundland—who are not numerous enough to fill an ordinary London parish—the satisfaction of knowing that by borrowing money their government has been enabled to earn revenue. There is practically no public revenue in Newfoundland except that derived from taxation, and the finances of the Colony appear to be in a chronic state of embarrassment. The Dominion of Canada has more than once offered to come to the aid of this little Colony, on condition that it will enter the Canadian Federation. But the Newfoundlanders prefer to enjoy their poverty and their pride.

HAROLD COX.

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DOES THE RACE OF MAN LOVE A LORD?

BY MARK TWAIN.

Often a quite assified remark becomes sanctified by use and petrified by custom; it is then a permanency, its term of activity a geologic period.

THE day after the arrival of Prince Henry I met an English friend, and he rubbed his hands and broke out with a remark that was charged to the brim with joy—joy that was evidently a pleasant salve to an old sore place:

“Many a time I’ve had to listen without retort to an old saying that is irritatingly true, and until now seemed to offer no chance for a return jibe: ‘An Englishman does dearly love a lord’; but after this I shall talk back, and say ‘How about the Americans?’”

It is a curious thing, the currency that an idiotic saying can get. The man that first says it thinks he has made a discovery. The man he says it to, thinks the same. It departs on its travels, is received everywhere with admiring acceptance, and not only as a piece of rare and acute observation, but as being exhaustively true and profoundly wise; and so it presently takes its place in the world’s list of recognized and established wisdoms, and after that no one thinks of examining it to see whether it is really entitled to its high honors or not. I call to mind instances

of this in two well-established proverbs, whose dulness is not surpassed by the one about the Englishman and his love for a lord: one of them records the American's Adoration of the Almighty Dollar, the other the American millionaire-girl's ambition to trade cash for a title, with a husband thrown in.

It isn't merely the American that adores the Almighty Dollar, it is the human race. The human race has always adored the hatful of shells, or the bale of calico, or the half bushel of brass rings, or the handful of steel fish-hooks, or the houseful of black wives, or the zareba full of cattle, or the two score camels and asses, or the factory, or the farm, or the block of buildings, or the railroad bonds, or the bank stock, or the hoarded cash, or—anything that stands for wealth and consideration and independence, and can secure to the possessor that most precious of all things, another man's envy. It was a dull person that invented the idea that the American's devotion to the dollar is more strenuous than another's.

Rich American girls do buy titles, but they did not invent that idea; it had been worn threadbare several hundred centuries before America was discovered. European girls still exploit it as briskly as ever; and, when a title is not to be had for the money in hand, they buy the husband without it. They must put up the "dot," or there is no trade. The commercialization of brides is substantially universal, except in America. It exists with us, to some little extent, but in no degree approaching a custom.

"The Englishman dearly loves a lord."

What is the soul and source of his love? I think the thing could be more correctly worded:

"The human race dearly envies a lord."

That is to say, it envies the lord's place. Why? On two accounts, I think: its Power and its Conspicuousness.

Where Conspicuousness carries with it a Power which, by the light of our own observation and experience, we are able to measure and comprehend, I think our envy of the possessor is as deep and as passionate as is that of any other nation. No one can care less for a lord than the backwoodsman, who has had no personal contact with lords and has seldom heard them spoken of; but I will not allow that any Englishman has a profounder envy of a lord than has the average American who has lived

long years in a European capital and fully learned how immense is the position the lord occupies.

Of any ten thousand Americans who eagerly gather, at vast inconvenience, to get a glimpse of Prince Henry, all but a couple of hundred will be there out of an immense curiosity; they are burning up with desire to see a personage who is so much talked about. They envy him; but it is his Conspicuousness they envy mainly, not the Power that is lodged in his royal quality and position, for they have but a vague and spectral knowledge and appreciation of that; through their environment and associations they have been accustomed to regard such things lightly, and as not being very real; consequently, they are not able to value them enough to consumingly envy them.

But, whenever an American (or other human being) is in the presence, for the first time, of a combination of great Power and Conspicuousness which he thoroughly understands and appreciates, his eager curiosity and pleasure will be well-sodden with that other passion—envy—whether he suspect it or not. At any time, on any day, in any part of America, you can confer a happiness upon any passing stranger by calling his attention to any other passing stranger and saying:

“Do you see that gentleman going along there? It is Mr. Rockefeller.”

Watch his eye. It is a combination of power and conspicuousness which the man understands.

When we understand rank, we always like to rub against it. When a man is conspicuous, we always want to see him. Also, if he will pay us an attention, we will manage to remember it. Also, we will mention it now and then, casually; sometimes to a friend, or if a friend is not handy, we will make out with a stranger.

Well, then, what is rank, and what is conspicuousness? At once we think of kings and aristocracies, and of world-wide celebrities in soldiership, the arts, letters, etc., and we stop there. But that is a mistake. Rank holds its court and receives its homage on every round of the ladder, from the emperor down to the rat-catcher; and distinction, also, exists on every round of the ladder, and commands its due of deference and envy.

To worship rank and distinction is the dear and valued privilege of all the human race, and it is freely and joyfully exercised

in democracies as well as in monarchies—and even, to some extent, among those creatures whom we impertinently call the Lower Animals. For even they have some poor little vanities and foibles, though in this matter they are paupers as compared to us.

A Chinese Emperor has the worship of his four hundred millions of subjects, but the rest of the world is indifferent to him. A Christian Emperor has the worship of his subjects and of a large part of the Christian world outside of his dominions; but he is a matter of indifference to all China. A king, class A, has an extensive worship; a king, class B, has a less extensive worship; class C, class D, class E get a steadily diminishing share of worship; class L (Sultan of Zanzibar), class P (Sultan of Sulu), and class W (half-king of Samoa), get no worship at all outside their own little patch of sovereignty.

Take the distinguished people along down. Each has his group of homage-payers. In the navy, there are many groups; they start with the Secretary and the Admiral, and go down to the quartermaster—and below; for there will be groups among the sailors, and each of these groups will have a tar who is distinguished for his battles, or his strength, or his daring, or his profanity, and is admired and envied by his group. The same with the army; the same with the literary and journalistic craft; the publishing craft; the cod-fishery craft; Standard Oil; U. S. Steel; the class A hotel—and the rest of the alphabet in that line; the class A prize-fighter—and the rest of the alphabet in his line—clear down to the lowest and obscurest six-boy gang of little gamins, with its one boy that can thrash the rest, and to whom he is king of Samoa, bottom of the royal race, but looked up to with a most ardent admiration and envy.

There is something pathetic, and funny, and pretty, about this human race's fondness for contact with power and distinction, and for the reflected glory it gets out of it. The king, class A, is happy in the state banquet and the military show which the emperor provides for him, and he goes home and gathers the queen and the princelings around him in the privacy of the spare room, and tells them all about it, and says:

"His Imperial Majesty put his hand on my shoulder in the most friendly way—just as friendly and familiar, oh, you can't imagine it!—and everybody *seeing* him do it; charming, perfectly charming!"

The king, class G, is happy in the cold collation and the police-parade provided for him by the king, class B, and goes home and tells the family all about it, and says:

"And His Majesty took me into his own private cabinet for a smoke and a chat, and there we sat, just as sociable, and talking away and laughing and chatting, just the same as if we had been born in the same bunk; and all the servants in the anteroom could see us doing it! Oh, it was too lovely for anything!"

The king, class Q, is happy in the modest entertainment furnished him by the king, class M, and goes home and tells the household about it, and is as grateful and joyful over it as were his predecessors in the gaudier attentions that had fallen to their larger lot.

Emperors, kings, artisans, peasants, big people, little people—at bottom we are all alike and all the same; all just alike on the inside, and when our clothes are off, nobody can tell which of us is which. We are unanimous in the pride we take in good and genuine compliments paid us, in distinctions conferred upon us, in attentions shown us. There is not one of us, from the emperor down, but is made like that. Do I mean attentions shown us by the great? No, I mean simply flattering attentions, let them come whence they may. We despise no source that can pay us a pleasing attention—there is no source that is humble enough for that. You have heard a dear little girl say of a frowzy and disreputable dog: "He came right to me and let me pat him on the head, and he wouldn't let the others touch him!" and you have seen her eyes dance with pride in that high distinction. You have often seen that. If the child were a princess, would that random dog be able to confer the like glory upon her with his pretty compliment? Yes; and even in her mature life and seated upon a throne, she would still remember it, still recall it, still speak of it with frank satisfaction. That charming and lovable German princess and poet, Carmen Sylva, Queen of Roumania, remembers yet that the flowers of the woods and fields "talked to her" when she was a girl, and she sets it down in her latest book; and that the squirrels conferred upon her and her father the valued compliment of not being afraid of them; and "once one of them, holding a nut between its sharp little teeth, ran right up against my father"—it has the very note of "He came right to me and let me pat him on the head"

—"and when it saw itself reflected in his boot it was very much surprised, and stopped for a long time to contemplate itself in the polished leather"—then it went its way. And the birds! she still remembers with pride that "they came boldly into my room," when she had neglected her "duty" and put no food on the window-sill for them; she knew all the wild birds, and forgets the royal crown on her head to remember with pride that they knew her; also that the wasp and the bee were personal friends of hers, and never forgot that gracious relationship to her injury: "never have I been stung by a wasp or a bee." And here is that proud note again that sings in that little child's elation in being singled out, among all the company of children, for the random dog's honor-conferring attentions: "Even in the very worst summer for wasps, when, in lunching out-of-doors, our table was covered with them and every one else was stung, they never hurt me."

When a queen whose qualities of mind and heart and character are able to add distinction to so distinguished a place as a throne, remembers with grateful exultation, after thirty years, honors and distinctions conferred upon her by the humble, wild creatures of the forest, we are helped to realize that complimentary attentions, homage, distinctions, are of no caste, but are above all caste—that they are a nobility-conferring power apart.

We all like these things. When the gate-guard at the railway station passes me through unchallenged and examines other people's tickets, I feel as the king, class A, felt when the emperor put the imperial hand on his shoulder, "everybody seeing him do it"; and as the child felt when the random dog allowed her to pat his head and ostracized the others; and as the princess felt when the wasps spared her and stung the rest; and I felt just so, four years ago in Vienna (and remember it yet), when the helmeted police shut me off, with fifty others, from a street which the Emperor was to pass through, and the captain of the squad turned and saw the situation and said indignantly to that guard:

"Can't you see it is the Herr Mark Twain? Let him through?"

It was four years ago; but it will be four hundred before I forget the wind of self-complacency that rose in me, and strained my buttons when I marked the deference for me evoked in the faces of my fellow-rabble, and noted, mingled with it, a puzzled

and resentful expression which said, as plainly as speech could have worded it: "And who in the nation is the Herr Mark Twain *um Gotteswillen*?"

How many times in your life have you heard this boastful remark:

"I stood as close to him as I am to you; I could have put out my hand and touched him."

We have all heard it many and many a time. It was a proud distinction to be able to say those words. It brought envy to the speaker, a kind of glory; and he basked in it and was happy through all his veins. And who was it he stood so close to? The answer would cover all the grades. Sometimes it was a king; sometimes it was a renowned highwayman; sometimes it was an unknown man killed in an extraordinary way and made suddenly famous by it; always it was a person who was for the moment the subject of public interest—the public interest of a nation, maybe only the public interest of a village.

"I was there, and I saw it myself." That is a common and envy-compelling remark. It can refer to a battle; to a hanging; to a coronation; to the killing of Jumbo by the railway train; to the arrival of Jenny Lind at the Battery; to the meeting of the President and Prince Henry; to the chase of a murderous maniac; to the disaster in the tunnel; to the explosion in the subway; to a remarkable dog-fight; to a village church struck by lightning. It will be said, more or less casually, by everybody in America who has seen Prince Henry do anything, or try to. The man who was absent and didn't see him do anything, will scoff. It is his privilege; and he can make capital out of it, too; he will seem, even to himself, to be different from other Americans, and better. As his opinion of his superior Americanism grows, and swells, and concentrates and coagulates, he will go further and try to belittle the distinction of those that saw the Prince do things, and will spoil their pleasure in it if he can. My life has been embittered by that kind of persons. If you are able to tell of a special distinction that has fallen to your lot, it gravels them; they cannot bear it; and they try to make believe that the thing you took for a special distinction was nothing of the kind and was meant in quite another way. Once I was received in private audience by an emperor. Last week I was telling a jealous person about it, and I could see him wince under it,

see it bite, see him suffer. I revealed the whole episode to him with considerable elaboration and nice attention to detail. When I was through, he asked me what had impressed me most. I said:

"His Majesty's delicacy. They told me to be sure and back out from the presence, and find the door-knob the best I could; it was not allowable to face around. Now the Emperor knew it would be a difficult ordeal for me, because of lack of practice; and so, when it was time to part, he turned, with exceeding delicacy, and pretended to fumble with things on his desk, so that I could get out in my own way, without his seeing me."

It went home! It was vitriol! I saw the envy and disgruntlement rise in the man's face; he couldn't keep it down. I saw him trying to fix up something in his mind to take the bloom off that distinction. I enjoyed that, for I judged that he had his work cut out for him. He struggled along inwardly for quite a while; then he said, with the manner of a person who has to say something and hasn't anything relevant to say:

"You said he had a handful of special-brand cigars lying on the table?"

"Yes; *I* never saw anything to match them."

I had him again. He had to fumble around in his mind as much as another minute before he could play; then he said in as mean a way as I ever heard a person say anything:

"He could have been counting the cigars, you know."

I cannot endure a man like that. It is nothing to him how unkind he is, so long as he takes the bloom off. It is all he cares for.

"An Englishman (or other human being) does dearly love a lord," (or other conspicuous person). It includes us all. We love to be noticed by the conspicuous person; we love to be associated with such, or with a conspicuous event, even in a seventh-rate fashion, even in a forty-seventh, if we cannot do better. This accounts for some of our curious tastes in mementos. It accounts for the large private trade in the Prince of Wales's hair, which chambermaids were able to drive in that article of commerce when the Prince made the tour of the world in the long ago—hair which probably did not always come from his brush, since enough of it was marketed to refurnish a bald comet; it accounts for the fact that the rope which lynches a negro in

the presence of ten thousand Christian spectators is saleable five minutes later at two dollars an inch; it accounts for the mournful fact that a royal personage does not venture to wear buttons on his coat in public.

We do love a lord—and by that term I mean any person whose situation is higher than our own. The lord of a group, for instance: a group of peers, a group of millionaires, a group of hoodlums, a group of sailors, a group of newsboys, a group of saloon politicians, a group of college girls. No royal person has ever been the object of a more delirious loyalty and slavish adoration than is paid by the vast Tammany herd to its squalid idol of Wantage. There is not a bifurcated animal in that menagerie that would not be proud to appear in a newspaper-picture in his company. At the same time, there are some in that organization who would scoff at the people who have been daily pictured in company with Prince Henry, and would say vigorously that *they* would not consent to be photographed with him—a statement which would not be true in any instance. There are hundreds of people in America who would frankly say to you that they would not be proud to be photographed in a group with the Prince, if invited; and some of these unthinking people would believe it when they said it; yet in no instance would it be true. We have a large population, but we have not a large enough one, by several millions, to furnish that man. He has not yet been begotten, and in fact he is not begettable.

You may take any of the printed groups, and there isn't a person in it who isn't visibly glad to be there; there isn't a person in the dim background who isn't visibly trying to be vivid; if it is a crowd of ten thousand—ten thousand proud, untamed democrats, horny-handed sons of toil and of politics, and fliers of the eagle—there isn't one who isn't conscious of the camera, there isn't one who is trying to keep out of range, there isn't one who isn't plainly meditating a purchase of the paper in the morning, with the intention of hunting himself out in the picture and of framing and keeping it if he shall find so much of his person in it as his starboard ear.

We all love to get some of the drippings of Conspicuousness, and we will put up with a single, humble drip, if we can't get any more. We may pretend otherwise, in conversation; but we can't pretend it to ourselves privately—and we don't. We do

confess in public that we are the noblest work of God, being moved to it by long habit, and teaching, and superstition; but deep down in the secret places of our souls we recognize that, if we *are* the noblest work, the less said about it the better.

We of the North poke fun at the South for its fondness for titles — a fondness for titles pure and simple, regardless of whether they are genuine or pinchbeck. We forget that whatever a Southerner likes the rest of the human race likes, and that there is no law of predilection lodged in one people that is absent from another people. There is no variety in the human race. We are all children, all children of the one Adam, and we love toys. We can soon acquire that Southern disease if some one will give it a start. It already has a start, in fact. I have been personally acquainted with over 84,000 persons who, at one time or another in their lives, have served for a year or two on the staffs of our multitudinous governors, and through that fatality have been generals temporarily, and colonels temporarily, and judge-advocates temporarily; but I have known only nine among them who could be hired to let the title go when it ceased to be legitimate. I know thousands and thousands of governors who ceased to be governors away back in the last century; but I am acquainted with only three who would answer your letter if you failed to call them "Governor" in it. I know acres and acres of men who have done time in a legislature in prehistoric days, but among them is not half an acre whose resentment you would not raise if you addressed them as "Mr." instead of "Hon." The first thing a legislature does is to convene in an impressive legislative attitude, and get itself photographed. Each member frames his copy and takes it to the woods and hangs it up in the most aggressively conspicuous place in his house; and if you visit the house and fail to inquire what that accumulation is, the conversation will be brought around to it by that aforetime legislator, and he will show you a figure in it which in the course of years he has almost obliterated with the smut of his finger-marks, and say with a solemn joy, "It's me!"

Have you ever seen a country Congressman enter the hotel breakfast-room in Washington with his letters?—and sit at his table and let on to read them?—and wrinkle his brows and frown statesmanlike?—keeping a furtive watch-out over his glasses all the while to see if he is being observed and admired?—those same

old letters which he fetches in every morning? Have you seen it? Have you seen him show off? It is *the* sight of the national capital. Except one; a pathetic one. That is the ex-Congressman: the poor fellow whose life has been ruined by a two-year taste of glory and of fictitious consequence; who has been superseded, and ought to take his heart-break home and hide it, but cannot tear himself away from the scene of his lost little grandeur; and so he lingers, and still lingers, year after year, unconsidered, sometimes snubbed, ashamed of his fallen estate, and valiantly trying to look otherwise; dreary and depressed, but counterfeiting breeziness and gayety, hailing with a chummy familiarity, which is not always welcomed, the more-fortunates who are still in place and were once his mates. Have you seen him? He clings piteously to the one little shred that is left of his departed distinction—the “privilege of the floor”; and works it hard and gets what he can out of it. That is the saddest figure I know of.

Yes, we do so love our little distinctions! And then we loftily scoff at a Prince for enjoying his larger ones; forgetting that if we only had his chance—ah! “Senator” is not a legitimate title. A Senator has no more right to be addressed by it than have you or I; but, in the several State capitals and in Washington, there are 5,000 Senators who take very kindly to that fiction, and who purr gratefully when you call them by it—which you may do quite unrebuked. Then those same Senators smile at the self-constructed majors and generals and judges of the South!

Indeed, we do love our distinctions, get them how we may. And we work them for all they are worth. In prayer we call ourselves “worms of the dust,” but it is only on a sort of tacit understanding that the remark shall not be taken at par. *We*—worms of the dust! Oh, no, we are not that. Except in fact; and we do not deal much in fact when we are contemplating ourselves.

As a race, we do certainly love a lord—let him be Croker, or a duke, or a prize-fighter, or whatever other personage shall chance to be the head of our group. Many years ago, I saw a greasy youth in overalls standing by the *Herald* office, with an expectant look in his face. Soon a large man passed out, and gave him a pat on the shoulder. That was what the boy was waiting for—the large man’s notice. The pat made him proud and happy, and the exultation inside of him shone out through his eyes; and

his mates were there to see the pat and envy it and wish they could have that glory. The boy belonged down cellar in the press-room, the large man was king of the upper floors, foreman of the composing-room. The light in the boy's face was worship, the foreman was his lord, head of his group. The pat was an accolade. It was as precious to the boy as it would have been if he had been an aristocrat's son and the accolade had been delivered by his sovereign with a sword. The quintessence of the honor was all there; there was no difference in values; in truth there was no difference present except an artificial one—clothes.

All the human race loves a lord—that is, it loves to look upon or be noticed by the possessor of Power or Conspicuousness; and sometimes animals, born to better things and higher ideals, descend to man's level in this matter. In the Jardin des Plantes I have seen a cat that was so vain of being the personal friend of an elephant that I was ashamed of her.

MARK TWAIN.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE STATE OF CUBA.

BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE JAMES BRYCE, M. P.

THE condition and prospects of Cuba, on which I am invited to submit some reflections suggested by a recent visit to that island, open up questions which ought to be of the greatest interest to thoughtful men all over the world, to European observers who are not directly affected as well as to Americans who have to take decisions that must determine the future of the country which they withdrew from the rule of Spain. The present situation of Cuba is a very peculiar one. She stands at the end of an historical period which has covered four centuries since her first settlement by Columbus, and at the beginning of another period in which new influences, racial and commercial, must tell powerfully upon her, whatever her political destiny. She is at present neither a subject nor an independent state. She is poor, yet with immense potentialities of wealth. Freedom has been promised her; but whether the hand which is eagerly stretched to grasp the boon will be able to use it when received, is still doubtful. And it is remarkable that the political crisis in which she now finds herself should coincide with an economic crisis in her fortunes, so that neither can be examined apart from the other.

Two articles, one dealing with the economic, the other with the political, side of the Cuban situation, have already appeared in the numbers of this REVIEW for December and January. Both, being written by American citizens, advocated certain policies. It would not be proper for one who writes from Europe, and as an outsider, to follow in the same path, and to appear as the advocate of any particular course of action. I shall therefore confine myself to stating the impression which I derived from what I saw of Cuba, and to indicating the conditions of the problem which the Cubans on the one hand, and the American people on

the other, now have to solve. The economic side of that problem is: How shall Cuba recover her material prosperity, which has suffered so severely from two insurrections followed by a war, and from the fall in the price of her staple commodity? The political side includes not only the question of the relations which the island is to hold to the United States, but also that of the capacity of her people for republican self-government.

Cuba is a country highly favored by nature. The soil is generally fertile and the vegetation luxuriant. There are vast stretches of undulating country covered with the richest grass. There is plenty of excellent timber upon the mountains. Nearly all of the island is suited either for tillage or for ranching, and the rainfall is sufficiently copious to make irrigation-works unnecessary. There are mines of iron, copper, and manganese; possibly of other metals also, for the mineral deposits have been very imperfectly explored. The climate is generally a good one, since the summer heats are tempered in most places by a sea breeze, and are not severe enough to prevent natives of southern Europe from laboring in the open air. Those malarial fevers which are the most constant scourge of tropical Africa and of large parts of India and Indo-China, are here confined to a few districts. Yellow fever, which did more than anything else to give Cuba a bad name, has been practically expunged from it by the efforts of the American medical staff. There are, therefore, no climatic obstacles to the development by labor of the vast natural resources of the island.

But Cuba, naturally rich, has remained for the most part an undeveloped country. Immense tracts fit for agriculture are lying untouched by plough or spade. Immense tracts in which one expects to find cattle or sheep are unstocked. The population is about a million and a half, though the area is about 36,000 square miles, and could support by agriculture alone, leaving out of account both mining and lumbering, ten millions of people. There are good harbors, but the coast is imperfectly lighted. There are few railways, and the roads are mostly mere tracks, apt to become impassable after heavy rain. One is everywhere struck by the contrast between the potentialities of the country and its actualities—or, in other words, by the change which might be wrought by the presence of capital, by the increase of labor, by the aid or supervision of an intelligent administration.

The want of capital and the want of labor, the untilled fields and the unstocked pastures, are partly due to the long-continued apathy and incompetence of the Spanish administration, which did little except collect taxes, and which gave little encouragement to those who sought to develop the country. But something must be set down to the two insurrections, in which plantations were laid waste, sugar factories destroyed, cattle slaughtered, the population reduced. There has not been time, since the war ended, for Cuba to recover even such prosperity as she enjoyed before the "ten years' insurrection" broke out.

Upon the top of these political troubles came that fall in the price of sugar to which the Cubans attribute so much of their present impoverishment. On this I need not dwell; for it has been fully discussed in the able article in the December number of this REVIEW, to which I have referred. They complain, however, that, while the price has been falling, they have also lost the British market, owing to the competition there of bounty-fed sugar from the European continent; while, in the far larger and far nearer market of the United States, they suffer from the high tariff on sugar maintained in the interests of the domestic producer, and now even more in the interests of the beet-root grower of the Northern States than of the cane-grower of Louisiana and Texas. This tariff is, in fact, in their view, the last straw under which the unhappy sugar-planter must fall and perish, dragging down the island into the abyss of bankruptcy.

These complaints against the effect of sugar bounties in Great Britain and of the protective tariff in the United States, are common to the whole of the West Indies. One hears them no less in Jamaica than in Cuba; indeed, they are more bitter there, because Jamaica thinks that Britain ought to help her. Without in the least denying their truth, there are three observations to be made, which may serve to relieve a little the dismal blackness of the picture which West-Indian planters draw. One of these is, that one hears it frequently stated, and I think virtually admitted, that even under existing conditions it is possible for a sugar estate which has been well cared for and is provided with the latest and best machinery to make a profit. A second is, that Germany, Austria, and France, the chief bounty-giving countries, seem to be on the point of abandoning their respective bounty systems, the discontinuance of which would, to some extent, relieve the West-

Indian planter by giving him a better chance in the British market.* And the third is, that Cuba and some of the other islands rely too much upon sugar, and would do better to extend the area of other crops, including tobacco (where the soil and exposure are favorable), coffee, cotton, and, still more, plantations of tropical fruit trees. Much as the fruit trade with the United States and Great Britain has grown of late years, it is probably capable of still further expansion. To this last remark the Cubans reply, that it takes time to plant fruit trees and bring them to production, whereas their present financial distress is urgent; and they add that, to provide new sugar machinery requires capital, which is the very thing that Cuba at present lacks.

These are the salient features of the economic position. They certainly show that, naturally rich as Cuba is, and hopeful as we may be of her ultimate future when a stable government has been established, she is at present passing through a very grave crisis, and is entitled to a favorable consideration from the United States—especially as through her severance from Spain she has incurred loss as regards the Spanish market. Now let us pass to consider, in the same rapid way, some of those features of her racial and social condition which affect the political aspect of the problem.

The population of the island, as has been already remarked, is about a million and a half. One third, roughly speaking, are negroes or mulattoes, and a good many more have in them a strain of colored blood. Educationally, they are backward, for certainly more than half—and I have, indeed, heard it said, three-fourths—are unable to read and write, while comparatively few have received what would be called in Europe or the United States a fair secondary education. They have shown no great aptitude for commerce—the largest business firms are generally either Spanish or foreign; and they are not very efficient as laborers, certainly less efficient than either the Spaniards of old Spain or the Americans of the Middle States. Except among the planters—if, indeed, they are an exception after what has been said of their depressed condition—there is very little wealth in Cuban hands. Politically, the people are quite untrained; for, during the long rule of Spain, there was practically no opportunity of learning

* As I despatch these pages it is announced that the European bounty-giving states (except Russia) have at the Brussels Conference agreed to abolish the bounty system.

how to work free institutions either in local areas or as respects the country as a whole. Spanish government was despotic, just as Spanish administration was bureaucratic. So, too, they have had hardly any means of learning who are their own best men, and, in this respect, it is unfortunate for them that they did not achieve their liberty by their unaided exertions, for, in the process of winning it, the men of most natural capacity for politics would probably have been brought to the front. On the other hand, it is their good luck to be not sharply divided into sections, either by ecclesiastical or by racial issues. The Roman Church, though she still holds a good deal of property, does not appear to exert much political power, and religious issues play no conspicuous part. As respects color, though the whites deem themselves much above the negroes, they do not assert their superiority in offensive ways—partly, perhaps, because the Cubans are a polite and courteous people; nor do the negroes show animosity against the whites. Now and then a little friction occurs—there was a case at Santiago a few months ago which roused some disquiet; but, on the whole, the relations of the races are friendly, as indeed is more often the case in Spanish than in Teutonic countries. Moreover, the predominance of the whites, in number as well as in wealth and knowledge, removes any occasion for serious uneasiness on their part.

To complete this rapid survey, let it be added that there is at present a considerable influx of immigrants from Spain, and especially from those northern parts of Spain, Catalonia, the Basque regions, Asturias and Galicia, which contain the most industrious and thrifty part of the population of that kingdom. Cuba is so underpeopled, and labor so scarce, that these immigrants come as a most needful and useful recruitment to her industries. There is room for many more of them; nor would any factor contribute so much to build up the prosperity of the country, were it not that many of the immigrants, coming as young, unmarried men, marry women of mixed blood, and will leave behind them children likely to prove less energetic and less frugal than they are themselves.

Such, stated in its simplest outline, is the position in which Cuba finds herself now that the control of her own destiny is to be restored to her, subject to those conditions which Congress has thought fit to impose. And among the questions she has

to decide, the most momentous is that of her relation to the United States, her nearest and most powerful neighbor. The Cubans are all agreed in desiring friendship, and in desiring to have the closest commercial relations. The admission of their products free of duty to the markets of the United States would be to them the greatest possible boon. But if the boon cannot be obtained except at the price of the annexation of their island to the United States, the question arises whether commercial prosperity ought to be purchased at the price of a sacrifice of national independence, and one hears in the island much debate on the subject.

This question presents itself in a very different light to the wealthier and to the poorer classes of the Cubans. The commercial men, the land-owners, and especially the sugar-producers, have everything to gain by the free entry of sugar into America. Were such free entry secured on a permanent basis the value of plantations would rise, trade would be quickened, and the growing competition of other sugar-growing countries would be far less formidable, because the product of those countries would probably be excluded by the same tariff which let Cuban sugars in. It may, indeed, be said that, even apart from sugar, annexation to the United States would benefit Cuba in many ways. It would raise all real-estate values. It would mean political stability; and political stability would mean the inflow of American and British capital. No doubt the number of American and (to a less extent) of British and Canadian firms might also increase; but the native Cuban is seldom a merchant, and does not greatly regard such competition, while he would rejoice in the making of railways and the establishment of manufacturing industries. Accordingly, the traveller is told that the bulk of the propertied classes, and especially the great bulk of the sugar-planters, would be willing to secure an open American market by annexation, if that free market can be had on these terms only. But he is also told that many of them are afraid to say so openly, because the current of popular feeling runs the other way. The mass of the nation, in all classes, from the small shopkeepers and artisans down to those negro squatters in the forests of the eastern districts, who are the poorest and most ignorant part of the population, are not keenly interested in politics. Most of them took no part in the insurrection. Many of them are hardly educated up to

the level of active civic zeal. One can hardly talk of public opinion among them, in the sense in which one talks of it in the United States or in England.

But their sentiment responds to the name of national independence. Independence had been the war-cry of the leaders in the two insurrections, and these leaders are the persons who have retained most influence with the masses. It is alleged that they would feel their importance gone if the country became either a State or a Territory of the American Union. But no such reason is needed to explain why a Spanish people, which was delivered from the control of a distant and inefficient government after two long struggles, should be unwilling to be absorbed into another empire, alien to it in blood and speech, and so vast that Cuba would form only a comparatively insignificant member of it. I was also told that the colored people are averse to union with the United States, because tales of lynchings of negroes in the South have reached them; but how far this statement was true I had no means of ascertaining. On the other hand, it is asserted that the immigrants from Spain who have come to Cuba within the past few years bear no ill-will to the United States, and have no burning desire for Cuban independence.

Broadly speaking, the impression left on the mind of a visitor three or four months ago—for I cannot speak of what may have happened since then—was, that although Cuba has never been a nation in the political sense, there is in her people a sentiment of nationality, based on community of religion, language, habits, and ideas, strong enough to make them desire to remain apart, in the enjoyment of as much independence as they can secure. This is the dominant feeling; though, no doubt, a minority, respectable by its wealth and social position, would be led by its economic interests to acquiesce in union with the mighty neighbor whose will can maintain or reduce or expunge a tariff which affects its material prosperity.

But the question on which the mind of a traveller in Cuba dwells chiefly is not that which relates to the probable wishes of the Cubans. It is that which touches the interests of the American people, who have now been brought into a relation with Cuba which, in one form or another, is evidently destined to be an abiding relation. The traveller may recognize, as I think the Cubans generally recognize, that the United States, having de-

clared, in the Platt amendment, a determination to secure what appeared needful for the benefit of America, is not disposed to interfere further, but rather to let Cuba have a fair chance of working out her own salvation in her own way. But it is impossible not to see that events may occur which will bring up afresh the question of some further control by the United States, or of some closer connection than the Platt amendment implies. That document covers a great deal, and contains various provisions which may not be strictly fulfilled by some future Cuban government. Debts beyond the power of Cuba to pay may be incurred. Sanitation may be neglected, in a way which may induce the American government to take steps for the protection of its Southern ports against infection. The system of government in Cuba may not work smoothly. There may be civil strife, or disorders, which, though scarcely amounting to war, the Executive cannot suppress. Or the judiciary, which has not hitherto inspired unlimited confidence, may fall short of its duty, and through weakness or corruption fail to protect the rights of property. In one way or another, the rights of American citizens may possibly be violated; or foreign governments may, at the instance of their injured subjects, address complaints not only to the Cuban government, but to the United States as holding the position of a sort of protecting Power. One need not suggest that there is any immediate risk that any of these things should happen. But they have frequently happened in most of the other republics of Spanish America; and the Platt amendment contemplates the possibility that they may happen here, for it expressly provides a remedy for them. Its third article runs:

"The government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence (*i. e.*, where independence is threatened by any compact with any foreign Power, or its lodgement in the island), the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba."

Now, if the government of the United States should intervene in any such case as one of the foregoing, the question of annexation or of some form of permanent control might again arise, perhaps as the only alternative to leaving the island a prey to internal factions. Accordingly, the mind of any observer who re-

flects upon the various possibilities of the future recurs constantly to the question of what the American people might have to lose or gain by adding Cuba to their territories, or by admitting her to their Federal Union as a State.

That the island is fertile and beautiful and (on the whole) healthy, that indeed it is in all its natural aspects a desirable possession, has already been remarked. No better field for the expenditure of capital could be wished for. Under a wise and firm government, and in the hands of our energetic race, it might attain to a very high measure of prosperity. It is, therefore, a country which the United States might desire to incorporate or possess, even apart from the unquestionable importance of its strategic position, lying across the southern coast of North America, and controlling the approach to any interoceanic canal that may hereafter be constructed. So, again, its sanitary condition must, from its proximity to and frequent communications with the ports of the Gulf and of Florida, be matter of concern to the United States. A despotic monarch, proud of the extent of his dominions, governing them at his own pleasure by such methods as each seemed to require, would not hesitate to annex Cuba, and would, if his administration were capable, make a remunerative province, and probably a well contented province; for the Cubans are not naturally more turbulent than other races. But when the conditions of the people and government of the United States are considered, other elements in the question present themselves. The Constitution and governmental system of the United States have not been constructed with a view to the control of dependencies. They contemplate a body of autonomous communities, forming a united and tolerably homogeneous nation, the component communities being all on the same level of public as well as private civic rights, and all, if not absolutely on the same level of intelligence and capacity, yet, at any rate, tolerably well qualified not only to govern themselves in local matters, but to bear their share in the management of national affairs. Nor is this a matter merely of governmental machinery, or of the want of such experience in the management of colonies as England has enjoyed. The principles which form the foundation of the American Republic are hard to reconcile with the rule of the Republic over subject or dependent communities; and, although the Constitution may be stretched to meet the case of such communities,

the process of stretching involves grave difficulties, which have been felt since 1898. Accordingly, any one who, knowing the United States, reflects upon this Cuban problem must recognize the objections to an attempt to govern her as the English govern India or their Crown Colonies. If that solution be rejected, there remains the plan of incorporating Cuba as a State of the Union; and the question arises, whether she is fit to be so incorporated with benefit to the Union itself.

The self-governing communities of the New World, outside the United States and Canada, present great differences in the measure of political success they have attained. Some are republics only in name, being virtually military tyrannies. Some, such as Mexico and Chili, to which one may perhaps add Argentina and Costa Rica, are at present well administered, and are reaching, Mexico most conspicuously, a high stage of material development. A few, on the other hand, remain stationary, or have even, as has most palpably happened in the case of Hayti, retrograded towards barbarism. It is impossible at present to say to which class Cuba would belong, if she were left to herself. She would not, one may confidently assert, fall anywhere near the level of Hayti, for the bulk of her population belong to a white race, and the immigrants from Spain will tend to increase the volume of the higher racial stock. Still, it must be admitted that there is a large colored element, a total want of experience in self-government, and, despite the efforts made by the American administration since 1898, a sad dearth of education, even of elementary education. In these and other respects, Cuba is not only below the level of the States of the Union, but is quite unlike any of them. Language, habits, religion, ideas, are all diverse; and it would require many years, even under the most favorable conditions, to assimilate her to them. Although the country is greatly underpeopled, there is little prospect of any immigration of Americans large enough to permeate the whole nation. The climate is too hot for men of Anglo-American stock to do hard work, especially open-air, agricultural work; so immigrants would belong only to the commercial class. They would no doubt do much to advance the material well-being of the island, and to develop her productive capacities. They would, after a while, Americanize the upper class. But they would not constitute any numerically important section of the population, nor be able, for a long

time, to raise the masses to their own level of intelligence. It may be said that similar phenomena exist in those Southern States of the Union where there is a large negro population. This is true. But every one knows what are the political and social difficulties to which the presence of that negro population gives rise. If the United States are already carrying in that population a burden so heavy that some have proposed the utterly impossible plan of sending them back to Africa, would it be to the advantage of the Republic to add to the burden?

Cuba might, no doubt, be erected into a new State and receive the usual machinery of a State government. Her own politicians, and those who would come from the United States, would soon learn how to run such a government. But if an observer who had no predilections either for or against democracy were to be asked what sort of system would be most naturally appropriate to Cuba, having regard to what history tells us of the suitability of different systems to peoples in a backward stage of political development, he might conceivably answer that she would prosper under a strong central government of the monarchical or oligarchical type, coupled with a liberal provision of local self-governing institutions, to be worked in small areas by the people themselves in such wise as to give them the habits and the sense of civic duty, by which they might become fitted for a democratic republic. Peaceful economic development under a strong government of such a type would create that intelligent middle class of persons holding some amount of property, which is required for the working of a democratic system.

This is, of course, mere speculation, for the kind of government which the supposed observer might suggest is not easily created, and has not been formally set up anywhere in the New World, although some of its so-called republics are really monarchies. Cuba is now receiving a republican constitution of the type usual in American countries. How it will work few will venture to predict. Neither will any one venture to predict that circumstances beyond the control either of the United States or of the Cubans themselves may not ultimately bring the island into the United States, as a Territory like Hawaii, or as a full-fledged State. Nations are swept onward by the current of events, and the years since 1897 have been full of surprises. I do not attempt to discuss these questions, for my aim has been only to in-

dicare, in rough outline, what are the salient facts of the case, and what the difficulties which may be looked for, in whichever direction the current may flow.

Whether the President and Congress could in 1898 have ousted the direct government of Spain from Cuba without a resort to arms, whether they could have escaped the responsibilities for Cuba which they have in fact incurred, while at the same time securing those naval and military interests which they desired to safeguard, having regard to the strategic position Cuba occupies—these are questions which belong to the past, and with which the historian of the future will have to deal. He will know more than is as yet generally known; and he will regard dispassionately questions which are still within the sphere of party controversy. But no party feeling in the United States, nor any compassion which any one in Europe may feel for the misfortunes of Spain, ought to prevent a recognition of what the American administration has done for Cuba within the last four years. The difficulties were enormous, and the spirit shown has been admirable. The results attained, considering both those difficulties and the shortness of the time, have been of high permanent value. The deadly scourge of yellow fever has been virtually extirpated. The cities have been improved and rendered healthy. A stimulus has been given to material progress. A powerful impulse has been given to education. The example of an efficient and honest administration has been presented to a people who for centuries had seen nothing of the kind. The Military Governor and his lieutenants have had to hold their course through rocks and shoals more numerous and more troublesome than can be known to any one outside the island. It is a pleasure to close these brief reflections with a sincere tribute to the character and abilities and enlightened energy of General Leonard Wood, who deserves to be long remembered with honor both by those whose affairs he has administered in so upright a spirit, and by his countrymen at home.

JAMES BRYCE.

THE TREND OF UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

BY WILLIAM R. HARPER, D.D., LL.D., PRESIDENT OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

IN every realm of action, men are to-day expecting important things to accompany the beginnings of this new century. If we expect these same great things in the field of education, we may not forget that, with enlargement and prosperity, there must come at times reaction, at other times readjustment.

I. The place occupied by libraries and laboratories in the educational work of to-day, as compared with that of the past, is one of commanding importance. Indeed, the library and the laboratory have already practically revolutionized the methods of higher education. In a really modern institution, the chief building is the library, with the stacks for storage purposes, the reading-room, the offices of delivery, the rooms for seminar purposes; it is the centre of the institutional activity. The librarian is one of the most learned members of the faculty; in many instances, certainly, the most influential. Lectures are given by him on bibliography, and classes are organized for instruction in the use of books. The staff of assistants in the library is larger, even, than was the entire faculty of the same institution thirty years ago. Volumes are added at the rate of thousands in a single year. The periodical literature of each department is on file. The building is open day and night. It is, in fact, a laboratory; for here now the students, likewise the professors, who cannot purchase for themselves the books which they must have, spend the larger portion of their lives. A greater change from the old order can hardly be conceived. The days are coming when, in addition to the library of an institution, each group of closely related departments will have

its separate departmental library. This will include the books in most common use, the maps and charts of special value. It is true that the cost of administration will be great, but the need will be still greater. The student in the future will do little of his work in the study; he must be in the midst of books. No ordinary student can afford to own one book in a hundred of those which he may wish at any moment to consult. As the scholar, though having thousands of volumes in his own library, must find his way to the libraries of the Old World when he wishes to do work of the highest character, so the student, though having hundreds of volumes in his own room, must do his work in the departmental library of the institution. His work must be done where, without a moment's delay, without the mediation of the zealous librarian, who may think more of the book than of its use, he may place his hand upon that one of ten or twenty thousand books which he desires to use. Some of us will see the day when, in every division of study, there will be professors of bibliography and methodology, whose function it will be to teach men books and how to use them. The equipment of the library will not be finished until it shall have upon its staff men and women whose entire work shall be, not the care of books, not the cataloguing of books, but the giving of instruction concerning their use. That factor of college work, the library, fifty years ago almost unknown, to-day already the centre of the institution's intellectual activity, half a century hence, with its sister, the laboratory, almost equally unknown fifty years ago, will have absorbed all else, and will have become the institution itself.

The laboratory is an institution altogether modern. To-day, it occupies the position of honor next to the library. It might even be said that the laboratory has outstripped the library. With but few exceptions, institutions have a single library; many of them have several laboratories. But even in the strongest institutions, these laboratories are not yet what they should be; for I remember that in a university which occupies to-day at least the second position among the universities of the South, the chemical laboratory is located in a portion of a basement; and in more than half of the colleges and universities of the country the work of all the departments of science is done in one building, or in a portion of one building. It will be necessary to provide

distinct laboratories, though not in every case separate buildings, for each of the departments of natural science, physics, chemistry, zoology, geology, mineralogy, palæontology, anatomy, physiology, anthropology, and the rest. The building and equipment of a single one of these will cost more than the entire college plant of the last generation. The running expenses, not including salaries, of one of these laboratories, will cost more than the whole expense of all the departments of science in the days of our fathers.

Progress up to the present time has been made largely in the laboratories of physics and chemistry, and in the observatories for astronomical work. Even here the present dwarfs the past. Only a few years ago, the eighteen-inch telescope was a monster. Now we have the thirty-six-inch of the Lick, and the forty-inch of the Yerkes.

The libraries and the laboratories with their equipment might be said to constitute the outside of educational work. But that would be only partially true. When we realize that the method and spirit of the work are largely determined by these outside factors, we may consent to allow them a place upon the inside. The absence of these determined in large measure the character of the work fifty years ago; their presence has transformed the whole work of education, and the work of transformation will continue.

II. The future will witness the lifting up of professional education and a closer identification of the professional schools with the universities. The great law-schools and medical schools of our country, as well as those of foreign countries, are not law-schools and medical schools which stand alone, independent of university connection. They are rather those schools which share the high ideals of the university, and are under university management. The majority of law and medicine schools in this country are stock companies, organized for pecuniary profit; but within a short period a change has come, and we already see the beginnings of reorganization in every quarter. The great theological seminaries of the future will be those which are identified, directly or indirectly, with the universities. The time is already near at hand when the theological seminary, standing alone and apart from other educational work, will not be able to attract even the ordinary students, not to speak of the

strongest. The tendency of things points unmistakably to a time when, as in the case of other professional schools, the theological seminary will be joined closely to the university. It is hardly possible here to show why this is to be. It is enough to say that the ordinary theological seminary cannot to-day provide the curriculum of study demanded by those who are to do the work of the ministry during the next quarter of a century. The churches demand a ministry of wider sympathies and larger views. The tendency of most theological education has been to make men narrow, rather than to broaden them. The churches already recognize this fact, and not only the churches, but the students themselves; and to-day it is not an uncommon thing for college men to omit entirely their theological training, in order to avoid what, they fear, will injure rather than help them.

This union of professional education with the university, which is rapidly taking place in all the great centres of the country, means two things: (1) the uplifting of this work, its broadening, and its acceptance of higher ideals; (2) the separation, to a greater or less degree, of the control of this work from the particular professions. The medical profession cannot control the medical education which is given in connection with the university. The ideals of the university are higher than those of the profession at large, and in spite of the strength of the profession, the schools thus connected will pass out from under their jurisdiction. The same is true of the law-school and its relation to the legal fraternity. The same is true of the theological school and its relation to the church. This change marks an important step in the evolution of professional education.

III. The future will bring a sharper distinction than has ever yet existed between the higher education maintained by the state and the higher education conducted on private foundations. In this latter class—which may be called, for the sake of definiteness, non-state education—the contribution, direct or indirect, of the various denominations forms the larger part. It cannot be said that the best interests of education at large would be secured if the state, as such, were to abandon its present policy of maintaining and directing the higher educational work. It would be just as great a mistake if, on the other hand, the non-state institutions were to disappear. Each of these great divisions possesses sources of strength to which the other may not lay claim.

Both have been thoroughly established; both will develop side by side through and beyond the twentieth century; each will correct the weaker tendencies of the other; each will supply something which the other cannot furnish. The one will to some extent antagonize the other, but it may safely be predicted that both, in generous rivalry, will go forward to do a work which neither could have done without the other. The state institution is one agent of the body politic; the non-state institution is the other. The body politic would be maimed and at serious disadvantage if either agent were disabled. In academic work, in college work, and in the work of universities on a state foundation and on a non-state foundation, the function of each will be more distinctly defined, the help which each can render the other more definitely determined. The churches have no occasion to raise the question, whether to the state alone shall be given the privilege of maintaining and directing the higher educational work. Whatever the state may do, the obligation which rests upon the churches is as strong and as serious as it has ever been in the past, and more important for the very reason that the state has made such strides in this direction.

IV. At no distant day, there will come into existence a class of institutions of higher learning, the slight beginnings of which have already appeared. So long as no university existed, in the strict meaning of the word, all institutions of higher learning belonged to the same class; nor was the line drawn between these institutions and institutions of a lower class, known as academies and preparatory schools. There are many academies in the United States which bear the name of college, and not a few the name of university. But since in these last years institutions having the real character of universities have been established, it is inevitable that these in time will differentiate themselves from the college, and that the college will in time differentiate itself from the academy. An organization was effected two years ago, composed of fourteen institutions which are recognized at home and abroad as institutions doing work of a university character. This was the first step in a series of steps, which, within a quarter of a century, will bring about the classification just mentioned; a classification greatly concerning the denominations, as such, and the denominational colleges; a classification, however, the real result of which will be higher standards

of work, better distribution of facilities, and more honest realization, on the one hand, of promises made by institutions, and, on the other, of hopes entertained by students.

Directly along this line will come another change, namely, the development of high schools into "junior" colleges. Evidence that this change is already taking place may be found on every hand. The establishment of hundreds of high schools through all the States is in itself a new element in our educational machinery, which has disarranged the former system, but, at the same time, has greatly advanced the interests of education itself. The quickening influence of these institutions is seen, not only in the increased number of those who continue their work in college and university, nor merely in the fact that a larger number of more intelligent men and women is thus contributed to the various communities, but especially in the fact that the teachers of the schools of a lower grade are vastly stronger and better prepared for their work.

The suggestion is made, from time to time, that the people will not consent to continue the public support of these high schools. But, as a matter of fact, they do continue to support them; and, more than that, these schools are constantly increasing their requirements for admission, as well as their facilities for instruction and the length of the curriculum. It has now come to be generally recognized that the ideal high school must have a curriculum of four years, and in many sections of the country this has already been secured. In others, it is coming. The next step in the development of this work will be the addition of one or two years to the present courses; or, in other words, the carrying of the high school up to the end of the sophomore college year. Already this has practically been accomplished in certain schools of Michigan and in some of our cities. It can be done at a minimum of cost. To-day, only ten per cent. of those who finish the high school venture to undertake work in college. If the high schools were to provide work for two additional years, at least forty per cent. of those finishing the first four years would continue to the end of the sophomore year.

With this modification of the high school, and with the reduction of many of our colleges to institutions of the same grade, there would come to be a system of colleges, state or non-state, which would meet the demands of the situation as they are not

met to-day. Many of the normal schools of Western States already practically occupy this position.

V. The small college, the college of the denomination, is certain to continue in the future; but it will sooner or later yield to the pressure of competition on every side and in every line, to the demands of economy, made more rigorous by the diminishing rate of interest, to the urgency for a higher standard of work, and to the claims made by its students for greater facilities in the way of libraries and laboratories, and join itself in close association with other similar colleges. The purpose of this association will be, in part, protection, but also, in part, greater strength. If it is asked how these ends will be attained by such association, it may be answered, in general, in accordance with exactly the same principles which lead to the joining together of churches in presbytery, or conference, or association; the same principles which lead men engaged in the same field of labor to form labor unions; the same principles which lead men engaged in the same business, whether it is insurance or railroading, whether it has to do with iron or sugar or wool, to join hands for the prevention of unnecessary expense, for the avoidance of injurious duplication, for the sake of gaining every possible economy. But how, it may be asked, will these principles operate in the case of colleges? With such association, and as a result of the understanding reached thereby:

- (1) There will come a better distribution of work among the colleges, and all will not undertake to do every kind of work;

- (2) There will come protection for all who thus associate together against misunderstanding and ignorance;

- (3) Results will be secured which no institution working alone could possibly hope to secure;

- (4) Educational work will be lifted above the petty jealousies and rivalries that to-day bring reproach upon it;

- (5) The evils of competition will be mitigated, and for these evils there will be substituted the blessings which follow honorable and legitimate rivalry;

- (6) The work of the small college will thus be dignified, and its place will be assured by the side of the institution maintained by the state;

- (7) Such a relationship will be, in fact, a federation, and through this federation each of the interested colleges will be

enabled to strengthen its faculties; for there is no reason why a strong specialist in a particular subject might not serve two or three institutions, to the advantage of the subject represented, the colleges thus associated, and the cause of higher learning.

Moreover, one may predict the close association of the smaller colleges, not only with each other, but also, in every case, with a university. The great advantages which will be found to accrue both to the college and to the university in such association will bring this about; for, after all, institutions, like individuals, move along the line of least resistance. One cannot point out these advantages in detail, but among them will be included:

(1) The intermingling of the teachers and lecturers, those of the college doing work in the university, and those of the university doing work in the college; the interchange of blood, as it were;

(2) The recognition of university appointment, thus bestowed directly and indirectly upon the teacher of the college;

(3) The opportunities for special investigation at the university afforded the younger college instructors;

(4) The special assistance of many kinds which the university may render the college in the conduct of its work;

(5) The prestige secured to the degrees of the college, in view of re-enactment by the university;

(6) The loan of books and apparatus to the college by the university;

(7) The establishment of scholarships and fellowships in the university, open to students of the college;

(8) The assistance rendered in the selection of instructors;

(9) The financial confidence created, upon the basis of which larger endowments may be secured;

(10) And, in general, that help which a stronger agent may furnish one not so strong in the accomplishment of the latter's work.

This association of denominational colleges with a university will take on different forms. In one case, the colleges of a denomination will be thus associated with a university known to be in sympathy with them and their work, even though the college and the university are situated far apart. In another case, the colleges of a section, regardless of denominational connection,

will be thus associated with the university of that district. Again, it will be the association of the colleges of a State with the State university. In some cases, this association will be effected on the part of the college with more than a single university, perhaps a state and also a non-state institution. Each of these kinds of association between college and university exists to-day; and the advantage of such association, when appreciated, will be sought by many institutions.

The field of higher education is, at the present time, in an exceedingly disorganized condition. But the forces are already in existence, through the operation of which, at no distant date, order will be secured, and a great system established, which may be designated "the American system." The important steps to be taken in working out such a system are co-ordination, specialization, and association.

WILLIAM R. HARPER.

LORD RANDOLPH SPENCER CHURCHILL.

BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR RICHARD TEMPLE, BART, G. C. S.I.

I shall essay to paint a word-picture of Lord Randolph Churchill, the most extraordinary man that has appeared in the British House of Commons and in British politics during the present generation. He was the young man eloquent—the fast-rising man despite youth and inexperience. He lived, flourished, strove, contended, ruled and died (prematurely) as a young man throughout. He once spoke of Mr. Gladstone as an old man in a hurry; as we in our human weakness often attribute to others the very faults we have ourselves, so he forgot that he was himself even a young man in a hurry.

When he rose before the English political world—as the moon rises full-orbed—he was like a youth, of a slim, wiry, well-shaped stature—showing from head to foot all the marks of a high-strung nervous organization—with regular features, face shaven, except as regards the moustache, complexion slightly olive, the hair parted in the middle, the eyes large, lustrous, fiery and expressive; the voice deep, rich and sonorous; the gesture energetic, yet graceful and appropriate. He had, of course, all the advantages which in the British Parliament and politics accrue to any one who has social prestige,—and in his case all this came from an illustrious family and from historic descent.

Before 1880 he had been noticeable, perhaps, but not conspicuous in politics. That he would do something noteworthy, all could see. But what that something would be none foresaw. He might become addicted to sport, he might join the turf, he might resort to some scientific pursuit, he might undertake extensive travel—or he might be content with shining in society, which latter, however, seemed the least probable of all the possible alternatives. But after 1880 his line became marked at once and for

ever, and it was that of politics in the best British sense and in the parliamentary meaning. He would excel conclusively and decisively within the House of Commons, he would try to form and guide public opinion outside, he would control and dominate the policy of his party. Some might have doubted at first what party he would adhere to; for, though by name a Conservative, his utterances had often an advanced Liberal tendency, and some of his methods were democratic. However, he declared himself positively as a Conservative, though the most marked proof he gave of Conservatism was his violent attacking of Liberal and Radical leaders!

First he stood forth singly from the Conservative ranks, which had been smitten utterly by the General Election of 1880, and by a defeat specially disheartening after the successes they had achieved in the European settlement between Russia and Turkey. Thus standing forth from this discouraged host in 1881, like a youthful warrior armed *cap a pie* he would dare Liberal leaders to single combat. The comic papers of the day depicted him in this attitude—almost like a pigmy champion: and indited verses alluding to his mighty ancestor—"a very Malbrook in the fight, fight, fight!" Soon it was apparent that he would treat the leaders of his own party with scant respect; he was even anxious to get rid of some among them; he would take important steps, as an independent Member, without their approval or even knowledge; and then he formed a little knot or nucleus, of three Members beside himself (one of whom was Arthur Balfour, the very man who is now the famous leader of the Commons). With this handful he organized what was jocularly called "the Fourth Party." But with this little band he gave verve and spirit to the then Conservative Opposition against the Liberal Government; in fact, it became the steel head to the shaft of the spear. Soon the spirit thus infused into his brother Members was communicated to the electors outside. The Conservative leaders could hardly have liked all these doings of his, as savoring of presumption; but the party outside rather enjoyed his splendid audacity. By the beginning of 1884, he was by common fame designated for some public office or other, as the Liberal Government had become shaken by certain failures in their Egyptian policy, and as the return of the Conservatives to power was in consequence anticipated. But the most which was then thought of for him was the

Secretaryship to the Admiralty or the Under Secretaryship for War! The Liberal Government, however, lived on till 1885, when the expectation of its early decease revived, and then he showed that his ambition would not be satisfied by any subordinate office; he would leap at one bound into some post of the first rank; seniors and the like, veterans in statesmanship, might be in the way, but he must have them disposed of somehow; there must be no lions in his path! His speeches in the House of Commons had been brief, incisive, telling, well phrased, finely delivered. He now began to make speeches on platforms outside in a more oratorical manner. And all England saw that in him a new gun, of heavy calibre and long range, had been added to the Conservative armament.

When the Liberal crash came in the summer of 1885, and the first of the Salisbury Administrations was formed, he was nominated Secretary of State for India, of which strange dominion he had acquired some practical knowledge. As a youthful Minister he was the head of the Council of India, consisting of men having experience long and vast. He presided at the Council Board of veterans and graybeards with gracious humility, professing himself to be a learner. To this day, his memory is fragrant there because of his patience, aptitude and rapidity in learning. But in the House of Commons, sitting prominently on the front Ministerial Bench, he became the principal mouthpiece of the new Government—defending it at all points of attack from a powerful Opposition, not only in his own Department of State, but in almost all departments. Despite these parliamentary avocations, he found time to make the earlier of the orations for which he soon became famous. Soon the dissolution of Parliament, with a General Election, ensued, and he was the acknowledged standard bearer of the Conservative party during the autumn. In the Parliament just dissolved a new Franchise Act had been passed, greatly extending the electorate in all the rural, as distinguished from the urban, districts; and his democratic style of eloquence proved to be admirably suited to the newly enfranchised voters. It was indeed a new Conservatism which he preached, still he taught the millions both in town and country to believe in the Conservatives, whose position had been much reduced in public confidence by the campaigns of Mr. Gladstone in 1879 and 1880. We may pause for an instant to reflect on the quickness with

which he had won this pre-eminent position. Though regarded by many shrewd judges as a coming man, still up to the beginning of 1885, he was little or nothing actually and substantially in politics. Yet by the autumn of that very same year—say in about eight short months—he had grown to be a prominent Minister of the Crown, one of the leading statesmen in the House of Commons, the prime leader in an electioneering campaign extending all over England, and beyond question the first platform orator of the day next after Mr. Gladstone himself. Indeed, many thought that he was not second to anyone.

When early in 1886, the following year, the Conservative Government was defeated in the new Parliament, he resigned together with his colleagues, after having held his high office under the Crown for about eight months, but with a strong and solid reputation officially. When the Gladstonian government was formed really for the purpose of proposing Home Rule for Ireland, he played a steady part inside Parliament helping the Conservative Opposition with forceful and well-aimed speeches. He directed his main force, however, against the Home Rule project by platform speeches outside in the provinces and in the great centres. Thus in the spring of 1886 he consolidated the reputation he had won in the autumn of 1885 as a platform orator of unsurpassed effectiveness. When in the summer of that year the Home Rule Bill was defeated, and a General Election ensued, he was again hailed as the standard bearer of the Conservative party. Immediately after Lord Salisbury himself he was the second person in the Conservative party, and admittedly the first among Conservative commoners. His speeches on the electioneering platforms were so sparkling, caustic, so logical too, and so broad in scope, that it was the desire of all political men to hear them. So great would be the concourse of hearers from many quarters converging upon the meeting places, that railway companies ran special trains to convey his audiences to their destinations! He routed and cut to pieces the defeated Home Rule policy. He formulated a political creed for the Conservative party far beyond anything which had previously been deemed orthodox—and after his departure it is wonderful still to note how much of that creed survives, and how much by that short and brilliant campaign of his he influenced for all time coming the mind of the greatest of the English political parties. When in this same summer the re-

sult of the General Election was the formation of a powerful Conservative Government, he had the choice of any post he liked except the Foreign Office, which was ultimately reserved for the Prime Minister. He chose the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, the most technically difficult of all, with his usual boldness, though he had absolutely no experience of State finance; but he believed himself, and doubtless with some justice, to have intelligence enough for anything. With this great post was combined the leadership of the Commons, which thus made him second-in-command of the Government. He was raised to this not by selection, but by acclamation—as it was felt by all that he had the ear not only of the Members, but of the electors and of the country.

In the short session which followed during the early autumn, he represented the Government in the Commons, not in any overweening or demonstrative manner, but with skill, tact and quietude. This naturally strengthened the public confidence in him. His boldness and self-confidence had always been the theme of wonder, and often of admiration. Now it was seen that in the proper place he could be prudent and reserved. The Gladstonians naturally enough tried to catch him tripping in regard to the Irish policy. But he anticipated them by at once expounding his policy with fullness and explicitness.

The short session over, he went for a trip on the Continent, visiting especially Germany, Austria and parts of Russia. This was a strange thing for a young Chancellor of the Exchequer to do—an inexperienced financier. Men marvelled indeed, but they knew him to be determined to understand all that was interesting under the sun, and they felt uneasy, perhaps, as to what his pondering mind might evolve out of the mazes of European politics.

Returning to England by November, he set himself to learn his duties as Chancellor of the Exchequer! Just as in the previous year he had astonished the Anglo-Indian veterans by his humble desire to learn, so now he agreeably surprised the financial authorities at the Treasury by his rapid mastery of principles and by his readiness to enter into details. There are still men in the Treasury who remember him with pleasure and say that had he only remained in his post long enough he would have proved one of the ablest men that ever entered that difficult department.

Then he resumed for a while his political campaigning; and appeared among other places at Dartford, in Kent, the very heart

of English Conservatism. Before the most influential audience that could be assembled he made the greatest of all his political pronouncements—and it proved also to be his last. How little the multitude—who listened with eyes and ears wide open, and drank in all the high sounding sentences without thinking of what was really implied and intended—could have dreamt that he would never speak in that way again! They felt how very much they owed him, what great things he had done for them in the year about to end and in the year before; they had derived so much benefit from his teaching and preaching, they were so willing to continue accepting his guidance; his points were so attractively put to catch their attention for the moment—that they hardly perceived how he was fastening upon them as Conservatives a fairly advanced Liberal policy. Struck by his genius and eloquence, they forgot all about his youth and inexperience, and the real scantiness of his political knowledge. His speech, when calmly considered after its appearance in print, went clearly beyond what the Conservatives would ultimately accept. Still, for the moment, no objection was openly raised—his speech passed muster—men trusted that his excesses would be pared away, when the doctrines laid down oratorically came to be applied to practice, and the party remained in contentment till Christmas time in the pleasant sense of victories won and still more to follow.

There was, however, one characteristic in his speech which every one saw—indeed, none could fail to see. He spoke throughout as if he alone, in his single person, was the Government, as if there were no Prime Minister, no Cabinet, no colleagues. In a certain sense, *l'état c'est moi* was the idea pervading his speech. Not that he implied absolutism in the slightest degree—but he did imply that the administration must be conducted according to the national will, that he had a better insight than anyone else into that will, and that with this intuition, he expounded to his party, including all his colleagues, what policy would answer and what principles would have to be carried out, whether politicians liked it nor not. Indeed, he would say privately that he had “an instinct” for politics, meaning, doubtless, that he had a sort of “second sight,” almost a gift, of foretelling what the nation would require. On a retrospect of his career it is now but too easy to see that in such a country as England this procedure on the part

of the most splendid party-leader, even the greatest genius, is very much like "riding for a fall."

At Christmas tide the London "Times" astonished the world, one morning, by the announcement that he had resigned his high office. The other newspapers had no such announcement, but it was understood that at midnight he had driven over to the "Times" office and communicated the news. There was something sensational in his procedure, but then he doubtless meant to cause such a sensation as would shake the Conservative Government to its foundations and produce a political cataclysm, a parliamentary whirlpool, out of which he might emerge, and then be free to form a new government, with himself as head, an administration in which he would be supreme, and a policy of which he would be the framer. That he was aiming at supremacy in the party is believed by many; some personal admirers may have abetted him in this aim; but the mass of Conservatives were fully supporting their own Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, and his colleagues.

It soon transpired that in Cabinet Council he had, as Financial Minister, demanded some reduction in the estimates for the army and navy, that the Ministers for those two departments had objected to making any reductions in reference to the armaments on the Continent of Europe, that the Prime Minister and the rest of the Cabinet had supported them, and that, consequently, he had resigned. It was thought by many outside that his ideas had been affected by what he saw during his visit to Central and Eastern Europe. Anyhow, he had evidently tried the forbearance of his colleagues too far. No doubt they valued his services immensely, they were most anxious to keep him and not to lose him; they dreaded the disturbance that would be caused by his secession. But when he trenched on such a subject as National Defence, they rounded on him and showed that solid front which Englishmen never fail to show in critical moments. His resignation was fully and immediately accepted. In fact, he had supplied a signal illustration of the vaulting ambition which overleaps itself.

Still, he had lighted the bomb and fired the mine—and he awaited the result. Much disturbance ensued throughout the Conservative party—telegrams by the shoal poured in upon him. He of course replied that he could do nothing, but that all remon-

stances should be addressed, not to him, but to the Government. His meaning probably was that the Government should be urged by the party to ask him to come back—doubtless he would do so, but upon his own terms—and that would amount to one more step on his road toward supremacy. But if such were his hope, it was not to be fulfilled. The Government and the party rallied after the confusion; his place as Chancellor of the Exchequer was filled by one highly qualified statesman, his position as leader of the Commons by another statesman. Some few weeks remained before the reassembling of Parliament, within which time the Government could mend the breach and prepare an unbroken front to be presented before the Opposition; and so on the date when Parliament met early in 1887, he was already a beaten and defeated man, owing to his own rashness and to his own miscalculation of political forces.

Immediately after the meeting of the House he asked leave to make his explanation. The Members crowded to hear him—as he rose, with his face, voice, figure, all associated with happy and triumphant memories, the Members began instinctively cheering almost as warmly as they had cheered him in his palmiest hours. But they grew silent as he proceeded, and he sat down at the end of his speech, amidst silence. How he must have felt the contrast between that and the tumultuous approbation that used to greet his perorations on former occasions. He had exactly confirmed all that was already understood by the public regarding the causes of his resignation, and he had concluded with what, perhaps, he meant to be the ominous words, “I appeal unto Cæsar.” That was in his peculiar manner, he would appeal to the people outside as against the Government and the Parliament. Doubtless he never thought of anything like a plebiscite; still unconsciously to himself his thoughts must have tended somewhat in that direction. His words did not prove to be ominous. The Cæsar of democracy did not listen to his appeal. The party in Parliament and in the country trusted in Lord Salisbury, the business in the Commons went on well, his absence ceased to be felt, the world took no further heed of the incidence of his resignation. He had vainly deemed himself to be the indispensable man. But in the hour of trial it was found that he could be dispensed with. As it is written in the stage directions when great actors are to quit the boards, so it was decreed of him, “*Exit.*” Yet many were very

sorry that "*sic transit gloria*" should thus be recorded of him, and that such a heyday both of actual achievement and of future promise should thus have come to an untimely close.

Whether he could by discreetly reforming his political conduct have retrieved his disaster and regained his position, may be doubtful; but many will believe that he could; and I am myself clearly of that belief, having been present in the midst of affairs. At all events he took no steps in that direction, but almost immediately proceeded to the South of Europe, as if he wished to be "out of sight and out of mind." Late in the spring he returned to the House and took his place as a private Member in the party where he had recently been the acclaimed leader. Now and again on some special occasion he moved in the House with some of his old forceful ability. Outside, too, he would occasionally make a speech with some of his old fire; but the glamour had been weakened, the spell had been broken, and there was no longer extreme curiosity to hear him, as before. He did not seem to have recuperative or rallying power; he had the *élan* to make a grand attack, but not the stubbornness to return again and again to the charge. Be that as it may, however, he certainly did not again play an active part in the Parliament which lasted till 1892. Once he stood forward to assail the Government in a style which offended the Conservative party. Once, too, he exerted his eloquence most loyally in defence of certain grants to the Royal family. On that occasion he said he had been so long absent from the House that he might almost claim the indulgence due to a new Member.

At one time some efforts were made by those Conservatives who still adhered to him absolutely, to induce him to return to some place in the Government, and apparently he was willing to do so. But whatever may have been the negotiations, they came to nothing, for he could not have been readmitted to the leadership, as the Conservatives were not sure that his temper was disciplined enough, or that he would be sufficiently tolerant toward the mediocrities who must always abound in any large body of men, to be capable of maintaining moral authority. Still, he always had a gracious manner toward those for whom he really cared.

Meanwhile, he went off on a long journey to South Africa, partly to explore for gold, partly to write graphic letters for a London newspaper. But the letters did not sustain his reputa-

tion; indeed, they had rather an unfavorable effect. His well known capacity for learning a new subject did not seem to stand him in good stead for the comprehension of South Africa.

Soon he returned to the House to find his place which he had thrown away occupied by an old friend! And alas! how changed he was! The fine, wiry figure remained, but the hair had left the head, and instead of the shaven face there was a beard; the manner, too, was less vivacious and somewhat absent. It was understood that he had felt premonition from the beginning, that he had expected a short lease of almost supreme authority and then an early death.

In 1893, however, he formally reappeared on the front Opposition bench to oppose Mr. Gladstone's second Home Rule Bill for Ireland. A hope had spread abroad that he was himself again, and once more the Members crowded to hear him, and the galleries were full. The oration was indeed very fine, but the world saw that he was no longer his old self. On subsequent occasions he rose to speak, but each time it became more apparent that some fatal change was supervening, and that he was succumbing to nervous depression. It were too sad to record the almost daily decay of his once beaming personality during 1894. He made gallant, almost desperate, efforts to recover himself, but these only hastened the end. During the autumn and early winter he journeyed to the sunny South of Europe, and in the beginning of 1895 was carried back to London, almost motionless, to die. Then for some days all England, in imagination, stood by the side of his death-bed. As the end came, quite quietly, all British politicians, friends and foes alike, were sorrowing. The Conservatives grieved over the untimely loss of one of the brightest ornaments that ever adorned their historic party. All men acknowledged that never had the force of youthful genius—striking, piercing, penetrating—been so displayed in British politics, except in the example of William Pitt the younger.

RICHARD TEMPLE.

THE RED MAN'S PRESENT NEEDS.

BY HAMLIN GARLAND.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

In my wanderings over the Rocky Mountain States, I have happened upon some twelve or fifteen Indian reservations. This unofficial inspection, made for fictional purposes, I now wish to turn to practical account in aid of a clearer understanding of the present conditions of the nation's wards. I am not to be taken as the representative of any organization whatsoever, and I have never held, and never sought, and do not intend to seek, any position under the government. Perhaps this freedom from departmental bias may lend a certain value to my statement of what I saw and what I think should be done. A part of what follows is necessarily critical, but its main intent is constructive. I do not doubt the good intention of the Indian Department; on the contrary, I believe its head to be sincerely anxious to clear the service of its abuses. What is here written is intended to aid rather than embarrass the Commissioner in getting rid of his inheritance of foolish policies.

It is necessary at the start to clear away the common misapprehension that "one Indian is precisely like another." This is not true. On the contrary, there are very wide divergencies of habit among the native tribes now living in America. Red men living side by side are as widely separated in speech and in manner as the Turk and the German. There are, indeed, two or three distinct races of Americans included under the term "Indian," speaking many languages quite distinct and irrelatable.

The second point to be grasped is this: There are no Indians living as nomads or hunters to-day. If the reader will examine a map of the United States Indian Department, he will find, scattered all over the West, minute, irregular patches of yellow, ranging from a thumb-nail's breadth to that of a silver quarter. These are the "corrals," or open-air prisons, into which the original owners of the continent have been impounded by the white race. Most of these reservations are in the arid parts of

the great Rocky Mountain Plateau; a few are in timbered regions of older States, like Wisconsin and Minnesota. Speaking generally, we may say these lands are relatively the most worthless to be found in the State or Territory whose boundaries enclose the red man's home, and were set aside for his use because he would cumber the earth less there than elsewhere. Furthermore, scarcely a single one of these minute spots is safe to the red people. Every acre of land is being scrutinized, and plans for securing even these miserable plots are being matured.

It will appear, even from a glance at this map, that to understand the "Indian problem," is to understand the climate, soil and surroundings of each one of fifty reservations, in a dozen States, hundreds, even thousands of miles apart, and to take into account the peculiarities of as many differing tribes of men. A rule which would apply perfectly to the Cheyennes of Oklahoma would not in the least apply to the Cheyennes of Montana, but might aid the Wichitas, Kiowas, or Fort Sill Apaches, not because the latter tribes are similar in habit, but because their soil, surroundings, and climate are practically the same.

The Sioux, Crows, Northern Cheyennes, Blackfeet, Gros Ventres, and Assiniboines, occupying respectively the Standing Rock reservation in Dakota, and the Crow, Tongue River, Fort Peck, Fort Belknap and Blackfeet reservations in Montana, are all in an arid climate and confronted with the problem of irrigation.

The Blackfeet, also a hunting race, have a land even less adapted to the raising of corn and wheat; for their reservation lies high on the eastern slope of the continental divide, and frosts blast both the growing and the ripening crop. They have, however, a good grass country and can be made self-supporting as herders. The Fort Peck reservation, in eastern Montana, on the upper Missouri, like the land at Standing Rock, Dakota, is upland prairie, with meagre streams and poor timber, a dry bleak land, fit only for stock-raising, except along the bottoms, where irrigation is possible.

The Crows are a little better off. They have abundant water from two beautiful streams, which take their rise in the Big Horn mountains; and they have put through some fairly successful irrigating ditches. They have also owned for several years herds of cattle; a cut in rations would not leave them helpless. The Northern Cheyennes, their neighbors, are in a rougher country,

a very arid country, with only a few feeble streams, but they have plenty of timber and good grazing lands. Their chief needs are cattle, and a fence to keep out the cattle-men.

The Sioux, the Blackfeet, and the Northern Cheyennes live practically the same life. They have small, badly-ventilated log or frame hovels of one or two rooms, into which they closely crowd during cold weather. In summer, they supplement these miserable shacks by canvas tepees and lodges, under which they do their cooking, and in which they sleep. Their home life has lost all its old-time picturesqueness, without acquiring even the comfort of the settler in a dug-out. Consumption is very common among them, because of their unsanitary housing during cold weather.

They dress in a sad mixture of good old buckskin garments and shoddy clothing, sold by the traders or issued by the government. They are, of course, miserably poor, with very little to do but sit and smoke and wait for ration day. To till the ground is practically useless, and their herds are too small to furnish them support. They are not allowed to leave the reservation to hunt or to seek work, and so they live like reconcentrados. Their ration, which the government by an easy shift now calls a charity, feeds them for a week or ten days, and they go hungry till the next ration day comes round. From three to seven days are taken up with going after rations. These words also apply to the Jicarilla Apaches, and to a part of the Southern Utes. Chief Charley's followers have lands along Pine River which they irrigate. On some of these reservations lands are allotted, either actually or nominally, though the people make less account of it than the agent reports.

The visitor among the Southern Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, and Fort Sill Apaches, will find conditions quite other than those of the North. The climate is mild and the land very productive. Corn, cotton, fruit of all kinds, and wheat can be grown. The winters are short, and water and timber fairly abundant. With the exception of the Yakima and Flathead reservations, those in Oklahoma are the only really habitable Indian lands I have visited. Manifestly, a regulation which would do good in Oklahoma might work incalculable harm in Dakota and Montana. To cut rations among the Southern Cheyennes would prove only a temporary hardship; but a cut in rations among the Blackfeet or

Sioux might result in actual starvation and death, or at least in slaughter of the small flocks of cattle which they have begun to cherish. These wide differences cannot be too often brought to departmental notice.

Upon close study, each tribe, whether Sioux, or Navajo, or Hopi, will be found to be divided, like a white village, into two parties, the radicals and the conservatives—those who are willing to change, to walk the white man's way; and those who are deeply, sullenly sceptical of all civilizing measures, clinging tenaciously to the traditions and the lore of their race. These men are often the strongest and bravest of their tribe, the most dignified and the most intellectual. They represent the spirit that will break but will not bow. And, broadly speaking, they are in the majority. Though in rags, their spirits are unbroken; from the point of view of their sympathizers, they are patriots.

There is much to admire in this unconquerable pride. I count it a virtue in that Northern chief who said: "I will not clean the spittoons of the white man's civilization." Hatred of tyranny is a distinctly American attribute, and one that deserves honorable consideration on the part of the department. Only those who are besotted with the wine of our cruel and uneasy civilization will condemn rankly and contemptuously the love of liberty, no matter whether in the heart of a brown man or of a red man. There should be some way to conserve and turn to account the lofty pride of the Sioux and the Cheyenne. When they lose their self-respect, they will sink to vagabondage and beggary; to break them is to destroy them. Science has come to our aid; we understand as never before the constitution of a red man's mind. The philosophy of evolution has broadened our conception of the universe, and in our dealings with primitive men religious bigotry and race hatred should no longer enter. The greedy man, on the one hand, and the fanatic, on the other, have too long confused the situation for the Indian.

The allotment of lands in severalty which began in land-lust and is being carried to the bitter end by those who believe a Stone Age man can be developed into a citizen of the United States in a single generation, is in violent antagonism to every wish and innate desire of the red man, and has failed of expected results, even among the Southern Cheyennes, where the land is rich and climate mild, because it presents a sombre phase of civilized life.

The attempt to make the Sioux a greedy land-owner, content to live the lonely life of the poor Western rancher, cut off from daily association with his fellows, is to me uselessly painful. If we would convert the primitive man to our ways, we must make our ways alluring.

We should not forget that the red man is a sociable animal, and that his life, so far from being silent and sombre, has always been full of song and rich in social interchange. All his duties—even his hunting—have always been performed in company with his fellows. He is a villager, never a solitary. He dreads solitude, and one of the old-time tribal punishments was to be thrust outside the camping circle. The life of every member of the tribe is open to comment. He confides every secret to his group of lodge-men. He shares his food, his tepee, with his fellows. It is this gregariousness of habit, this love of his kind, and this deep-seated dread of loneliness, which make the Sioux and the Cheyenne so reluctant to adopt the Dawes land theories. They cling to the lodge for the reason that it can be easily moved, and is cheap.

Naturally, those who were resolute to make the Indian a solitary took little thought of this deep-seated mental characteristic, being confident that resolute whacking would jar his brain-cells into conformity with those of a white man of the same age. With them the red hunter is not a man peculiar to his environment; he is merely a bad boy who obstinately goes wrong. That he loves running water, that he needs to be near wood for his fires, that he shrinks from the bleak, wind-swept prairies, are considerations of small account to them; but a man with many years experience among the Cheyennes said to me: "It is hard to make progress under the present system."

In the desire to make better Indians, and to make the transition from their old life to the new as easy as may be, to lessen rather than to add to the weight of their suffering, I offer the following suggestions:

First. Group the families of each tribe on the water courses of its reservation, in little settlements of four or five families, with their lands outlying, instead of forcibly scattering them over the bleak and barren uplands. The Standing Rock Sioux, Northern Cheyennes, and Assiniboinés of Forts Peck and Belknap, could all be so colonized, and water drawn in from the streams upon

their gardens,* while their cattle range in common. Why should not the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, already on allotments along the streams, be allowed to draw together in villages if they please? The Northern Cheyennes, now in full possession of their streams, should retain these water rights in common. Individual occupancy of lots and individual ownership of products is all that is necessary to their colonization on the arable and irrigable land. Cattle of gentle breed should be given to them as the beginning of individual herds. The red man's feeling that the earth is for the use of all men, is right; he has always distinguished between the ownership of things and the ownership of land and water. It is possible to refine him without teaching him to be either greedy or stingy, just as we can emphasize the return to individual labor without forcing him to live as if in solitary confinement. I confess I have no sympathy with those who would make the red man suffer needlessly to fit their notion of discipline. As a boy, I hated the solitary labor of the Western farm, and I would not condemn even a convict to such life as is involved in a lonely cabin on the plains.

Second. Each reservation should be divided into districts, not too large, and a really competent man employed to personally teach the red men how to plow, sow, and reap. This essential part of the service is sadly inefficient. The "farmers" of the various agencies I have visited, are either ignorant or slothful, or they are so burdened with duties around the agency corrals, that they are hardly ever of marked use to the red men. The present working of the Civil Service has led to a vicious habit of "transferring" a bad or weak man from post to post. Furthermore, the employees in many cases are hold-overs, men who sought the service as a refuge and who remain in it because they are unfitted for other life. I am willing to admit, however, in justice to the department, that the pay is too small to secure the services of a really capable man, unless he assumes double duty, as among the Southern Cheyennes, where the farmers serve as sub-agents, or school superintendents, and have little time to give to field work.

* The farmer at Poplar Creek two years ago showed me a garden of nearly one hundred acres which he had set aside in lots to some sixty or eighty men; and, though the season's water had been very meagre, he had been able to supply these families, through their own labor, with potatoes for the winter. He did more. He demonstrated that these people, with water for their lands, could be self-supporting in three years by means of a ditch costing not more than \$50,000.

Part of the useless travel in this work of superintending would be removed by settlement in groups as above outlined, but an increase in the number of industrial teachers must be given before adequate instruction can be assured. The government would save money in the end.

Life at most of the Indian agencies is not a joyous thing to contemplate. The buildings are bare, bleak barracks. The boarding-houses are vile, and amusements are few. It is not wonderful that refined natures shudder and flee at first glance. Only the chain of necessity keeps the average employee to his post. The Indian soon becomes a burden, a nuisance. Duties are mechanically performed, and each man permits his hand to fall short rather than to over-reach his exact duty. The effect of such service is not precisely inspiring to the Indian. The only ways to change this service are these—raise the standard of wages and make life pleasanter for those who isolate themselves to teach.

Third. A vigorous, wholesome woman is needed in each district as matron. She ought not to be the wife of the farmer; her first duty should be the welfare of her wards, and she should have a genuine sympathy for them. As I go among the red people, the lack of a matron of this character seems the most crying omission of all. I have never seen this work properly done. It is, indeed, a sort of higher education. The women need to be taught by example how to cook and sew, how to keep house, how to bridge the chasm between the tepee fire and the cook-stove. The red people are like children in all these things; they cannot go beyond their teacher; they can only follow. If their "farmer" is ignorant and a loafer, and their matron slothful and ill-humored, they are involved in these vices. They are like children, also, in that each effort is quite sincere, though fitful. They are easily discouraged. They can reason, they do reason, and they want to do the right thing; but the mental habits fixed by thousands of years of a simpler life are hard to overcome. The man or woman called to teach them should be patient and a leader. It is not true to say that this work is being done in the schools. Working in "relays" in the laundry or kitchen of a boarding-house is quite different from taking care of a home after marriage. The field matron is needed to supplement the instruction in the schools.

Fourth. Wherever a tribe has a peculiar natural appetite for an art—as canoe-building, weaving, basket-making, or pottery—

baking—the department should send among them a teacher capable of rescuing perishing forms and symbols, and able also to develop new forms built upon the old. The Jicarilla Apaches, for example, are fine basket-makers. This art, in place of being ignored or positively discouraged, as at present, should be at once seized as a means of benefiting the tribe. The growth of grass, willows or other material necessary for it should be cultivated and a market opened on just terms. *The value of such an art in maintaining the self-respect of a tribe cannot be over-estimated.* The Rev. W. C. Roe, a missionary at Seger's Colony, Oklahoma, is of the sort I can commend. He is employing this month seventy men and women making bead-work, tepees, bows and arrows, moccasins, and ornamental pouches—and what he has done can be duplicated by the agents and missionaries of other tribes. The Navajo blankets and silver-ware, the Hopi and Tewan pottery, the Chippewa canoes, are all in demand, and the art of making them should be fostered. Life on most of the reservations is a grim contention against wind and sun and bare brown earth. Each condition should be minutely studied, and every favoring law seized upon. Whenever an industry can be developed along inherited aptitudes, it should be done.

John Seger, who has been for many years a friend and teacher among the Arapahoes and Southern Cheyennes, pleads for an Old Folks' Home near his school, where the old people could spend the rest of their lives in peace near their grandchildren. They will not last long, but we cannot afford to let them suffer. Under Seger's plan a great part of their food would be raised in a garden, and they could be employed to teach their native arts to the young people. The licensed trader is a survival of the old rule and should be abolished. His monopoly is intolerable. Under the single restriction that no liquor should be sold, competing stores should be welcomed on each reservation, in order that the red man may sell his product to better advantage, as well as supply his needs at the lowest possible cost.

Fifth. Schools should be established in each "farm district," which should be at once boarding and industrial schools, like those at Colony and Red Moon, Oklahoma, and these schools should displace all sectarian and non-reservation schools whatsoever, and all forcible transportation of pupils to Eastern schools should instantly cease. The theory that to civilize the red man it is

necessary to disrupt families and to smother natural emotions by teaching the child to abhor his parents, is so monstrous and so unchristian that its failure was foretold by every teacher who understood the law of heredity. The school should raise the parents with the child. Instruction should be most elementary, as it is at Seger, at Darlington, and at Red Moon, among the Southern Cheyennes. In these schools, the child is taught to grapple with the conditions of life on his own reservation. He is taught how to mend a harness and put it on a horse, not how to make a wagon; how to plant potatoes, not how to conjugate a Latin verb. After he has acquired the power to read and write and speak colloquially (which the Carlisle Indians I have met seldom do), he is taught the value of money, and sufficient arithmetic to enable him to transact the business of a herder or farmer. But admirable as this is, there are other possibilities. Wherever white and red are mingled as settlers, I would educate them in the little red school-house together, and this can soon be done in some parts of Oklahoma. In any case, the education should arm the child for his battle for life and should not alienate him from his people. "Honor thy father and thy mother," is a command which the red children implicitly obey, until they are taught that everything their poor old parents do is vile.

Sixth. The missionaries in the field should be given to understand that they have no more rights in the premises than any other visitor, and that their attempt to regulate the amusements and the daily life of the red man is without sanction of federal authority. Many of the missionaries I have met are devoted souls, but I would not care to live where they had power to define what recreations were proper and what were not. Their view of "profane" songs and pleasures is absurdly narrow and (to put it mildly) inelastic. They do not represent the culture and scholarship of our day; and while I appreciate their motives and their sacrifices, I cannot but observe that they are often an embarrassment to the agent and sad examples of narrow piety. In the interest of their own influence, I would urge all Eastern Missionary Societies to at once impress upon their representatives on the reservations the wisdom of assisting in the preservation and development of the native arts of the tribe with which they are associated. This they can do with very little money, by inducing all the old men and women (who are the fast fading representatives of

these arts) to instruct their sons and daughters, nieces or grandchildren, in silver-smithing, basket-making, blanket-weaving, or whatever form of work they know best. The parent society could also form itself into an agency for the sale of wares, being careful to keep the advice of accredited authorities on art in order that the product may not lose vogue by becoming cheap and characterless. Mr. and Mrs. Roe, of Seger's Colony, Oklahoma, are examples of missionaries with larger aims than merely making converts. Mr. Roe's influence is not due to his preaching of dogma, but to his kindness and helpfulness as a man and brother.

This industrial side of the Indian problem fits in just now with the revival of handicraft so strikingly general throughout the nation, and it may be that in it lies a very considerable means of aiding the red man, as he painfully crosses the gulf between his old warrior life and his life as a cattle-herder and gardener. He cannot be cut off from all his past; progress is not of that nature; it proceeds by slow displacement, by gradual accretion. Above all, the red man must feel that he is worth while, that he is a man among men—different, but not despicable because different. We should try to make him an admirable red man, as Booker Washington is trying to make the negro an admirable black man.

Seventh. Wherever a red man takes his allotment, he should be considered a citizen, free to come and go as he pleases, subject to the same general laws as his white neighbor. He should be allowed to visit other reservations and inter-marry with other tribes; he will never inter-marry to any extent with the whites; he ought not to do so if he could. Under this new condition, the agent will no longer be the commander, but the friend, the adviser, the attorney; his authority will depend on his judgment, his tact, his helpfulness.

The present condition of the allottee is an anomalous one; he is neither man, brute, nor neighbor. He is told by the Commissioner that he is free to do as other men; but when he seeks to leave the reservation he is ordered back by the agent. He is forbidden to visit in numbers exceeding five or ten; he is ordered not to dance, and admonished to wear his hair short. He is told that he must not use paint on his face, and a hundred other useless indignities and restrictions are put upon him;* and, if he pro-

*The general effect of the legislation suggested by those who would convert the man of the Stone Age into a "Christian citizen" is something like this:

tests, he is told that so long as he eats the rations of the government he must obey the agent; and yet these rations are not only his necessity, they are his due. I have sometimes felt that the red man is the most patient and long-suffering creature in the world. Those who cry out against "pauperizing" him by means of rations have little comprehension of the barren lands he inhabits, and the necessity and the justice of his allowance.

The allottee should be made a citizen in truth, subject to punishment when he goes wrong, free to dress as he pleases and live as he pleases, so far as forceful change is concerned. He should be encouraged to live better, to dress in keeping with his fortunes. Religious bias should no longer control him. His rights as a man should be respected. I have no sympathy with those who would "break" the head man and discredit every native amusement, turning the tribe into a settlement of joyless hypocrites. The zealots who preach this are themselves losing power in the world. What sort of village would that be where sombre fanatics could regulate the amusements and the education of the citizens? A people must have play; and, until the young red men and women come naturally to enjoy baseball and the Virginia reel, the government is in cruel business when attempting to force relinquishment of native songs, games and dances.

Finally. The question of abolition of reservations comes up, and is advocated by those who would teach the red man to farm, as you teach a puppy to swim by flinging it into the river. "Let them sink, or paddle and keep afloat," they say, but to let down the bars on some of the reservations would be to submerge the

"You, Whiteshield, will at once leave your pleasant camp in the grove beside the Washita and take yourself to your homequarter. You will at once give up the tepee and all your skin clothing. You will put off your moccasins and take to brogans. You will build a hut and live therein. You will have your hair cut short, and give up painting your face. You will cease all singing and dancing. Every form and symbol of the past is vile—put them away. You will send your children to school—even the little ones of five must go. Smoking is expensive, and leads to dreaming—stop it. To do bead-work or basket-weaving is heathen; your wife must abandon that. You will instantly begin to raise pigs and chickens, and work hard every day, because it is good to work. In order that you may know how sweet it is to live the life of the white farmer, you may go to church on Sunday and hear a man talk in words which you do not understand, and sing songs which white people sing when they have nothing better to do." This reads like caricature, but I assure the reader it is only a condensation of the suggestions made in my hearing by kindly people who believed themselves to be Christians.

tribe utterly and render it homeless. The reservation is still an "isle of safety" to the Northwest tribes.

Moreover, we must never forget that what is true of one reservation is not true of another. In Oklahoma, the settlers and the Cheyennes and Arapahoes are about to mingle peaceably, for the reason that "the horseman with a gun," the cattle-man, is passing away, and the peace-loving farmer is taking his place. "I do not fear the man in the fields with his plow," said a Cheyenne to me; "but the man on the horse who rides and shoots, him I fear." In this remark is much enlightenment. Wherever the lands are generally arable, and the settlers are bent above plows and spades, where peaceful homes are being established and district schools built, there the lines of the reservation can safely give way. But to let the predatory cattle-men in on the reservation of the Northwest is to open the gate to trouble and corruption. The Cheyenne range should be fenced rather than leased or laid open to outside stock.

The cow-boy is a picturesque citizen, but he does not make for sweetness and light. He is not as lawless as he once was, but he is not even now an inspiration to a race struggling to acquire sobriety and thrift. Nevertheless, he has been for forty years the chief exemplar of the white man's civilization—so far as the red men were aware. Our agents have been mainly unmarried men, living as in a barrack, offering little in way of domesticity to the eyes of the tribes they ruled. They were not all corrupt, but they were sojourners; they made no homes among the Indians. The female teachers and most missionaries are also solitaries, with repellent notions of man's duty to God and their own duties to the redskin. Speaking generally, it is safe to say that the red men and the red women have had very slender opportunity to learn of the ways in which the industrious, peaceful, kindly American farmer and his family live. The Ute, the Cheyenne and the Crow came in contact only with the ragged, filthy fringe of our civilization.

But the cow-boy, the "scout," the lawless trapper, the "lonesome men," are passing away. As a novelist, I am sorry to see them go; as a well-wisher of the red men, and as a believer in decent speech, sobriety and kindly living, I am glad of the cow-boy's diminishing hoof-beats. He carries with him something fine, but his room is better than his presence when all is said and done.

The ranchers of Oklahoma to-day are farmers, as they should be, paying for their grass and building homes for their wives and children—men who realize that protection lies in law, not in violence; they will make it a point to dwell in peace with their red neighbors.

Therefore, I would abolish the reservation line in Oklahoma, but I would retain it for the present in Montana. Instead of trying to "break the power of the chiefs," I would use them to influence others less able. The agent can do much to discredit a head man, but he cannot rob him of any genuine influence he may have, for among the red men of a reservation, as among white people in a community, there are those who are natural leaders, who are orators, with the power to convince and lead.

There are not wanting those who say cynically: "Why take all this trouble? There are only a couple of hundred thousand of the redskins; let 'em die!" To such words we reply: As a nation, we can't afford to rest under the stigma of inhuman cruelty. These red men are on our conscience and cannot by any easy shift be put away. They are survivals in our midst of the Stone Age; they are not to blame for their inelasticity of habit; moreover, they have many admirable qualities. We are answerable for them, just as we are answerable for the black man's future. As the dominant race, we have dispossessed them; we have pushed them to the last ditch—which will be their grave, unless we lay aside greed and religious prejudice and go to them as men and brothers, and help them to understand themselves and their problems; and only when we give our best to these red brethren of ours, do we justify ourselves as the dominant race of the Western continent.

HAMLIN GARLAND.

SOUTH AFRICA AND EUROPE.

BY THE LATE JEAN DE BLOCH, RUSSIAN COUNCILLOR OF STATE,
AND AUTHOR OF "THE WAR OF THE FUTURE."

No historic phenomenon is more remarkable than the persistency with which disastrous but avoidable events recur again and again, in spite of the warning which each generation of sufferers bequeaths to its successors. It is a truism to say that history repeats itself, and many take that proverb to imply that historic events, whether fortunate or disastrous, must inevitably reproduce themselves in every stage of social development, owing to a presumed identity of human sentiments, passions, and aspirations, in all ages. Others put the historic truth into the convenient formula, that human nature is unteachable. From the very dawn of history, unjust warfare, corruption, and religious and racial persecution have been ruinous to prosperous states; yet we find all these evils, with little diminished vigor, flourishing under various forms to-day. Yet, in reality, we cannot explain this fact by any such easy phrase as that "human nature is everywhere the same," or that "human nature is unteachable." The broad lessons of history are, on the contrary, very well understood by all civilized peoples; the general agreement as to what those lessons are is, perhaps, the best proof of that.

The truth is that nations, when they embark upon some fatal policy—upon a disastrous war, which ruins them from outside, or upon misgovernment, which consumes them from within—do not do so because they are ignorant of the lesson of history that such courses are invariably followed by destruction, but because, under the influence of passion and of unwise counsel, they have become firmly convinced that their own case is exceptional, and excluded by some magic exemption from the operation of the historic laws which have been revealed by the history of the past.

When disaster follows, the suffering nations still fail to recognize that their case was in no way exceptional, and that their misfortunes arose merely from inability to regard themselves objectively, as they regard other nations, both present and past. They refuse even to recognize the immediate causes of their disasters, and cast about them for far-fetched and improbable explanations. The French, in 1870, having entered upon a war without preparation, and having suffered the natural consequences, even went so far as to attribute their defeat to treachery. In like manner, the English, being unwilling to accept an ordinary explanation of the remarkable series of events which have hitherto characterized the South-African War, have fabricated an ingenious and wholly unnecessary explanation, which has shrouded in mystery the meaning of events which, in reality, are explicable in a perfectly simple manner. This explanation, which may be summed up in the words of its exponents, as "the peculiar conditions of South-African warfare," meets with universal acceptance in England, and there is a tendency to accept it among all peoples not openly hostile to England. Yet it is probable that no delusion was ever more threatening to the peace of mankind, for its acceptance means that Europe and the world will never learn a lesson the importance of which for the welfare of the world is incalculably great.

It was natural that the nations of the European Continent, in their sympathy with the two republics, should seek to explain the defeats which the Boers continued to inflict upon the English even long after the regular Boer defence had broken down, by declaring that the English were inferior to the Boers in every military quality. It was natural, too, that English critics should refuse to admit the truth of this. Some other explanation had in the nature of things to be put forward. As I shall hereafter show, a very obvious explanation was to be found in the changed conditions of offensive warfare, which have resulted from the improvement of rifles and artillery, the employment of smokeless powder, and the more general adoption of the spade as an arm of the first importance. British critics, whether military or civilian, would, however, have none of this. Just as the French in 1870 raised the cry of "Treachery!" the British proceeded to fabricate a complicated network of pretended causes to explain why it was that the conquest of South Africa was necessarily

accompanied by defeats and delays. The distance of the country from Europe, its vastness, its configuration, the difficulty of protecting communications, the sparseness of the population, the lack of a local food-supply, and a hundred minor conditions arising therefrom, were the real causes, said the British apologists, of the British difficulties and disasters.

Now this theory is, on its face, very plausible; but doubt is immediately thrown upon it when we observe that, though all these conditions are permanent, and were well-known to every one long before the war broke out, they were never adduced beforehand as conditions likely to cause disaster, but were only brought forward after disaster had actually occurred. The doubt is increased when we know that, before the war, arguments of a totally different kind were employed to show that disaster would occur to the British arms, or to the arms of any other Power which should undertake an offensive war without an enormous superiority in numbers and resources. These latter arguments together make up the "changed conditions of warfare" theory, or, in other words, the theory which claims that, under modern conditions, the defensive possesses an inherent superiority, which can be overcome only by overwhelming forces.

The fact that this theory was broached before the war broke out, whereas the rival explanation of "peculiar conditions" was a belated afterthought, stands *primâ facie* in its favor. But the fact is that the British argument will not bear a moment's examination. I shall deal shortly with some of these explanations, to show how unsubstantial they are. Firstly, as to the vastness of the country and the consequent difficulty of guarding communications, we know that Napoleon marched all over Europe, and that history is full of examples of hostile armies traversing, again and again, vaster countries than the two South-African republics. Still more significant is the fact that nearly all the serious defeats sustained by the British took place at an inconsiderable distance from their base, and when communications were perfectly safe. The vastness of the country and threatened communications played no part whatever in the battles of Colenso, Stormberg, and Magersfontein. These factors had, of course, an enormous effect upon the strategical development of the war, and were largely responsible for its prolongation; but they did not affect at all the tactical conditions of individual engagements.

Still more strange is the assertion of British apologists, that the sparseness of the population was one of their great obstacles. The British enjoyed the advantage of being opposed only by a handful of Boers, yet their apologists fall into the inconsistency of wanting them at the same time to have whatever advantage attaches to campaigning in a thickly settled country! If South Africa were peopled as thickly as Europe, the British might have been able to live on the country, but they would have been opposed by several millions of men instead of fifty thousand. To claim, therefore, that the sparseness of the population was a "peculiar difficulty" of South-African warfare, while ignoring the advantage of having to fight a scanty population, is surely the height of absurdity.

Even the splendid climate of South Africa has been libelled as a "peculiar condition of South-African warfare." And so it is; but only in the sense that every climate but his own is a peculiar condition to an invader. The climate of South Africa differed from that of England chiefly in being drier, and therefore more suitable for campaigning; and for the British, who have fought in every country on the globe, to put forward such an argument, only shows how great is the strain imposed upon the apologist. Similarly, we find that the configuration of South Africa is infinitely more open, and presents less obstacles to an invader, than any equal area in Western or Central Europe. Nor did the distance of seven thousand miles which separates the Cape from England play any considerable part, and it may be doubted whether the British could have sent their 350,000 men from London to Edinburgh with as little difficulty as they experienced in sending them from Southampton to Cape Town and Durban.

Now, the facts which I have pointed out completely destroy the value of the British explanation. Are we, therefore, to fall back upon the Continental theory, that the Boers were in every way superior soldiers to the British? This theory is equally untenable. The earlier stages of the war disprove it. At these stages, the British were very considerably inferior to the Boers in numbers and, in some respects, in armament. Yet, despite their numerical superiority, the Boers, who, we are told, were superior to the British in soldierly qualities, never gained a real advantage over their enemies. The three unfortified towns against which they advanced in great numbers and in exultant

spirits, held out triumphantly. Wherever the Boers attacked, they were driven back with heavy loss. It was the same at Ladysmith, at Kimberley, and at Mafeking. When reinforcements arrived, the British began a series of counter-attacks upon the Boer positions, and were repulsed as decisively. That neither side was successful in attack, though each was triumphant in defence, seems to me to be like the key of the whole situation.

The key of the situation, in short, lies in the fact that the South-African War confirms what had been repeatedly affirmed in advance by myself and by those authorities upon whom I relied in preparing my book, that "new conditions of warfare" had arisen, the main characteristic of which was that the strength of the attack, both physical and moral, had declined to an extraordinary extent since the last great war. It is impossible to explain in an article the basis of this theory; but it may be summed up by saying that the improvements in the rifle and in artillery, and the universal employment of field intrenchments, altogether operate to the advantage of the defensive. It is much less important to explain why this is so, than to prove that it was so; and I shall, therefore, give a short summary of the way in which the war vindicated the thesis.

It is necessary to premise that, although I have treated these facts in detail elsewhere, I have never before attempted to summarize their consecutive effect. It is not very easy to apply the canons of logic to an art so arbitrary as war, as to which there is so much in dispute; yet it is no exaggeration to say that nearly every individual event in South Africa either directly or indirectly proves the superiority of defensive warfare. Even those few facts which seem to prove the contrary, on examination are often the strongest bases of the argument. We know, for instance, that attacks sometimes succeeded; but we know not the less certainly that any such attacks were undertaken with unexampled superiority of numbers, or were accompanied by turning movements. We know, also, that the defence occasionally broke down, as did the defence of Cronje at Paardeberg; but we know that the defence broke down not in consequence of the effectiveness of the attack, but owing to starvation and the hopelessness of relief, under conditions which would not be repeated in a European war.

I will take the question of reconnaissance first, since that,

though not an arm of combat, is the most indispensable of the preliminaries to attack. Before the outbreak of the South-African War, I laid it down in my book, as the result of observation, that "smokeless powder, and modern arms and ammunition insure long ignorance of a defender's exact position, and in consequence serious loss before the true position is ascertained... the period of uncertainty may cause immense losses to the attacker." This affirmation was based partly upon results observed at manœuvres in Europe, and partly upon the reports of the European *attachés* during the war in Cuba. It was in every way confirmed by experience in South Africa. The attackers were almost invariably in ignorance of the defenders' position, with the result that before the truth was ascertained they had suffered such severe losses as necessitated abandonment of the attack. At Stormberg, the British marched, in total ignorance, to within a few hundred yards of the Boer trenches, and in consequence were driven back in flight, leaving a third of their men in the hands of the Boers. The correspondents relate that, even after the Boers had opened fire, the British were totally unable to locate them. At Magersfontein, the experience of the attackers was the same. The Highland Brigade there lost a quarter of their strength in a few minutes, owing to their ignorance of the Boer position. All over the battlefield the British suffered from the same difficulty of locating their enemy. To quote the *Daily Mail* correspondent: "While the Highlanders were fighting on the left, the Guards advanced on the right across the open veldt, and fought an invisible foe for fifteen hours." At Modder River, and at Colenso, the defenders were invisible, and their smokeless powder gave no clue to their position. At Modder River we read that "most of the officers and men on the British side never saw a Boer, and were not even certain on which side of the river the Boers were."

This is entirely a "new condition of warfare"; and its effect is that the *sine qua non* of attack, that the attacker should be exactly informed as to the defender's position, has been made unattainable under the altered conditions of war. I shall now attempt to show how the South-African War has shown a similar decline in the reliability of other auxiliaries of attack.

All tacticians are agreed that an infantry attack upon an entrenched position must be preceded by a vigorous artillery bom-

bardment, the object of which is both to cause loss to the defenders and to damage their *morale*. Without this, it is agreed, no infantry attack can have the reasonable chance of success which is necessary if attack is to be undertaken. Now, the last great wars tend to show that the effect of artillery for this purpose is very much exaggerated. "At Plevna," said Todleben, "we would sometimes fire a whole day for the purpose of killing a single Turk." Since then, artillery has been improved enormously in range, accuracy, and explosive effect, Professor Langlois calculating that the guns in use to-day are forty times more effective than those of 1870. Yet, in spite of this, the lesson of Plevna was not only repeated, but emphasized, by the experiences of South Africa. Every one of the great battles of the South African War was begun by a heavy bombardment; yet in no case is there any record of the Boers suffering sufficiently to shake their *morale*, much less to drive them from their intrenchments. At Enslin, two batteries of field-guns, and several heavy naval guns, bombarded the Boer trenches, until, to quote a correspondent, "it seemed impossible that any living thing could be left in them." Yet only twenty-one dead Boers were found after the battle, mostly killed by rifle fire. At Modder River, three thousand heavy projectiles were poured into the Boer position; yet the Boer Army held its ground, retiring later only in consequence of a flank attack. At Colenso, the British attackers had forty-six guns, and the Boers only twelve. The correspondents reported that the Boer position on Fort Wylie, "as the result of the exploding shells, looked like a volcano in full eruption"; yet the Boer guns on this very position were fought to the end. At Paardeberg, 4,000 Boers were shut up in a small space, and subjected for ten days to the fire of from fifty to a hundred field-guns, heavy naval guns, and howitzers, some of the latter firing 120-pound Lyddite shells. The result of this unprecedented bombardment was that 170 men were killed and wounded, at least half of whom suffered during the infantry attack which preceded the bombardment. The lesson of the war, in short, was that artillery was almost wholly ineffective when employed against intrenchments. That this was not due to any inherent defects in the guns, or in the manner in which they were served, is shown by the fact that the Boer bombardment of Ladysmith and Kimberley was equally without serious effect. It is also

shown by another very striking incident. I refer to the ill-fated attack upon Spion-Kop, when the Boer artillery, employed *against the attacker*, put out of action in one night some 1,300 men. In this action, the British, owing to the stony nature of the ground, and the neglect to despatch an efficient engineering corps to the occupied position, were unable to intrench themselves. Hence the heavy losses, and the completed demonstration of the fact that, while the power of modern artillery is unprecedented, it can be used only with effect against an exposed enemy, or, in other words, against an advancing attacker.

It is, of course, argued by those who still believe in the efficacy of artillery in attack, that the effect of gun fire is chiefly moral. But those who thus argue forget that this moral effect is merely the consequence of fear, and that, when riflemen safely sheltered behind intrenchments realize that they have nothing to fear from the enemy's guns, the moral effect upon them will be nil. This was the case in the Transvaal War, where the severest artillery bombardment never drove the Boers from their positions.

In these facts, which are not disputed (though attempts have been made to explain them away), we see another element in the increment of strength to the defensive. The complete failure of the artillery is, of course, entirely due to the more perfect intrenchments of to-day, and to the invisibility of those intrenchments which results from the employment of smokeless powder by their defenders. Yet the British, in all these engagements, were enormously superior to the Boers in number of guns, and in supply of ammunition. In an ordinary war between Powers of equal or almost equal strength (the two alliances of Continental Europe for example), there will be no such disparity in armament or numbers. The defender will not only not be inferior in artillery to the attacker, but, more probably, superior, since the fortifications on the European frontiers are permanent and equipped with heavier guns than the attacker can conveniently transport.

If this be so, we must conclude that, in the war of the future, infantry will be required to attack without either the moral or material encouragement which was formerly supplied by successful artillery bombardment. This leads directly to the question of infantry attack under modern conditions, and here also we find a change entirely to the advantage of the defenders. In

The War of the Future, I examined this question; and it seemed to me indisputable that, excluding accidental factors, a superiority in numbers which no European Power would be likely to possess would be required in order to carry out a successful frontal attack. Experiments made at my instance in Switzerland showed that theoretically this superiority would not be less than eight to one; and the studies of von Rohne and others led them to similar conclusions. Accidental circumstances play so large a part in any individual battle that it is, of course, impossible to gain any direct confirmation of these figures from single battles in South Africa. But the general experience of the frontal attacks attempted in Natal and in the Western Cape Colony shows decisively that an enormous superiority is indispensable, and that, even with such a superiority, success cannot always be relied upon. The one great instance of a Boer frontal attack in force (the attack upon Ladysmith on January 6th, 1900), resulted in total failure. It is necessary to cite this first, lest the objection be made that the British attacks, which I shall now deal with, failed only because of some inherent defect in British methods. These British attacks were numerous, and all resulted in total failures. The only battle of the war in which the Boers were really routed, as the result of a direct attack, was at Elandslaagte, where the British outnumbered the Boers by five to one, and carried out at the same time a flank attack. Attacks at Belmont and Enslin resulted in the withdrawal of the Boers from their positions in good order. But in every other case, the British frontal attacks failed, even when made by forces outnumbering the Boers by four or five to one. At Magersfontein, 13,000 British made an attack upon half that number of Boers, and were decisively defeated. At Colenso, 20,000 British attempted a frontal attack upon a fourth of the number of Boers and were defeated with a loss of eleven guns. At Paardekop, 16,000 to 20,000 British, with enormously superior artillery, attempted a frontal attack upon 4,000 exhausted Boers and were driven back with a loss of 1,400 men, the Boer loss being less than a hundred. The Boer loss in most of these South-African battles is not definitely known; but most reports agree that the intrenched Boers invariably lost less than a tenth of the number which they put out of action among the attackers.

All this confirms the belief, which is becoming more and more

prevalent among military men, that the frontal attack, as a method of offence, is tending to pass out of practical warfare. The consequence in European warfare must be very great. The European alliances are equal in numbers and differ only in speed of mobilization. If the relations between attack and defence were now what they have been in the past, this difference in the rapidity with which mobilization is carried out would play a great, probably a decisive, part. But, in the words of von der Goltz, "the growing power of resistance of every military unit now enables a single division to accept battle with a whole army corps, if it be confident of reinforcement within a reasonable time." On the European frontiers, before the smaller forces of the slowly mobilizing Power can be driven from their positions, the slower Power will have completed the concentration of its troops, and equality will then be established. This conclusion is inevitably driven in upon us when we consider the conditions of European frontiers, and the exceptional thinness of modern defensive lines. The French frontier, in case of an attempted invasion by Germany, is as good an instance as any other. The Franco-German frontier is only 160 miles in length, and it is studded with fortresses and anterior defensive lines, which arose as the result of the war of 1870-71. Within forty-eight hours, the French could concentrate upon this frontier a force of 300,000 men. That is to say, they would have an average of 2,000 men per mile for the entire frontier. Twenty years ago, such a line would have been thin to the point of danger. But the magazine rifle has changed all that. At Magersfontein, the Boers held all day an improvised position some twenty miles long with less than 6,000 men; that is, they had only 300 men a mile, sixteen times less than was formerly regarded as the necessary strength per mile. In the other battles of the South-African War, the Boer defensive lines were equally thin; yet, with the magazine rifle, they were always able to attain sufficient fire-intensity to defeat any attempt to break through their lines. At Waterloo, the British had more men concentrated on *two* miles of defences than the whole Boer Army; yet their fire was not sufficient to prevent the French reaching close to their lines, and in some cases even penetrating them. With the modern rifle, however, we find 300 men per mile developing an intensity of fire sufficient to decimate any body of troops attempting to approach

in close formation. It must be concluded, therefore, that the 2,000 men per mile which the French, immediately upon the outbreak of war, could throw upon their permanently fortified frontiers, would constitute a defence formidable enough to baffle any attempt to break through in the short time which would elapse before the arrival of reinforcements.

This, it seems to me, is the chief tactical problem presented by the failures of infantry attack in South Africa. The facts cited undoubtedly lead to the conclusion that, as in the case of artillery, modern improvements in infantry weapons have altogether favored the defensive. I shall not attempt to deal here with the complex and disputed question of the rôle of cavalry in attack. But cavalry, or rather mounted infantry, had an enormous importance in the carrying out of the indirect offensive in South Africa, so great indeed that many European critics pretend to see in the new arm of mounted men who fight on foot a solution of the vexed problem of the difficulty of attack, and a counter-agent to the defensive advantages which result from the use of improved firearms. In the later stages of the war, after the first defence of the Boers had been broken down, Lord Roberts employed vast numbers of mounted men in his attacks, and the system adopted had a considerable, though limited, success. The British commander engaged the enemy with infantry and artillery in front, and despatched his mounted men to threaten their flanks. As the Boers were always from five to ten times less numerous, this system, of course, proved efficacious. But, though the British invariably forced the Boers out of their positions, they never succeeded in scoring the decisive success of cutting off their retreat. The Boers not only withdrew in safety, but took with them their slow transport and position guns of a weight never before employed in the field. This fact is, perhaps, the most important of all in the interpretation of the South-African War; for it shows, as will be seen, that, under modern conditions, even if attack should succeed, the defender has opportunities for orderly withdrawal which he did not possess in the past. Fifty years ago, the defenders, instead of being forced slowly from their positions and left to retreat almost unmolested, would have been routed at the point of the bayonet, cut to pieces by the pursuing cavalry; their guns would have been captured, and a great part of their men killed and taken prisoners. But owing to the im-

mense distances between the combatants in the South-African battles, it was constantly found that, before the attacker's cavalry had ridden far enough to threaten the defender's rear, the horses were so exhausted that effective pursuit was out of the question. This change eminently constitutes a "new condition of war," for it results from a new factor—that is, the long range of modern rifles and artillery. Like the other changes enumerated, it is decidedly to the advantage of the defender; for while, in case of defeat, it insures him against rout and destruction, it offers no counterbalancing advantage to the attacker. The range of rifles, and the endurance of horses are, moreover, not accidental or temporary factors, and will work out their results in Europe no less certainly than they did in South Africa.

It should be added, however, that the limitations of cavalry in the offensive, which were shown so plainly in South Africa, must be even more marked in any European war. In the first place, there will be no initial superiority of numbers such as there was in South Africa. In the second place, the continuous fortifications upon all the European frontiers make it almost impossible even to attempt those flanking movements for which mounted men are so eminently fitted. There is no single point upon the French frontier where a German army, mounted or unmounted, could turn the defender's lines. The whole frontier is lined with continuous fortifications, which must first be carried by direct attack—a method which would almost certainly fail. There are, indeed, two considerable gaps left in the lines of defences, but these gaps have been left undefended on purpose, and are so situated that any attempt to enter them for the purpose of turning the French rear would inevitably result in the invaders being cut off from their base and captured. But it is hardly necessary to discuss a contingency so improbable. It is sufficient to point out that all successful turning movements in South Africa were carried out in a flat, unfortified country, with a superiority quite inconceivable in Europe.

In view of the purely tactical character of all these factors, it is an absurdity to pretend that they do not teach a lesson to the whole world. Their applicability to the military conditions of modern Europe cannot be disputed. The Great Powers of Europe are to-day divided into two armed camps, each camp differing hardly a hair's-breadth in the sum of its numbers, arma-

ment, efficiency, and national spirit. On the frontiers rise impregnable fortifications, executed on a scale and with a completeness unknown in the past; and between ancient enemies stands the invisible wall of an enhanced defensive, which, arising from human progress itself, shows no practicable opening for human assault. By these changes, we are brought face to face with the practical disappearance of war from one of its most ancient domains. For can it be conceived that any statesman will be so blind, or any mob so passionate, as to rush into a struggle whence neither valor nor genius can draw any compensating result? Be it added that, happily, there is now no question pending in Europe likely to provoke acute enmity. Dynastic and religious wars are things of the past. Frontiers are everywhere sharply delimited, if not exactly according to racial divisions, at least more closely corresponding to that ideal delimitation than they have ever been before. On the Continent of Europe, even rumors of wars have passed away. In the decade of 1880-1890, seldom a month passed without rumors being published in the European press, on apparently good authority, that France and Germany, or Russia and Germany, were secretly mobilizing with a view to immediate hostilities. Such rumors are seldom heard to-day.

It is argued, with apparent plausibility, that all conclusions as to the impracticability of war which are based upon equality of numbers, training and armaments, are unreliable, because they leave the undetermined human factor out of account. I remember once discussing this problem with a professor at the French *École Militaire*, who put the obvious objection in admirable form. He says:

“Suppose you are right as to the equality of the European alliances. Assume, if you will, that numbers, armaments, training, are in the sum total practically equal—that does not necessarily imply that neither side can win. In these great organizations, apparently so equal, there is an infinite ground for dissimilarities of much greater importance than mere inequality of numbers. There are varying degrees of faith in the justice of one's cause, confidence in one's leaders, historic influences, and individual genius—the possibility of a great commander coming to the front under the stress of events. All these factors may favor one army, which in outward appearance enjoys no superiority. Finally, there is Accident. The interception of a despatch, the wrecking of a train, a sudden fall of snow, a stray bullet killing a trusted commander, the

late arrival of expected supports, the inexplicable panics which set in without cause—all these accidents have made history in the past, and in the future any one of them may turn the tide of an otherwise indecisive combat. War has always depended upon accidents as much as upon acts, and it will continue to do so."

This argument expresses admirably the objection to the thesis that the mechanism of war has perfected itself beyond the verge of practicability. It is not, however, difficult to find an answer. If war does break out, the human factor and the factor of accident will undoubtedly play a considerable part. But there are reasons why they cannot play such a decisive part as they have often played in the past. The law of averages applies in all human affairs. If two men toss pennies half a dozen times, one may possibly win all six. But if they toss a hundred times there is no human possibility that one will win all hundred; it is a hundred to one that the winnings will be fairly equally divided. This may be taken as a parable to illustrate the part which accident is likely to play in the prolonged and complex warfare of the future. A hundred years ago, a single victory, the fall of a single fortress, was often sufficient to determine a war. But with the numerous and vast armies, the endless and repeated defensive lines, and the inexhaustible reserves of modern Europe, a single battle decided by a single lucky chance cannot have a decisive result. There will be innumerable battles, innumerable fortresses to be besieged, and scores of armies operating and co-operating. In such circumstances, accident may play a correspondingly great, but it will necessarily be an equal, part. An intercepted telegram, or the late arrival of supports, may decide one engagement; but they cannot materially influence a whole war. It would require numerous favorable accidents to end it. And, just as in tossing pennies a hundred times, there is in the complex warfare of modern times no possibility of a sequence of accidental circumstances favoring one side.

But, even if the gambler's chance could determine a conflict, as it sometimes did in the past, we have in the facts above mentioned an excellent reason why peace is likely to be kept. No statesman ever went to war relying upon chance alone. Wars are determined upon because the determining nation is convinced of the superiority of its numbers, the better training of its men, the perfection of its armaments—that is to say, it is assured of

its superiority in those factors in which we know that no superiority at present exists. Nor can statesmen go to war any longer with a light heart, trusting to the genius of a proved commander. Since the passing away of the great captains of 1870 and 1877-78, no country in Europe can claim the superiority which rests upon the possession of a great captain. Moltke, Blumenthal, Gourko, and Skobelev are no more. Their successors may be as great as they, but their names and their country are yet unknown. They can be proved only by events; but, so far as the calculations of statesmen go, they do not exist.

There is, happily, another reason why war upon the European Continent is unlikely to break out. That is the extreme caution of modern European statesmen, their distrust of popular agitation, and their nervous dread of responsibility. The Transvaal War, in this respect, has taught to the world a lesson incomparably more valuable than even that military lesson which I have attempted to indicate. From its beginning to its present uncertain stage, it has been a continuous and uninterrupted exposure of the vanity of complacent thoughts which, the proverb tells us, are the children of vain wishes. Not merely every military, but every political, every social, every material, every spiritual consideration relied upon, and trumpeted abroad in premature pæans of victory, has been found to be a baseless edifice, which the first breeze of actual fact has overthrown. The collapse of the airy castle of Imperial France, thirty years ago, was not more instructive. There the lesson was sudden. In South Africa, however, delusion has followed delusion, and the wreck of each has hardly been complete before another has been planted on its ruins. It is the soldiers and statesmen, not the visionaries and philanthropists, who have been led astray by dreams. Can it be believed that, with the lesson before their eyes of this general ensnaring of the intelligence of the most practical people in the world, the more cautious and responsible statesmen of Europe will lightly enter upon a war so vast and so terrible that all the incidents in the bloody struggle under the Southern Cross would be crowded into a single one of its battle-fields? The answer to that question lies in the nervous distrust of themselves, and the still greater distrust of popular agitation, which characterizes all the present rulers of Europe. An infinitesimal risk of diplomatic friction is sufficient to pre-

vent decisive steps being taken in international matters, even where great good might possibly result from an active policy. The impassioned movement which is still proceeding on the Continent for intervention on behalf of the Boers, has never altered a word in diplomatic despatches. Astute statesmen preferred to employ the agitation for their own ends, and to deprecate it good-humoredly when it threatened to become dangerous. They know that a single word addressed by Napoleon III. to the Austrian Ambassador was sufficient to convince Europe that war between the two Powers was imminent, and that by convincing Europe, it actually made war unavoidable. The *status quo* has now become a religion in Europe. Everywhere there is a fearful, almost superstitious, dread of uttering an unconsidered word which might alarm foreign suspicion or pander to domestic passion. Even the Armenians must be abandoned to their fate, lest some inconsiderable element of friction should disturb the placid relations of the European Powers.

All this, it may indeed be urged, points to the postponement of war rather than to the assurance of peace. It indicates no lightening of the burden of armaments, and offers, at best, but the lesser of two evils. Therein lies Europe's danger; and it may indeed be doubted whether sudden destruction in the cataclysm of universal war is less to be feared than the continuous decay of the social organism, the shackling of civilization, and the ultimate political revolt which Militarism must bring about. But, if war be only deferred, it can hardly be doubted that social enlightenment will end in the decline of Militarism. Other evils as great have passed away. Belief in the permanence of any evil institution means despair as to the continuity of human progress. Militarism has been heavily shaken by the events of the South African War. The decline has already gone so far that its adequacy, even for the purposes for which it is intended, is a matter of doubt among soldiers themselves. A comprehensive inquiry into the whole subject is the best way to bring about reform; and if such an inquiry were carried out by a Commission representing men of science and men of affairs, as well as soldiers and politicians, there can be little doubt that the trembling basis of a pretended necessity upon which Militarism rests would be swept away, to the great benefit of Europe and of the rest of the world.

JEAN DE BLOCH.

THE POLICE POWER AND THE POLICE FORCE.

BY W. A. PURRINGTON.

WITH civilization crime increases. This proposition will seem paradoxical only to those who have not defined its terms. The more complex man's social life and the more various his desires and interests, the more numerous are his statutes, enforcement of which is effected through the power of the state. Now, since crime is the doing or failing to do some act the commission or omission of which a public law declares to be punishable, it must, necessarily, increase with the growing complexity of a society that prohibits acts which, under simpler conditions, are permissible. The moral quality of the forbidden act or omission is not, in the legal sense, at least, a necessary element of its criminality, except in so far as it may be deemed immoral to violate any statute, however ridiculous or unjust.

Thus, in New York, from 1887 to 1892, it was a misdemeanor,—that is to say, a minor crime, punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both,—“to intentionally give food or shelter” to an English sparrow (*passer domesticus*). It is still a misdemeanor in that State to engage in the business of a barber on Sunday; except in the city of New York and the village of Saratoga Springs, where “barbering,” as it is called, may be lawfully engaged in on that day up to one o'clock in the afternoon. A bizarre result of this latter statute, prior to the consolidation of Brooklyn with New York in the greater city, was that at the same moment an act was criminal at one end of the bridge connecting the cities which was lawful at the other; and the highest court of the State declared this curious “Sunday law” to be a constitutional exercise of the police power. That feeding sparrows, a work of mercy justified even by the Westminster Catechism, and rendering services of cleanliness, supposed to be nigh to godliness, can be made

criminal offences, shows that crime is not necessarily vicious or sinful, but, apart from the statute, may be harmless or commendable. On the other hand, in many jurisdictions acts prohibited by divine law are not criminal because not forbidden by human statute; for instance, idolatry and adultery.

Sin is violation of divine law jeopardizing the soul. Vice is habitual doing of something that is of itself a defect in good morals, which are good customs tending to promote the general welfare. What is considered vicious in one community or epoch may be esteemed moral in another. What is harmless in moderation is vicious in excess.

These distinctions are not always regarded. Very recently, a religious journal, edited by a most able and scholarly teacher, differentiated vice from crime by defining the former as "a violation of the moral code, the direct injurious effect of which falls exclusively on the wrong-doer," and the latter as "a violation of the moral code, the direct injurious effects of which fall in considerable measure upon others." Of these definitions, the former omits the characteristic of all vice, habitualness, and fails to include a host of vices,—tale-bearing, for instance, and its kindred immorality, of which Jack Falstaff said, "Lord, Lord, how subject we old men are to this vice of lying!" The latter is equally faulty in omitting the characteristic element of all crime, punishability. Their framer naturally concluded that, "it is the business of the law to prevent crime, but in general to prevent vice only when it becomes criminal,—that is, when the direct injurious effect falls in appreciable measure upon others than the wrong-doer"; an impotent conclusion if vice is never criminal unless punishable by law; moreover, it would be difficult to mention a vice the evil effects of which do not fall more or less directly upon others than the wrong-doer. Following the same line of thought, another leading religious journal lately argued that "there should be not a strict but a judicious administration of the law against Sunday saloons"; the distinction in practice between strict and judicious enforcement, however, not being made clear. Such reasoning confuses sin, crime and vice as much as Touchstone's railing at Corin; "Why, if thou never wast at court, thou never saw'st good manners; if thou never saw'st good manners, then thy manners must be wicked; and wickedness is sin, and sin is damnation. Thou art in a parlous state, shepherd." One earnestly opposed to

what he deems immorality easily passes to regarding it as wickedness, sin and damnation, and to endeavoring, often with mistaken zeal, to stamp it out by extreme and even questionable methods; forgetful that vice is habit, and that even the praiseworthy man desirous of improving this world on the wise Emersonian plan, of reforming one person, finds it no easy task to mend his own accustomed ways.

The police power is the very vaguely defined control exercised by the state,—in our country within the limits of written constitutions,—for the preservation of public order, and the protection of the citizens' right to health, comfort, fair dealing, and freedom of worship. In its widest sense, this power extends to preventing or punishing the highest crime as well as the smallest misdemeanor. It punishes the murderer; it may, although, unfortunately, it rarely does, punish those guilty of defiling floors and afflicting with the reek of stale cigars the nostrils of fellow-passengers in public conveyances. In a restricted sense, this power is applied to preventing or punishing, by civil as well as by criminal penalties, minor or habitual offences against public health and order. The growing and alarming tendency with us is to exercise the police power almost entirely by creating new crimes. Well-meaning persons of abounding faith believe that by legislation they can end whatever they disapprove of. Legislators are obliging to constituents. And so it has come about that, if we substitute "crime" or "misdemeanor" for "felony," the words of Sir James Mackintosh are as true to-day as when, on March 2d, 1819, in moving for a Parliamentary committee to inquire into the state of the criminal law, he said:

"As I take it, the most important consequence of the Revolution of 1688 was the establishment in this country of a parliamentary government. This event, however, has been attended by one inconvenience—the unhappy facility afforded to legislation. Every Member of Parliament has had it in his power to indulge his whims and caprices on that subject; and if he could not do anything else he could create a capital felony."

Since these words were uttered, the criminal law has been vastly improved, in that courts have ceased to be shambles as they were at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when, in England, a host of acts were punishable by death, most of which now are either lawful or merely misdemeanors,—such as breaking a fish-

pond or cutting down a tree, for which a man was hung in 1814 at the Essex assizes, the theft of anything in value over a shilling and fraudulent bankruptcy. These savage laws made life and property no safer than they are to-day, and defeated their own purpose by breeding a professional class of alibi witnesses, begetting technicalities in construing indictments that still protect rogues, and producing jurors capable of rendering such verdicts as "Guilty of stealing a guinea worth sixpence." In short, their rigor was modified in their enforcement, and they gave rise, in the words of Sir William Grant, to "a general confederacy of prosecutors, witnesses, counsel, juries, judges, and advisers of the crown to prevent the execution of the criminal law." But if we have reduced the degree of punishment we have, probably, under the police power increased the number of crimes; and whereas laymen should be able, at least, to ascertain what is lawful and right, that they may walk straitly, neither legislator, judge nor lawyer can tell without minute research what acts are criminal. The Society for the Prevention of Crime on January 17th last addressed a letter to the present Mayor of New York, saying:

"We are emphatic in our insistence that you brace your administration into accord with your oath, that you summon the exceptional resources that are at your command to the work of frankly and resolutely suppressing open or clandestine violation of recognized statutes, and thus either dignify law by the success with which you enforce it, or, by the demonstrated impossibility of enforcing it, convict the legislature of its moral obligation to come to your relief."*

Just what "recognized statutes" are, was not made clear, nor why they alone should be enforced, nor yet what relief the legislature should afford. The Mayor replied temperately, saying, among other things:

"I asked the presiding Justice of the Court of Special Sessions† a few weeks ago to furnish me with a list of misdemeanors as defined by the Legislature. He replied that he was unable to do so, for it would take

* The Mayor, in an ante-election speech to the "German-Americans" at Cooper Union, on October 24th, 1901, had said: "Now it is not expected that, if we are elected, the laws will be administered in a narrow and provincial spirit." On the same night the present District Attorney was reported by the *New York Times* as saying that, if he were elected, and any one was caught violating the excise law, he would exercise the discretionary power vested in him by statute in the matter, and that the liquor dealer would stand on the same footing as any one else.

† This court has exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance of misdemeanors committed in New York city.

an able lawyer three months to compile it. Does anybody suppose that all of these penalties are enforced, or that the administration is derelict because it does not go out of its way to find out what laws thus go by default."

The penal laws are not all contained in the Code, but are found as well in separate statutes, such as the Game, Labor, Dairy, and other laws regulating customary pursuits of men—medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, pedicuring, public accounting, even horse-shoeing. Which of these laws are "recognized"? And what specifically is meant by their "enforcement"? Are we to understand that laws are not enforced because many who violate them escape punishment? What seems to be constantly forgotten is that the law is a schoolmaster,—a very poor one, it may be,—and that its value is largely prophylactic: while every violation of it may not be punished, its presence upon the statute books and its execution in the case of proved violations educate the public mind to obedience. The enforcement of every law calls for the exercise of discretion; and punishment untempered with mercy defeats its purpose. The statutes regulating medical and dental practice have not done away with quackery and ineptness either in or out of the ranks of the professions; but they have tended to exclude from those ranks numberless incompetents, and to elevate the standard of medical education to its present high plane. No self-respecting man, aspiring to professional or social standing, risks becoming a misdemeanant by practising medicine without legal qualification. Yet those laws never have been, and never can be, so rigorously administered but that zealous searchers may find violating them a host of quacks, against whom, perhaps, competent legal evidence cannot be procured by decent methods. And if the fact that such violations go on be proof that the statutes are either ineffective or unenforced, the case against both the laws and the persons who administer them is made out. But is not every law enforced, if, whenever evidence of its violation is put before the authorities, the offense is prosecuted?

Laws increasing the difficulty of earning livelihood, or gratifying natural or even artificial wants and desires, if rigorously enforced by methods opposed to the common sense of fairness or decency, beget antagonism to authority and sympathy for offenders, even on the part of those enforcing the law. Burns, himself a collector of excise, sang none the less joyously how:

"The Deil cam' fiddlin' through the town,
And danced awa wi' the Exciseman,
And ilka wife cries, 'Auld Mahoun,
I wish you luck o' your prize, man.'"

It is worth while, then, for every one to consider what is the true function of the police force, and whether it is desirable for them to adopt the extreme methods sometimes employed in enforcing police legislation; for methods of enforcement are not less, perhaps they are more, important than the substance of the law.

The first and primary duty of these men is to protect life and property, to preserve public decency and to execute criminal process. When in any city these functions are thoroughly performed, that city is well policed. Writing of the English officials, Sir James Fitz-James Stephens says:

"The police in their different grades are no doubt officers appointed by law for the purpose of arresting criminals; but they possess for this purpose no powers which are not also possessed by private persons. They are, indeed, protected in arresting innocent persons upon a reasonable suspicion that they have committed a felony, whether a felony has in fact been committed or not, whereas the protection of a private person in that case extends only to cases in which a felony has been committed; and they are, and private persons are not, under a legal duty to arrest when the occasion arises; but in other respects they stand upon precisely the same footing as private persons. They require a warrant and may arrest without a warrant in the same cases. When they have arrested they are under precisely the same obligations. A policeman has no other right as to asking questions or compelling the attendance of witnesses than a private person has; in a word, with some few exceptions, he may be described as a private person paid to perform, as a matter of duty, acts which, if so minded, he might have done voluntarily."

Substantially, this describes the function of our policemen, which the New York Code of Criminal Procedure seems to limit still further, by authorizing them to arrest without warrant, even in case of felony, only if the crime has actually been committed and the officer has reasonable cause for believing that the person arrested committed it. No one has power to arrest for vicious practices not forbidden by law or for misdemeanors, without a warrant, unless the offences be committed within his view. Magistrates may issue warrants only upon being satisfied, by sworn information of facts within the affiant's knowledge, that a misdemeanor has been actually committed, and that there is reasonable

ground to believe that the accused committed it. Such an affidavit is insufficient if its allegations rest upon information or belief only. The facts must be positively sworn to. If an officer is legally authorized to make an arrest, but not otherwise, he may break open an outer or inner door or window in the performance of his duty, if, after giving notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance; but he has no more right to force himself into a private house without legal authority than has any other citizen, and if he attempts so to do he may be lawfully resisted. An arrest for felony may be made at any time; but an arrest on Sunday or at night must be specially authorized, in the case of a misdemeanor, by the magistrate's endorsement on the warrant. In great cities, these principles are too frequently disregarded. Even a criminal has a right to live until his life is forfeited by law. Even those who pursue vice as a means of livelihood may lawfully, while at large, eat, drink, sleep, and even amuse themselves; they must have resorts wherein to satisfy those natural wants. It is reasonable to suppose that such places will not be conducted with entire decorum; but, unless the disorder therein is such as to amount to public nuisance and violation of the law, the inmates are entitled to the same protection that is due to the best citizen. Their houses are their castles. Yet, where law-breakers congregate, it is wise to foresee and provide against the outbreak of their criminal propensities, while still allowing them the measure of liberty to which they are entitled.

Before the election in New York city of the reform administration of Mayor Strong, sequent to the disclosures of the Lexow Investigating Committee, the municipal statute known as the Consolidation Act, now as the charter, prescribed in detail, as it still does, the duties of the police force, directing them, among other things, by its 282d section, at all times, day and night, to preserve the public peace, prevent crime, maintain order, and to "carefully observe and inspect all places of public amusement, all places of business having excise or other licenses to carry on any business," all gambling and disorderly places, "and to repress and restrain all unlawful or disorderly conduct or practices therein." Thus was created a duty of surveillance, but not necessarily of suppression. Not only were gaming and other evil resorts thus placed under police supervision, but also all places wherein licensed business was carried on—that is to say, offices of physicians, lawyers, and

dentists, shops of pharmacists, and a host of other reputable places. There have been and still are in the city of New York persons habitually violating the laws regulating the practice of medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, and other pursuits; but there is scarcely a known instance wherein the police, of their own motion, have either kept the business places of such persons under surveillance, or caused the arrest of those violating laws therein; nor do the persons and societies interested in securing and enforcing those laws hold the District Attorney and the police force negligent because they do not undertake systematically to collect the evidence necessary to carry out the law to the letter. The 285th section of the Consolidation Act empowered the Superintendent of Police, upon the written report of any member of the police force, or of two or more householders, stating good grounds for believing any house, room or premises to be used for common gaming or playing games of chance or lewd amusements, to authorize any member of the force to enter therein, arrest all persons found violating the law and seize all implements for gaming. So far-reaching was this power that, for some years prior to Mayor Strong's administration, a superintendent's warrant had rarely been issued, and yet the failure to apply therefor was one of the facts upon which charges were sustained against Police-Captain Eakins, who was dismissed from the force for neglect of duty in failing to exercise all reasonable methods of suppressing evil resorts in his precinct. Nevertheless, the framers of the present charter, while preserving that section as section 318 of the new statute, have omitted policemen from the number of those entitled to make such reports, leaving that privilege or duty to householders,—probably from a perception of what enormous opportunity for oppression was placed in the hands of the police by the earlier section.

Such powers being lodged in the police, the practical and most difficult question arises: What are they to do in order to enforce these manifold statutes? Where a crime is committed in their presence, thus affording them legal evidence of the offence, it is their duty, as we have seen, to make an arrest. But how far are they to go in gathering evidence of minor crimes that they may be, morally yet not legally, certain are taking place? The case of Captain Eakins already referred to is instructive. The metropolis from time to time is aroused to a sense of sin by rural investi-

gators or its own reformers, sits on the stool of repentance a while and then merrily goes back to its wallow. Such an awakening followed the Lexow investigation. Forty members of the police force were indicted,—most of them for the crime of extortion, always the besetting sin of society's paid protectors. Out of eight brought to trial, five were acquitted and three convicted. One conviction was sustained, the accused having recklessly pleaded guilty. Thirty-one complaints were made before the police commissioners, who dismissed fifteen men from the force, the majority of whom were subsequently restored to their positions by the courts. The dismissal of Captain Eakins was one of those sustained. He was not charged with extortion, but with neglect of duty in permitting certain evil resorts to exist. He frankly admitted that he knew of their existence, but, nevertheless, had reported to the superintendent of police that there were no disorderly places in his precinct. He sought to justify this misstatement of fact upon the ground that it did not deceive the superintendent, who had ordered his captains to suppress such places if they had sufficient evidence, but, otherwise, not to report them. It was amply shown by the testimony of reputable witnesses, including clergymen of different denominations, that the captain's precinct had greatly improved under his administration. It was also shown that he had arrested a great number of disorderly persons in the streets. The prosecution showed in disagreeable detail, by testimony of certain "agents" to their observation of and participation in debauchery, that the evil resorts specified were openly carried on and easily accessible. It may be said in passing that, although the attorney for the prosecution subsequently became head of the police commission, those places, if report may be believed, continued to exist and for the most part exist to this day.* One of the commissioners, Colonel (now General) Grant, differing with his colleagues, voted to acquit the accused officer, upon the ground that, if the uniformed police force were required in order to suppress such places to procure evidence by the methods of those "agents," the necessary result would be so to deprave the men that they would turn to blackmail as a cleaner employment. While the Supreme Court held that, from

* Stow's "A Survey of the City of London," 1597, says that in the thirty-seventh year of Henry VIII., 1546, the Stews of Southwark were put down by proclamation and sound of trumpet. "But though the sin was no longer allowed in this place, the same sin still remained."

the evidence, his colleagues "were permitted" to infer neglect of duty by the accused officer, they appear at the same time to have fully sustained Commissioner Grant's disapproval of the use by the uniformed force of "agents'" methods. They said: "If evidence as to the character of such houses could only have been obtained in the manner in which the witnesses for the prosecution obtained it, the findings would hardly be justified"* This dictum would imply a distinct advance from the position taken by that Court in the unreported cases of Police Officers Horan† and Blonk,‡ both of whom, after dismissal from the force for committing vicious acts in order to secure evidence against low resorts, it restored to office. Blonk's case is unreportable; Horan's in its way is amusing. His captain bade him get evidence against a low resort kept by the notorious "The" Allen, and gave him money for that purpose. He spent the money elsewhere, pawned his overcoat for two dollars, and was discovered in Allen's place drunk and disorderly on the proceeds—but, as the court held, drunk and disorderly in the line of duty.

Committing magistrates in excise cases require proof that the liquor alleged to have been sold in violation of the law was alcoholic. Its color, odor, sale over a bar and such circumstances are not accepted as sufficient evidence; the witness is required to have drunk or tasted the fluid. Should policemen be ordered to enter bar-rooms and tipple for the sake of enforcing the excise law? The sort of evidence required in other cases, the sort adduced against Captain Eakins, is such that no man procuring it can preserve self-respect and moral tone. Commissioner Grant having taken the position that men of the uniformed force should not be ordered to do such things, when he found the Mayor holding a different view, was consistent, and resigned his Commissionership.

There can be no doubt that extortion is practised by the police force of every great city.§ There is as little doubt that the men are often tempted to wink at violations of law, not only by the vicious, but by "respectable" citizens—merchants, for instance, who blockade sidewalks for purposes of their trade. On the other hand, it is certain that the police force contains a splendid body of

* *People ex rel. Eakins vs. Roosevelt*, 16 App. Div. at page 371.

† Memorandum, 35 Hun 671.

‡ Memorandum, 45 Hun 589.

§ In "Esther Waters," Mr. Moore puts the London "tariff" below New York's: "So you're a copper, are you? I might 'ave known it. . . . I know your sort; them that pays 'alf a crown a week to be let alone,—yer pension, it is out of their pockets."

men; there is not a day when its members do not risk their lives in the performance of duty; courageously arresting desperate malefactors, stopping maddened runaways, rescuing the drowning and carrying inmates from burning houses. If, as is unfortunately true, their testimony has come to be doubted, it is to some extent due to the fact that truth is not rigorously exacted of them. Honest men naturally revolt against espionage. "We are true men, thy servants are no spies," was the cry of Joseph's brethren. Where untruthfulness and base acts are made part of official duty, the wonder is not that there is so much but that there is so little deterioration of moral fibre.

Certain laws are to an extent self-enforcing—the laws prohibiting acts which are sometimes called *mala per se*, as being wrong in themselves, and so regarded by the universal sense of right and good morals, such as murder and offences against property. Individuals affected by these wrongs set the law in operation and come forward as witnesses. This is not so with the *mala prohibita*, or acts which the ordinary man is willing on the whole to have prohibited, but has no lively interest in punishing. Statutes prohibiting acts of this class are usually secured by persons to whom they seem highly important. Without the efforts of the medical profession, for instance, it may be doubted whether laws regulating the practice of medicine would be enacted, and experience certainly shows that, if "enforcement" means procuring evidence against offenders, they would not be enforced except in comparatively rare instances. Moreover, if such enforcement of all these statutes were undertaken by the police, they would have no time for their primary duties, and the field for blackmail would be indefinitely extended. Laws of this kind are, for the most part, set in motion by societies incorporated with power to aid in prosecution. They secure the necessary evidence. Their officers are responsible men who proceed with caution, realizing their liability in actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution to persons whose liberty they may unlawfully restrain. Thus these laws are adequately enforced, the liberty of the citizen better safeguarded, and the law's administration taken out of politics. If the methods of these societies become obnoxious and intolerable, the remedy is at hand. They have the right, but not the duty, to prosecute, and are free to exercise discretion and discharge their function in no "narrow and provincial spirit." All such laws

are liable to abuse. They afford opportunity for oppression. But an oppressive society is less harmful and more easily gotten rid of than an oppressive police force. Sydney Smith, in 1804, writing in the *Edinburgh Review*, deplored the existence of a society formed for the suppression of "vice," in which term was then included remissness in religious observance, saying:

"Men whose trade is rat catching love to catch rats; the bug destroyer seizes on his bug with delight, and the suppressor is gratified by finding his vice. The last soon becomes a mere tradesman like the others; none of them moralize or lament that their respective evils should exist in the world. The public feeling is swallowed up in the pursuit of a daily occupation and in the display of a technical skill."

There is truth in this; yet, undoubtedly, such societies in our modern life work for good, even if incidentally they do some harm. But nothing can be truer than these other words of the dean:

"You may drag men into church by means of force, and prosecute them for buying a pot of beer, and cut them off from the enjoyment of a leg of mutton; and you may do all this till you make the common people hate Sunday, and the clergy and religion and everything which relates to such subjects. . . . You may produce outward conformity by these means; but you are so far from producing (the only thing worth producing) the inward feeling, that you incur a great risk of giving birth to a totally opposite sentiment."

The present public prosecutor of New York, who was a coadjutor of the President of Mayor Strong's Police Board in essaying a strenuous enforcement of excise laws by police espionage, has frankly said that the result of their joint efforts was nothing more than "to raise the amount of blackmail from the five dollars a month levied on the saloon-keeper during former administrations, to ten dollars during ours."

A solution of the vexed problem of enforcing police legislation is not offered here; but it is suggested that the abuses now existing in the police force would be much lessened if the men were restricted to their true function, the protection of life, property, and public decency, the execution of process, and the surveillance of places suspected of being evil resorts, so as promptly to suppress there as elsewhere, but not otherwise, offences against public order. They should not be required to become petty spies and *agents provocateurs*; nor should they be called upon in the ordinary discharge of duty to be liars and enticers. If evidence must be procured by

tippling and consorting with the lewd, it should be procured by a small body of jackals amenable to special discipline, or by "agents" of suppressing societies; not by the uniformed force. If necessary, let the law of evidence be modified and adapted to the exigencies of the case, as it has been in prosecutions under the game laws and similar statutes, although this is an experiment fraught with danger. But instead of ordering policemen to participate in vice in order to punish it, their superiors should call to sharp account members of the force found in liquor saloons or other evil resorts except when making arrests or executing process. Thus the self-respect and character of the police force would be advanced, and the liberty of the citizen safeguarded, even perhaps the liberty to do some things not seriously affecting the public welfare, and if considered vicious by some, not so considered by all.

Policemen are better paid and pensioned than soldiers. Their duties require as much courage and more discretion. Their uniform should cover as much honor. Soldiers are ordered to scout for information, but not to spy; and short shrift awaits a spy when captured. Would not the establishment of a like standard in the police force greatly minimize the vice of extortion?

W. A. PURRINGTON.

RUSSIAN SCHOOLS AND THE HOLY SYNOD.

BY PRINCE KROPOTKIN.

IF the September number of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, which contained a rejoinder by the Procurator of the Holy Synod to my article on "The Present Crisis in Russia,"* was allowed to enter Russia, my compatriots will surely feel most grateful to the Editor for having obtained that rejoinder. For nearly twenty years, almost every paper and review in Russia, with the exception of the subsidized *Moscow Gazette* and *The Russian Messenger*, has been bitterly criticising both the system of schools inaugurated by the Procurator and the highly-colored reports about them which have been made every year to the Emperor. These papers have received "warnings"—three warnings meaning the suppression of the paper; but their criticisms have never been answered. It is now for the first time that the Procurator condescends to speak on terms of equality with one of his critics.

I may point out that M. Pobiedonostseff does not contradict the statement of facts, which I made in these pages, concerning the origin of the students' disturbances and the events connected with them. My account may be taken, therefore, as substantially correct. The report which nobody in America wished to believe—namely, that a large number of students had been sent to the army, merely for having held students' meetings, is thus confirmed by the Procurator. Nor does he object to my strong condemnation of the Government's policy in this case. On the contrary, he mildly corroborates my views in the following sentence:

"What is unfortunately true is, that the measure in question was applied at once to one hundred and eighty students, which gave it a peculiarly rigorous character; whereas the law was meant to apply only to a few exceptional cases."

* NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, May, 1901.

The Procurator of the Synod disputes only the part which I ascribed in this measure to the Emperor and to himself; but of this more will be said presently.

For every Russian, the main point of interest in M. Pobiedonostseff's reply is his treatment of the great question of popular education. It is not surprising, perhaps, that he should represent refugees as being ignorant of Russia and unable to understand their mother country. But whether M. Pobiedonostseff or myself knows Russia best, is, I believe, a matter of little interest. As to which of us, in writing about Russia for Western readers, is the more reliable, that is another question which can be settled at once. In his rejoinder M. Pobiedonostseff describes Russia as follows:

"There are no roads, and the people live on the steppes, in the woods, in the marshes; their dwellings are sometimes separated by five to eight hundred versts (330 to 530 miles) of uncultivated and impassable country; and the inhabitants themselves, without culture, here and there even barbarous, gain a scanty living far from all means of communication and the necessities for industry and commerce."

Now, it is positively certain that if a schoolboy, even in a primary school, had thus described Russia, he surely would have got a bad mark. Such conditions as the Procurator describes undoubtedly prevail in the barren lands of Siberia, and in the far North of European Russia—in the Petchora Land and the Kola peninsula. But, when one speaks of the schools of Russia, one surely does not have in mind these remote parts of the Empire, any more than one who speaks of the schools of Canada has in mind the barren lands round the Hudson Bay. As a matter of fact, in Middle Russia, which contains a population of over fifty million people, the average distance between the villages is only from two to five miles. Moreover, in Russia, the peasants live in villages of from 200 to 2000 inhabitants, seldom of 100, and occasionally of 5000 to 10,000 souls; and even the smallest village in Russia, with its thirty children of school age, offers better facilities for opening a school than a population of fifty farmers scattered on their "quarter sections." Poor though Russia undoubtedly is, she is still not so poor as Finland by far; and yet, the "coefficient of education"—that is, the number of children going to school, in proportion to the total population—is thirty per cent. in Finland, as against three to four per cent. in Mos-

cow, Vladimir, Kursk, Tamboff, and other provinces belonging to the fertile or to the industrial belt of Central Russia.

It is not the poverty of Russia that has prevented the Russian peasants from learning to read since they became free, nor her steppes and forests, and still less the distances between her villages. From 1863 to 1883, it was the general policy of the Government and, above all, of the successive ministers of Public Instruction; and, since 1883, it has been the influence which M. Pobiedonostseff enjoyed in the councils of the Czar, and his use of that influence for preventing the opening of any schools, except those which would be under the control of the Synod. Having begun by pleading the necessity of opening parish schools, were they only of the lowest grade, in such remote parts of the Empire as those which he has described in this REVIEW, he gradually developed the policy which has characterized his administration: "Better have no schools at all, than allow any one but the village clergy to start primary schools in any part of the country; let all the money which the state and the local governments can spare for that purpose flow in that channel."

In order to establish this policy, highly-colored reports have been made to the Emperor every year about the wonderful activity of the village clergy in opening new schools. The accuracy of these reports has always been contested in Russia itself, all the "warnings" notwithstanding. Furthermore, the efforts of all those who have honestly worked for spreading education in our country have been belittled and misrepresented. Nay, "the Schools' Council of the Holy Synod" did not hesitate even at open falsification of figures. The proof of this may be found in an official publication, which I have before me on my table. I mean the work issued in Russia, in 1896, by order of the Ministry of Public Instruction, under this title: "Popular Education at the All-Russian Exhibition of Nijni Novgorod, published by the Head of the Educational Department of the Exhibition, E. Kovalevsky."

The School Department of the Synod exhibited on this occasion a number of costly maps, intended to show to the visitors the wonderful progress achieved by the Synod with its schools, as against all other schools, since 1884. An explanatory pamphlet, issued by the same Department, was distributed at the same time, free, in immense numbers of copies to all visitors, who

were assured by the writer of the pamphlet that within the last ten years the number of Reading Schools of the Synod had increased eighteen times. It appeared, however, that this was a gross exaggeration, the number having increased in reality less than twice. To quote from the official publication issued by the Ministry of Public Instruction (p. 123) :

"Thus, to give one instance, in the map which illustrated the numerical growth of the Reading Schools [of the Synod], and which was intended to prove to the visitors that these schools had very rapidly multiplied, an important misstatement was introduced. It was said in the table that in 1884 there were only from 500 to 1000 such schools in Russia, while in 1893 their number had reached 18,000. . . . As soon as the Educational Department of the Exhibition was opened, rectifications began to pour in. It appeared that in the province of Moscow alone there were 300 such schools, 400 in Vladimir, and altogether there were more than 10,000 of them. . . . The numbers of schools under the Ministry of Public Instruction were shown on the maps as being considerably smaller in numbers than they actually were. Official statements came in, both from functionaries of the Ministry and from the Zemstvos, asking that these inaccuracies be rectified."*

As to the above-mentioned pamphlet, E. Kovalevsky remarks:

"It was most regrettable that the anonymous author of this pamphlet found it necessary, while pointing out the qualities of the Synod schools, to depreciate those of the Ministry of Public Instruction, and to assure his readers that they were quite strange to the Russian people."

I certainly do not mean to suggest that the Procurator of the Synod was personally responsible for the fabrication of those maps or of that pamphlet; but there are plenty of sycophants everywhere, and they know what will please their masters. I am even ready to admit that the Procurator never verifies the figures which he gives in his "Yearly Reports." He can have no time for that. He tells us, thus almost repeating my very words, that "the parish priest, engaged in his professional duties, cannot efficiently carry out school teaching"; and it is scarcely probable that the Procurator himself, also engaged in his professional duties, can efficiently carry out his assumed duties of organizing schools all over Russia. But if he has no time for that work, why in the world should he undertake it, and obtain from the Emperor an arrangement by which the poor yearly allowance inscribed in

* In the province of St. Petersburg 391 schools were shown, instead of 900; in Kursk, 300 instead of 592, and so on.

the State budget for primary schools goes to the very people who, according to his own confession, "cannot efficiently carry out teaching"?

Over and over again has it been pointed out in the Russian press—very often detailed proofs being in hand—that the statistics given in the Synod's Reports as to children who are supposed to receive instruction in the Parish and the Reading Schools of the Holy Synod (910,760 boys and 205,730 girls) are grossly exaggerated, and that if the real attendance were given, these figures would dwindle to much less than two-thirds. Why has not an honest investigation been made in the matter?

Things appear still worse when we come to consider the composition of the teaching staff of these schools and the results obtained in them. The children, after one year's instruction at one of these schools, cannot even spell; although, Russian being a phonetically spelt language, we used, in our Sunday schools, to teach pupils to spell and read in fifteen lessons—sometimes even in nine. This slowness of progress is explained in Russia by the very low standard of the teachers in most of the Synod schools.

What, then, would be the proper way of meeting such criticisms? To ask an investigation, or, failing that, to publish, at least, an exact statement of the teaching qualifications of the teaching staff, and to give tables showing the progress achieved by the pupils. But that is precisely what has never been done. All I can gather from the last available reports of the Procurator is, that the teaching staff of the Holy Synod schools was as follows in 1898:

	Parish schools.	Reading schools.
Priests	561	642
Deacons	2,154	1,245
Cantors	1903	2,329
Hired teachers	11,211	11,776
Total	15,829	15,992

Granting that the deacons and the cantors are now better educators than they were thirty years ago, I vainly try to ascertain from the Reports, of what sort of men and women the odd twenty-three thousand hired teachers are composed. What proportion do they contain of trained teachers, and what proportion of soldiers whose sole education was got at a regimental school during their three years' service in the army? Nor do we find such

figures in the Procurator's rejoinder. All he says on this point is this:

"What Kropotkin says about the incapacity of the Village Clergy is certainly unjust. Perhaps in his time the ignorant schoolmasters of whom he speaks, often recruited from pensioned soldiers, were only too common. To-day we have a regular system of seminaries and training colleges for the education of schoolmasters and schoolmistresses."

Yes, we have a few, a very few, training colleges; but how many, or rather how few, trained teachers are employed in the Synod Schools we are not told, and the reader is left to wonder whether this proportion is not as small as the proportion of Russian villages which are separated from each other by distances of "from five to eight hundred versts."

In my opinion, the whole question of primary education in Russia is too important a subject to be treated in such an off-hand way. Leaving aside the laudable efforts which the Ministries of War, Agriculture, and Finance are making in this direction, we have in Russia three bodies which are directly responsible in matters of primary schools: the Ministry of Public Instruction, the Provincial and District Councils (the *Zemstvos*) and the Holy Synod. Now, for forty years, and especially since 1883, we have seen the most extraordinary spectacle of the two governmental bodies using all their power to prevent the Local Governments from doing their duty with regard to popular education, and then fighting among themselves for the money allowance for primary schools which is inscribed in the State budget, as well as for all the moneys which can be scraped together from the already over-taxed village communities and the *Zemstvos*—at the same time excluding the two latter from any control of the ways in which these moneys are spent. To achieve this end, a decisive blow was struck under Alexander III. at the local self-government institutions, so as to make of them mere tax-collectors who provide money for schools, but have no voice in their management. Consequently, I only express the opinion of every educated man in Russia when I say that it is high time that this state of affairs should come to an end.

The ideal of the Procurator is that of the Roman Church. What he seeks for in Russia—and successfully, in great measure—is to introduce the system which was instituted in France in 1849, and prevailed especially under Napoleon III., under which

primary education was entirely handed over to the clergy, and a "*lettre d'obédience*," delivered by the Bishop, was all the certificate one required to become a teacher. But Russians know how this system very nearly brought France to ruin, when she came into armed conflict with her better educated neighbor. Consequently, all educated Russia most anxiously desires now that a serious reform should be made in the whole system of primary education, and that the present system, which was introduced at a time when, to use the Procurator's own expression, "prohibition had gone mad," should come to an end. I will only add, as regards secondary and University education that all that I have said concerning it in this REVIEW, far from having been "biased" or exaggerated, has received most striking confirmation in Russia itself since last May. Committees are now at work, and the Universities are sending in elaborate reports, with a view to obtaining reforms in the very directions which were indicated in the May number of this REVIEW. And I will add that in this I have nothing to boast of, because I only summed up what Professors of the Universities and educators of all grades have been saying in Russia for years, without ever being listened to, until the last University riots ended in such a tragical way.

The second part of M. Pobiedonostseff's rejoinder deals with the responsibilities for the abominable measure that was taken against the students—a measure which has led to massacres at St. Petersburg and has done more to discredit the Government among all classes of society than all that the revolutionists have ever written. At the outset, as was only natural in a country placed under absolute rule, public opinion at St. Petersburg attributed a large share of responsibility for all this to the Emperor, and my article reflected that state of opinion. Now M. Pobiedonostseff tells us that I was wrong: that the absolute ruler of Russia "had no share" in this misdeed of his ministers, and I am really very glad to acknowledge it. I will even add on my own behalf that the information which I got from St. Petersburg, soon after my return from America, was to the same effect. But, the Emperor having no share of the blame for the Kieff affair, whose fault was it?

M. Pobiedonostseff writes:

"The decree concerning the military service of students guilty of creating an agitation against the university curriculum was published

independently of any initiative on the part of the Emperor. The ministers in a Cabinet meeting that had been called in consequence of these university disorders, deemed it necessary to have recourse to this punishment, and their resolution was submitted for the Emperor's approval. A regulation was published, according to which the application of the penalty in each case was made to depend on a special committee comprising the ministers whose departments were concerned, and the decisions of this committee were to be valid in law without needing an imperial sanction. The Kieff affair, therefore, was settled in this way, and the will of the Emperor had no share in it."

And the Procurator adds:

"It should be remembered that our Emperor never issues such orders on his personal responsibility. He contents himself with confirming the decisions of the various executive councils and the resolutions of his ministers in cases prescribed by law."

As for his own responsibility in the matter, M. Pobiedonostseff says:

"I was totally ignorant of this Kieff affair, which concerned two ministers only, Bogolèpoff, and the Minister for the Interior."

The Council of the Ministers, in which M. Pobiedonostseff has a seat in his capacity of Procurator of the Holy Synod—in a "Cabinet meeting," as he writes—had thus prepared a law which gave to two ministers the power of imposing military service as a punishment for acts of disobedience towards the University authorities, and themselves to appoint special committees, or rather Courts nominated *ad hoc*, for the purpose of applying that most extraordinary punishment just as they liked. This astounding law—which, as circumstances have now proved, was too bad even for Russian forbearance—was submitted to the Emperor, who gave it his approval and issued it in the form of a decree signed with his own hand. He did so, we are now told, confiding in his Cabinet, probably without realizing what power for mischief he was thus giving to Bogolèpoff and Sipyaghin, nor how they would misuse it; just as he never seems to have realized to what a violation of his own oath to Finland he was recently led by another of his ministers.

It thus appears that the ministers may take action which will incite disturbance all over Russia, leading to the effusion of blood and to general discontent, and that when you ask, Who is to blame for it all? there is nobody to take upon himself the responsibility.

The Emperor is out of the question, we are told; he must trust somebody, and he trusts his Cabinet. One member of his Cabinet now repudiates publicly all responsibility for the consequences of this particular decree. The other members of the Cabinet will probably say that they are not responsible either, because it was the Emperor who signed the decree, while he might have refused to sign it if it were contrary to his views. The Ministers of Education and of the Interior have only used the powers which the Cabinet gave to them; and the committees they have nominated to act as judges, in sending 183 students to the army, have only done what they were authorized to do by their superiors. Every one was right, and there is nobody to blame!

There is one point which the Procurator seems to have overlooked. He has developed in this REVIEW the theory of a Constitutional Monarchy in Russia. The Emperor, he writes, only confirms the decisions of his Cabinet, and consequently is not responsible for their mistakes. This is certainly a quite new construction of the relations which prevail in Russia between the three law-making authorities of the Empire: the Council of the State, the Committee of the Ministers, and the Emperor. It only confirms the idea which I have expressed in these pages—namely, that the conception of a responsible ministry is rapidly growing up in Russia. Very well, let it be so. Nobody in Russia, I am sure, will object if the Emperor prefers to be treated as an irresponsible constitutional sovereign. Only the institutions of the country will have to be altered to suit this new condition. So long as the choice of the ministers depends entirely upon the good pleasure of the ruler, and so long as the country has no means whatever of controlling the action of the ministers, the sovereign will always be considered responsible for their misdeeds, even though he may personally disapprove them; and M. Pobiedonosteff will agree with me that his way of disentangling the responsibilities is, to say the least, not practical at all.

Perhaps, he will also agree—and if he does not, all Russia is now telling it loudly enough—that there is something extremely abnormal in the conditions which he is so anxious to maintain. The Cabinet, trampling under its feet a fundamental law of the Empire, and giving to two ministers such formidable and uncontrolled powers, has made a grave blunder. But for repairing this blunder, and for securing the abrogation of this law (virtually, it

has been abrogated), no other means were available but a general revolt in all the universities, street demonstrations which have led to the killing of a number of students in St. Petersburg, the shooting by court martial of two students in the army, the killing of a minister, and the exile of nobody knows how many students and of aged, generally respected persons, who were only guilty of sympathy with the victims of the irresponsible Cabinet. Russia does not want more of that.

If I speak of the coming Constitution, it is not because I see in it a panacea. My personal ideals go far beyond that. But, whether we like it or not, it is coming. The colossal blunders of the ministers, and their increasingly frequent assumption of the right, under the shelter of the Emperor's signature, of modifying by mere decrees the fundamental laws of the Empire, render it unavoidable.

P. KROPOTKIN.

THE NORTHERN SECURITIES COMPANY AND THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST LAW.

BY ROBERT L. CUTTING.

THE Northern Securities Company is a New Jersey corporation formed by the stockholders of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific railroads exchanging their certificates of stock for those of the former company, the Northern Securities Company thus becoming the sole, or, at any rate, the majority, stockholder in the two railroads. The action of the stockholders of these corporations has been called, and is in effect, a merger of the two railroads; for while each of the corporations nominally retains its individuality and independence, both are controlled by the holding company, so that virtually they have been consolidated.

The Northern Pacific and Great Northern are parallel roads, running through some six or seven Northwestern States from Minnesota to the Pacific coast. Now, it has been the policy of Minnesota, and of most of these States, to forbid the consolidation of parallel and competing roads, whether by actual merger, or by the lease or purchase of one by the other, and statutes of the utmost stringency have been enacted by them to that effect. It is, too, a matter of general law and public policy throughout the United States and England to regard as pernicious all combinations in restraint of trade or commerce, or that tend to create monopoly.

On behalf of the merger, it is contended that it is nothing but an arrangement among the stockholders of these companies to place their shares in the hands of a holding corporation, so as to attain greater stability in the management and control of the respective properties, and that, far from injuring the people of these States, this will, if anything, inure to their benefit, in that,

by reducing the expenses of management and operation, it will enable the roads to give their patrons cheaper transportation. It is argued that the prosperity of the railroads is bound up with that of the people they carry for, and that it is for the common interest that rates should be so adjusted as to encourage business and foster trade; the prosperity of shippers and producers being synonymous with profitable railroad business. This means that the maintenance of minimum rates is more profitable to all concerned.

This argument is plausible and in great measure true, so long, at least, as the control of the railroads is in liberal and far-seeing hands.

On the economic side of the question, too, we find much to convince us that combination is the natural result of a high state of industrial development, and that it is but the working out of inexorable economic law. Unrestrained competition may well be a healthful and needed stimulus in the development of industry, up to a certain point. But from competition may flow the gravest consequences. For there readily comes a time when demand fails to keep pace with supply, and when old markets are glutted and new ones are not able to absorb the steadily increasing supply of commodities. Then it is that competition, becoming keener and keener, drives the weak ones to the wall, causes profits to disappear, and forces sales of goods below production cost. It is at this stage, and very logically too, that combination steps in, like some *deus ex machina*. For prices must be regulated and output curtailed to bring trade back to a living basis of profit, and to keep production within market requirements. An agreement come to for this purpose is the first step in a series that leads eventually to consolidation, either in the form of a trust or a large company. The old "trust," in which the direction and control of separate firms or companies were placed in the hands of trustees, has become rare; but the large corporation, which has swallowed these smaller groups, is still popularly known as a "trust."

Now, the actual result of large industrial combinations has been, generally speaking, to reduce the price of its products to the consumer. The saving in expenses of management, manufacture, distribution, etc., which is effected by combination, is incalculable, and it is to the interest of the trusts to keep prices

down to such a minimum as to discourage competition, the possibility of which in a country full of enterprise is never eliminated.

So, reasoning on these lines, it is contended that the merger of railroads is beneficial, and may prove as valuable to them and to their patrons as combination has proved in other lines of industry.

But the State of Minnesota, through her officials, has declined to accept this view.

A corporation outside of her jurisdiction, and not even seeking to do business within her borders, has accomplished what the laws of Minnesota forbid, namely, a merger of parallel and competing lines of railroad running through her territory.

What is Minnesota's redress?

She cannot proceed against the Northern Securities Company in her own courts for lack of jurisdiction and inability to get process over it; and, so far as the Great Northern and Northern Pacific are concerned, they have taken no corporate action whatever, and are, ostensibly at least, still carrying on business as separate and competing roads.

Minnesota's application to the Supreme Court of the United States to enjoin the Northern Securities Company from voting the stocks of the two railroads, on the ground that a combination in restraint of competition and injurious to Minnesota and her people would be thereby created, has been unsuccessful. The Supreme Court refused permission to Minnesota to bring such a suit, on the ground (1) that the rights of the parties could not be properly adjudicated, unless the Great Northern and Northern Pacific corporations were brought in as parties defendant; and (2) that, if they were so brought in, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be ousted, as it has no constitutional power to hear and determine controversies between a State and her citizens. That the Northern Pacific is incorporated in Minnesota, and a citizen of that State, is sufficient to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction.

What then remains?

It would be futile for Minnesota to attack the Securities Company in New Jersey, as it is regularly incorporated, and for purposes lawful under the statutes of that State.

How, it may be asked, can Minnesota attack the lawfulness of a corporation legally incorporated in another State?

While nothing can be authorized by the legislature of a State which is unlawful under its own constitution or that of the United States, this is the extent of the limitation upon State legislation. New Jersey may perfectly well authorize the formation of corporations for the purpose of conducting business reprobated by the laws of Minnesota. The public policy of New Jersey may favor transactions which that of Minnesota may denounce. New Jersey may deem the consolidation of parallel railroads to be in the interest of her people. Minnesota may adopt the opposite policy. Only when the New Jersey corporation attempts to do business in Minnesota, may the legitimacy of that business be judged by the policy of Minnesota, as embodied in her statutes.

But such is not the case here, as the Securities Company is willing to remain quietly in New Jersey, merely as a species of investment company holding stock in other corporations. The position of the Securities Company is thus apparently impregnable as regards the State courts, and it is plain that Minnesota or any other State injuriously affected must seek redress, if any is to be had, in the Federal courts.

But, to get an injunction, it would be necessary to show that the control exercised by the Securities Company over the two railroads in question, through its ownership of their stock, threatened an injury impending, irremediable, and non-compensable in damages, a contention hardly in keeping with the facts. So that, even had not Minnesota's action been nipped in the bud by a technicality, it is scarcely probable that she would have been able to make out a case for the injunctive relief she was seeking.

Apparently, the existence of the Securities Company can nowhere be attacked by a State or an individual with any prospect of success.

It is, then, only left to consider what the Attorney-General may do on behalf of the Federal government, and this brings us to the Sherman Anti-Trust law.

Under the power given it to regulate commerce between the States, Congress, on July 2d, 1890, passed "an act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." Drawn by the late John Sherman, it has ever since borne his name. The conditions which prompted this legislation sprang from our peculiar dual form of government. The States, sovereign within their own borders, cannot legislate as to matters

of inter-State commerce; and, while most of the States passed laws forbidding trusts and combinations within their respective jurisdictions, under penalties more or less severe, there was little or no harmony in these anti-trust laws and much conflict and divergence in their interpretation and effect.

If organized in one State and doing business in several others, a trust could evade the laws of States not favorable to certain parts of its business, by carrying on such parts of it in other States whose laws were more favorable to that particular phase of its affairs. Then the books and accounts could be readily enough conveyed from one jurisdiction to another, and officers as well as documents perambulated hither and thither at will.

Again, it is a cardinal principle of jurisprudence that one State will refuse to execute the penal laws of another State, and most of the laws against trusts and combinations, being penal in their nature, were prosecuted at common law or under statutes, while equity was rarely resorted to for injunctions, except in cases of conspiracy and the like. And, finally, where engaged in inter-State commerce, the trusts could invoke the Federal jurisdiction and hide behind its ægis with impunity. So that the trusts readily took advantage of the discord of remedy and conflict of authority among the States; and, although all were in agreement that something ought to be done to curb the mischief of the growing power of the trusts, it seemed as though no uniform and effective remedy could be devised.

In this emergency, there came a general and popular demand that the Federal government should take charge under the commerce clause of the Constitution. And it was under such auspices that the Sherman law was born into the world of jurisprudence, and became the law of the land.

The provisions of this law are substantially as follows:

"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. . . . Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a \$5,000 fine or one year's imprisonment, or both." (Secs. 1 & 2.)

By Sec. 8, "person" or "persons" is expressly made to include corporations.

By Sec. 4, the Circuit Courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction; and the District Attorneys in the several districts, under the direction of the Attorney-General, are commanded to institute proceedings in equity to restrain and prevent violations of the law; and by Sec. 5, process from one district runs to all other districts throughout the United States.

By this statute, Congress enunciated the national policy in reference to combinations involving inter-State business and which constitute monopolies. It is really based on the common law doctrine that competition is the salutary foundation of trade, and that any arrangement that tends to restrain competition is adverse to the public interest. It is an expression of the sturdy Anglo-Saxon opposition to monopoly and restraint of trade, which has never abated a jot either here or in England since the days of the Tudors.

The law has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as applying especially to transportation, it having been decided that mere manufacturing is not inter-State commerce, even though the product to be distributed among the States must eventually pass from one State to the other. The Sherman law applies only from the moment the transit from State to State begins, and from that moment any contract or combination which restrains or monopolizes becomes illegal.

The language of the act would prevent even a combination which was not a monopoly in the sense of covering the entire United States; that it suppressed competitive commerce between only two of the States would be sufficient.

The Sherman law again differs from any previous legislation in the comprehensiveness of the remedy it has provided. When it discovers that the result of any given transaction is to create a monopoly, in addition to providing the usual penalties it prescribes that the writ of injunction shall issue to put an effective quietus upon the persons or corporations engaged therein. It is not needful here, as in the application for the ordinary injunction by a State or an individual, to show that irreparable injury will ensue; but, once it is established that a combination exists, the injunction must issue as a matter of course.

It is plain, too, that the enforcement of the statute will not be obstructed by the form into which the combination is cast, as the law says: "whether as a trust or otherwise." So that

whether individuals or corporations enter into such an agreement among themselves, to carry it out in corporate or other form, is immaterial.

Now, the charter of the Securities Company as a matter of fact provides for the purchase not only of the stocks and bonds of railroads, but for other business enterprises, all legitimate on their face; and every presumption should be in favor of the rightfulness of the enterprise. The right to contract, to buy and sell, to trade and traffic, has long been treated under our common law system as the inherent right of every individual or corporation. The Securities Company is entitled to the benefit of this right and to the presumption that it seeks to infringe no law.

But how if this transaction in which it is engaged is found actually to constitute an interference with competitive inter-State commerce, and in effect a monopoly of railroad traffic in the Northwestern States?

It is the clash of these two principles, liberty of contract and prohibition of monopoly, which is involved in the solution of the problem.

The validity of the transactions of the Securities Company in Northern Pacific and Great Northern stocks seemingly depends, therefore, upon a question of fact. Does the holding of their stocks in one and the same interest bring about the suppression of competition between these railroads, and constitute a partial monopoly of inter-State traffic?

In this connection, the nature of the proceeding which the government has instituted has a certain bearing. If the Attorney-General had proceeded under the penal clauses of the Sherman law, it would have been necessary for the government to show that the organizers of the Securities Company harbored the intent of making a combination contrary to law. If the Securities Company only incidentally bought these Northern Pacific-Great Northern shares in the course of its business, and not as a part of an original design, the absence of intent to create a monopoly might have afforded a good defence in such penal prosecution.

But as the government has proceeded for an injunction to restrain the Securities Company from voting on the stocks which it holds in these roads, the suggestion is not available that the virtual combination of the two roads is a mere incident of the

general business of the Securities Company, nor will the absence of intent stay the hand of the law. But the question to which the Attorney-General will seek an answer is: Does the control of these two companies result in giving the power to the Securities Company to restrain competitive traffic?

If the answer is in the affirmative the injunction must issue.

If the injunction issues, it will affect great interests. The capital stocks and bonded indebtedness of the companies brought together under the control of the Securities Company aggregate upwards of eight hundred million dollars, for the ownership of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern carries with it control of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy railroad. If the injunction issues, it will not only prohibit the Securities Company from voting on the stocks of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern, but it will compel it to re-change these stocks for its own shares, as the latter will be rendered practically worthless by the injunction. Without the stocks of these railroads, the Securities Company would be a mere empty shell.

Such is the sweeping nature of the result that may be brought about by the Sherman law, going, as it does, far beyond any remedy ever before devised against monopoly.

But the projectors of the Securities Company are strenuously insisting that there is nothing illegal either in the intent or result of their corporate creation, and it still remains to be seen whether or not it can be brought under the ban of this most drastic law. If what has been done is not illegal it may well be that the dawn of a new and brilliant era in concentrated railroad management is at hand. For if this merger, or whatever it may be, is sustained, many other railroad properties will be brought together in the same way. Already a multitude of "Security Companies" have been formed, ready to demonstrate the benefits of combination, and only waiting to see the fate of the pioneer company before beginning operations.

If, however, the Supreme Court decides against the legality of the Securities Company, while many brilliant plans may be thwarted, the wrong done will doubtless be righted by none more willingly than by those who in good faith and inadvertently will be shown to have erred.

ROBERT L. CUTTING.

GEORGE SAND: THE NEW LIFE.

BY HENRY JAMES.

THOSE among us comfortably conscious of our different usage—aware, some would say, of our better conscience—may well have remarked the general absence, in France, of biographic commemoration of extinct worthies. The *Life*, as we understand it, the prompt, pious, spacious record and mirror of the eminent career, rarely follows the death. The ghost of the great man, when he happens to have been a Frenchman, “sits” for such portraiture, we gather, with a confidence much less assured than among ourselves, and with fewer relatives and friends to surround the chair. The manner in which, even for persons of highest mark among our neighbors, biography either hangs back for years or altogether fails, suggests that the approach is, even if authorized, too often difficult. This general attitude toward the question, it would thus appear, implies the predominance, for such retrospects, of doors bolted and barred. Hesitation is, therefore, fairly logical; for it rests on the assumption that men and women of great gifts will have lived with commensurate intensity, and that as regards some of the forms of this intensity the discretion of the inquirer may well be the better part of his enthusiasm. The critic can, therefore, only note with regret so much absent opportunity for the play of perception and the art of composition. The race that produced Balzac—to say nothing of Sainte-Beuve—would surely have produced a Boswell, a Lockhart and a Trevelyan if the fashion had not set so strongly against it. We have lately had a capital example of the encounter of an admirable English painter and an admirable English subject. It is not irrelevant to cite such a book as Mr. Mackail’s *Life of William Morris* as our high-water mark—a thing extremely to rejoice in. Each term of the combination appears supposable in France, but

only as distinct from the other. The artist, we gather, would there have lost his chance and the sitter his ease.

It completes in an interesting way these observations, which would bear much expansion, to perceive that when we at last have a Life of Madame George Sand—a celebrity living with the imputed intensity, if ever a celebrity did—we are indebted for it to the hand of a stranger. No fact could more exactly point the moral of my few remarks. Madame Sand's genius and renown would have long ago made her a subject at home, if alacrity, in such a connection, had been to be dreamed of. There is no more significant sign of the general ban under which alacrity rests. Everything about this extraordinary woman is interesting, and we can easily imagine the posthumous honors we ourselves would have hastened to assure to a part taken, in literature and life, with such brilliancy and sincerity. These demonstrations, where we should most look for them, have been, none the less, as naught—save indeed, to be exact, for the publication of a number of volumes of letters. It is just Madame Sand's letters, however—letters interesting and admirable, peculiarly qualified to dispose the reader in her favor—that, in England or in America, would have quickened the need for the rest of the evidence. But now that, as befalls, we do at last have the rest of the evidence as we never have had it before, we are of course sufficiently enlightened as to the reasons for a special application of the law of reserves and delays. It is not in fact easy to see how a full study of our heroine could have been produced earlier; and, even at present, there is a sensible comfort in its being produced at such a distance as practically imputes the act to a detached posterity. Contemporaneously, it was wise to forbear; but to-day, and in Russia, by good luck, it is permitted to plunge.

Mme. Wladimir Karénine's extraordinarily diffuse, but scarcely less valuable, biography, of which the first instalment,* in two large volumes, brings the story but to the year 1838, reaches us in a French version, apparently from the author's own hand, of chapters patiently contributed to Russian periodicals. Were it not superficially ungrateful to begin with reserves about a book so rich and full, there might be some complaint to make of this wonderful tribute on grounds of form and taste. Ponderous and prolix, the author moves in a mass, escorted by all the penalties

* "*George Sand, sa Vie et ses Œuvres. 1804-1876.*" Paris, 1899.

of her indifference to selection and compression. She insists and repeats, she wanders wide; her subject spreads about her, in places, as rather a pathless waste. Above all, she has produced a book which manages to be at once remarkably expert and singularly provincial. Our innocence is, perhaps, at fault, but we are moved to take the mixture as characteristically Russian. Would, indeed, any but that admirable "Slav" superiority to prejudice, of which we have lately heard so much, have availed to handle the particular facts in this large, free way? Nothing is, at all events, more curious than the union, on the part of our biographer, of psychological intelligence and a lame æsthetic. The writer's literary appreciations lag, in other words, half a century behind her human and social. She treats us to endless disquisitions on pages of her author to which we are no longer in any manageable relation at all—disquisitions pathetic, almost grotesque, in their misplaced good faith. But her attitude to her subject is admirable, her thoroughness exemplary, the spirit of service in her of the sort that builds the monument stone by stone. When we see it reared to the summit, as we are clearly to do, we shall feel the structure to be solid if not shapely. Nothing is more possible, meanwhile, than that a culture more homogeneous—a French hand or a German—could not have engaged in the work with anything like the same sincerity. An English hand—and the fact, for *our* culture, means much—would have been incapable of touching it. The present scale of it, at all events, is certainly an exotic misconception. But we can take of it what concerns us.

The whole thing, of course, we promptly reflect, concerns at the best only those of us who can remount a little the stream of time. The author of "*L'Histoire de ma Vie*" died in 1876, and the light of actuality, to-day, rests on very different heads. It may seem to belittle her to say that to care for her at all one must have cared for her from far back, for such is not in general the proviso we need to make on behalf of the greatest figures. It describes Madame Sand with breadth, but not with extravagance, to speak of her as a sister of Goethe, and we feel that for Goethe it can never be too late to care. But the case exemplifies, perhaps precisely, the difference, even in the most brilliant families, between sisters and brothers. She was to have the family spirit, but she was to receive from the fairies who attended at her cradle

the silver cup, not the gold. She was to write a hundred books, but she was not to write "Faust." She was to have all the distinction, but not all the perfection; and there could be no better instance of the degree in which a woman may achieve the one and still fail of the other. When it is a question of the rare originals who have either, she confirms us, masculine as she is, in believing that it takes a still greater masculinity to have both. What she had, however, she had in profusion; she was one of the deepest voices of that great mid-century concert against the last fine strains of which we are more and more banging the doors. Her work, beautiful, plentiful, and fluid, has floated itself out to sea, even as the melting snows of the high places are floated. To feel how she has passed away as a "creator," is to feel anew the immense waste involved in the general ferment of an age, and how much genius and beauty, let alone the baser parts of the mixture, it takes to produce a moderate quantity of literature. Smaller people have conceivably ceased to count; but it is strange for a member of the generation immediately succeeding her own that she should have had the same fate as smaller people: all the more that such a mourner may be ruefully conscious of contributing not a little himself to the mishap. Does he still read, re-read, can he to-day at all deal with, this wonderful lady's novels? It only half cheers him up that, on the occasion of such a publication as I here speak of, he finds himself as much interested as ever.

The grounds of the interest are difficult to give; they presuppose so much of the old impression. If the old impression, therefore, requires some art to sustain and justify itself, we must be content, so far as we are still under the charm, to pass, though only at the worst, for eccentric. The work, whether we still hold fast to it or not, has twenty qualities, and would still have an immense one if it had only its style; but what I suppose it has paid for it in the long-run is its want of plastic intensity. Does any work of representation, of imitation, live long that is predominantly loose? It may live in spite of looseness; but that, we make out, is only because closeness has somewhere, where it has most mattered, prevailed. It is hard to say of Madame Sand's productions, I think, that they show closeness anywhere; the sense of fluidity is what, in speaking of them, constantly comes back to us, and the sense of fluidity is fundamentally fatal to the

sense of particular truth. A picture is never the stream of the artist's inspiration; it is the deposit of the stream. For the picture, in George Sand, we must look elsewhere, look at her life and her nature, and find them in the copious documents in which these things, and many others, are now reflected. All *this* mass of evidence it is that constitutes the "intensity" we demand. The mass has little by little become large, and our obligation to Mme. Karénine is that she makes it still larger. She sets our faces, and without intending to, more and more in the right direction. Her injudicious analyses of forgotten fictions only confirm our discrimination. We feel ourselves in the presence of the extraordinary author of them, and yet also feel it to be not by reason of them that she now presents herself as one of the most remarkable of human creatures. By reason then of what? Of everything that determined, accompanied, surrounded their appearance. They formed, all together, a great feature in a career and a character, but the career and the character are the real thing.

Such is far from usually the case, I hasten to recognize, with the complete and genuine artist. Poor is the art, a thing positively to be ashamed of, that, generally speaking, is not far more real for this servant of the altar than anything else, anything outside the church, can possibly be. To have been the tempered and directed hammer that makes the metal hard: if that be not good enough for such a ministrant, we may know him by whatever he has found better—we shall not know him by the great name. The immense anomaly of Madame Sand was that she freely took the form of being, with most zest, quite another sort of hammer. It testifies sufficiently to her large endowment that, given the wide range of the rest of her appetite, she should seem to us to-day to have sacrificed, even superficially, to *any* form of objective expression. She had, in spite of herself, an imagination almost of the first order, which overflowed and irrigated, turning by its mere swift current, without effort, almost without direction, every mill it encountered, and launching, as it went, alike the lightest skiff and the stateliest ship. She had, in especial, the gift of speech, speech supreme and inspired, to which we particularly owe the high value of the "case" she presents. For the case was, definitely, a bold and direct experiment, not at all in "art," not at all in literature, but conspicuously and repeatedly

in life; so that our profit of it is, before anything else, that it was conscious, articulate, vivid—recorded, reflected, imaged. The subject of the experiment became, also, at first hand, the journalist, much of her work being simply splendid journalism—commissioned to bring it up to date. She interviewed nobody else, but she admirably interviewed herself; and this is exactly our good fortune. Her autobiography, her letters, her innumerable prefaces, all her expansive parentheses and excursions, compose the generous report. We have in this form, accordingly, to my sense, a literary title for her far superseding any derived from her creative work. But that is the result of a mere betrayal, not the result of an intention. Her masterpiece, by a perversity of fate, is the thing she least sat down to. It is, since she is a case, the mere notation of her symptoms, the aid to the study of them. To this has the author of "*Consuelo*" come.

But how in the world, indeed, was it *not* to be the particular cross-road at which the critic should lie in wait for a poor child of the age, whom preceding ages and generations had so almost infernally conspired to trap for him, to give up, candidly astray, to his hands? If the element of romance for which our heroine's name stands is best represented by her personal sequences and solutions, it is sufficiently visible that her heredity left her a scant alternative. Space fails me for the story of this heredity, queer and complicated, the very stuff that stories are made of—a chain of generations succeeding each other in confidence and joy, and with no aid asked of legal or other artificial sanctions. The facts are, moreover, sufficiently familiar, though here, as elsewhere, Mme. Karénine adds to our knowledge. Presented, foreshortened, stretching back from the quiet Nohant funeral of 1876 to the steps of the throne of King Augustus the Strong of Poland, father of Maurice de Saxe, great-great-grandfather of Aurore Dupin, it all hangs together as a group of *data* more provocative than any the great novelist herself ever handled. Her pre-natal past was so peopled with *dramatis personae* that her future had to supply them in such numbers as would preserve the balance. The tide of illegitimacy sets straight through the series. No one to speak of—Aurore's father is an exception—seems to have had a conventional paternity. Aurore herself squared with the convention but by a month or two; the marriage of her parents gave her a bare escape. She was brought up, by

her paternal grandmother, between a son of her father and a daughter of her mother born out of wedlock. It all moves before us as a vivid younger world, a world, on the whole, more amused and more amusing than ours. The period from the Restoration to the events of 1848 is the stretch of time in which, for more reasons than we can now go into, French life gives out, to those to whom its appeal never fails, most of its charm—most, at all events, of its ancient sociability. Happy is our sense of the picturesque Paris unconscious of a future, all “avenues” and exhibitions; happy is our sense of these middle years of a great generation, easy and lusty, despite the ensanguined spring that had gone before. They live again, piecing themselves ever so pleasantly and strangely together, in Madame Sand’s records and references; almost as much as the conscious close of the old *régime*, so vaunted by Talleyrand, they strike us as a season of which it would have been supremely good to taste.

They were, at any rate, unable to withhold from the wonderful young person growing up at Nohant the conditions she was so imperiously to require for tasting in her own manner. Though the motto of her autobiography is “*Wahrheit und Dichtung*,” quite as much as it had been that of Goethe’s, there is a truth beyond any projected by her professed fables in her evocation of the influences of her youth. Upon these influences Mme. Karénine, who has enjoyed access, through her heroine’s actual representatives, to much evidence hitherto unpublished, throws a hundred interesting lights. Mme. Dupin de Franceuil and Mme. Dupin the younger survive and perform for us, “convince” us, as we say, better than any Lélia or any Consuelo. Our author’s whole treatment of her remarkable mother’s figure and history conveniently gives the critic the pitch of the great fact about her—the formation, apparently at a given moment, yet in very fact, we may be sure, from far back, of the capacity and the determination to live, with high consistency, for herself. What she made of this resolve to allow her nature all its chances, and how she carried on the process—these things are, thanks to the immense illustration her genius enabled her to lend them, the essence of her story; of which the full adumbration is in the detached pictorial way she causes her mother to live for us. Motherhood, daughterhood, childhood, embarrassed maturity, were phenomena she early encountered in her great adventure, and nothing is more typical

of her energy and sincerity than the short work that we can scarce help feeling she makes of them. It is not that she for a moment blinks or dodges them; she weaves them straight in—embarks with them, indeed, as her principal baggage. We know to-day, from the pages before us, everything we need to know about her marriage and the troubled years that followed; about M. Casimir Dudevant and his possible points of view, about her separation, her sharp secession, rather, as it first presents itself, and her discovery, at a turn of the road, as it can only be called, of her genius.

She stumbled on this principle, we see, quite by accident, as a consequence of the attempt to do the very humblest labor, to support herself from day to day. It would be difficult to put one's finger more exactly upon a case of genius unaided and unprompted. She embarked, as I have called it, on her great voyage with no grounds of confidence whatever; she had, obscurely, unwittingly, the spirit of Columbus, but not so much even as his exiguous outfit. She found her gift of improvisation, found her tropic wealth, by leaping—a surprised *conquistador* of “style”—straight upon the coral strand. No awakened instinct, probably, was ever such a blessing to a writer so much in need. It was for a long time all her initiation, practically all her equipment. The curious thing is that she never really arrived at it at all, but that she started with it, as a Patti or a Mario starts with a voice, and that it was simply the train in which she travelled. It was to render her as great a service as any supreme faculty ever rendered its possessor, quite the same service as the strategic eye renders a commander in the field, or instant courage the attacking soldier: it was to carry her through life still more inimitably than through the career of authorship. Her books are all rich and resonant with it, but they profit by it meagrely compared with her character. She walks, from first to last, in music of her own making, and it is in truth, sometimes only, with her present biographer to elbow us a little the way, that these triumphant sounds permit us a near enough approach to the procession to make out quite exactly its course.

No part of her career is, to my sense, so curious as this particular sudden bound into the arena. Nothing but the indescribable heredity I have spoken of appears traceably to have prepared it. We have on one side the mere poverty and provincial-

ity of her marriage and her early contacts, the crudity of her youth and her ignorance (which included so small a view of herself that she had begun by looking for a future in the bedaubing, for fancy-shops, of little boxes and fans); and on the other, at a stride, the full-blown distinction of "*Valentine*" and "*Jacques*," which had had nothing to lead up to it, we seem to make out, but the very rough sketch of a love-affair with M. Jules Sandeau. I spoke just now of the possible points of view of poor M. Dudevant; at which, had we space, it might be of no small amusement to glance—of an amusement, indeed, large and suggestive. We see him, surely, in the light of these records, as the most "sold" husband in literature, and not at all, one feels, by his wife's assertion of her freedom, but simply by her assertion of her mind. He appears to have married her for a nobody, approved and guaranteed, and he found her, on his hands, a sister, as we have seen, of Goethe—unless it be but a figure to say that he ever "found" her anything. He appears to have lived to an advanced age without having really—in spite of the lawsuits he lost—comprehended his case; not the least singular feature of which had in fact positively been the deceptive delay of his fate. It was not till after several years of false calm that it presented itself in its special form. We see him, and his so ruthlessly superseded name, never to be gilded by the brilliant event, reduced, like a leaf in a whirlwind, to a mere vanishing-point.

We deal here, I think, with something very different from the usual tittle-tattle about "private" relations, for the simple reason that we deal with relations foredoomed to publicity by the strange economy involved in the very play of genius. Nothing was ever less wasted, from beginning to end, than all this amorous experience and all this luxury of woe. The parties to it were to make an inveterate use of it, the principal party most of all; and what, therefore, on that marked ground, concerns the critic is to see what they were appreciably to get out of it. The principal party, the constant one through all mutations, was alone qualified to produce the extract that affects us as final. It was by the publication four years since of her letters to Alfred de Musset and to Sainte-Beuve—by the appearance also of Mme. Arvède Barine's luminous little *Life of Musset*—that we began to find her personal history brought nearer to us than her own communications had, in her lifetime, already brought it. The

story of her relations with Musset is, accordingly, so known that I need only glance at the fact of her having—shortly after the highest degree of intimacy between them had, in the summer of 1833, established itself in Paris—travelled with him to Italy, settled with him, briefly, in Venice, and there passionately quarrelled and parted with him—only, however, several months later, on their return to France, to renew again, to quarrel and to part again, all more passionately, if possible, even than before. Mme. Karénine, besides supplying us with all added light on this episode, keeps us abreast of others that were to follow, leaves us no more in the dark about Michel de Bourges, Félicien Mallefille, and Chopin than we had already been left about their several predecessors. She is commendably lucid on the subject of Franz Liszt, impartially examines the case and authoritatively dismisses it. Her second volume brings her heroine to the eve of the historic departure with Chopin for Majorca. We have thus, in this convenient form, enough for one mouthful of entertainment, as well as for superabundant reflection.

We have indeed the whole essence of what most touches us, for this consists not at all of the quantity of the facts, nor even of their oddity: they are practically all there from the moment the heroine's general attitude defines itself. This is the solid element—the details, to-day, are smoke. Yet it was in particular in taking her place, that autumn evening, in the southward-moving diligence that Alfred de Musset—it was on this special occasion, I hasten to add, that she gave most the measure of her choice of the logical life. She had reached toward such a life, obviously in quitting the conjugal roof in 1831—had attacked the experiment clumsily, but according to her light, by throwing herself on such material support as faculties yet untested might furnish, and on such moral as several months of the *intimité* of Jules Sandeau and a briefer taste of that of Prosper Mérimée might further contribute. She had done, in other words, what she could; subsequent lights show it as not her fault that she had not done better. With Musset her future took a stride; emotionally it “looked up.” Nothing was wanting, in this case—independently of what might then have appeared her friend's equal genius—quite ideally to qualify it. He was several years her junior, and as she had her husband and her children, he had, in the high degree of most young Frenchmen of

sensibility, his mother. It is recorded that with this lady, on the eve of the celebrated step, she quite had the situation, as the phrase is, out; which is a note the more in the general intellectual lucidity. The only other note, in fact, to be added is that of the absence of funds for the undertaking. Neither partner had a penny to spare; the plan was wholly to "make money," as it were, as they went. A great deal was, in the event, to tell the truth, to be made—but the event was at the time far from clear to them. The enterprise was, in consequence, purely and simply, with a rounded perfection that gives it its value for the critic, an affair of the heart. That the heart, speaking of it as a fully representative organ, should fail of no good occasion completely and consistently to engage itself was the definite and, as appeared, the promising assumption on which everything rested. The heart was real life, frank, fearless, intelligent, and even, so far as might be, intelligible, life; everything else was stupid as well as poor, muddle as well as misery. The heart, of course, might be misery, for nothing was more possible than that life predominantly was; but it was, at all events, the misery that is least ignoble.

This was the basis of Madame Sand's personal evolution, of her immense moral energy, for many a year; it was a practical system, applied and reapplied, and no "inquiry" concerning her has much point save as settling what, for our enlightenment and our esteem, she made of it. The answer meets us, I think, after we have taken in the facts, promptly enough, and with great clearness, if we consider that it is not, that it cannot be, in the conditions, a simple one. She made of it then, intellectually, a splendid living, but she was able to do this only because she was an altogether exceptional example of human stuff. It is here that her famous heredity comes in: we see what a race accumulation of "toughness" had been required to build her up. Monstrous monarchs and bastards of kings, bastards of bastards, courtesans, dancers supple and hard, accomplished men and women of the old, dead, great world, seasoned young soldiers of the Imperial epic, grisettes of the *pavé de Paris*, Parisian to the core—the mixture was not quite the blood of people in general, and, obviously, such a final flower of such a stem might well have fixed the attention and appealed to the vigilance of those qualified to watch its development. These persons would, doubtless, however, as a result of their observation, have acquired betimes a sense of the

high vitality of their young friend. Formed essentially for independence, and constructed for resistance and survival, she was to be trusted, as I have hinted, to take care of herself: this was always the residuary fact, whenever a passion was spent. She took care of Musset, she took care of Chopin, took care, in short, in her career, of a whole series of nurslings, but never failed, through the worst ingratitude, to be, by her own elasticity, still better taken care of. This is why we call her anomalous and deprecate any view of her success that loses sight of the anomaly. The success was so great that, but *for* the remainder, she would be too encouraging. She was one in a million, and the cluster of circumstances is too unlikely to recur.

It is by her success, none the less, we must also remember, that we know her; it is this that makes her interesting and calls for study. She had all the illumination that sensibility, that curiosity, can give, and that so ingeniously induces surrender to it; but the too numerous weaknesses, vulgarities and penalties of adventure and surrender she had only in sufficient degree to complete the experience before they shaped themselves into the eloquence into which she could always reascend. Her eloquence—it is the simplest way to explain her—fairly *made* her success; and eloquence is superlatively rare. When passion can always depend upon it to vibrate, passion becomes to that extent action, and success is nothing but action repeated and confirmed. In Madame Sand's particular case, the constant recurrence of the malady of passion promoted, in the most extraordinary way, the superior appearance, the general expression, of health. It is not, of course, to be denied that there are, in her works, infirmities and disfigurements, odd smutches even, or unwitting drolleries, which show a sense on some sides enfeebled. The sense of her characters themselves, for instance, is constantly a confused one; they are too often at sea as to what is possible and what impossible for what we roughly call decent people. Her own categories, loose and liberal, are yet, naturally, never rough; when they sin it is by excess of indulgence and absence of the humorous vision, a nose for the ridiculous—the fatal want, this last almost always, we are reminded, the heel of Achilles, in the sentimental, the romantic estimate. The general solidity of her novels, at any rate, I leave impugned, and the feature I have just noted in them is but one of the points at which they fail of reality. I stick to

the history of her personal experiment, as the now so numerous documents show it; for it is here, and here only, that her felicity is amusing and confounding; amusing by the quaintness of some of the facts exposed, and yet confounding by reason of the beauty mixed with them.

The "affair" with Musset, for instance, has come to figure, thanks to the talent of both parties, as one of the great affairs in the history of letters; and yet, on the near view of it that we now enjoy, we learn that it lasted but little more than a year. Even this measure, indeed, is excessive, so far as any measure serves amid so much that is incoherent. It supposed itself to have dropped, for upwards of six months, during which another connection, another imperious heart-history, reigned in its stead. The enumeration of these trifles is not, I insist, futile; so that, while we are about it, we shall find an interest in being clear. The events of Venice, with those that immediately preceded and followed them, distinctly repay inspection as an epitome, in their totality, of the usual process. They appear to contain, as well as an intensity all their own, the essence of all that of other occasions. The young poet and the young novelist met, then, appear to have met for the first time, toward the end of June, 1833, and to have become finally intimate in the month of August of that year. They started together for Italy at the beginning of the winter, and were settled—if settled be not too odd a word to use—by the end of January in Venice. I neglect the question of Musset's serious illness there, though it be not the least renowned part of the adventure, and observe simply that by the end of March he had started to return to Paris, while his friend, remaining in Venice, had yielded to a new affection. This new affection, the connection with Pietro Pagello, dates, unmistakably, from before Musset's departure; and, with the completion of "*Jacques*" and the composition of the beautiful "*André*," the wonderful "*Léone-Léoni*" and some of the most interesting of the "*Lettres d'un Voyageur*," constituted the main interest of our heroine during the spring and early summer. By midsummer, she had left Italy with Pagello, and they arrive in Paris on August 14th. This arrival marks immediately the term of their relations, which had by that time lasted some six or seven months. Pagello returned to Italy, and if they ever met again it was the merest of meetings and long years afterwards.

In October, meanwhile, the connection with Musset was renewed, and renewed—this is the great point—because the sentiments still entertained by each (in spite of Pagello, in spite of everything) are stronger even than any awkwardness of which either might have been conscious. The whole business, really, is one in which we lose our measure alike of awkwardness and of grace. The situation is in the hands of comedy—or *would* be, I should rather say, were it not so distinctly predestined to fall, as I have noted, into those of eloquence. It is prolonged till the following February, we make out, at furthest, and only after having been, more than once in the interval, threatened with violent extinction. It bequeathes us thus, in a handful of dates, a picture than which none other, probably, in the annals of “passion” was ever more suggestive. The passion is of the kind that is called “immortal”—and so called, wonderful to say, with infinite reason and justice. The poems, the letters, the diaries, the novels, the unextinguished accents and lingering echoes that commemorate it are among the treasures of the human imagination. The literature of the world is appreciably the richer for it. Eloquence, in a word, on both sides, marked it for her own; it was born, according to the adage, with a silver spoon in its mouth. It was an affection, in short, transcendent and sublime, and yet the critic sees it come and go before he can positively turn round. The brief period of some seventeen or eighteen months not only affords it all its opportunity, but lodges comfortably in its lap a relation founded on the same elements and yet wholly distinct from it. Musset occupied, in fact, but two-thirds of the time. Pagello overlapped him because Pagello also appealed to the heart; but Pagello’s appeal to the heart was disposed of as expeditiously. Musset, in the same way, succeeded Pagello at the voice of a similar appeal, and this claim, in its turn, was polished off in yet livelier fashion.

Liveliness is, of course, the tune of the “gay” career; it has always been supposed to relegate to comedy the things to which it puts its mark—so that, as a series of sequences amenable mainly to satire, the approximations I have made would fall neatly into place. The anomaly here, as on other occasions of the same sort depicted in Mme. Karénine’s volumes, is that the facts, as we are brought near to them, strike us as so out of relation to the beautiful tone. The effect and the achieved dignity are those

of tragedy—tragedy rearranging, begetting afresh, in its own interest, all the elements of ecstasy and despair. How can it not be tragedy when this interest is just the interest, which I have touched on, of exemplary eloquence? There are lights in which the material, with its want of nobleness, want of temper, want even of manners, seems scarcely life at all, as the civilized conscience understands life; and yet it is as the most magnanimous of surrenders to life that the whole business is, in the documents, triumphantly reflected. It is not only that "*La Nuit d'Octobre*" is divine, that Madame Sand's letters are superb and that nothing can exceed, in particular, the high style of the passage that we now perceive Musset to have borrowed from one of them for insertion in "*On ne Badine pas avec l'Amour*"—to the extreme profit of the generation which was, for many years thereafter, to hear Delaunay exquisitely declaim at the Théâtre Français: it is that, strange to say, almost the finest flower of the bouquet is the now-famous written "declaration" addressed to Pagello one evening by the lady. Musset was ill in bed; he was the attendant doctor; and while, watching and ignorant of French, he twirled his thumbs or dipped into a book, his patient's companion, on the other side of the table and with the lamp between them, dashed off (it took time) a specimen of her finest prose, which she then folded and handed to him, and which, for perusal more at leisure, he carried off in his pocket. It proved neither more nor less than one of the pontoon bridges which a force engaged in an active campaign holds itself ready at any time to throw across a river, and was in fact, in its kind, a solid and beautiful structure. It happily spanned, at all events, the gulf of a short acquaintance.

The incident bears a family resemblance to another which our biographer finds in her path in the year 1837. Having to chronicle the close of the relation with Michel de Bourges, from which, again, her heroine had so much to suffer, she has also to mention that this catastrophe was precipitated, to all appearance, by the contemporaneous dawn of an affection "*plus douce, moins enthousiaste, moins âpre aussi, et j'espère plus durable.*" The object of this affection was none other than the young man then installed at Nohant as preceptor to Madame Sand's children—but as to whom, in the event, we ask ourselves what, by this time, her notion of measure or durability can have become. It is just

this element that has positively least to do, we seem to make out, with "affection" as so practised. Affection, in any sense worth speaking of, is durability; and it is the repeated impermanence of those manifestations of it on behalf of which the high horse of "passion" is ridden so hard, that makes us wonder whether such loves and such licenses, in spite of the quality of free experience they represent, had really anything to do with it. It was the last thing, verily, they contained. Félicien Mallefille may be, to his heart's content, of 1837 and even of a portion of 1838; it is Chopin who is of the rest of the year and—let us hope our biographer will have occasion to show us—of at least the whole of the following. It is here that, as I have mentioned, she pauses.

One of the most interesting contributions to her subject is the long letter from Balzac to his future wife, Mme. Hanska, now reproduced in the most substantial of the few volumes of his correspondence ("*Lettres à l'Étrangère, 1833-1842*," published 1899) and printed by Mme. Karénine. The author, finding himself near Nohant in the spring of 1838, went over to pay his illustrious colleague a visit, and spent a day or two in sustained conversation with her. He had the good fortune to find her alone, so that they could endlessly talk and smoke by the fire, and nothing can be all at once more vivid, more curious and more judicious than his immediate report of the occasion. It lets into the whole question of his hostess's character and relations—inevitably more or less misrepresented by the party most involved—air and light and truth; it re-establishes the proportions. It shows these things as confronted, in a word, with Balzac's huge sense of the real, and offers the grateful critic still another chance to testify for that precious gift. This same critic's mind rests, it must be added, with complacency on the vision, thus evoked, of the way that, for three days, from five o'clock in the afternoon till five in the morning, the wonderful friends must have had things out. For once, we feel sure, fundamental questions were not shirked. As regards his comrade, at any rate, Balzac puts his finger again and again on the truth and the idiosyncrasy. "She is not *aimable*, and, in consequence, will always find it difficult to be loved." He adds—and it is here that he comes nearest straightening the question—that she has, in character, all the leading marks of a man, is as little as possible

a woman. He implies that, though judged as a woman she may be puzzling enough, she hangs together perfectly if judged as a man. She is a man, he repeats, "and all the more that she wants to be, that she has sunk the woman, that she isn't one. Women attract, and she repels; and, as I am much of a man, if this is the effect she produces on me she must produce it on men who are like me—so that she will always be unhappy." He qualifies as justly, I may parenthesize, her artistic side, the limits of which, he moreover intimates, she had herself expressed to him. "She has neither intensity of conception, nor the constructive gift, nor the faculty of reaching the truth"—Balzac's own deep dye of the truth—"nor the art of the pathetic. But she holds that, without knowing the French language, she has *style*. And it's true."

The light of mere evidence, the light of such researches as Mme. Karénine's, added to her so copious correspondence and autobiography, makes Madame Sand so much of a riddle that we grasp at Balzac's authoritative word as at an approach to a solution. It is, strange to say, by reading another complexity into her image that we finally simplify it. The riddle consists in the irreconcilability of her distinction and her vulgarity. Vulgar, somehow, in spite of everything, is the record of so much taking and tasting and leaving, so much publicity and palpability of "heart," so much experience reduced only to the terms of so many more or less greasy males. And not only vulgar, but, in a manner, grotesque—from the moment, that is, that the experience is presented to us, in any degree, in the name of terror and pity. It was not a passive, but an active, situation, that of a nature robust and not too fastidious, full, at all times, of resistance and recovery. No history gives us really more ground to protest against the new fashion, rife in France, of transporting "love," as there mainly represented, to the air of morals and of melancholy. The fashion betrays only the need to rejuvenate, at a considerable cost of falsity, an element in connection with which levity is felt either to have exhausted itself or to look thin as a motive. It is in the light of levity that many of the facts presented by Mme. Karénine are most intelligible, and that is the circumstance awkward for sensibility and for all the graces it is invited to shed.

The scene quite changes when we cease to expect these graces. As a man Madame Sand was admirable—especially as a man of

the dressing-gown and slippers order, easy of approach and of *tutoiement*, rubbing shoulders with queer company and not superstitiously haunted by the conception of the gentleman. There have been many men of genius, delightful, prodigal, and even immortal, who squared but scantily with that conception, and it is a company to which our heroine is simply one of the most interesting of recruits. She has in it all her value and loses none of her charm. Above all, she becomes in a manner comprehensible, as any frank Bohemian is comprehensible. We have only to imagine the Bohemian really endowed, the Bohemian, that is, both industrious and wise, to get almost all her formula. She keeps, here and there, a feminine streak—has at moments an excess of volubility and too great an insistence on having been in the right; but, for the rest, as Balzac says, the character, confronted with the position, is an explanation. "*Son mâle*," he writes to Mme. Hanska, "*était rare*"—than which nothing could have been more natural. Yet for this masculine counterpart—so difficult to find—she ingenuously spent much of her early life in looking. That the search was a mistake is what constitutes, in all the business of which the Musset episode is the type, the only, the real melancholy, the real moral tragedy.

For all such mistakes, none the less, the whole lesson of the picture is precisely in the disconcerting success of her system. Everything was, at the start, against that presumption; but everything, at the end, was to indicate that she was not to have been beaten. Others might well have been, and the banks of the stream of her career are marked, not invisibly, with mouldering traces of the less lucky or the less buoyant; but her attitude, as life went on, was more and more that of showing how she profited of all things for wisdom and sympathy, for a general expertness and nobleness. These forces, all clarified to an admirable judgment, kept her, to the last day, serene and superior, and they are one of the reasons why the monument before us is felt not to be misplaced. There should always be a monument to those whose *tour de force* has been great. What greater *tour de force* than to have bequeathed in such mixed elements, to have principally made up of them, the affirmation of an unprecedented intensity of life? For though this intensity was one that broke down, in each proposed exhibition, the general example remains, incongruously, almost the best we can cite. And all we can say is

that this brings us back once more to the greatness, the exceptional energy and wellnigh monstrous vitality, of the individual concerned. Nothing is so absurd as a half-disguise, and Madame Sand's abiding value will probably be in her having given her sex, for its new evolution and transformation, the real standard and measure of change. This evolution, this transformation, all round us, is unmistakable; the change is in the air; women are turned more and more to looking at life as men look at it and to getting from it what men get. In this direction their aim has been, as yet, comparatively modest and their emulation low; the challenge they have hitherto picked up is but the challenge of the "average" male. The approximation of the extraordinary woman has been practically, in other words, to the ordinary man. Madame Sand's service is that she planted the flag much higher: her own approximation, at least, was to the extraordinary. She reached him, she surpassed him, and she showed how, with native dispositions, the thing could be done. These new records will live as the precious text-book, so far as we have got, of the business.

HENRY JAMES.

A GERMAN VIEW OF THE AMERICAN PERIL.

BY DR. WILHELM WENDLANDT, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION IN BERLIN.

THE American peril is a problem in arithmetic. It will cause the greatest distress to the party who has made a mistake in his calculations. Viewed from this stand-point, it threatens not Germany alone, nor even Europe alone, but also America itself. The Americans have always been cool calculators, but they err if they suppose that England is the only old country that has learned how to figure.

For thirty years all the European states have directed their whole attention and their accumulated skill of centuries to the practical method of creating values, with a view to the increase of individual and national wealth. The industry of the middle European states, in particular, is the result of this application of the modern intellect. It is just as young as the industry of the United States. But it rests upon very different foundations.

American industry has "grown phenomenally" because, in the main, of the presence in the country of almost all raw materials, and because of the continued immigration of European brains and labor. At the opening of the century the German Imperial Chancellor, like President Roosevelt, was able to speak in the Reichstag of the unexampled progress of the industry of his country. The causes of this other phenomenal growth, which involved a transformation of Germany from an agricultural into an industrial state in the space of three decades, are to be found, aside from the presence of coal and iron in Germany, not only in the mechanical exploitation of raw materials, but particularly in the thorough commercial and scientific training of the people.

German civilization, like that of England, is older by many centuries than that of America. Its antiquity might be regarded

as a disadvantage; but at the present stage of development of the World-Powers it means a measure of advancement, a lead in the race, which cannot by any means be entirely cut down by the progress of a century, much less by that of a generation.

England had a lead over all civilized countries, because it had not been ruined economically by a thirty years' religious war in the seventeenth century. Germany caught up again in the century just past. As regards certain specialties of industry, Germany is the oldest industrial country in the world. As early as the year 1400, the products of the Nuremberg toy industry and German art were known and esteemed in all markets. On these foundations, covered up but not destroyed by the ruins of war, the industry of the German Empire was built up organically and surely when political strength was restored, and that in so short a time that it surprised the Germans themselves. The same is true of German shipping, which has recently made similar astonishing progress.

Parallel with Germany, her neighboring and allied states have developed industrially to a greater or less extent. France has made, comparatively, the least progress. But her exports have recently increased, and her industry would presumably soon recover from its lethargy if the French would courageously lay aside their unhappy thoughts of revenge, which still hang about them like a fashionable dress, and would come to a clear realization of their economic relations to their neighbor states.

Notwithstanding this state of affairs in the European nations, America has sprung a surprise upon old Europe. The fact that this occurrence was not recognized in time by the political leaders and by European manufacturers, and that it is not even yet appreciated at its proper significance, is what constitutes the real core of the American peril to Europe. Not as if America were in a position to surpass old Europe in any direction in the coming centuries; but neglect of the timely and proper use of precautions core of the American peril to Europe. Not as if America were fore, does not consist in a lack, on the part of the inhabitants of the Old World, of the means of protecting themselves, but in their failure to recognize its actual presence.

Here is where Americans have an advantage which they are utilizing at present to the fullest extent with shrewd calculation. Upon this basis their high protective tariff system has grown up,

which has laid in ruins before the eyes of the whole world the doctrine of free trade.

The Dingley bill signifies a complete revolution of the world's economic policy. The European states will be compelled to adjust themselves to it, unless the United States are preparing to remove their almost insurmountable wall of protection. The Dingley tariff, as a whole and in its separate parts, could not be better fitted to arouse the resentment of the entire commercial world of Europe; and one cannot sufficiently admire the forbearance of the states which have submitted since 1896 to a measure equivalent to a revolution in the world of commerce. The conviction is gradually dawning on all thinking men that the adoption of an entirely new commercial law by one World-Power requires a corresponding reconstruction of the commercial laws by the other Powers.

Hence it follows that while the Dingley tariff is a danger to Europe at present, it also involves no less a danger to the United States in the future; for, as soon as Europe, or even the allied states alone, proceed with the same indifference to the interests of others as America has shown, none will be more severely injured than that state whose export trade is now enjoying a "phenomenal growth." If the European markets are closed, even in part only, to the United States, the inevitable result for America will be an industrial crisis of an extent such as the world has never seen.

The development which the trusts are taking is at work even now in the direction of a crisis, such as has been observed at times in the ever-fluctuating fate of the American railroads and banks. Such mighty reverses have not occurred in the states of Europe, neither are they possible. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why Mr. Roosevelt is paying special attention to the growth of the trusts. As soon as American labor arrays itself against the owners of the trusts, and as soon as immigration materially decreases, as it has begun to do, American industry will be prostrated. Then it will become apparent to what extent the domestic consumer in the United States has been injured, on the one hand by the Dingley tariff—which increases the price of foreign products fifty per cent. on an average—and on the other by the trusts, which compel him to pay their own prices.

The growth of the trusts would not, therefore, be the main

occasion for Europe's adopting a hostile commercial policy towards America. The Dingley tariff, however, is the "*pièce de résistance*" which must be removed or rendered ineffective.

To prove this further a specialized examination of the Dingley tariff is necessary. But before making such an examination we will call to mind the present status of the treaty relations between the United States, Germany, and other states.

The basis of our commercial relations is the treaty of 1828 between Prussia and the United States, which was transferred in 1871 to the combined states of Germany. Then, in 1891, America was included in the "most-favored-nation" clause as regards duties on grain. This perhaps somewhat hastily granted concession was ill-requited by the Americans, who refused us the privileges of the "most favored nation" down to the latest agreement on July 10th, 1900. At present, the German Empire applies the "most-favored-nation" clause, with limitation, to the commercial treaties with Austria-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Roumania, Russia, Servia, and Switzerland; while the President of the United States proclaimed on July 13th, 1900, that the concessions granted to France, Italy, and Portugal applied also to imports from Germany. This agreement may be abrogated at three months' notice. It is a cause of gratification that the United States have thus abolished differential treatment, especially towards France, and that the enjoyment of the provisions of the second French treaty of July 24th, 1899, seems assured to us as soon as it takes effect. The question, as is well known, is one regarding the most favorable concessions on liqueurs, wines, and the like, which had been granted to France, and it was rather a matter of principle for the German Empire to seek to obtain the same terms. In this we have been successful, but we have done a poor stroke of business, because we have thereby sanctioned America's claim to the privileges of the most-favored-nation clause on the ground of our December treaties with France, Italy, Russia, and Austria; while the concession we have received applies only to the few articles mentioned. However, the principle has some value; we shall be able to use it later as a precedent. The new treaty with France contains, in the main, reductions of duties on classes of goods imported into the United States from Germany, such as chemicals, mineral-waters, toys, gloves, iron and textile goods, and especially knitted goods, laces,

velvets, velveteens, as well as lace trimmings, mixed woven goods, articles of clothing, embroideries, linens, etc. These reductions, to be sure, would not benefit us until they had gone into effect for France.

The American "maximum concession," which differs in principle from the most-favored-nation clause hitherto customary in commercial treaties, is one of the principal causes productive of resistance to the Dingley tariff. It has been truly said that the limited maximum concession of America, which relates essentially to alcoholic beverages, is one in appearance only, and cannot be regarded as in any way an equivalent of exchange with the tariff treaties of the European states.

The maximum concession which European states allow each other on the basis of their treaty tariffs, constitutes a very different foundation for treaties as to the most favored nation from the right of the President to grant reductions on a few articles, which, moreover, it must be said, are of no great importance in industry.

This fact becomes the more evident in view of the enormous increase of duties effected by the Dingley tariff.

A detailed calculation of the duties of the two countries shows that the Dingley tariff imposes an import tax of fifty per cent. of the value of the total imports, or forty-five per cent. of the value of the dutiable goods, while Germany does not quite levy ten per cent. and seventeen per cent. respectively. Comparing, therefore, the total imports, the American protective tariff exceeds the German fivefold, and comparing the dutiable goods, threefold. Moreover, certain important articles of industry must pay the United States Treasury a very much greater rate than the average.

Now, the effect of these enormous duties is increased still further by the specialization of the tariff. Under lumber, for example, it distinguishes five different kinds which are differently taxed, the duty rising from one cent to fifty cents; under glass, there are seven rates; under steel ingots, there are four, the duty rising from two marks to about thirty-five marks per double hundredweight; leather gloves alone comprise nineteen items. Add to this that the Dingley tariff takes cognizance of about ten different measures: "piece," "ton," "pair," "square yard," "square inch," "cubic foot," "gallon," "bushel," etc. These

different terms, of course, frequently occasion unintentional mistakes in the declarations, and of these the appraisers take advantage.

Moreover, a duty by weight is added in many cases to the duty *ad valorem*. This provision is frequently found in the Dingley tariff, where we therefore have a double taxation, according to value and according to weight.

It is worthy of notice, furthermore, how this tariff is handled. The certification of invoices involves great inconvenience to foreign industry. Every invoice exceeding the value of \$100 must be examined and certified by the American consul in the country from which it comes. The consul may require the personal appearance of the manufacturer before him, and even put the manufacturer under oath. The invoice must contain not only the value of the article, but the market and wholesale prices in the principal markets of the country, statements as to time, place, and person of the seller, the actual cost, as well as all expenses, including the value of the packing, such as wooden and paper boxes, bags, etc. Among these expenses are to be considered especially the cost of packing, freight to the shipping port, commissions, transportation, and insurance. The injustice of these demands is in obliging a foreign manufacturer to reveal his methods of production and his business secrets. The German government had recognized this state of affairs, and instructed its envoy some time ago to bring it to the notice of the American government. The answer was that nothing could be done until the objectionable provision of the law was changed.

This provision of the Dingley tariff is so vexatious that the Manufacturers' Association has submitted a request to the Prussian Minister of Commerce, the German Bundesrath and the Reichstag to add to the new German tariff law a provision which would enable Germany eventually to make the same demands. This clause or provision is to be about as follows: The German Empire shall have the right of immediately taking like measures towards countries that require certificates of origin, shipping duties, especially high licenses for commercial travellers, and the like, so that the battle may be waged with equal weapons on both sides.

The functions of the appraisers in America are a downright Draconic institution. They have full power and are supported

by the government in such a way that hardly anything can be done against them. There is nothing left to do but to pay what they demand; for protests result in protracted lawsuits, and the importer is in reality dispossessed as against the American manufacturer.

If the slightest undervaluation is proved, very high fines immediately become operative. If, for example, the appraised value exceeds the amount declared, one per cent. of the appraised value is added.

According to our view, it is to our mutual interest to reach some understanding conducive to the welfare of the two nations on the basis of a consideration of the facts of the case. There is no doubt that the foundations from which the European states have risen are already menaced by the aggressive economic policy of the United States, and there is also no doubt that Europe is arming in an economic sense against America. Inducements to do so are furnished by the statistics. Those relating to the foreign trade of Germany and America may be taken as evidence of the necessity for the Germans ceasing to remain inactive spectators of their course of development.

According to American authorities, the total imports into America in 1891 were valued at 3,497 millions of marks, and the exports at 3,663 millions. After ten years, the imports were 3,482 millions, and the exports 6,103 millions. While, therefore, the imports remained stationary, the exports doubled.

The share of Germany in this was as follows: In 1891, Germany was still exporting more to America than she received from that country, the amount being 409 millions of marks against 385 millions. In 1900, German exports were 434 millions, an insignificant rise in view of the fact that the population of America had greatly increased. On the other hand, the imports into Germany from America doubled in the ten years. They are 830 millions of marks.

German authorities afford a picture of still sharper contrasts, for the American authorities may have a certain interest in not making the contrasts appear too sharp. German authorities have it that American exports to Germany in 1891 were 457, and had risen in 1900 to 1,021 millions. German exports, on the other hand, had risen from 358 to 440 millions. In both cases, then, German statistics show a greater increase. But, then, this gives

a proportion as between American exports to Germany and German exports to America of 10 to 4.

Comparing the most important items of export and import in the course of the last ten years, we find that Germany received from America raw cotton valued at 140.2 millions of marks in 1890, but 258.8 millions in 1900. This increase might really be a source of satisfaction to us, for it shows that German industry has used more raw material. Other items, however, are very uncomfortable reading. It is sure to be felt painfully by the agricultural population that the importation of wheat increased from 8.8 to 60.6 millions of marks in the ten years mentioned. Our mining industry has seen the importation of copper rise in ten years from 0.4 to 101.4 millions of marks. Dried fruit has risen from 1.4 to 11.9, oil-cake from 7 to 23, lard from 47 to 87, petroleum from 62.1 to 71.1 millions. As it is more a question of raw materials for America, the same line of evidence would not be so important, but the converse is the more serious. In the same ten years, the German exportation of cotton hosiery has fallen off from 35 to 25, musical instruments from 10.1 to 2.6, silk garments, underwear, etc., from 5.8 to 0.3, woollen garments, underwear, etc., from 5.7 to 3.5, fine leather goods from 12.3 to 3.2, half-silk fabrics, cloths, shawls, from 63.2 to 19.9, linen damask from 3.1 to 0.7, photographic paper from 2.5 to 0.3, and, finally, woollen cloths and unprinted fabrics from 27.4 to 7.3 millions of marks.

This picture, however, assumes a much more unfavorable aspect if we call to mind the percentage of industrial products to that of agricultural products or raw materials in the exports of the United States. The figures furnished by the Treasury Department in Washington itself show that forty years ago industrial products formed only 12.76 per cent. of American exports, while during the last fiscal year they were 31.54 per cent. In ten years the share of industry in the exports has doubled. The money value figures out as follows: Forty years ago, the exports of industrial products were, in round numbers, 40 millions of dollars; thirty years ago, 68 millions; twenty years ago, 102 millions; ten years ago, 157 millions; five years ago, 183 millions; and last year, 432 millions of dollars. This means an increase of 136 per cent. within five years. Cotton and petroleum are now no longer at the head of the export list, as they were formerly;

there has been a revolution, and the top is now occupied by iron and steel products amounting to 122 millions of dollars. Only five years ago, the exports in this branch were only 32 millions, and ten years ago, 25.5 millions of dollars. The increase in five years is therefore nearly 300 per cent. These calculations may be extended to other products in which we are equally interested; thus the exports of leather and leather goods rose in ten years from 12 to 27 million dollars, cotton goods from 10 to 24 million, agricultural implements from 4 to 16, chemicals from 5 to 13, wooden wares from 6.5 to 11, paraffine articles from 2.4 to 8.6, paper goods from 1.2 to 6.2, tobacco goods from 3.9 to 6 million dollars. Only thirty years ago, the value of all the exports of the United States in agriculture, mining, forestry, fishery, and other products was hardly greater than that of the industrial exports alone is now.

The characteristic of the American peril is that it does not menace any single European country, but all European commercial states alike, and, last but not least, the United States itself. The natural consequence of this condition of affairs is that it creates the necessity for common resistance on the part of all the states affected by it against the common aggressor.

Historically, the idea of a European customs union is about twenty years old.

In 1879, when Bismarck was preparing the new German tariff, the French were the first to suggest a combination of the middle European states against the American peril, which, however, at that time chiefly menaced European agriculture. This idea, emanating from the French political economist, G. de Molinari, was again taken up by the International Agricultural Congress in Pesth in 1885. When the McKinley tariff went into effect, in the fall of 1890, it produced indignation in all the more important European states, and new voices were raised for a general commercial union of Europe. Count Caprivi also recognized the danger, and expected to make a nearer approach to an understanding among the European states on the subject of customs by means of the commercial treaties he recommended at the close of 1891. At the International Agricultural Congress of Pesth in 1896, the idea was again taken up. Among German parliamentarians, Dr. Hammacher and Count Kanitz pointed out, with especial reference to the industrial development of the United

States, that the instinct of self-preservation must compel the European states to seek for mutual support for defence against America. As is shown by Crispi's papers, which have recently been published, that Italian statesman, when negotiating with Caprivi in 1893 for the Triple Alliance, mentioned as one condition that Germany should not give up the idea of a middle European customs union.

Since 1897, the idea of common resistance to the American policy of prohibitive duties has not been abandoned in the states of Europe, but has been vigorously discussed on all sides. Before that, there had not been any official utterances on this subject, but now a more or less positive recognition of the necessity of a common defence has been made by the Austrian and the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, the Spanish government, the French Minister of Commerce, and, finally, Count Goluchowski, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

How far the negotiations initiated by the Manufacturers' Association with the representatives of industry and commerce of the European states have progressed, is not at this time communicated to the public. We must not fail to recognize, however, that since 1897 the chances are essentially more favorable for a European customs union. At that time, England did not seem convinced that the American invasion could ever be a serious danger to her; but at the present day the commercial relations of France, as well as England, towards Germany have greatly altered. It has turned out that England is menaced more than any other state. The English statesman, Sir Charles Dilke, has recently argued in *Figaro* that the powerful competition of America is to be regarded as one of those motives, independent of friendliness or aversion, which are calculated to make European nations more tractable, if not more disposed to act together.

The idea of a European customs union supported by English statesmen will not again disappear from the scene. The provoking commercial policy of the Americans is creating a world of enemies. If the United States continues its policy to the point where the European states, in addition to the means now at their individual command, adopt a common resistance to its gross selfishness, the time is not distant when the American peril to Europe will be converted into a European peril to America.

WILHELM WENDLANDT.

THE NATIONAL DEBT OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

BY DR. MORIZ DUB.

EACH of the states composing the Austro-Hungarian monarchy has independent national finances. They have neither a debt nor a loan in common. Our account must therefore consider the national debt and the financial position of the two halves of the monarchy separately.

I.—THE AUSTRIAN PROVINCES.

The origin of a large amount of Austria's liabilities may be found in the disastrous wars of the past century. The three great wars with Prussia, particularly the celebrated Seven Years' War, entailed an expenditure of nearly 300 millions of florins. During the long period of peace which followed upon this epoch, a large portion of these foreign loans was paid off out of the savings of the home administration, and the burden of the interest was considerably reduced by means of a successful conversion; the Austrian finances were put in order, and the Budget displayed an important surplus for the first time. The great wars with the French Republic and with Napoleon, however, soon nullified these achievements. The monarchy was again compelled to strain its credit to the utmost: it was found impossible to raise loans in England or Holland, and recourse was had to the expedient of issuing paper money, which soon led to the ruin of the entire national economy.

The science of finance was as yet little understood. It was believed that real capital could be created by issuing and circulating paper money, and that such paper notes in unlimited quantity would possess the purchasing power of the actual coin, which was driven more and more out of the country through the increase of the national liabilities. Austria was fairly overwhelmed with a flood of paper money. The notes of the Vienna City Bank, the so-called "*Bankozettel*," were inordinately multiplied; in the year 1810, immediately after the termination of the dis-

astrous campaign against Napoleon, these notes were in circulation to the enormous amount of 1,060 million florins,* while the population amounted to no more than 26,000,000. This paper money completely lost all value by reason of the quantity issued, which far surpassed the actual requirements: and the notorious Financial Charter of February 20th, 1811, was nothing less than the formal bankruptcy of the state. This charter reduced the actual value and cash currency of the note to one-fifth of its nominal value. The "*Bankozettel*" were entirely withdrawn from circulation and replaced by a new paper money, the "Redemption Bills," in the proportion of five to one, so that the paper currency sank to 211 millions of florins. For existing contracts formerly made, a new scale of conversion was fixed upon the new valuation according to the time when the contract was concluded and the depreciation of money when the contract was entered upon. The financial edict diminished by one-half the interest on the Funded Debt, the nominal value of which at that time amounted to 800 millions of florins, and the coupons of which were paid in the depreciated "*Bankozettel*": the payments were thereupon made in the new "Redemption Bills," which were as yet of full value.

The ensuing and even more costly wars with France caused the hasty and non-consolidated issue of new notes; while, by means of the anticipation of the taxes, another new form of paper money, the "Anticipation Notes," was brought into circulation, so that the flood of paper swelled from 211 to 638 millions of florins from 1811 to 1816. The value of the new paper money sank to two-fifths of the nominal value, and it was consolidated afterwards at this rate. The regulation of the financial system was effected by the foundation of the National Bank of Austria in the year 1816, which still forms the only bank for the issue of notes for both states of the monarchy in common, under the name of the Austro-Hungarian Bank. The National Bank successfully undertook to reduce the paper-money circulation to the normal level. The bank paper issued by the state gradually disappeared entirely from circulation, while the National Bank notes formed the only fiduciary money, and no more state paper money was issued from 1816 till 1866. During the disastrous campaign with Prussia in the year 1866, however,

* According to the nominal value, about £100,000,000.

unredeemable state notes were issued, and thus the already advanced consolidation of the currency was thrown back for thirty years. Only of late years has it been possible to pay off this floating debt entirely, and by the adoption of the gold standard to place Austrian finance upon a basis warranting permanence.

We return to the Consolidated Debt. In the year 1811, Government stockholders received a heavy blow by the reduction of their dividends by one-half. In 1818, a partial compensation was made by the spontaneous act of the Sovereign. A kind of stock had been previously created which formed the standard of Austrian national credit for fifty years—the five per cent. “*Métalliques*.” In 1816, a new loan was raised, by which the holders of the old state bonds, upon the payment of a certain sum, exchanged these for new bonds, the “*Métalliques*,” which were rated at five per cent. in the current coin, but the dividends on which were later on curtailed again in the wars of 1859 and 1866, until they were identified with the present 4.2-per-cents. in 1868. By this means, the nominal capital of the debt was reduced from 608 to 488 millions of florins. The debt, thus reduced, was divided into 488 series, of which each amounted to a million of florins. A drawing of the series five times a year was established; the bonds contained in the series drawn, bearing only half of the original interest in paper, were exchanged into new “*Métalliques*,” at the original percentage. In order to lessen the expense thus incurred by the state, an additional sum of five millions of the old debt was purchased at the Exchange and annihilated. This plan was arranged for 49 years; after that period the entire old debt would have disappeared and been replaced by *Métalliques* at five per cent. to a nominal value of 244 millions of florins. The drawings were duly carried out until the year 1867, so that in 1868 the whole then existing old debt was replaced at the full rate of interest. Such was the plan which, although generously and apparently logically conceived, yet imposed a disproportionately heavy burden upon the State, so that it was only possible to carry it out by the negotiation of new loans. The national debt accordingly increased again slowly, but continuously. In 1831, it had reached the amount of a thousand millions, and it was considerably augmented by the stormy events of 1848 and the succeeding period. In 1852 the national debt had exceeded 1,700 millions of florins.

The Treasury was almost empty. The deficit in the Budget had been a chronic occurrence for nearly a century: the larger portion of the national income was swallowed up by the burden of interest upon the national debt, and loans of the most dangerous form, those of the Bank of Issue, were continually increased by the pressure of circumstances. The largest financial operation undertaken by the state was the national loan of 1854. The loan was to pay interest at five per cent. in silver, and amounted to 500 millions of florins. The issue of the loan was an appeal to national patriotism; more than a million and a half subscribers were promptly enrolled. The large sums received, which burdened the state with an annual charge of more than 30 millions of florins, were devoured by the rapacious maw of the military administration. However, upon the outbreak of the war with Italy, the necessary sums for the mobilization were wanting. The worst and most painful discovery was made at the time of the Peace of Villafranca. It then became manifest that the amount of the national loan consisted of 611 instead of 500 millions of florins, and that secret negotiations of the Minister of Finance were responsible for the excess. In addition to this operation, several other smaller issues of loans had to be carried out. The state had recourse to the ever-ready means of floating debts upon the Bank of Issue. State demesnes were sold at an absurdly low rate, and the state railways were sold to foreign companies at an immense loss. At the close of the war, Austria had a debt of more than 2,000 millions of florins.

The financial breakdown was one of the strongest motives which induced Austria to abandon the old system of Absolutism and clericalism and to become a constitutional state. In the October Patent of 1860, and still more in the February Charter of 1861, the control of the finances and the issue of new loans were mentioned as among the most important prerogatives of the Parliament then summoned for the first time; and the representatives of the people addressed themselves to this difficult task with the greatest devotion, although for a time with but little success. The action of Ignaz von Plener, the first constitutional Austrian Minister of Finance, struck at the root of the evil, and aimed at regulating the relations with the Bank of Issue. This was successfully accomplished in a surprisingly short time, thanks to the energetic co-operation of Herr Lucam, the gifted Secretary

of the Bank at that time; in 1865 the National Bank would have been in a position to undertake cash payments after all the advances made to the Government had been consolidated. The disastrous war with Prussia in 1866 put an end to all these schemes. To meet the expenses of the war the state again issued unredeemable paper money not founded upon a money value.

The new regulation of the relations between Austria and Hungary, as well as the cession of the Italian provinces lost in the war, rendered necessary an entire reorganization of the national debt. Italy assumed a portion of the debt, which was contracted for the newly acquired provinces of Lombardy and Venetia. During the settlement of the dual monarchy, Hungary was not to be prevailed upon to recognize the existing national debt as common to both halves of the monarchy. Austria alone remained responsible for the loans contracted during the period of Absolutism. Hungary merely undertook an annual contribution of 29.18 millions of florins, for the interest of the large debts which had been incurred in the suppression of the Hungarian Rebellion and the agricultural colonization of her land, and in addition an annual share of 1.15 millions of florins for the extinction of the lottery loans.

The reorganization of the national debt thus became an inevitable and pressing task. Austria had recourse to an expedient which undermined her credit for many years:—the reduction of the coupons of the national debt. Soon after the war of 1859 a tax of six per cent. was imposed upon the interest of the national debt, and this was raised to seven per cent. in 1862. Now a maximum income tax of sixteen per cent. was laid upon the stocks, so that the five-per-cent. coupons were paid at the rate of 4.2 per cent. These are the Austrian 4.2-per-cents. At the same time there followed the conversion of all the older debts into the uniform 5 and 4.2 per cents respectively, of which two kinds were created, one payable in paper and one in silver.

The reduction of the coupons was really a compulsory arrangement with the creditors of the state, who, however, have been richly compensated for their loss in interest by the price and intrinsic value of their paper, as the price of the uniform stock, which stood at 57 per cent. at the time of the conversion, has risen above par. The cost of interest upon this new debt stood at 106.3 millions of florins after the reduction of the coupons,

and the saving thus effected amounted to eleven millions of florins.

The following years were devoted to the slow consolidation of the state finances. After the reorganization of the dual monarchy came the period of economical prosperity, four short years, in which companies were floated with mushroom speed and stock-jobbing rioted in the wildest manner. Then followed a resounding crash. The crisis of 1873 seriously damaged the prosperity of the Austrian nation. Through the enormous losses in national property, the reserve funds of the people were severely impaired. The Austrian Government was compelled to proceed to the negotiation of a foreign gold loan at a heavy sacrifice. Austria had the silver currency; but by a law passed in 1867 an Austrian gold coin (the four-florin and eight-florin piece) had been created, equal in value to the ten and twenty franc pieces. Upon this gold coinage was based the new foreign loan, the four per cent. Gold Rente, which was raised in 1875, chiefly in France. By the issues of the following year, this first purely Austrian debt was increased to 272.6 millions of florins. In 1892 and 1895, a further series of this Gold Rente was issued, but this time for an economically useful object—the regulation of values and the redemption of the floating paper debt. In the eighties, Austria contracted internal loans, which were taken up again upon the increase of prosperity after the great crisis. A five per cent. paper stock was created, the proceeds of which were devoted to the construction of railways upon a large scale, but also for less productive objects, such as military expenses, the re-arming of the army and the covering of deficits in the Budget: 238.8 millions of florins of this five per cent. stock were issued. The national debt was also increased by the acquirement of private railways by the state.

The lowering of the rate of interest which took place universally in the early nineties, afforded the opportunity to the Austrian monarchy of considerably reducing the burden of interest. The state had recourse to the conversion of the five per cent. Government Stock, especially the Paper Rentes. In 1892, the entire five-per-cent. were converted into a four per cent. stock based upon the new crown currency. The standard rate of interest for the Austrian national debt was henceforth four per cent. The continual reduction of the rate of interest also led to excesses

in after-years. Such an excess was the creation of a $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Rente, which was exceedingly unpopular, possessed no attraction at home, and was placed with much difficulty with foreign, particularly French, capital.

The regulation of the currency and the adoption of the gold standard are of the most beneficial influence upon the Austrian national debt. Austria thus joins the ranks of those states which are economically sound, and upon the completion of the work will stand upon the same level with France and Germany. The state paper, which forms a melancholy souvenir of an inglorious fratricidal war, is extinct; the gold value of the currency, formerly exposed to the most violent fluctuations, is settled and assured by a wise bank policy; while the creditors of the state receive their interest and return of capital no longer in a depreciated coinage, uncertain in value, but in honest money of full value in the foreign markets.

The present amount of the Austrian national debt, together with the cost of interest and capitalization, calculated upon a uniform basis, may be seen from the following figures:*

I.—GENERAL DEBT.

	Tot. Amount of Funded Debt.		Annual Cost of Interest.	
	Millions, Crown.	Millions. £	Millions, Crown.	Millions. £
4.2 per cent. paper rentes....	2,967.32	123.64	124.62	5.19
4.2 per cent. silver.....	2,011.54	83.87	84.48	3.52
Lottery.....	283.10	11.81	9.75	0.40
Property loans.....	54.67	1.61	3.00	0.12
Salt bonds.....	72.34	3.01	3.24	0.13
Lesser old debts.....	51.44	2.14	1.47	0.06
Total of general national debt....	5,440.41	226.08	226.56	9.42

II.—AUSTRIAN NATIONAL DEBT.

4 per cent. gold.....	1,168.69	48.69	46.74	1.94
4 per cent. crown.....	519.29	21.63	20.77	0.86
$3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. invested.....	116.90	4.87	4.09	0.17
Debt to the Austro-Hungarian Bank.....	60.00	2.50	—	—
Debt for the Danube regula- tion works.....	14.16	0.56	0.70	0.03
Share in construction of South Austrian Railway...	28.39	1.18	1.42	0.06
State railways.....	1,436.19	59.83	58.83	2.45
Departmental debts.....	22.60	0.94	0.91	0.04
Floating debt.....	11.99	0.49	0.52	0.02
Total of the Austrian na- tional debt.....	3,378.21	140.69	133.98	5.57
Grand total of the national debt....	8,818.62	366.77	360.54	14.99

* 1 crown = $\frac{1}{2}$ florin; £1 = about 24 crowns.

The difference between Paper Rentes and those Rentes the interest of which is payable in silver has only a historical meaning at the present day, since there is no longer any distinction between bank notes and silver. It forms the chief part of the general debt, which is the result of the conversion of 1868 at a reduced rate of interest; the interest was originally five per cent., but the coupons were subjected to the 16 per cent. tax, so that the actual interest was reduced to 4.2 per cent. The Lottery Loans date from a former period of unsound finance, during which the state arranged large issues of lottery tickets in order to attract capital; this system is now abandoned, and state lotteries are only held occasionally for charitable purposes. The Demesne Loans are a mortgage loan, which the state contracted during the financial distress of the war of 1866, by mortgaging its property upon extremely severe terms. The Salt Bonds are a species of Exchequer Bills, with a currency of three to six months and mortgage upon the state salt mines. The purely Austrian debt consists of those loans which the Austrian monarchy has contracted during the course of the last 32 years for her own economical and military requirements. The debt upon the state railways requires a special explanation. The network of the Austrian state railroads amounts to 10,000 kilometres in round numbers. These were partly due to the construction of state lines and partly to the purchase of existing private railway companies. In the latter case, the shares and bonds of these railways were taken possession of by the state for self payment, and these form the bulk of the state railway debts here adduced. The costs of the lines which have been built by the state were supplied from the balances in cash and the issues of shares. If these expenses be added to the outstanding railway debt, the total capital invested in Austrian railways works out at 2,541 millions of crowns. The interest required upon this principal amounts to 114.7 millions of crowns; as, even in the past year, the proceeds of the state railways only amounted to 70.25 millions of crowns, the state was obliged to make a subsidy of 44.4 millions.

The state property of Austria consists—irrespective of small undertakings, such as the silver mines at Przibram and a few coal mines, as also of state demesnes and forests—chiefly of state railways, which, far from supplying a surplus to the Budget, annually demand considerable subsidies for the interest and an-

nunities of the loans contracted. The liabilities of the state arise for a small part only from productive expenditure, but for the most part from military expenses and the misdeeds of a financially unsettled past, and therefore are a heavy burden to the taxpayer. It is characteristic of this circumstance that, in the general expenditure of the Budget, the national debt takes a prominent position, and absorbs far more of the public revenues than is the case, for instance, with Germany; hence, important educational requirements are driven into the background, while discreditable and antiquated sources of income, such as the lotteries, cannot be abolished, because there is a lack of other sources of the necessary revenues to replace these gains, and the service of the national debt consumes very large sums annually. At the same time, the state of affairs with regard to this point has also very considerably improved during the last ten years. By reason of the continual increase in the state revenues from the direct taxes and indirect contributions, the Budget has greatly augmented, and the state has been enabled to make numerous grants for educational and charitable purposes. The national debt is no longer the Moloch which devours the entire public revenues, and by means of the great conversion the administration of the debt has been materially facilitated. In this respect, Austria stands next to the great financial Powers, in spite of a noticeable interval, and throws unhappy Italy quite into the shade.

An important question which presents itself, when judging of the financial condition of a country, refers to the local distribution of its Government bills of debt. In wealthy countries the stock is in the possession of the national capital; and a few nations, such as England and Germany, as well as France, are even largely creditors of foreign states. Austria-Hungary is not in this fortunate position. The large loans of the past century were placed abroad in a preponderating degree; and English, Dutch, and German capital eagerly joined in the Austrian subscriptions, while the older Austrian railways were constructed chiefly with French and German money. This position of liability towards other countries has greatly improved of late years. For the last eight or ten years, Austrian securities have been flowing back from abroad, and considerable quantities of the state funds have been taken up by Austrian capital.

II.—THE NATIONAL DEBT OF HUNGARY.

The national debt of Hungary has only existed for the last thirty years. We have seen that the responsibility for the debt of the earlier régime, when Hungary was united to Austria, was assumed by Austria alone, and that Hungary only pays a fixed annual contribution to Austria. The national credit of Hungary often forms the subject of complacent reflection on the part of the nation, because it has not as yet been tarnished by national bankruptcy or stoppage in the payment of interest. However, the Hungarian national debt has suffered considerable reverses in its time. During the seventies, Hungary was in serious financial straits: the salaries of officials were paid in copper coins, and the Minister of Finance used to send every day for the toll-money taken at the Ofen Suspension Bridge, which often amounted to only a few florins, in order to make up the necessary sums for daily expenses; while loans at a high rate of interest had to be contracted abroad, and there was a permanent deficit in the Treasury. By the financial skill and good fortune of several Hungarian Governments, and more especially of Alexander Wekerle, the Hungarian Minister of Finance, who has attained European celebrity by his achievements in the reform of the values and his glorious "*Culturkampf*," Hungary has succeeded, like Austria, in banishing the deficit, in restoring the balance to the national finances, and in amassing considerable cash-surpluses for the Treasury, which rendered it possible for Hungary to make her contribution to the extinction of the floating bank note without raising a loan, and almost without any infraction of the national credit.

Since 1867, the Hungarian national debt has risen to the considerable amount of 5,000 million crowns. This figure appears very high for such a short period, especially when one reflects that the expenditure for purposes of defence and for the army, which has been the cause of the immense increase in the debt of Germany, has been only in part covered by loans. But it must not be forgotten that a very considerable portion of the loans contracted served for productive purposes, especially for the completion of state railways. Hungary possesses 9,000 kilometres of state railways: the capital invested in these, in state property, and other assets is estimated at 6,000 millions of crowns; and al-

though these investments, demesnes, forests, factories, and even railways owned by the state, only afford an insufficient interest, yet the state administration is prosperous. The Hungarian national debt was at first exceedingly burdensome, and the various loans were contracted at oppressive, if not prohibitive, rates. This was in the seventies, when, immediately after the severe financial crisis, the power of capital was broken and new resources to cover the deficit in the Treasury were difficult to come by.

The six per cent. Gold Rente was closed at a rate which offered an interest of nearly eight per cent., and the loans payable in paper were issued at very low sale prices. Of late years, Hungary has succeeded in lessening the burden of her liabilities by means of conversions on a large scale.

It may here be pointed out that Hungary has undergone three conversion periods. In 1881, the six per cent. Gold Rente, to the total amount of 400 millions of florins, was converted into a four per cent. Gold Rente which still exists. In 1888, a series of five per cent. stock was converted into four-per-cents. In 1892, in connection with the reform of the currency, the conversion of the five per cent. Paper Rente into the four per cent. Hungarian Crown Rente took place; this now forms the standard paper value of the Hungarian national credit, and also represents the type of the present issues.

It is a not insignificant fact that in Hungary the attempt, here doubly unsuccessful, was made to reduce the interest of Government Rentes below four per cent., and in 1895 a four per cent. loan, to the amount of 22½ millions of florins, was issued, for the regulation of the Danube at the Iron Gate, for which Hungary received authorization from the Powers at the Berlin Congress; in 1898 followed the issue of the 3½ per cent. Hungarian Investiture Rente, but this resulted in a complete failure, as the shares of this loan underwent an immense depreciation and still fill the portfolios of the Institute of Issue. The Hungarian State has, therefore, returned to the four per cent. Rentes, in view of the rising tendency of the rate of interest and the fluctuation in the price of stock.

The following table shows the present amount of the Hungarian national debt and the various categories of which it is composed:

Government Stock.	Nominal Capital.	Actual Condition. Millions of Crowns.	Annual Charges.
4 per cent. gold rente.....	1,268	1,156	50.72
4 per cent. paper rente.....	1,182	1,075	47.28
3½ per cent. paper rente.....	60	55	2.10
Total.....	2,510	2,286	100.10
Railway* Stock.			
Interest payable in gold.....	462	420 (<i>circa</i>)	30
Interest payable in silver.....	263	250	15
Interest payable in paper.....	1,539	1,470	75
Total.....	2,264	2,140	120
Departmental debts.....	140	140	7
Grand total.....	4,914	4,566	227.10

Owing to the difference of language, we are not in possession of recent authentic publications, and we therefore rely upon the monumental work of Alexander v. Matlekovits, written in 1896: the figures, therefore, are merely approximate as regards the actual condition of the debt, but there is but little room for error. The costs for interest and reduction of the national debt absorb an annual sum of 230 millions of crowns. This amounts to 240 crowns per head of the population for the debt, and about 12.1 crowns for the annual payment of interest. This latter absorbs about 25 per cent. of the total revenues, and the same proportion of the state expenditure. But it must be remembered that only one portion of the national debt (a large one, it is true) is dependent upon the general inland revenues, and that the part of the public debt which was contracted for the construction and acquirement of state railways and other productive objects also enjoys the income from these branches of the private economical activity of the state, which afford a not inconsiderable contribution to the interest required.

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THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF JAPAN.

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IN compliance with the request of the Editor of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, I propose in these pages to trace briefly the development of the financial system in Japan since the inauguration of the present era. As the Restoration of 1868 was an event necessitated by the force of circumstances, it was accomplished with comparative ease, so far as the transfer of political power from the Shogunate to the theoretically legitimate Imperial Government was concerned. But Japan had then to enter upon a new course in her national and international existence. It was necessary for the hitherto isolated nation to remodel its institutions fundamentally, in order to equip itself for intercourse with the Western countries and for participation in the general progress of the world. The fall of the Shogunate and the revival of the Imperial rule constituted thus only the beginning of a difficult and complicated task—the making of New Japan. It is with one important aspect of this task that I purpose to deal in the present sketch.

It is not surprising that a government emerging from the throes of a revolution should be financially embarrassed at the outset. But the case of our Imperial government after its

restoration to actual power was an exceptionally peculiar one, owing to the nature of the government it had replaced—a circumstance to which I shall advert presently. The chaotic condition of the finances of the new government may be inferred from the fact that, in the first year of its existence, the revenue accruing from taxation was little more than one-tenth of the expenditure, and that the deficit had to be met chiefly by the issue of inconvertible notes.* Nor was this state of things confined to the year immediately following the Restoration, for it was not until a few years afterwards that the issue of notes ceased to be an important item of the revenue. One of the most pressing needs of the new government was, therefore, to secure sufficient resources for the public Treasury by establishing a proper system of taxation; and, in doing this, care had to be taken to make the new system consonant with the policy of facilitating and encouraging the economic progress of the nation.

It is a known characteristic of the feudal system that under it there is no clear distinction between administrative powers and proprietary rights. Japan under the Shogunate was no exception to the rule. The lords of the fiefs, into which the country was divided, not only governed, but also held a sort of proprietary right over, their respective domains, with the result that the rights of the people over their estates were restricted in more ways than one, and that the land-tax had much of the nature of rent. The tax paid in rice was the main source of the lords' revenues; though, in the lack of any fixed and common system of taxation, its rate varied in the various fiefs, while other miscellaneous duties were imposed according to the industrial conditions of the different localities. Hence the burdens of the agricultural population were unduly heavy, the rate of the tax on land ranging between thirty and seventy per cent. of its net produce. As to the people in general, their position as taxpayers was ill-defined and vexatious, liable as they were to the arbitrary imposition of irregular contributions in the form of money and personal service. In fact, the feudal system under the Shogunate was a military organization, in which the welfare of the agricultural, industrial and commercial classes was avowedly and wantonly sacrificed for the maintenance of the warrior class.

* The chief items of the revenue in 1868 were as follows: **Taxes**, 3,157,310 yen; **issue of notes**, 24,037,390 yen; **loans**, 4,732,482 yen; etc.

While the position of the people as taxpayers was thus ill-defined, the position of the Shogunate as the central government was also financially a peculiar one. The Shogunate exercised a supreme authority over all the clans, but the whole country was not under its direct government. The lords of the clans, holding their domains by grant or recognition of the Shogunate, were required, in case of need, to put their military force at its disposal, and to render it certain other services. Contributions, not very great in amount, were also made by some of the clans to the revenue of the Shogunate; but no tax was to be directly imposed by the central government upon the subjects of the lords of the various fiefs. The ordinary revenue of the Shogunate was raised principally from the territories reserved as its own, in distinction from those granted to the clans. It would seem, therefore, that in this respect the Shogunate was not much more than the greatest of the clans.

Now it will be easy to understand how the financial difficulties of the newly restored Imperial government were aggravated by the peculiar nature of its predecessor. In 1868, the central authority was, indeed, transferred to the Imperial government, but the resources of the whole country were not yet under its command. It was not enough for the new government simply to take the place of the old; but the social and political organization had to be radically altered so as to meet the requirements of the novel situation. Before anything like a sound financial adjustment could be hoped for, it was essential to effect the complete abolition of the feudal system—especially the particularism of the clans and the undue privileges of the warrior class.

The impulse toward unification, conscious in certain sections of the nation and unconscious in others, was indeed one of the most potent causes of the Restoration, and, by the time it was effected, the centralization of authority was almost universally perceived to be an indispensable antecedent to the establishment of the new order. Thus, in 1869, the second year after the Restoration, all the clans of their own accord surrendered their "domains and people" to the Imperial government, and, in 1871, a prefectural system was instituted for the administration of the whole country, putting it under the direct control of the central government.* The feudal privileges of the clans and clansmen

*Even after surrendering their "domains and people" to the Imperial

were thus abolished, and the country was to be henceforth governed by uniform laws, before which all sorts and conditions of people were to stand on a footing of equality.

One of the important results of the abolition of the feudal system was that it became possible to make a clear distinction between administrative powers over the territory and proprietary rights over the soil, which were inseparably united under the authority of the Shogunate and of the lords of the clans. In the petition of the lords for permission to surrender their "domains and people" to the Imperial government, the reason given for their decision was that, "since all domains and people belong to the Emperor, we, subjects of His Majesty, must not own them privately." In confirming the territorial sovereignty over the domains thus put at its disposal, the new government retained the sovereign administrative power according to the modern principles of public law, while the proprietary right over land was granted to private persons. Herein was laid the foundation for a stable financial system calculated to secure sufficient revenues to the government, and to put the obligation of the people as taxpayers on a well-defined and uniform basis. The first and most far-reaching step toward the full establishment of the new system was the reform of the land-tax, a measure so far-reaching in its effects that it is indeed to be counted among the most weighty events in the annals of New Japan. However, in order to appreciate the importance of this reform justly, it must be looked at in co-ordination with some other achievements of recognized prominence.

Among the fundamental principles of the new régime, as announced in the famous Five Articles of the Imperial Oath which were promulgated on the very morrow of the Restoration, three may be noticed as standing out most conspicuously, namely: the active participation of the nation in the progress of the world, respect for public opinion in the direction of state affairs, and the social emancipation of the whole populace.* As the respect for public opinion culminated in the introduction of the represen-

Government, the lords of the clans were appointed governors of the districts corresponding to their former domains, and allowed to retain a large portion of the power exercised by them under the Shogunate. The change of 1869 was, therefore, only nominal. The real abolition of the feudal privileges dates from the establishment of the prefectural system, under which the former lords were entirely replaced by agents of the central Government as local governors.

*The third article of the Oath says that every man, even among the common people, should be allowed to have full scope for his abilities.

tative system, and the policy of active participation in the general progress led to the acquisition of a perfect international status in consequence of the revision of treaties, so the emancipation of the people prepared the way for a remarkable display of economic activity. Of course, no definite time can be pointed to as marking the consummation of the last of these eventualities, as in the case of the other two. If, however, it were to be commemorated in association with some event, the land-tax reform would be the most fitting one. In the overthrow of the feudal system, the abolition of the privileges of the warrior class paved the way for constructive effort in the work of emancipation; in this constructive work, the land-tax reform, confirming the most important form of private property, was the greatest legislative measure.

The reform of the land-tax was proposed in 1869; the fundamental laws relating to this reform were promulgated in 1873; and in 1881 the reform was finally accomplished. Though the measure was called a reform, it was in reality nothing less than the genesis of a uniform system which had been at once made possible and necessitated by the political unification of the country. The salient features of the new system may be epitomized as follows:

(1.) The proprietary right of private persons over land was recognized and confirmed by conferring title-deeds upon them. In Europe, there seem to have been cases in which feudal domains were retained as private possessions either by the Crown or by the feudatories, even after the political system of overlordship ceased to exist. Consequently, the conversion of the feudal tenure of land into perfect proprietorship by the common people had sometimes to be effected by purchase. But the case was different in Japan, all occupiers of land there being at once, and without any transaction of a personal character, recognized as owners of the respective lands actually held by them.*

(2.) Restrictions on the people's right over their landed estates were taken away. This was but a corollary of the recognition of their perfect ownership. Under the Shogunate, the sale and purchase of land were forbidden, though various means of evading the law were not unknown. The feudal tenants also had

*For giving up their domains, the feudal lords and their retainers were indemnified by the grant of Government loan bonds, on which they drew the interest.

not absolute liberty to decide for themselves as to what products they should raise from the land they cultivated. Since each clan aimed at being self-sustaining, as far as possible, in its supplies, and as the production of rice was everywhere considered important above all, official interference was exercised sometimes even to the detriment of the real capabilities of the soil. But the perfect proprietorship of land confirmed by the land-tax reform included, as a matter of course, the right of alienating or exploiting it according to the free choice of the owner, so that the resources of the country might be developed and utilized to the best advantage.

(3.) As the basis of taxation, an official assessment of the value of land was made throughout the country. This will account for the fact that rather a long time was required for the accomplishment of the land-tax reform. Under the Shogunate, the produce of land was the basis of taxation, so that the annual crop had to be officially examined from time to time. Not only was the process highly embarrassing to all concerned, but it was not calculated to secure a steady public revenue. The adoption of the new basis of taxation was to be desired from all points of view; only the undertaking was one of tremendous magnitude. The difficulties attending the cadastral survey are so great that, if I am correctly informed, it has not been finished or even attempted at all in certain countries of Europe, one of them having failed to accomplish it after working at it for forty-three long years. But the new government of Japan, impetuously bent on reform and progress, was strongly determined to overcome every difficulty in carrying it through. In assessing the value of land, the annual amount of its net produce over an average of five years was first converted into a money value according to its average price for the same period; and then, this money value of the produce being considered as interest, the amount of capital estimated as necessary for yielding it was taken as the value of the land. By this method the official valuation of the land was completed in 1881, and it was revised in 1899, with a view to removing certain defects. Japan has thus at present a cadastre of tolerable perfection.

(4.) The land-tax was made payable in money, whereas under the Shogunate it had to be paid in rice and other produce. With this change, the quasi-rental character of the land-tax entirely

disappeared, and its rate was fixed at a percentage of the legal value of land. The burden of the agricultural population was also considerably lessened, for the tax on land was fixed, at the time of the initiation of the reform, at three per cent., and in 1877 reduced to two and one-half per cent. of its legal value, at which rate the tax remained till the recent augmentation of taxes as a part of the so-called *post bellum* financial programme.

The signification of the land-tax reform will be manifest from the preceding summary. Land being, after all, the basis of our material life, there can be no question about the great importance of a radical change in the system of land tenure. It may be said, indeed, that the land-tax reform ushered in the social conditions under which a free play of the economic forces of the country became possible. The general principle that the obligation of the people as taxpayers should be regulated by proper laws was also implied in, and exemplified by, the land-tax legislation—a principle which was afterwards expressly guaranteed by a provision of the Constitution.

As regards the revenue of the government, it was natural, in the early years of the present era, that by far the largest portion of it should come from the land-tax; for Japan of old was essentially an agricultural country, other industries having yet to be developed under the new régime. Even in 1881, the year in which the land-tax reform was completed, the yield of that tax, which was the sole direct tax imposed at the time, amounted to 42,000,000 yen in a total taxation of 60,000,000 yen.* The fundamental source of the national revenue was thus the land-tax. But, to meet the increasing public needs of the rapidly progressing country, it was necessary to seek, besides the comparatively stationary land-tax, such sources of revenue as expand automatically in proportion to the growth of national wealth. Hence, after a careful examination of the items of miscellaneous taxation that had existed under the Shogunate, the new government imposed certain indirect taxes; and in 1887 the income tax, at a rate of from one to three per cent., was introduced as a new direct tax. Among the indirect imposts, the *sake*† tax has probably occupied the most important place from olden times, though for-

* These figures are given in round numbers, as is the case in other similar passages of the present article.

† Generic name of intoxicating liquors; in particular the common drink of the Japanese, brewed from rice.

merly there appears to have been no fixed system of taxing alcoholic drinks. The adoption of the present basis of taxation—the amount of *sake* brewed in the measure of *koku**—dates from 1878. The rate of the *sake* tax, which has been raised several times since it was first fixed on the new basis, stood at four yen per *koku* before the inception of the *post bellum* programme. Since the war with China has given rise to considerable changes in the financial condition of Japan, it may be well to give here the figures showing the main items of the national revenue in the year before the memorable event:

THE ORDINARY REVENUES IN 1893:

Land tax.....	Yen 33,808,680
Income tax.....	1,238,763
Sake tax.....	16,637,436
Customs duties.....	5,125,372
Other taxes.....	8,194,512
Total taxation.....	Yen 70,004,763
Revenue from Government Industries and Government property..	11,743,263
Miscellaneous receipts.....	4,135,049
Grand total.....	Yen 85,883,080

After the war of 1894-5, the national expenditures increased remarkably, in consequence of the various schemes intended to enable the country to face the new situation in the Far East. The extraordinary expenditures were to be met by appropriating the war indemnity, and by raising public loans; but, to meet the increase of the ordinary expenditures, there was no choice but to increase the taxes, which means has since then been thrice resorted to—first in 1896, then in 1899, and a third time last year. The augmentation in the annual revenue resulting from these measures of increased taxation is estimated at 95,000,000 yen. I shall now give a brief account of the more important items of this increase.

The rate of the *sake* tax was raised to seven yen per *koku* in 1896, to twelve yen per *koku* in 1899, and to fifteen yen per *koku* last year. The scheme adopted at a recent session of the Diet includes also a new tax on beer at the rate of seven yen per *koku*. Taken all together, the estimated annual increase of the tax on alcoholic beverages amounts to 42,000,000 yen, with the result that this kind of tax now occupies the foremost place, not only among the indirect taxes, but among all the taxes, whether indirect or direct, including the land tax.

* One *koku* is equal to 39.7 gallons.

The rate of the land tax was raised* in 1899 to 3.3 per cent. of the legal value of land, the annual increase of revenue that results from it being estimated at 8,000,000 yen. There is, however, a peculiar circumstance which ought to be remembered in connection with the increase of the land tax. Owing to various circumstances, notably the rise in the price of its produce, the real value of land has been at least trebled, on the average, since its legal value was assessed at the basis of taxation; so that there is at present a wide discrepancy between its real and its legal value. Therefore, even with the above-mentioned increase, the rate of the tax on land is hardly more than one per cent. of its real value. In fact, the recent increase of the land-tax is only a partial set-off to the relative reduction of the burden of land owners that has automatically come about since the date of the land-tax reform.

Besides raising the rates of the income tax to between one and five and one-half per cent., the business tax was added in 1896 to the list of direct national taxes.† The rates and standards of this new tax are too complex to be summarized in a few words. It may suffice to observe that it is imposed upon business of various descriptions above a certain amount. The importance of this kind of tax lies in its bearing upon the distribution of the franchise; for the payment of a certain amount of direct national taxes is one of the qualifications for an elector of the members of the House of Representatives. While the payers of the land-tax are mostly of the agricultural class, the payers of the business-tax are mostly of the commercial and industrial classes. The introduction of the latter tax as a direct national tax, therefore, is calculated to counteract in some measure the political preponderance of the agricultural population. This is a sign of the times, showing the commercial and industrial development of the country.

The government monopoly of leaf-tobacco is a new feature of our financial systems, as remodelled in accordance with the *post bellum* programme. The establishment of this monopoly was intended to increase the national revenue, and, at the same time, to relieve the tobacco trade of vexatious regulations connected with the stamp and license duties on it that had formerly existed.

* The increase of the land tax was agreed to as a temporary measure for a period of five years, at the end of which the question will have to be reconsidered.

† Various forms of business tax were formerly imposed as local taxes.

While, on the one hand, the *post bellum* programme has introduced new taxes and increased old ones, certain taxes, on the other hand, have been abolished, with a view to simplifying the system of taxation. Besides those referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the internal taxes existing at present are the soy tax, drug tax, registration tax, stamp duties, sugar tax,* etc.

The customs duties were but a scanty source of revenue in the opening years of the present era, owing to the limitation, by the old treaties, of import and export duties to five per cent. *ad valorem*, as well as to the small volume of foreign trade at the time. For many years, indeed, the customs receipts did not exceed 3,000,000 yen. But, in consequence of the remarkable growth of foreign commerce, the revenue from the customs duties increased considerably in recent years, even under the old treaties, and amounted to 9,000,000 yen in 1898. In addition to this, the following year saw the revised treaties put into operation, and they, in a large measure, restored tariff autonomy to this country. With the taking effect of the new treaties, the export duties were entirely abolished, and a statutory tariff was generally applied to imports, the new rates of duties varying from five to thirty-five per cent. *ad valorem*, according to the kinds of commodities. A marked increase in the revenue from the customs duties ensued at once, as will be seen from the receipts under this head for 1899 and 1900, which were respectively 15,900,000 yen and 16,900,000 yen. Henceforth, the customs duties may be counted as one of the chief items of the state revenue. Moreover, the Japanese government has now acquired greater freedom in regulating the general system of taxation, because import duties on certain articles may be raised to degrees corresponding to the internal taxes on similar articles, as has been already done in the case of alcoholic drinks and tobacco. We have thus recovered tariff autonomy, so far as the general principle is concerned. But it is to be deplored that the import duties on certain important commodities are still limited by our treaties with a few countries, of which, I am happy to say, the United States is not one. Not that the Japanese nation contemplates adopting a policy of protection, and finds an obstacle to the adoption of such a policy in the remaining restrictions on tariff autonomy. Conventional tariffs on the basis of reciprocity

* This tax went into operation on the 1st of October last.

may also be welcome to Japan. All we desire—I think, justly—is the total abolition of the unilateral obligations imposed upon us in regard to the tariff that have been allowed to linger in our existing treaty relations.

Looking back over the development of our system of taxation, we may notice that the basis of our national finances has steadily widened in proportion to the development of economic activities. It is a gratifying fact that, whereas the land-tax was at first the only substantial source of revenue, other taxes, especially indirect ones, have gained in importance, so much so that one of them now substantially exceeds the land-tax. It will be interesting to compare the following figures taken from the budget for 1901 with those for 1893, given above:

ESTIMATED ORDINARY REVENUES FOR 1901.*

	Yen.
Land tax.....	46,561,082
Income tax.....	5,618,255
Business tax.....	6,142,517
Tax on alcoholic drinks.....	55,230,970
Customs duties.....	15,770,137
Stamp duties.....	13,899,069
Other taxes.....	9,418,508
Revenue from Government industries and Government property†.	49,728,897
Miscellaneous receipts.....	5,371,235
Total	207,540,670

A comparatively long space has been taken up thus far in describing our system of taxation, partly because of its importance as the basis of our national finances, and partly because of its peculiar relations with the reorganization of society in New Japan. Other branches of the financial system may now be treated with greater brevity. After the system of taxation, in the order of my exposition, comes the financial administration in the narrower sense of the term—that is, the management of the public Treasury.

During the first few years of the Restoration era, the financial administration was in a most disorderly condition, each Department of the government, in the absence of any fixed rules, managing its fiscal affairs with a large degree of independence. In 1872, the year following the political unification of the country by the establishment of the prefectural system, a first step was

*The estimated increase of revenue resulting from the lastly adopted measures of increased taxation is here only partially taken into account, because they had not been put into operation from the beginning of last year.

†This item of revenue includes various kinds of fees, besides taxes.

‡Of the revenue from Government industries, 12,814,298 yen accrues from the tobacco monopoly.

taken towards centralizing the management of the government's fiscal affairs in the hands of the Minister of Finance, and in 1873 a "Procedure of Receiving and Disbursing" was determined on, which contained the germ of a budgetary system. The Law of Financial Administration, which was enacted in 1881, provided among other things for the formation of a Board of Audit directly responsible to the Emperor. By this time it was established in principle that the fiscal affairs of the government should be managed solely by the Department of Finance, subject to the examination of the Board of Audit. But it was with no small difficulty that the principle was given effect to, owing to the practice of allowing the various departments of the government to keep the respective funds appropriated to them, a practice which originated in financial chaos after the Restoration and was long a fruitful source of abuses. The year 1883 is a memorable one in consequence of the final abolition of this practice. In that year fiscal transactions of the government were entirely and effectively centralized in the Department of Finance; and, shortly afterwards, the receiving, keeping and disbursing of public money was entrusted to the newly established Bank of Japan. The long contemplated unification of financial administration was thus completely accomplished at last. Another important advance was made in 1886, when the practice of publishing the annual budgets and settled accounts in Imperial Ordinances was adopted. And with the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889, the Law of Financial Administration was revised and its system was given the present shape. The budget is now drawn up by the Minister of Finance and has to be voted annually by the Diet, to which the settled accounts, as attested by the Board of Audit, are also presented. Before the establishment of the Diet, all reforms in the system of financial administration were directed to unifying and regulating the management of fiscal affairs within the government; and, when this was fairly accomplished, the Constitution came to provide for political restraints from the outside. All this is, no doubt, a mere commonplace to financiers and publicists of Western countries. But the tact and energy of our successive Ministers of Finance have been considerably taxed in putting into operation a system conceived and framed in accordance with the accredited principles of financial administration.

The development of the monetary system forms one of the most important and most interesting chapters of the financial history of New Japan. But, since a detailed report on it has been officially translated into English,* I shall here confine myself to a concise statement of a few prominent points.

Though a system of gold and silver coinage was established in the beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate's régime and was nominally kept intact for more than two and a half centuries, it was practically destroyed by degrees in consequence of successive debasements resorted to by the Shogunate as a means for relieving financial distress, and also in consequence of the issue of paper money or clandestine coinages on the part of various clans. Facing the confused state, the Restoration government recognized at once the necessity of reorganizing the currency system. The New Coinage Law was promulgated in 1871 with a view to establishing the gold standard. But, as in those days silver was the universal medium of exchange in the trade of the Far East, it was difficult for Japan to maintain gold monometallism. The result was that the silver one yen or trade dollar, which had been originally intended as the medium of foreign trade within the limits of the treaty ports, was allowed after 1878 to circulate as legal tender throughout the country. From that time the currency system of Japan was on the basis of bimetalism.

There was, moreover, another circumstance which added to the difficulty of establishing a sound monetary system in the beginning of the Restoration era. The new government was obliged, for some time after its inception, to issue paper money, the circulation of which became impeded as its amount increased. Measures were taken before long to redeem these notes by an exchange with government bonds. But, just when their credit had been nearly recovered, the civil war of 1877, commonly known as the Satsuma rebellion, broke out, and the government was again driven to the untoward expedient of issuing inconvertible notes, which brought on a great depreciation of their value and a consequent disturbance of the economic world. To remedy this evil, the government, in 1881, began to take steps to redeem a portion of the paper money in circulation, and to increase the specie

*"Report on the Adoption of the Gold Standard in Japan," by Count M. Matsukata, H. I. J. M.'s Minister of State for Finance, 1899.

reserve of the Treasury, with the object of establishing a convertible notes system. That object was accomplished in 1886, through the instrumentality of the Bank of Japan, which two years previously had been granted the exclusive privilege of issuing convertible notes. But since the specie reserve had to be accumulated mainly in silver, Japan found herself a silver standard country, when she was disentangled from the financial and economic disturbances that arose out of the inflation of paper money.

This was, perhaps, a stage in the development of our currency system that had to be necessarily passed through. The government, however, had never lost sight of the necessity of finally adopting the gold standard so as to exercise due influence in the economic movement of the world at large. The need of the reform became the more urgent as a result of the alarming depreciation of silver in recent years. Unexpectedly and fortunately, the receipt of the war indemnity from China offered us opportunity for effecting the long-desired change. As China had, at all events, to raise a loan in Europe, she was easily induced to pay the indemnity in British, instead of Chinese, money. Thus the sum of £32,000,000 sterling was put at our disposal; and, with a portion of it as reserve of the Bank of Japan, the gold standard system was put in operation on the 1st of October, 1897. The details of the new coinage system are beyond the scope of the present article; only it may be mentioned that one yen in gold, which is the new unit of coinage, was made approximate in value to the old unit in silver, so as to avoid an abrupt change in the price of commodities and a disturbance of the relations between debtor and creditor.

In connection with the development of the financial and the monetary system, it may not be out of place to give a brief account of the position of the Bank of Japan; and, by way of extension, of the general banking system in Japan. Although certain rudimentary organs of monetary circulation existed under the Shogunate, the banking system properly so called is a product of New Japan. At first, our system was modelled upon the American system, and a number of National Banks were established, subject to the regulations promulgated in 1872. They had the privilege of issuing convertible notes under seemingly favorable conditions, and those notes were designed gradually to

replace the inconvertible notes issued by the government. But, owing to the unabating efflux of specie from the country, the National Banks soon found it impossible to maintain the responsibility of specie payments, and the government had to allow them to exchange their notes with government notes. Thus they failed to be of use as instruments for the gradual withdrawal of inconvertible notes. As organs for the circulation of capital, too, they proved quite inadequate, because, with few exceptions, each of them was confined to a narrow and separate circle of influence. In parallel with the political unification of the country, the need of a central bank, placed in a supreme and commanding position above all others, became evident. The Bank of Japan was, therefore, established in 1882, for the purpose of bringing other banks nearer together, and of facilitating the monetary circulation throughout the country. The regulation of the currency was another object which the Bank of Japan was expected to aid in accomplishing. Hence, while the Bank of Japan was empowered in 1884 to issue convertible notes, the National Banks were deprived of that privilege in due course of time. After several alterations in the regulations concerning it, the Bank of Japan is now authorized to issue notes on securities, besides those on the specie reserve, to the extent of 120,000,000 yen. In case of pressing demand, it may make an issue beyond the ordinary limit, subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance and to the imposition of an extra-issue tax. The capital of the Bank of Japan was at first 10,000,000 yen, of which the half was held by the government. It stands now at 30,000,000 yen, the shares originally held by the government having been transferred to the Imperial Household.

Most of the National Banks, after the expiration of their charters, have been changed into private banks, and are now, on the whole, efficient organs of monetary circulation. These, together with other ordinary banks that have been newly established, numbered 1,868, with an aggregate capital of 354,000,000 yen.* The savings-banks have been an object of particular care to the government, which, besides establishing the post-office savings system, has made special regulations for them, so that their business shall be carried on with greater security than in

*The figures given here with reference to the banks are those of the end of 1900.

the case of ordinary banks. Their number is now 487, with an aggregate capital of 58,000,000 yen.

Besides the Bank of Japan, there are several organs of monetary circulation which deserve notice because of their peculiar nature. The Yokohama Specie Bank, established in 1880, and with a capital of 24,000,000 yen at present, is specially designed to facilitate foreign exchange. The Hypothec Bank (*Crédit Foncier*) of Japan, with a capital of 10,000,000 yen, was established in 1896, for the purpose of making long-term loans at low rates of interest on the security of real estate. While the Bank of Japan, as the central organ of monetary circulation, is essentially commercial in nature, the Hypothec Bank is the centre of the Agricultural and Industrial Banks (number 46, aggregated capital 28,000,000 yen), distributed over the country. To complete the organization of the banking system, a loan was enacted in 1900, providing for the establishment of the *Crédit Mobilier* of Japan, whose chief and characteristic function will be to make loans on the security of shares and debentures. At present, the Bank of Japan provisionally transacts this kind of business within certain limits. However, the need of two special organs for supplying capital, one on the security of real estate, and the other on the security of shares and debentures, was perceived as early as at the date of the establishment of the Bank of Japan. One having been furnished by the Hypothec Bank of Japan, it is our hope that the other will be also successfully established before long.

In concluding the present survey of the financial system, I feel impelled to make a remark on the general financial situation of Japan since the war of 1894-5. There are some people who hold the pessimistic view that the basis of our national finances has been endangered by the recent increase of national expenditures. It is true that the annual expenditures, which used to be about 80,000,000 yen before the war, have mounted up to about 200,000,000 yen in 1896, and to 275,000,000 yen in the budget for 1901. It is also true that the war with China was followed by economic disturbances, from which we are still suffering. But, if we take a broad view of the situation, any such alarm seems to be unwarranted. As Count Okuma pointed out in a preceding number of this REVIEW, Japan has, through an industrial revolution, entered on a new phase of economic life,

and has made great strides in the short period of thirty years. The armed struggle of 1894-5 being an occasion for the manifestation of accumulated national forces, the changes that have followed it may appear sudden and abrupt. If, however, comparison is made with the state of things in the early years of the Restoration era, it will be seen that the state expenditures at the present time are by no means out of proportion to the growth of national wealth.* This may be evidenced by the fact that the greater part of the present revenue accrues from sources such as were either non-existent or quite insignificant at the beginning of the present era. To support my contention in another way, attention may be called to the fact that, while the total expenditure of 1900 is eight times that of 1868, the volume of foreign trade has multiplied fifteen-fold within the same period. The increase in the volume of foreign trade may be taken as an index of the general economic progress, though the ratio is not necessarily the same in all its branches. Seeing that Japan is quite a young country, so far as the present phase of her economic life is concerned, greater progress than in the past may be reasonably expected in the future; the more so, because the Western Pacific is fast growing in importance as a centre of the world's commerce. The vitality of the Japanese people has been proved by their achievements in the past thirty years, and the financial and economic institutions of the country are now in fair working order. If financial affairs and economic enterprises are directed with care and circumspection, we need not entertain misgivings about our capacity to bear the burden due to our new position among the Powers of the world.

M. MATSUKATA.

*The following figures show the successive increase of the annual revenue and expenditure at the end of every ten years since the beginning of the present era:

Year.		Revenue.	Expenditure.
		Yen.	Yen.
1868	Settled accounts.....	33,089,301	30,505,060
1878		62,443,739	60,941,320
1888		92,956,919	81,504,004
1898		220,054,127	219,757,568
1901	(Budget).....	277,497,003	275,887,424

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

BY SENATOR JONATHAN P. DOLLIVER.

IN a recent essay Mr. Brooks Adams has emphasized the opinion that war is the final expression of commercial competition between nations, and, while his illustrations of the proposition are ponderous enough to seem conclusive, it is hardly credible that in the modern world the conflicting interests of trade may not be adjusted to promote the peace and prosperity of all. It cannot, however, be denied that the attitude of the great Powers, in their present dealings with China, presents in the last analysis a commercial question of universal importance. If there is not wisdom enough in the world to manage that question without inviting the waste and desolation of war, the boasted progress of mankind is more imaginary than real.

The interest of the people of the United States in the affairs of China is one that relates mainly to their opportunities to sell in that country the products of their factories and their farms. They make no pretence of any concern above others for the integrity of the Chinese territory, nor for the comfort and happiness of the imperial household. It is true that the voluntary missionary enterprises of the Christian churches of the United States have enlisted the enthusiasm of millions of our people in vast projects of philanthropy, which have for their ultimate object the regeneration of Asia.

But, so far as the government itself is concerned, there is little or nothing in its Chinese policy to warrant us in making any claim to motives higher than those which have actuated the people of other countries. Our interest in Asiatic problems does not arise from our new position in the Pacific Ocean. It antedates all that, beginning with the first American cargo which our merchants sold in China; and, if it is greater now than ever before,

it is not because we are occupying the Philippine archipelago, but because we have grown in these later years to the first rank as an exporting community. If any of our public men have thought that a true national statesmanship isolates us from the politics of the world, that notion has gone to pieces in the development of our foreign trade and our gradual conquest of all the market places of the earth.

It was at one time thought that, if we took care of our own boundaries, never looking beyond them, except to see how the Monroe Doctrine was coming on, it was about all that could be expected from a quiet and peaceful neighborhood. Such a philosophy of the national life has become an absurdity in the light of the current statistics of our trade with the world. It was inevitable that the United States should acquire a commercial interest, present and prospective, beyond all other peoples, in the vast territory to which the Pacific Ocean is the natural and convenient approach. Our acquisition of strategic islands in that ocean, however interesting from the military point of view, constitutes no part of our title to enter the market places of the Orient; and those who suppose that, in asserting our commercial rights on the other side of the world, we have cast away the national sense of duty which we inherited from our fathers, to guard with jealous care the development of free institutions in this hemisphere, comprehend neither the Monroe Doctrine, nor the higher laws of our commercial growth. The fact that we are under an historic obligation to take care of others near at hand, is not likely to interfere with the exercise of our right to take care of ourselves wherever we go down to the sea in ships.

It will be seen, therefore, that the people of the United States have good reason to look with anxiety upon the vicissitudes which have beset the Chinese Empire in the last few years.

The commercial invasion of China began with the enterprise of English merchants, long before any other country aspired to compete with them in the field of foreign commerce. It was accompanied with diplomatic formalities about concessions, treaty ports, and schemes of fiscal administration in which the outside world took only a languid interest. Because there were but few conflicting interests, the British monopoly of the Chinese trade hardly created a comment. It avoided the challenge of other nations for a still profounder reason, for wherever the British

authority and influence were set up, the commercial world had the assurance of fair play and equal rights.

It is only in these later years that the significance of Asia in the world's market place has attracted the attention of European statesmen. The marvellous development of industrial Germany has, in a sense, created the Chinese question from the standpoint of Europe; while the transformation of the backward tribal provinces of Japan into a parliamentary government with modern political and commercial aspirations has hastened the crisis in Asia. A still more tangible influence has operated to bring about the present situation. The long cherished purpose of Russia to find access to the Pacific Ocean in temperate latitudes, a purpose which may not have originally involved a greed of territory or a desire for dominion over alien races, has added a distinct impetus to the course of events.

In the summer of 1894, on account of disputes arising over affairs in Corea, Japan in declaring war upon China took a step which very greatly hastened the movement of the European world against the Chinese Empire. Prior to that time, the nations of Europe, while they had occasion to suspect that China was helpless in a military sense, did not know it with enough certainty to warrant the scheme of grand larceny which has since in a greater or less degree occupied their minds. But when the Island Empire, with its new ships and its new army modelled after European fashions, descended upon Manchuria, both by land and sea, and within a brief period disabled the Chinese fleet and sent its troops running for dear life in the direction of Peking, the cynical smile, which had for a long time been noticeable upon the faces of European statesmen, grew into an audible chuckle as they caught a glimpse of fresh opportunities to extend the blessings of civilization in China. The government of the Empress Dowager quickly perceived that the war with Japan was over, called in an American diplomatist who had often been a counsellor of the Empire, and concluded a treaty making peace with Japan. That treaty ceded to Japan that portion of the province of Feng T'ien which had been occupied by her forces, including the appurtenant islands near the northern shores of the Yellow Sea. This territory, in the hands of Japan, was expected by her to become a permanent barrier against the progress of Russia toward the Korean peninsula.

But before the ratifications of the treaty could be exchanged, the inexperienced government of Japan received its first formal introduction to Western diplomacy. She found herself confronted by a joint note, in which Russia, Germany, and France united, informing her that the peace of Asia required that there should be no territorial aggression against China, and suggesting in terms not easily misunderstood that, aside from the island of Formosa, a cash indemnity from her late enemy was the only fruit of her victory which she would be permitted to retain.

Great Britain did not join in this note, but, for some strange reason, by the lassitude of her silence, gave it the moral advantage of her apparent indifference; and, beginning with the Japanese Emperor's proclamation of May 10th, 1895, when his army took up its humiliating retreat from the peninsula district of northern China, with no spoils of war to speak of except 30,000,-000 Kuping taels, the literature of diplomacy has become a bewildering parade of hypocrisy and gaseous pretences. Sir Henry Wotton, the quaint old English essayist, who in the autograph album of a friend described an ambassador as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth," would not find any necessity for revising his definition if he could have the opportunity to look over the shadowy correspondence that, for the past eight years, has been accumulating in the foreign offices of Europe.

Hardly had the back of Japan been turned, when the Russian government, which had pleaded the permanent peace of Asia as a reason for preserving the landmarks of the Chinese Empire, through agencies which were practically official, acquired concessions under the name of the Eastern Chinese Railway Company "for the construction and working of a railway within the confines of China, from one of the points on the western borders of the province of Hei-Lung-Kiang to one of the points on the eastern borders of the province of Kirin, and for the connection of this railway with those branches which the imperial Russian government will construct to the Chinese frontier from Trans-Baikalia and the Southern Ussuri lines"; the company also being empowered "to exploit, in connection with the railway or independently of it," coal mines or other enterprises industrial and commercial. Within less than two years, we find Russia pocketing a treaty with China, by which the Emperor agrees to lease to Russia Port Arthur, Ta-lien-wan, and the adjacent waters, and

such indefinite territory in the surrounding districts as might be subsequently agreed upon, and concluding with an extension of the railway concessions to include the construction of a line to Ta-lien-wan, or any other suitable point between Neuchwang and the mouth of the Yalu river.

Thus, this officious friend of the panic-stricken Chinese court, by a stroke of the most cheerful diplomacy ever before practised in this world, ousts the victorious armies of Japan, diverts the terminus of the Trans-Siberian railroad from Vladivostok to the genial climate of the Corean Bay, and literally takes possession of the industrial and commercial possibilities of northern China. In the whole transaction, only a single touch of sentiment can be discerned by the most acute observer, and that is where the traveller approaches a bend in the road, as the locomotive turns aside from the grave-yard which contains the dust of the founders of the imperial dynasty, reposing there, in a slumber hardly more profound than that of their royal descendants at Peking.

In order to show that this sudden contradiction in the attitude of Russia towards China was merely a part of the programme talked over by the three remonstrants against the aggressive purposes of Japan, we have only to notice the appearance within a month of the German fleet in the same waters, looking for satisfaction for the murder of an unfortunate missionary, and somewhat ostentatiously vindicating the Christian religion by extorting from His Majesty, the Emperor of China, the practical sovereignty of an indefinite zone surrounding the bay of Kiao Chow, including a ninety-nine years lease of both sides of the entrance to the harbor, which commands the Province of Shantung.

Almost at the same time, we find the French ambassador holding up the Tsung-li-Yamen on three propositions; first, a railway concession from the frontier of Tonking to Yunnan-Fu; second, a lease by the Chinese government, "in consideration of its friendship for France," of the bay of Kwang-Chow-Wan for a naval and coaling station; third, the right to intervene in the reorganization of the postal service of China. And within one day after receiving M. Dubail's interesting despatch, the Chinese government replies in these words, helpless and hopeless in their pathetic brevity: "As it is said in the despatch which you addressed to our Yamen that these three requests are destined to draw closer the bonds of friendship which unite us, we are able to acquiesce in

them. China and France ought to strengthen the good relations which exist between them, and avert forever any cause for conflict."

In the meantime, the British government begins to show signs of awakening. On February 9th, 1898, Sir Claude MacDonald asks and secures renewed assurances of China that she will not, under any condition, alienate "the Yangtze region," now entirely hers, "to any other Power," "whether under lease, mortgage, or other designation." And on the first of July following, Great Britain, having made up her mind to keep in the procession, takes a lease by agreement with China of the port of Wei-Hai-Wei, including the adjacent waters, islands, and mainland, to be subject to her sole jurisdiction "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia."

These transactions by no means complete the list of the incursions against the sovereignty of China, conducted by those over-advertised friends of the peace of Asia. It must, however, be said for Great Britain that her movement of July 1st, following some time after the other treaties, so-called, were negotiated, was evidently intended to secure a point of hostile observation, not so much in the direction of China, as against those nations which had taken advantage of her infirmities; for, whatever else may be said of the English government, there are few who will deny that it possesses too much wisdom to confuse the development of commerce with the impossible task of undertaking to colonize the interior of China.

It will be seen at once that a national government administered thus, without either sense or patriotism, its territory parcelled out to smooth-spoken conspirators who appeared unctuously on the scene to save the empire from the Japanese invader, would naturally lose the respect of its own people, and especially of that portion of the people which had been educated, however crudely, to the profession of arms or other athletic sports.

In view of what happened after the evacuation of Manchuria by Japan, the popular insurrection of 1900, directed in blind fury against all strangers within the confines of the empire, will appear to the discriminating historian very much less offensive than it seemed at the time. That pitiful outcry of enraged patriotism represents to-day the saving remnant of the Chinese people. If all these things could have happened, if an imbecile administra-

tion could have gone on distributing the sea ports of the country as the avarice and self-interest of other nations might suggest, without calling forth an outbreak of popular wrath, then indeed the only thing China would be entitled to under the law of nations would have been a *post-mortem* examination. Curiously enough, the riots of 1900, involving the diplomatic representatives of all the Powers, the missionaries of all faiths, and merchants and travellers from every land, rendered China an immeasurable service, by bringing the Powers face to face in her capital, and compelling an open adjustment of their accounts.

The movement of the allied Powers for the relief of the besieged legations at Peking gave the first occasion to the government of the United States to define its policy in China. Fortunately, our squadron on that station was in command of an experienced and capable officer, Rear-Admiral Louis Kempff, and it has seldom fallen to an American naval commander to deal with questions so difficult without an opportunity to seek instructions. The old sailor had to decide the question himself, and he did it with a wisdom so profound and a moral courage so superb, as to give his name a conspicuous place in the history of the American navy.

He declined to join in the bombardment of the Taku forts, because we were at peace with China and constrained by a traditional policy which avoids foreign alliances; and from that time, whatever the United States did in China, though we operated in harmony with the other Powers, was done upon our own responsibility and without motives inimical to the Chinese Empire.

The position taken by our fleet was promptly reinforced by Mr. Hay's circular note to all the Powers, dated July 3rd, 1900, in which he sets forth in plain terms the purpose of President McKinley in sending a detachment of American troops for the rescue of our beleaguered citizens, and made a definite statement of the purpose of the government of the United States to aid in preserving "Chinese territorial and administrative entity," and to "safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

The disinterested attitude of the United States was represented in the most generous way to the Chinese government by Mr. Wu Ting-fang, its able and accomplished minister at Washington;

and as early as July 19th, the President of the United States found himself called upon by the Emperor of China's foreign office "to take the initiative in bringing about a concert of the Powers for the restoration of order and peace."

It is not too much to say that the United States has ever since had not only the confidence of China, but of all other interested Powers, for the reason that we seek no advantage over others, and entertain no designs against her sovereignty. We have still further invited the confidence of mankind by taking the earliest possible steps, after the safety of our citizens in China was assured, to anticipate the joint obligation of the Powers to withdraw their troops, and by wise counsel aid that disordered empire in re-establishing its authority.

The mutual suspicions of the European Powers, after the Peking expedition had ended, was well illustrated by the joint agreement between Germany and England, dated October 20th, in which, after asserting the equal rights of the world in "the commercial and economic activities of China," they especially disclaimed the motive of making use of the unsettled state of affairs there "to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in the Chinese dominions," and expressed their intention to act together for the protection of their own interests, should other Powers fail to observe these principles. All interested nations were asked to express their approval of the doctrines stated in this agreement, and it evidently afforded Mr. Hay satisfaction, in stating the adherence of the United States, to recall his correspondence of the previous year with France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan, as well as his circular of July 3rd, 1900, in which he had sought a written pledge from all these nations that, whatever happened in China, no nation should ever suffer the wrong involved in discriminating customs duties, unequal transportation rates, or other servitudes in their commerce with the people of China.

It is, however, to be noted that, while the other Powers acquiesced in Secretary Hay's broad and comprehensive statement of the rights of all, the Russian Foreign Office, by an oversight that could hardly have been unintentional, omitted any reference to the question of uniform railway rates within the territory already pre-empted by her in northern China, and made no comment whatever on the question suggested by Mr. Hay's note as to other treaty rights within the Russian sphere of influence.

contenting itself with a nebulous expression about the "open door," and a brief reference to the recent creation of a free port at Ta-lien-wan. These omissions were all the more suggestive, in view of the unconcealed preparation of Russia to perpetuate the military occupation of Manchuria.

It did not require very deep insight into the situation to inform Japan and the other nations, which had been wasting their official stationery in diplomatic correspondence, that, with a Russian army in possession of Manchuria, a Russian bank administering its finances, a Russian mining company claiming its natural resources, and a Russian railway system monopolizing its means of transportation, the Chinese Empire was already effectually dismembered, and the rights of the world's commerce already subjected to the selfish interest of a single Power. Long before the beginning of the present year, the legations at Peking had grown more weary of watching one another than they had been of watching the common enemy in the dark days of the Boxer siege; and it became evident that a definite statement of international rights was due to the whole world. The Chinese administration remained plastic in the hands of the Russian Embassy, and treaty after treaty confirming Russian pretensions was made, only to be torn up on the protest of indignant Powers, until on the 30th of January the London government took a step of far-reaching interest to the world at large. It entered into an agreement with the Empire of Japan, with the object of maintaining "the general peace of the extreme East," and especially "the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China, and the Empire of Korea, and equal opportunities in these countries for the commerce and industry of all nations."

The first four articles of this treaty are as follows, and the simplicity and directness of its language are such that little room is left for explanation:

"Article I. The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safe-

guard those interests, if threatened, either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

"Article II. If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Power will maintain a strict neutrality and use its best efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

"Article III. If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Power will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

"Article IV. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described."

The immediate effect of the announcement of this treaty was to bring the whole world to its senses. Contemporaneously with its publication, our State Department sent a memorandum both to Peking and St. Petersburg, asserting in plain terms that the situation in Manchuria was a distinct breach of the stipulations of treaties between China and foreign Powers, not only damaging the rights of American citizens by exposing them to discriminations, but tending also to cripple the Chinese Empire in the discharge of its international obligations. The terms of this memorandum indicate that it was written with the text of the Anglo-Japanese treaty within easy reach.

The concert of Europe responded to the publication of the treaty with a composure so grave as to appear almost comical. Everybody, including the Russian official press, said it contained exactly the idea they had long cherished. That is apparently so, so far as Germany is concerned, and even France is upon record in her correspondence with the United States to the same effect. So far as the Russian government is concerned, no assurances or other evidence either in word or deed have ever been given except in respect to the freedom of the new port of Ta-lien-wan. So that it is not strange that, as soon as the ministry at St. Petersburg recovered from its surprise, it announced in a memorandum communicated to our government by the Imperial Embassy, imperfectly if not incorrectly stating the scope of the Japanese treaty, that the allied governments of Russia and France held to the principles of that treaty as the basis of their own policy, "and

at the same time a guarantee for their special interests in the Far East." They added, however, an almost undisguised challenge to Japan by saying in effect that, if war occurred, all parties might as well get ready for a two-Power fight.

The terms in which our government received the memorandum of March 3rd, submitted by the Russian ambassador, ought to leave no doubt in the minds of the Powers of Europe that the interests of the United States are identical with those of the nations which stand ready to defend the equality of commercial rights both in the ports of China and along the highways of her internal traffic. We too stand for the independence of China and Corea; we too are interested in the access of our enterprising citizens to the mines and forests of that empire; we too understand that the "open door" is a meaningless phrase with foreign armies occupying the interior, and foreign railway companies subjecting our merchandise to the burdens of extortion and discrimination; and it may as well be understood now as at a later time that no possible alliance, in Europe or out of it, will deter the United States from effectually maintaining the principle of fair play in the commercial development of the Orient.

It would be as well, therefore, for both Russia and France to study with some care the comment of Secretary Hay upon the concluding paragraph of their joint memorandum of March 3rd, in which the government of the United States "reserves for itself entire liberty of action, should circumstances arise whereby the policy and interests of the United States in China and Corea might be disturbed or impaired."

Nor is it necessary, when interests so momentous are at stake, to conceal the fact that the people of the United States are apt to lose patience with such expressions of contemptuous gayety as were indulged in by Count von Bülow in the Reichstag, on the third of March, as reported in the London *Times* of the next day. The Imperial Chancellor appears even yet to look upon China as a pudding waiting for the knife. "We do not in the least," he says, "want to have an extra helping of pudding in China, but we ask for the same helping which the others get." If the first minister of the German Crown cannot rise above a cheap levity like that, in speaking for the most sober-minded nation of the world, it is to be hoped that there are other functionaries in Berlin who will take the pains to read carefully the American Sec-

retary's answer to the joint note of the Allied Powers who have taken most to heart the new treaty between England and Japan

There can be no disparagement of the historic friendship between the government of Russia and the people of the United States, and there are few who do not welcome the recent agreement of that government with China by which provision is made for the prompt evacuation of Manchuria by the Russian army. Our people indulge also the expectation that distinct assurance will be no longer withheld, that Russia claims no privileges within Chinese territory to which the commercial world is not admitted on the same terms.

It is already obvious that, whatever the defects of the Chinese government may be, it is the only government adapted to that vast and strange population. To disturb that empire, to wantonly separate its provinces from the régime to which they have been accustomed through the inheritance of centuries, would be an act of criminal folly for which no nation can afford to take the responsibility. The world ought to help China, and lend its influence to the gradual readjustment of its political mechanism to the needs of times to which its old forms are no longer adapted.

Even to-day its market place offers an inviting field to the enterprises of commerce; but the sum total of its present foreign trade is as nothing compared to the demand for the world's merchandise when that people shall have been caught, as it one day will be, in the currents of modern progress. The people of the United States are not unmindful of their present share in the trade of China. They do not intend to see that cut off, nor in any wise unjustly constrained; but they are looking to the future.

As the result of a conflict with Spain in which they had absolutely no motive except the welfare of others, they find themselves very near to the coasts of Asia; they propose to open headquarters there for the transaction of business. They expect to see the Chinese Empire one day aroused from the sleep of ages; and under the guidance of a Secretary of State who in the lifetime of William McKinley shared in a peculiar measure the confidence of that great President, they have cast in their lot with those who, in the interest of the peace of the world and the plain rights of trade and industry, propose to defend that ancient Empire against either spoliation or anarchy.

JONATHAN P. DOLLIVER.

THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

BY ANDREW CARNEGIE.

THE American people are at last learning the truth about the Philippine situation. At this moment, they are shocked at the perpetration of such atrocities as have rarely appalled civilized man, the proof of which is found in the testimony of four of our own officers, trusted men of honor. Major Gardiner, whose report is sickening, is endorsed by no less an authority than Judge Taft, the Governor-General of the Philippines. The story is too revolting to be dwelt upon. Fortunately, the President and Secretary Root are aroused, and resolved that the good name of the American people is not to be thus foully stained. The guilty will be punished. General Kitchener, in South Africa, has shown them how he deals with savagery in war—two Australian butchers of prisoners have been shot. If the General has not been libelled by the four officers who agree about his orders—"Kill all over ten—take no prisoners—burn and slay"—what is the Commander-in-Chief going to do with him? But all these details, sickening though they be, are only of passing moment compared with the problem which confronts us. We now learn from the commanding officer that in Samar, the people are now more intensely aroused against us than they were at first.

Has not the time arrived for the President and Cabinet to consider our position in these islands? The President inherited the *damnosa hereditas*. So did Secretaries Root, Moody, Shaw, Knox, and Payne. These men are to be pitied, and no one with a modicum of sound sense would hold them responsible for the serious situation. It is one question whether one should plunge into an unknown stream; quite another when one sees one's friends in mid-stream, struggling with the dangerous current and liable to be overwhelmed, and plunges in to save them.

In a moment of aberration, and against the calm decision arrived at with the hearty approval of his Cabinet, President McKinley suddenly reversed his policy. His first decision was merely to get a suitable coaling station in Manila Bay. He never entertained the idea of entangling his country with "possessions" in the far distant tropics, where Americans could not settle.

The writer had the honor of an interview with him before war broke out with our allies, and ventured to predict that, if he attempted to exercise sovereignty over the Filipinos—whom he had bought at two dollars and a half a head—he would be shooting these people down within thirty days. He smiled, and, addressing a gentleman who was present, said: "Mr. Carnegie doesn't understand the situation at all." Then, turning to the writer, he said: "We shall be welcomed as their best friends." So little did dear, kind, loving President McKinley expect ever to be other than the friendly co-operator with these people. He would have recoiled from the mere idea of coercing them. But there was the discharge of a shot by some unknown man on one side or the other, and peace vanished. The commanders of the Filipinos were absent at the time, which gives credibility to their assurances that it was an accident, wholly unexpected.

War between the two previously co-operating forces ensued, and has lasted till now. Even if it were suppressed for a time it would surely break out at intervals, as the Dutch have found in Java. The Filipinos justly expected the independence for which they had risen against Spain when the Spaniards were vanquished, not an exchange of masters.

Recent events have produced a profound impression upon the public mind; and after years of killing these people and burning their homes, we begin to see those best qualified to judge now speaking out as a matter of duty.

The foremost authority on the question, it will be generally admitted, is Principal Schurman, appointed by President McKinley, Chairman of the Philippine Commission, which spent so much time there. He speaks with knowledge. He tells us:

"If the Filipinos come to believe that our jingoes and imperialists represent the mind of the American people, they will, like the Boers, fight till they are annihilated: our crowning victory would be their utter extinction. Our assertion of sovereignty is supported at the present time only by the federal party, who are numerically small, who are held to-

gether by the cohesive force of public office, and who, worst of all, are animated by the delusion (which is the foremost plank of their platform) that the Philippine Islands will be admitted, first as a territory and then as a state, into the American union. Apart from this exception, which rests on a misapprehension, the Filipinos are opposed to us and unanimously demand independence. *Here* most of those who talk about Philippine affairs have in the past assumed the colonial policy as a matter of course; but this no Filipino will endure. *There* some Filipinos support our sovereignty on the understanding that the Philippine Islands are to be a state of the American Union; but this no American will endure. The final resultant of these psychological forces must be Philippine independence.

"There are two distinct groups of Filipinos. First, we have the civilized and Christianized Filipinos of Luzon and the Visayan islands, numbering about 6,500,000 souls. Formerly divided into rival communities, they have been solidly unified by the events of the past few years, and the new-born national consciousness clamors loudly and incessantly for independence. Secondly, we have the Mohammedan and heathen tribes of the southern islands—Sulu, Palawan, and the interior of Mindanao—who are estimated to number 1,500,000. These are all tribally organized and ruled by datos and sultans. Some external sovereign or suzerain they must have; and if we do not retain these southern islands we must hand them over to some other power. Thus, for example, we might exchange them with Great Britain for the British West Indies. But whatever be done with them, the civilized and Christianized democracy of Luzon and the Visayas desire independence. They are fairly entitled to it; and united as they now are, I think they might very soon be safely entrusted with it. In their educated men, as thorough gentlemen as one meets in Europe or America, this democracy of 6,500,000 Christians has its foreordained leaders."

Here is the man who knows; and in his opinion the Filipinos could very soon be safely entrusted with Independence. He is not alone in this belief. Admiral Dewey reported that they were better fitted for self-government than the Cubans, and said he knew both races well. General Merritt testified to their fitness and qualities. General MacArthur has told the Senate Committee that:

"There is no question of the power of the Filipinos to attain any standard of excellence. They have a large representation in all the artisan employments. They have a deft touch. They are great in wood carving. They are artists. They are going to take high rank as artists. They are natural musicians. There is hardly a person in the islands who does not play on some instrument."

It is such people we are now killing for the crime of desiring a trial of self-government, for which they rose against Spain.

Ex-Secretary-of-the-Navy Long has recently declared that the end we must keep steadily in view is their Independence.

The Governor-General, Judge Taft, has told the Senate Committee that it would have been better had we never gone there.

The President himself has told Congress that the Philippines are a burden—a great burden, indeed, they are and must be. The loss of life is great both of American and Filipino. The ruin of the health of our men is certain. Judge Taft is only one of many who return to us invalided. The cost in money is not less than sixty millions per year. But more than all this is the false position into which we have drifted, as the invaders of a civilized Christian land, using force against the aspirations of a people for a country for which to live or, if necessary, to die. A people which has shown itself willing to fight and die for Independence has earned the right to a trial of it. Upon this point President Schurman closes his instructive message with this truly American sentiment:

“And, to repeat what ought not to need repetition anywhere within the limits of our free Republic, any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better than the best possible government of Filipinos by Americans.”

We seem to hear the voices of the Fathers echoing this statement of American doctrine—Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, Hamilton, Adams, and the voice of one who ranks even with these—Lincoln, who held that God never made a people good enough to rule over another people.

The American people need only to be satisfied upon one point: Is it not our duty to continue forcing our rule upon these six and a half millions of Christian people, *for their good?*

If all our people really knew the Tropics, and had seen the result of foreign rule there, or had read its history, the question would be answered as soon as stated. All history teaches that the influence upon the inferior race of such members of a superior race as go to the Tropics, is injurious to both. Where a superior race can go freely, and settle a land hitherto inhabited by an inferior race, as our race settled here among the Indians, genuine good is done—but even then not to the Indians, but to the cause of civilization as a whole. It is a step in advance. To a superior race no portion of the earth is closed which it can populate, and which it can make its dwelling-place. If Americans could and would

go, in great numbers and of all classes, and make their permanent homes in the Philippines, their doing so would undoubtedly result in progress there; but it would involve loss to our own land, which needs all its people and all proper people who can be induced to come here, for we have only 32 people to the square mile, while England and Wales have 502. We have a rich continent of our own to develop.

As a matter of fact, there will go to the Philippines a few male adventurers, who, not being able to succeed here, will try abroad. There will have to go 40,000 soldiers; but let any one who has travelled the Tropics tell you of the malign influence an army has upon the natives, and of the not less serious influence exerted upon an army by its situation there. Contact is ruinous to both races. I have travelled round the world and talked to many people in the Tropics. India is a good illustration of the rule of our race over alien races. The British are the best governors of dependencies, and they have been in India for more than two hundred years, time enough, one should think, to educate a people sufficiently to give them a trial of self-government. Yet, if Britain left India to-day, she would leave behind scarcely a trace of her influence. Railroads, telegraphs, and canals would remain, which might not have been so extensively built but for the British occupation—though even this may be doubted, for the Independence of a people stimulates action and ensures progress. Britons cannot grow in India. The few merchants and members of professions who seek their careers there must have seasons out of that climate. British children cannot be successfully reared there. Soldiers must be transferred, as ours are to be every three years from the Philippines. Therefore the races remain apart. One knows nothing of the other.

There is another important point. After two hundred and more years of occupation, it is still necessary for Britain to keep seventy thousand British troops in India, besides many Indian troops which are sent to regions far from their native homes, so as to be among strangers, and therefore trustworthy as oppressors. And, pray, let my readers mark this: Not one piece of artillery is given to any native regiment. That would never do. Why? Because no invader can ever trust the oppressed not to strike, when opportunity offers.

The aspirations of a people for self-government may be sup-

pressed for a time, but seldom if ever eradicated. We all remember the fearful Mutiny. Britain sits to-day upon a volcano. Many of the educated Indians have learned English in the schools. Those to whom I talked, knowing I was an American and not a Briton, quoted American ideas, and referred to Washington and the War for Independence, and always ended by saying: "Some day we shall be free like you." It was a crime to teach the slave to read—a mistake to teach the people of India English. We prohibited the reading of the Declaration of Independence in the Philippines last fourth of July. To the incredulous reader let me repeat this fact. It is on record and acknowledged by our officials. We can imagine the first thought of so good a man as Judge Taft and so good an American as he has been hitherto when this was suggested to him.

"Is thy servant a dog that he should do this thing?" But, alas, he did it!

We are engaged in work which requires suppression of American ideas hitherto held sacred. If the Republican Candidate for the Presidency, even if it were President Roosevelt himself, popular as he is, could be taxed with having approved this next Fourth of July, he would probably be defeated in the next campaign. Were I of the Democratic party, I should base the campaign largely upon this order, and ask the people if they wished a President capable of suppressing the reading of the Declaration of Independence in any part of the world.

The American idea of the rights of man and of the right of self-government is not false. It is true.

All communities, however low they may be in the scale, have the germ of self-government. Without this they could not exist; there could not be communities. No tribe, not even the Afridis, the most warlike of all, but has its governors, orders and degrees. Whether a people are fit for self-government according to our standard is unimportant. They are fit to improve if they are permitted, and in no other way has man improved in this domain than by experience. Our own race had many centuries of varied success and failure before it reached its present position. As well try to teach a boy how to swim without his striking out for himself, as expect a people to learn the art of governing themselves by your doing the governing for them. There is nothing so enervating to a people as to relieve them of the task of looking

after themselves. They deteriorate with every year of foreign control.

I submit that we make a grave mistake in not following, in the Philippines, the American policy which has triumphed in Cuba. President McKinley said to the Cubans that he would "aid them to establish a stable, free and independent government, and thus realize the highest aspirations of the people." This kept the peace; not one Cuban was shot. It would have kept the peace in the Philippines. The promise has been honorably fulfilled; and no page of American history is to shine more gloriously in the future than that which records that the Republic was the protector of Cuba—a record which will prove to future generations of Americans a priceless heritage, for no nation but our own has delivered an oppressed people from a foreign yoke, and without return handed over to them their country as an independent Republic. Nor is any nation likely to do so, but let us hope the American nation is to repeat this sublime act of self-abnegation with the Philippines, and establish, under her protection, the first Republic of the Orient. This accomplished, what a position for the future is ours—the greatest of Republics the Mother of other Republics. Here lies true glory, which no other nation can attain.

The opportunity lies at our feet to-day, and President Roosevelt may become, as some predict, the Man of Destiny. He is still free, being uncommitted. He has but to copy President McKinley's words to Cuba, and address them to the Philippines, and the glory is his and his country's to endure while history lasts. Is he bold enough? Has he really the courage with which he is credited; or is he at heart but the commonplace opportunist? Democracy loves a leader. Is he one, or only an official?

I believe there lies behind the mere official in Theodore Roosevelt a man, an American man, intensely imbued with the principles of which his country is the exponent and the product, and in defence of which we may rest assured its people will sooner or later rise. The Democratic party is pledged to the policy of Independence and hence could offer no opposition, while our own party would welcome with enthusiasm the declaration of the President, "As Cuba so Philippines."

ANDREW CARNEGIE.

A DEFENCE OF GENERAL FUNSTON.

BY MARK TWAIN.

I.

February 22. To-day is the great Birth-Day; and it was observed so widely in the earth that differences in longitudinal time made curious work with some of the cabled testimonies of respect paid to the sublime name which the date calls up in our minds; for, although they were all being offered at about the same hour, several of them were yesterday to us and several were to-morrow.

There was a reference in the papers to General Funston.

Neither Washington nor Funston was made in a day. It took a long time to accumulate the materials. In each case, the basis or moral skeleton of the man was inborn disposition—a thing which is as permanent as rock, and never undergoes any actual and genuine change between cradle and grave. In each case, the moral flesh-bulk (that is to say, *character*) was built and shaped around the skeleton by training, association and circumstances. Given a crooked-disposition skeleton, no power nor influence in the earth can mould a permanently shapely form around it. Training, association and circumstances can truss it, and brace it, and prop it, and strain it, and crowd it into an artificial shapeliness that can endure till the end, deceiving not only the spectator but the man himself. But there is nothing there but artificiality, and if at any time the props and trusses chance to be removed, the form will collapse into its proper and native crookedness.

Washington did not create the basic skeleton (disposition) that was in him; it was born there, and the merit of its perfection was not his. It—and only It—moved him to seek and prefer associations which were contenting to Its spirit; to welcome influences which pleased It and satisfied It; and to repel or be indif-

ferent to influences which were not to Its taste. Moment by moment, day by day, year by year, It stood in the ceaseless sweep of minute influences, automatically arresting and retaining, like a magnet of mercury, all dust-particles of gold that came; and, with automatic scorn, repelling certain dust-particles of trash; and, with as automatic indifference, allowing the rest of that base kinship to go by unnoticed. It had a native affinity for all influences fine and great, and gave them hospitable welcome and permanent shelter; It had a native aversion for all influences mean and gross, and passed them on. It chose Its subject's associations for him; It chose his influences for him; It chose his ideals for him; and, out of Its patiently gathered materials, It built and shaped his golden character.

And we give *him* the credit!

We give God credit and praise for being all-wise and all-powerful; but that is quite another matter. No exterior contributor, no birth-commission, conferred these possessions upon Him; He did it *Himself*. But Washington's disposition was *born* in him, he did not create It; It was the architect of his character; his character was the architect of his achievements. If my disposition had been born in him and his in me, the map of history would have been changed. It is our privilege to admire the splendor of the sun, and the beauty of the rainbow, and the character of Washington; but there is no occasion to praise them for these qualities, since *they* did not create the source whence the qualities sprang—the sun's fires, the light upon the falling rain-drops, the sane and clean and benignant disposition born to the Father of his Country.

Is there a value, then, in having a Washington, since we may not concede to him *personal merit* for what he was and did? Necessarily, there is a value—a value so immense that it defies all estimate. Acceptable outside influences were the materials out of which Washington's native disposition built Washington's character and fitted him for his achievements. Suppose there hadn't *been* any. Suppose he had been born and reared in a pirate's cave; the acceptable materials would have been lacking, the Washingtonian character would not have been built.

Fortunately for us and for the world and for future ages and peoples, he was born where the sort of influences and associations acceptable to his disposition were findable; where the build-

ing of his character at its best and highest was possible, and where the accident of favorable circumstances was present to furnish it a conspicuous field for the full exercise and exhibition of its commanding capabilities.

Did Washington's great value, then, lie in what he accomplished? No; that was only a minor value. His major value, his vast value, his immeasurable value to us and to the world and to future ages and peoples, lies in his permanent and sky-reaching conspicuousness as an *influence*.

We are *made*, brick by brick, of *influences*, patiently built up around the framework of our born dispositions. It is the sole process of construction; there is no other. Every man and woman and child is an influence; a daily and hourly influence which never ceases from work, and never ceases from affecting for good or evil the characters about it—some contributing gold-dust, some contributing trash-dust, but in either case helping on the building, and never stopping to rest. The shoemaker helps to build his two-dozen associates; the pickpocket helps to build his four dozen associates; the village clergyman helps to build his five hundred associates; the renowned bank-robber's name and fame help to build his hundred associates and three thousand persons whom he has never seen; the renowned philanthropist's labors and the benevolent millionaire's gifts move to kindly works and generous outlays of money a hundred thousand persons whom they have never met and never will meet; and to the building of the character of every individual thus moved these movers have added a brick. The unprincipled newspaper adds a baseness to a million decaying character-fabrics every day; the high-principled newspaper adds a daily betterment to the character-fabric of another million. The swiftly-enriched wrecker and robber of railway systems lowers the commercial morals of a whole nation for three generations. A Washington, standing upon the world's utmost summit, eternally visible, eternally clothed in light, a serene, inspiring, heartening example and admonition, is an influence which raises the level of character in all receptive men and peoples, alien and domestic; and the term of its gracious work is not measurable by fleeting generations, but only by the lingering march of the centuries.

Washington was more and greater than the father of a nation, he was the Father of its Patriotism—patriotism at its loftiest

and best; and so powerful was the influence which he left behind him, that that golden patriotism remained undimmed and unsullied for a hundred years, lacking one; and so fundamentally right-hearted are our people by grace of that long and ennobling teaching, that to-day, already, they are facing back for home, they are laying aside their foreign-born and foreign-bred imported patriotism and resuming that which Washington gave to their fathers, which is American and the only American—which lasted ninety-nine years and is good for a million more. Doubt—doubt that we did right by the Filipinos—is rising steadily higher and higher in the nation's breast; conviction will follow doubt. The nation will speak; its will is law; there is no other sovereign on this soil; and in that day we shall right such unfairnesses as we have done. We shall let go our obsequious hold on the rear-skirts of the sceptred land-thieves of Europe, and be what we were before, a *real* World Power, and the chiefest of them all, by right of the only clean hands in Christendom, the only hands guiltless of the sordid plunder of any helpless people's stolen liberties, hands recleansed in the patriotism of Washington, and once more fit to touch the hem of the revered Shade's garment and stand in its presence unashamed. It was Washington's influence that made Lincoln and all other real patriots the Republic has known; it was Washington's influence that made the soldiers who saved the Union; and that influence will save us always, and bring us back to the fold when we stray.

And so, when a Washington is given us, or a Lincoln, or a Grant, what should we do? Knowing, as we do, that a *conspicuous* influence for good is worth more than a billion obscure ones, without doubt the logic of it is that we should highly value it, and make a vestal flame of it, and keep it briskly burning in every way we can—in the nursery, in the school, in the college, in the pulpit, in the newspaper—even in Congress, if such a thing were possible.

The proper inborn disposition was required to start a Washington; the acceptable influences and circumstances and a large field were required to develop and complete him. The same with Funston.

II.

"The war was over"—end of 1900. A month later the mountain refuge of the defeated and hunted, and now powerless

but not yet hopeless, Filipino chief was discovered. His army was gone, his Republic extinguished, his ablest statesman deported, his generals all in their graves or prisoners of war. The memory of his worthy dream had entered upon a historic life, to be an inspiration to less unfortunate patriots in other centuries; the dream itself was dead beyond resurrection, though he could not believe it.

Now came his capture. An admiring author* shall tell us about it. His account can be trusted, for it is correctly synopsized from General Funston's own voluntary confession made by him at the time. The italics are mine.

"It was not until February, 1901, that his actual hiding-place was discovered. The clew was in the shape of a letter from Aguinaldo commanding his cousin, Baldormero Aguinaldo, to send him four hundred armed men, the bearer to act as a guide to the same. The order was in cipher, but among other effects captured at various times a copy of the Insurgent cipher was found. The Insurgent courier was convinced of the error of his ways (though by exactly what means, history does not reveal), and offered to lead the way to Aguinaldo's place of hiding. Here was an opportunity that suggested an adventure equal to anything in penny-awful fiction. It was just the kind of a dare-devil exploit that appealed to the romantic Funston. It was something out of the ordinary for a brigadier-general to leave his command and turn into a scout, but Funston was irresistible. He formulated a scheme and asked General MacArthur's permission. It was impossible to refuse the daring adventurer, the hero of the Rio Grande, anything; so Funston set to work, imitating the peculiar handwriting of Lacuna, the Insurgent officer to whom Aguinaldo's communication referred. Some little time previous to the capture of the Tagalog courier, several of Lacuna's letters were found, together with Aguinaldo's cipher code. Having perfected Lacuna's signature, Funston wrote two letters on February 24 and 28, acknowledging Aguinaldo's communication, and informing him that he (Lacuna) was sending him a few of the best soldiers in his command. Added to this neat forgery General Funston dictated a letter which was written by an ex-Insurgent attached to his command, telling Aguinaldo that the relief force had surprised and captured a detachment of Americans, taking five prisoners whom they were bringing to him because of their importance. This ruse was employed to explain the presence of the five Americans: General Funston, Captain Hazzard, Captain Newton, Lieutenant Hazzard, and General Funston's aide, Lieutenant Kitchell, who were to accompany the expedition.

"Seventy-eight Macabebes, hereditary enemies of the Tagalogs, were chosen by Funston to form the body of the command. These fearless

* "*Aguinaldo.*" By Edwin Wildman. Lothrop Publishing Co., Boston.

and hardy natives fell into the scheme with a vengeance. Three Tagalogs and one Spaniard were also invited. The Macabebes were fitted out in cast-off Insurgent uniforms, and the Americans donned field-worn uniforms of privates. Three days' rations were provided, and each man was given a rifle. The 'Vicksburg' was chosen to take the daring impostors to some spot on the east coast near Palanan, where Aguinaldo was in hiding. Arriving off the coast at Casignan, some distance from the Insurgent-hidden capital, the party was landed. Three Macabebes, who spoke Tagalog fluently, were sent into the town to notify the natives that they were bringing additional forces and important American prisoners to Aguinaldo, and request of the local authorities guides and assistance. The Insurgent president readily consented, and the little party, after refreshing themselves and exhibiting their prisoners, started over the ninety-mile trail to Palanan, a mountain retreat on the coast of the Isabella province. Over the stony declivities and through the thick jungle, across bridgeless streams and up narrow passes, the footsore and bone-racked adventurers tramped, until their food was exhausted, and they were *too weak to move*, though but eight miles from Aguinaldo's rendezvous.

"A messenger was sent forward to inform Aguinaldo of their position and to *beg for food*. The rebel chieftain promptly replied by despatching rice and a letter to the officer in command, instructing him to treat the American prisoners well, but to leave them outside the town. What better condition could the ingenious Funston have himself dictated? On the 23d of March the party reached Palanan. Aguinaldo sent out eleven men to take charge of the American prisoners, but Funston and his associates succeeded in dodging them and scattering themselves in the jungle until they passed on to meet the Americans whom the Insurgents were notified were left behind.

"Immediately joining his command, Funston ordered his little band of dare-devils to march boldly into the town and present themselves to Aguinaldo. At the Insurgent headquarters they were received by Aguinaldo's bodyguard, dressed in blue drill uniforms and white hats, drawn up in military form. The spokesman so completely hoodwinked Aguinaldo that he did not suspect the ruse. In the meantime the Macabebes manœuvred around into advantageous positions, directed by the Spaniard, until all were in readiness. Then he shouted, 'Macabebes, now is your turn!' whereupon they emptied their rifles into Aguinaldo's bodyguard. . . .

"The Americans joined in the skirmish, and two of Aguinaldo's staff were wounded, but escaped, the treasurer of the revolutionary government surrendering. The rest of the Filipino officers got away. Aguinaldo accepted his capture with resignation, though greatly in fear of the vengeance of the Macabebes. But General Funston's assurance of his personal safety set his mind easy on that point, and he calmed down and discussed the situation. He was greatly cast down at his capture, and asserted that *by no other means* would he have been taken alive,—an admis-

sion which added all the more to Funston's achievement, for Aguinaldo's was a difficult and desperate case, and demanded extraordinary methods."

Some of the customs of war are not pleasant to the civilian; but ages upon ages of training have reconciled us to them as being justifiable, and we accept them and make no demur, even when they give us an extra twinge. Every detail of Funston's scheme—but one—has been employed in war in the past and stands acquitted of blame by history. By the custom of war, it is permissible, in the interest of an enterprise like the one under consideration, for a Brigadier-General (if he be of the sort that can so choose) to persuade or bribe a courier to betray his trust; to remove the badges of his honorable rank and disguise himself; to lie, to practise treachery, to forge; to associate with himself persons properly fitted by training and instinct for the work; to accept of courteous welcome, and assassinate the welcomers while their hands are still warm from the friendly handshake.

By the custom of war, all these things are innocent, none of them is blameworthy, all of them are justifiable; none of them is new, all of them have been done before, although not by a Brigadier-General. But there is one detail which is new, absolutely new. It has never been resorted to before in any age of the world, in any country, among any people, savage or civilized. It was the one meant by Aguinaldo when he said that "*by no other means*" would he have been taken alive. When a man is exhausted by hunger to the point where he is "too weak to move," he has a right to make supplication to his enemy to save his failing life; but if he take so much as one taste of that food—which is holy, by the precept of all ages and all nations—he is *barred from lifting his hand against that enemy for that time*.

It was left to a Brigadier-General of Volunteers in the American army to put shame upon a custom which even the degraded Spanish friars had respected. *We promoted him for it.*

Our unsuspecting President was in the act of taking his murderer by the hand when the man shot him down. The amazed world dwelt upon that damning fact, brooded over it, discussed it, blushed for it, said it put a blot and a shame upon our race. Yet, bad as he was, he had not—dying of starvation—begged food of the President to strengthen his failing forces for his treacherous work; he did not proceed against the life of a benefactor who had just saved his own.

April 14. I have been absent several weeks in the West Indies; I will now resume this Defence.

It seems to me that General Funston's appreciation of the Capture needs editing. It seems to me that, in his after-dinner speeches, he spreads out the heroisms of it—I say it with deference, and subject to correction—with an almost too generous hand. He is a brave man; his dearest enemy will cordially grant him that credit. For his sake it is a pity that somewhat of that quality was not needed in the episode under consideration; that he would have furnished it, no one doubts. But, by his own showing, he ran but one danger—that of starving. He and his party were well disguised, in dishonored uniforms, American and Insurgent; they greatly outnumbered Aguinaldo's guard;* by his forgeries and falsehoods he had lulled suspicion to sleep; his coming was expected, his way was prepared; his course was through a solitude, unfriendly interruption was unlikely; his party were well armed; they would catch their prey with welcoming smiles in their faces, and with hospitable hands extended for the friendly shake—nothing would be necessary but to shoot these people down. That is what they did. It was hospitality repaid in a brand-new, up-to-date, Modern Civilization fashion, and would be admired by many.

“The spokesman so completely hoodwinked Aguinaldo that he did not suspect the ruse. In the meantime, the Macabebes manœuvred around into advantageous positions, directed by the Spaniard, until all were in readiness; then he shouted, ‘Macabebes, now is your turn!’ whereupon they emptied their rifles into Aguinaldo's bodyguard.”—*From Wildman's book, already quoted.*

The utter completeness of the surprise, the total absence of suspicion which had been secured by the forgeries and falsehoods, is best brought out in Funston's humorous account of the episode in one of his rollicking speeches—the one he thought the President said he wanted to see republished; though it turned out that this was only a dream. Dream of a reporter, the General says:

“The Macabebes fired on those men and two fell dead; the others retreated, firing as they ran, and I might say here that they retreated with such great alacrity and enthusiasm that they dropped eighteen rifles and a thousand rounds of ammunition.

“Sigismondo rushed back into the house, pulled his revolver, and told

* Eighty-nine to forty-eight.—*Funston's Lotos Club Confession.*

the insurgent officers to surrender. They all threw up their hands except Villia, Aguinaldo's chief of staff; he had on one of those new-fangled Mauser revolvers and he wanted to try it. But before he had the Mauser out of its scabbard he was shot twice; Sigismondo was a pretty fair marksman himself.

"Alambra was shot in the face. He jumped out of the window; the house, by-the-way, stood on the bank of the river. He went out of the window and went clear down into the river, the water being twenty-five feet below the bank. He escaped, swam across the river and got away, and surrendered five months afterwards.

"Villia, shot in the shoulder, followed him out of the window and into the river, but the Macabebes saw him and ran down to the river bank, and they waded in and fished him out, and kicked him all the way up the bank, and asked him how he liked it." (Laughter.)

While it is true that the Dare Devils were not in danger upon this occasion, they *were* in awful peril at one time; in peril of a death so awful that swift extinction by bullet, by the axe, by the sword, by the rope, by drowning, by fire, is a kindly mercy contrasted with it; a death so awful that it holds its place unchallenged as the supremest of human agonies—death by starvation. Aguinaldo saved them from that.

These being the facts, we come now to the question, Is Funston to blame? I think not. And for that reason I think too much is being made of this matter. He did not make his own disposition, It was born with him. It chose his ideals for him, he did not choose them. It chose the kind of society It liked, the kind of comrades It preferred, and imposed them upon him, rejecting the other kinds; he could not help this; It admired everything that Washington did not admire, and hospitably received and coddled everything that Washington would have turned out of doors—but It, and It only, was to blame, not Funston; his It took as naturally to moral slag as Washington's took to moral gold, but only It was to blame, not Funston. Its moral sense, if It had any, was color-blind, but this was no fault of Funston's, and he is not chargeable with the results; It had a native predilection for unsavory conduct, but it would be in the last degree unfair to hold Funston to blame for the outcome of his infirmity; as clearly unfair as it would be to blame him because his conscience leaked out through one of his pores when he was little—a thing which he could not help, and he couldn't have raised it, anyway; It was able to say to an enemy, "Have pity on me, I am starving; I am too weak to move, give me food; I am your friend,

I am your fellow-patriot, your fellow-Filipino, and am fighting for our dear country's liberties, like you—have pity, give me food, save my life, there is no other help!" and It was able to refresh and restore Its marionette with the food, and then shoot down the giver of it while his hand was stretched out in welcome—like the President's. Yet if blame there was, and guilt, and treachery, and baseness, they are not Funston's, but only Its; It has the noble gift of humor, and can make a banquet almost die with laughter when it has a funny incident to tell about; this one will bear reading again—and over and over again, in fact:

"The Macabebes fired on those men and two fell dead; the others retreated, firing as they ran, and I might say here that they retreated with such alacrity and enthusiasm that they dropped eighteen rifles and a thousand rounds of ammunition.

"Sigismondo rushed back into the house, pulled his revolver, and told the insurgent officers to surrender. They all threw up their hands except Villia, Aguinaldo's chief of staff; he had on one of those new-fangled Mauser revolvers and he wanted to try it. But before he had the Mauser out of its scabbard he was shot twice; Sigismondo was a pretty fair marksman himself.

"Alambra was shot in the face. He jumped out of the window; the house, by-the-way, stood on the bank of the river. He went out of the window and went clear down into the river, the water being twenty-five feet below the bank. He escaped, swam across the river and got away, and surrendered five months afterwards.

"Villia, shot in the shoulder, followed him out of the window and into the river, but the Macabebes saw him and ran down to the river bank, and they waded in and fished him out, and kicked him all the way up the bank, and asked him how he liked it." (Laughter.)

(This was a wounded man.) But it is only It that is speaking, not Funston. With youthful glee It can see sink down in death the simple creatures who had answered Its fainting prayer for food, and without remorse It can note the reproachful look in their dimming eyes; but in fairness we must remember that this is only It, not Funston; by proxy, in the person of Its born servant, It can do Its strange work, and practise Its ingratitude and amazing treacheries, while wearing the uniform of the American soldier, and marching under the authority of the American flag. And It—not Funston—comes home now, to teach us children what Patriotism is! Surely It ought to know.

It is plain to me, and I think it ought to be plain to all, that Funston is not in any way to blame for the things he has done, does, thinks, and says.

Now, then, we have Funston; he has happened, and is on our hands. The question is, what are we going to do about it, how are we going to meet the emergency? We have seen what happened in Washington's case: he became a colossal example, an example to the whole world, and for all time—because his name and deeds went everywhere, and inspired, as they still inspire, and will always inspire, admiration, and compel emulation. Then the thing for the world to do in the present case is to turn the gilt front of Funston's evil notoriety to the rear, and expose the back aspect of it, the right and black aspect of it, to the youth of the land; otherwise *he* will become an example and a boy-admiration, and will most sorrowfully and grotesquely bring his breed of Patriotism into competition with Washington's. This competition has already begun, in fact. Some may not believe it, but it is nevertheless true, that there are now public-school teachers and superintendents who are holding up Funston as a model hero and Patriot in the schools.

If this Funstonian boom continues, Funstonism will presently affect the army. In fact, this has already happened. There are weak-headed and weak-principled officers in all armies, and these are always ready to imitate successful notoriety-breeding methods, let them be good or bad. The fact that Funston has achieved notoriety by paralyzing the universe with a fresh and hideous idea, is sufficient for this kind—they will call that hand if they can, and go it one better when the chance offers. Funston's example has bred many imitators, and many ghastly additions to our history: the torturing of Filipinos by the awful "water-cure," for instance, to make them confess—what? Truth? Or lies? How can one know which it is they are telling? For under unendurable pain a man confesses anything that is required of him, true or false, and his evidence is worthless. Yet upon such evidence American officers have actually—but you know about those atrocities which the War Office has been hiding a year or two; and about General Smith's now world-celebrated order of *massacre*—thus summarized by the press from Major Waller's testimony:

"Kill and burn—this is no time to take prisoners—the more you kill and burn, the better—Kill all above the age of ten—make Samar a howling wilderness!"

You see what Funston's example has produced, just in this

little while—even before he produced the example. It has advanced our Civilization ever so far—fully as far as Europe advanced it in China. Also, no doubt, it was Funston's example that made us (and England) copy Weyler's *reconcentrado* horror after the pair of us, with our Sunday-school smirk on, and our goody-goody noses upturned toward heaven, had been calling him a "fiend." And the fearful earthquake out there in Krakatoa, that destroyed the island and killed two million people— No, that could not have been Funston's example; I remember now, he was not born then.

However, for all these things I blame only his It, not him. In conclusion, I have defended him as well as I could, and indeed I have found it quite easy, and have removed prejudice from him and rehabilitated him in the public esteem and regard, I think. I was not able to do anything for his It, It being out of my jurisdiction, and out of Funston's and everybody's. As I have shown, Funston is not to blame for his fearful deed; and, if I tried, I might also show that he is not to blame for our still holding in bondage the man he captured by unlawful means, and who is not any more rightfully our prisoner and spoil than he would be if he were stolen money. He is entitled to his freedom. If he were a king of a Great Power, or an ex-president of our republic, instead of an ex-president of a destroyed and abolished little republic, Civilization (with a large C) would criticise and complain until he got it.

MARK TWAIN.

P. S. April 16. The President is speaking up, this morning, just as this goes to the printer, and there is no uncertain sound about the note. It is the speech and spirit of a President of a people, not of a party, and we all like it, Traitors and all. I think I may speak for the other Traitors, for I am sure they feel as I do about it. I will explain that we get our title from the Funstonian Patriots—free of charge. They are always doing us little compliments like that; they are just born flatterers, those boys.

M. T.

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY IN ROME.

BY JAMES McMILLAN, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN.

THAT was a fortunate day for art in America when Daniel H. Burnham urged the reluctant architects of New York City to participate in the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago; and they, only half consenting, agreed to consider the matter so far as to visit the city that had won the privilege of providing the site for the Exposition in the exciting competition before Congress. They went, a train-load of the great builders and artists of the east; they saw a wilderness of swamp on the lake shore; and they returned with the resolve that they would do their part in building a transient city, that for a few short months should celebrate the discovery of America.

Then came the inevitable discussion of the general scheme; and after much debate it was decided that, instead of a large number of individuals each working out his own ideas, there should be one plan to which each architect should subordinate his own efforts. Moreover, the plan selected was no novel creation calculated to excite the admiration of the moment. On the contrary, they resolved to return to that general style of architecture in which the world's most beautiful, most dignified, and most impressive structures had been constructed. The buildings themselves might endure only for a day, but the impression made by them should be lasting.

To the work, moreover, should be called not only the architects but also the sculptors, the painters, and the landscape architects; so that all, working in harmony to attain a given end, might present a product instinct with the highest art to be attained in a land without settled art traditions of its own.

The success was beyond question. Uniformity of cornice line, subordination of individual features to the general effect, nice

balance of parts in the composition, together with a happy blending of the formal with the informal in landscape treatment, all united to impress both the educated and the uneducated with a sense of that order, symmetry, and dignity which are the underlying characteristics of the American mind. Instinctively and universally the result was seen to be good.

The Exposition ended, the once beautiful buildings were broken up or destroyed by fire. The grounds were turned into parks, and the White City became apparently nothing but a glorious memory. Yet, although the body perished, the spirit lived. A little group, made up of those who had labored untiringly to produce so much beauty, determined that they would not willingly allow the idea of monumental building in America to die.

In 1894, the year succeeding the Chicago Fair, they established "The American School of Architecture in Rome," the object being to enable American students of architecture to develop their powers under the most favorable conditions, as to both instruction and surroundings. So certain was the success of the experiment, and so rapid the improvement of the students, that, three years after the foundation of the school, the promoters enlarged its scope to include the allied arts of sculpture and painting. In this way it came about that there was established in Rome an American Academy on the general lines of the French Academy, which since the days of Louis XIV. has trained for France the men who have given direction, unity, and lasting distinction to the art of that nation.

The first home of the American Academy was in the Palazzo Torlonia, and its first director was Mr. Austin W. Lord, of New York City, a member of the firm that has recently won the competition for the new building for the Department of Agriculture in Washington. In 1895, the Academy removed to the Villa dell' Aurora, once a part of the famous Villa Ludovisi, on the Pincian Hill overlooking the Villa Medici, the extensive and commanding quarters of the French Academy. Rising from a terrace elevated some twenty feet above the surrounding streets, the villa stands in the midst of a garden planted with trees after designs by the most celebrated of all landscape architects, Lenôtre.

During the years since its opening, the Academy has been supported by the voluntary gifts of its founders, and the money raised has represented, in the main, the self-sacrifice and devotion of

men in the active pursuit of their professions. Without endowment of its own, the villa has offered its hospitality to the holders of various scholarships, such as in architecture, the Rotch travelling scholarship, Boston; the Columbia travelling scholarship, New York; the travelling scholarship of the University of Pennsylvania; the two scholarships for sculptors under the will of William H. Rhinehart, of Baltimore, and administered by Henry Walters, one of the most liberal and steadfast friends of the Academy; and the scholarship established for the study of mural painting, by Jacob H. Lazarus, under the charge of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

An exhibition held at the American Fine Arts Galleries in New York, during the December of 1896, first attracted public attention to the high quality of the work done by students of the Academy, and proved beyond question the desirability of supporting such a school.

The occasion of founding a school in Rome for the instruction of American artists has been explained. The causes are now to be considered. All great art borrows from the past the larger part of what it gives to the future. In architecture, the work of the individual is confined mainly to adapting to the conditions of his particular problem forms that have already been perfected. His originality is displayed in the selection of a suitable style of architecture and in the adjustment of its forms to the uses to which the particular building is to be put. For example, Thornton and his successors have created in the Capitol at Washington a building at once dignified, beautiful and individual; and yet they have worked in the classical style of architecture. So, too, the Interior and the Treasury Department buildings, following classical models, are recognized as satisfactory; whereas the State, War, and Navy building and the new Post-Office building, in which the architects have attempted originality as to style, already serve as warnings. These considerations become important in the highest degree when one reflects that government buildings are built to last forever; and that, while we deprecate those constructions which belong to an experimental style that has perished, there is always before the public a body of enthusiasts who believe they have discovered new fashions of building that will supersede the architecture of the past. In a few years these geniuses are crowded out by others with still newer fancies; but,

unfortunately, their works live after them to be perpetual monuments of bad taste.

Now, it is the general opinion that, for monumental work, Greece and Rome furnish the styles of architecture best adapted to serve the manifold wants of to-day, not only as to beauty and dignity but also as to utility. Therefore, a school located at Rome, with the requirement that students shall spend a portion of each year in travel in Greece and Italy, offers the student an opportunity to make a thorough acquaintance with both classical models, and also with the models which mark the revival of classicism known as the Renaissance.

In the judgment of the founders of the Academy, it is of the highest importance that the student of art, before starting on his professional career, should study thoroughly in Italy, Sicily, and Greece the typical monuments of antiquity, and such works of the Italian Renaissance as are worthy to be ranked with them. Greece produced the greatest artists of the ancient world; but Rome, during her supremacy, became, and after her fall remained, the great reservoir of Greek art. Furthermore, Rome herself, as a powerful and far-reaching empire, adapted to her varied needs the art she had borrowed, so that the modifications of Greek art have a value to the student only second to that art in its original development.

During the Renaissance, Rome called into her service the artists of all Italy. With their aid, she built the most important church in all Christendom; and on the walls of her buildings were painted the most famous of all frescoes.

To this most fruitful field the governments of France, Spain, Belgium and Germany send their most promising students, to find those advantages for final training that are best fitted for a professional career. Up to this time, the American student has resorted to Paris, there to take at second-hand instruction which may best be obtained from original sources; and the Academy was founded by men who were trained in Paris and who recognized the limitations of their instruction.

At this juncture in the history of the Academy, the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia was ordered to report a plan for the improvement of the entire park system of the District. After consultation with the American Institute of Architects, the commission selected to prepare such a plan was made up of Daniel H. Burnham, of Chicago; Charles F. McKim and

Augustus Saint Gaudens, of New York; and Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., of Brookline, Massachusetts. Mr. Burnham, Mr. McKim and Mr. Saint Gaudens had been intimately associated together in the Chicago work, and they are also promoters and supporters of the Academy, Mr. McKim being its president, and Messrs. Burnham and Saint Gaudens members of the board of trustees. Mr. Olmsted, as assistant to his father, also had part in the work on the World's Fair.

The extensive studies of the Commission led them to recommend a return to the original plan of the city of Washington as prepared, in 1791, by L'Enfant under the direction of President Washington; and, in addition to considering the development of the parks as such, they discussed the whole subject of the location of public buildings, having in view both landscape settings and architectural effect.

The needs of the Government in the way of new buildings are very great. All the Departments are over-crowded, and clerical work is done at a sacrifice of time, comfort and even health. Besides, the Government is paying more than \$200,000 a year in rentals for private buildings occupied in the District of Columbia. Among the projects now before Congress are the extension of the east front of the Capitol; the construction of an office building for the members of the House of Representatives; a new building for the Departments of State and of Justice, and another for the Department of Agriculture; a Hall of Records; new buildings for the National Museum and the Geological Survey; and an independent home for the Supreme Court of the United States, which always has occupied quarters in the Capitol.

The plans already accepted for the Agricultural building, which is to cost \$2,500,000, were prepared by a New York firm of architects, one of the members having been a director of the Academy. The programme of the competition called for the use of the classical style of architecture, that being the style now prescribed for new public buildings throughout the United States by the Supervising Architect of the Treasury. There is universal agreement in Washington that, in the great revival of building about to begin at the national capital, the universal or classical type of architecture shall prevail. It is, therefore, necessary that opportunity be offered to American students to study in detail the architecture of Greece and Rome.

The field for painters and sculptors is only less wide than that for architects. The decorations in the Boston Public Library and the Library of Congress have drawn public attention to mural decoration. Thirty years or more ago, Brumidi decorated the Capitol after the Italian manner; and, whatever else may be said of his work, it is at least a part of the architecture of the building. The opportunities offered by monumental structures, building and to be built, are so numerous that it seems to the founders of the Academy in the highest degree desirable to provide the means for our young men to study mural painting, where that art reached its highest development. It is understood that one of the foremost painters of the country, who is also connected with the Academy, is soon to go to Rome with a commission that it will require three years to complete; and during the time he is making a copy of one of the world's great decorations, he will also direct the work of the students in painting.

In the field of sculpture, the opportunities for public work are increasing constantly. The recent competition for the Grant memorial brought together nearly two score of models, the greater portion of the number having architectural features. Sculptors of the highest reputation were not represented in the competition, as was to be expected; and among the models many were crude in both conception and execution. The award calls for a second competition between the two sculptors who stood first on the list, to settle the question as to whether the ability shown in the sketch would be continued in the completed work. There is not in Washington to-day an important public work of sculpture by either Saint Gaudens or French. Other cities have secured from these sculptors statues of generals and statesmen, while the national capital has its commanding sites occupied by inferior statues of these same heroes, rendered often by political artists.

The bill for the incorporation of the American Academy in Rome, now before Congress, contemplates no more than such an official recognition of the project as shall give to its students the privileges accorded to students of the national academies of other nations; no financial aid is contemplated. The persons named as incorporators are among the leading architects, painters and sculptors; the great universities and technical schools are represented by their presidents; the Secretaries of State and War, the

Librarian of Congress and the Supervising Architect, and a considerable number of men known for their interest in art and art education, have given their countenance and support to the enterprise.

A few weeks ago, the King of Italy sent for the director, Mr. S. A. B. Abbott, and expressed great interest in the idea that the people of the United States were about to place their school on the same financial basis with the French Academy. He asked all manner of questions denoting his sympathy with the project, and offered to attend the exhibitions of student work.

With so much interest, both in this country and in Rome, and with such a strong demand for men of the widest and deepest training, the future of the American Academy in Rome would seem to be assured.

JAMES McMILLAN.

WOMAN AND HER SPHERE.

BY THE DUCHESS OF SUTHERLAND.

"I have been ready to believe that we have even now a new revelation, and the name of its Messiah is Woman."—Oliver Wendell Holmes.

WERE it not for the never silent voices of the past, one might be tempted to imagine that, in common with the Röntgen rays, wireless telegraphy and the Maxim gun, the last decade of the nineteenth century bore the honor of the invention of woman.

Certain it is that round the magic name a mighty whirlwind of argument and pother has arisen. Through the dust of controversy one needs a clear eye to recognize that no petticoated species has suddenly been evolved. Womanhood has worn its halo and carried its stripes throughout the ages; what the poet has glorified, and man—prosaic man—has kissed or kicked, according to circumstances, is in no way metamorphosed. Clad in her robe of contradictions, woman was yesterday the pride or sorrow of our race; she remains the same to-day. The eternal feminine is the eternal feminine still.

Yet, at the dawn of a new century, we cannot be satisfied with these generalizations. To make good our claims in the present, we turn instinctively to the great women among the dead; for often a truer sense of proportion is attained by regarding the reflection of an object rather than the object itself. We grip strongly in our minds the thing that has happened; the thing that is happening may remain elusive.

They stand out singly in their power, those women of yesterday. Joan of Arc and Queen Elizabeth, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, Fanny Kemble, George Sand and George Eliot, Madame de Staël, Mrs. Barrett Browning, Madame de Sévigné and Madame le Brun, Hannah More, Charlotte Brontë, Elizabeth Fry, Rosa Bonheur; in heterogeneous medley the names come tumbling

through my mind. In their several ways all have sat serenely on the lap of Fame. "*Place aux dames*" without a murmur—and with ungrudging eulogy history has acknowledged the justice of the position.

We must, however, discriminate, and note the gulf of characteristics, of years, of countries, that stretches between these names; that has allowed the personality of each to be brought to such exquisite moulding. Undoubtedly, the tendency of the successive epochs with which I am dallying was altogether individualistic. Yet as we draw our minds to the present, we know that all genius unconsciously adapts its manifestation to the need of the race in its particular stage of development. History repeats itself, even if it repeats itself disguised, as it moves events, by the temper of the age. Joan of Arc and Elizabeth Fry are linked closer than the superficial observer might allow. The intelligence of Queen Elizabeth finds its civilized counterpart in our generation.

Society, while fundamentally unchanged, exhibits to-day a different state of affairs to that prevalent in the past. In the minds of men the historic element has declined, to make way for the growth of the modern element of science. Happily, or unhappily, according to opinion, science demands fresh methods of administration. It draws the ever-growing population of the world under its sway, and accomplishes movements and advances, not man by man, but by groups, by parties, by amalgamations. The very nature of our industries, of our trade combinations, of the inclination to congregate in cities—a foremost impulse with the people of the country—proves this. For the individual there can be no leisurely walking to pre-eminence; those who can must crush to the front.

Paradoxical as it may appear, it is to the tune of liberty that the world has been hurried to this fresh captivity. For, undoubtedly, we are in captivity to systems, in spite of the assurance that systems are but the framework of the eternal and ever-expanding idea. Systems, however, especially in their relation to economic and social conditions, have advantages; they cannot allow any portion of life to escape valuation or to evade its use.

We have already seen that a woman here and there in other centuries towered without emulation above the herd of her sex. Now, in its numbers, the whole sex, no longer singing of resigna-

tion behind barred gates, has, through this rearrangement of the world's affairs, been called out for inspection, for inquiry.

The scientific spirit drills humanity by battalions, and judges results in the gross, but demands definition, analysis, precision in terms. As in our museums it labels specimens, in our dictionaries it classifies words, so for the human atom it can accept no general statements. Why are these women, it asks, and for what?

Surely, comes the immediate answer, for motherhood—the power which none can gainsay—motherhood of prophets and kings, motherhood of men. As mother, woman rocks the cradle of all civilization, she sets the commencement of all histories. Like a star upon her brow, she carries the notable moment of the beginning.

Science, however, passes beyond the passionate sentiment of this truth.

“Man is an organism,” it says; “woman, in more refined and subtle form, is an organism likewise. Both, from natural instinct, take their share in the reproduction of the race. But, for mental growth, are woman's chances equal to man's chances? Is her position in harmony with the ideal social state? If not, give her the chances and the position; for to create harmony, to establish a scheme of justice, slowly, but for certain, is my mission.”

And from this command emancipation for the sex has come—emancipation, sudden, perhaps, but inseparable from the law of evolution, and in league with progress, consequently in league with the welfare of society of which the “organic unity is a cardinal principle.”

Just for a little we stand now dizzy with our own importance, uncertain, or too certain, of ourselves.

As we look out at the possibilities that have been accorded us for making headway toward the perfection of the future, there is reason to feel apprehension at the scramble of some venturesome female souls on the ladder of intellectual and political ascent. Adorned as these are by shapeless shirt-waists, indifferent to clearness of complexion and pearly teeth, such apprehensions do not arise from dread of a fell encounter with the tyranny of man; giggling golden-locks below is in full possession of all ammunition for such warfare. But the reflex action of their impetuous conduct upon their own lives is to be dreaded; for conduct does much to determine character, and character is essential to a woman if

she is to be the builder of great things. What we are, not what we do, leaves the graven letters upon the stone.

Seriously, in considering the relative position of men and women in public life, one cannot cast reflection upon the enlightened man's attitude toward the enlightened woman. It is a shock for him, undoubtedly, when a few years ago, as we reckon time, she had no status in his calculations beyond the pleasing attraction of a plaything, to find now at his side a host of women claiming in calm determination equality of brain and muscle and opportunity with himself. But he has borne the shock well, and it is probable that he is perfectly ready to offer to the women who convince his reason of the value of their work a willing co-operation.

Now that we may speak our mind, let us declare that a world of men can no more be imagined than a world of women; for after all there is so little difference in their relative importance to the community. The combination of their varied faculties is the only condition within the range of fancy. The childish squabble, "You can't have this and I will have that," between the unreasonable representatives of the sexes, is puerile in the extreme.

There is an old story,* the Japanese myth of creation, of how Izananni and Izanigi, the Adam and Eve of the Land of the Rising Sun, stood upon the floating bridge of heaven, the rainbow. Izananni brought up from the bottom of the sea, with his coral pointed spear, the material of which he formed the first dry land. Descending with his consort Izanigi, they set out right and left to make the tour of the island. They met, and the goddess, speaking first, cried: "How delightful to encounter a beauteous male!" But at this Izananni took offence, for he thought it unbecoming that the female should speak first; so they made the circuit a second time, and when they met again Izananni said, before Izanigi could speak: "How pleasant, indeed, to meet a lovely woman!" Thus both were satisfied. Somewhat in the same infantile spirit, if not in the same civil manner, is the war between the extremes of both sexes conducted at the present day.

But in truth, in a matter of so much moment, the extremes may not be considered. To teach the imperfect sex to say "we," as the little organ blower taught the organist to say it when each learnt that neither could make music without the other, is, to my

* "Sunrise Stories"

mind, woman's greatest mission. To ridicule passion or to despise the lover is unnatural and absurd; but to establish a true comradeship between the sexes is the highest purpose of life; yet is development so slow that only a portion of mankind and of womankind have learnt this secret of existence.

On a summer afternoon, from the breezy hill-side above a bay in the Western Highlands, is to be seen, meandering among the brown rocks, the strong silvery current of a river running to the sea. Presently, the tide rises to meet the river; and in time rocks and sand have disappeared under one sheet of water, whether salt or fresh one cannot tell. Its waves break with equal strength along the coast. To me such a scene is allegorical of the forces of life. The waters mingle, as the forces wielded by the hands and the hearts of men and women are united in one effort after one object.

Women are not meant to be fanatics, but rather to make fanatics of men. The sight of a mob or army of men who, thrilled by sudden emotion, sweep on to some goal, be it good or bad, brings to the onlooker a flush upon the cheek, a quickened throb to the pulse. A mass of women moved to enthusiasm or frenzy by the same circumstances awake no feeling but regret. Without her frame or environment, woman, as the unset diamond, fails to impress. She needs to be appraised sitting by her writing-table—holding, even as she talks, the book that she reads, the children of her home perhaps clinging to her knee.

To turn to the practical from the sentimental side of the matter, we realize that women are at present somewhat retarding things, for themselves and all the world, by a lack of discipline. Released from petty restraint, they occasionally overlook the fact that they must govern themselves. This is especially necessary for the woman with the largest sphere of influence, with the best administrative capacity. Before such an one knows it, great responsibilities slip into her hands. Tacitly, she is given the shaping of characters, the guiding of careers. To a few women this fact is ennobling beyond measure; to others it brings a sudden intoxication which is gravely unbalancing.

Man is by nature a philosopher; woman becomes one only by education. She forgets too often that to be ready to obey is a mark of strength; and she shipwrecks herself, in a sudden sense of superiority, on trifles and side issues. She has yet to learn that

it is best to beware of "glorie or fame," which Montaigne calls that "vain image and idly simple voice which hath neither body nor hold-fast," best to refrain from battering against barred doors. Barred doors will be barred no longer when she has swept and garnished the many empty rooms leading to their approach, and which cry to her, as she rushes by, to make them in their emptiness habitable.

It is difficult, I know, to allocate to all ambitious women in public life their proper sphere. In fairness it must be granted that a woman, in spite of her avowed liberty, starts life under a disadvantage. She is harassed by trifles and conventionalities which a man escapes. There are certain expectations of a woman which hold without much reason to the general conception of her nature. She should be at the beck and call of all who have need—wide-eyed with sympathy and without complaint. She dare not beg the leisure a man commands, and is accorded solitude grudgingly, her very security of self becoming insecure.

It is, however, imperative that women should recognize this age as essentially one of preparation for the sex, rather than achievement. The natural powers of the average female mind are certainly equal, if not superior, to the average man's. Robert Louis Stevenson wrote his belief that there is something more substantive about a woman than ever there can be about a man. But so long a start have men obtained in freedom, and in consequent development, that opinion yields them a false superiority. Woman, like a butterfly emerging from the chrysalis, has wings at last, and latent strength to enable her to fly at will, but for a period she must wait for fuller growth. In this waiting, she comes to the possession of her own soul and finds, as Carlyle puts it, "by study of herself the ground she stands on, what her combined inward and outward capability specially is."

Above all education is needed self-knowledge. Self-knowledge will reveal "the spirit of the race, the almighty will of life." It will give calmness to look round, and temper strong persuasions with a weakness for weakness, and leisure to cultivate that saving grace, a sense of humor. Cultivate, did I say? The gift of the gods comes not by cultivation; still, what a glorious addition to the sum of life will be the emancipated woman with a sense of humor!

It is, perhaps, hard for us to be patient; to know that not to

us, but to our children, and to our children's children will come attainment, that *we*, mentally and physically, must train ourselves that *they* may have the full and perfect life. With few exceptions we have no heritage of superlative health or nervous energy to uphold us. Our mothers belonged wholly to the *ancien régime*, and we must see to it that we strengthen, not squander, the faint physical forces which they supplied us with, for the body must support bravely the vigor of the mind.

Still, to be able to foresee, to know that the best and highest must ultimately be bequeathed by us to the coming woman, that in itself brings courage.

Courage is no mean quality to desire when we gaze at the multitude of women streaming, unchecked at last, through the open gates of opportunity. The wise ones walk with wary footsteps, ready in faith and humility to take up the allotted task; the shrieking band of ignoramuses, exorbitant in demands and unfit in capacity, tear past; and around and behind them everywhere the multitude of haggard, anxious women of our industrial classes sweep into the toil and turmoil of offices and factories. These accept in payment the pittance called wages, and evade inspection and advice from sheer terror of having an hour's labor curtailed or losing in any manner a weekly sixpence.

The serious part of the whole question is, that for many working women in the middle and lower classes emancipation is still so spurious an affair. They have freedom to work, that is about all; and the evils attendant upon over-pressure dog their every footstep. The middle-class women who hold important public posts as clerks, telegraphists, teachers, etc., have the hardest task. They know and understand, and yet they have neither time nor health to act upon their convictions. They may ride a bicycle if they can afford to hire one, but they can count on no support if they ask for higher salaries and shorter hours. Their freedom still resolves itself into authorized slavery. For the lower-class woman, matters are different, but no better. The working man in the same position reads, thinks, debates—he sees the possibility of becoming a man of mark. But the woman beside him is still rudderless; her untrained mind cannot grasp the meaning of the companionship he needs, her intellectual status is still appallingly low. One is haunted by the fear that, till women in the upper strata of society are united in letting their best influence filter

through to the strata of varying grades below them, there is little gain for the sex as a whole. As things are at present, the aspect of our manufacturing cities, with their women's and child's labor, is no pleasing one.

Good it is that we can look beyond. The battle strews the field with dead, but the ultimate victory is not jeopardized. We, who tramp shivering at our experiences along the road of progress, know that at every step we march nearer the light. Through all these thoughts runs the fire of a larger hope, that upon our acknowledged virtues we may learn to graft the greater virtues; not, indeed, stolen from men, but absorbed from Him who has stamped all humanity with His likeness; the Silent Power controlling the spirit of every age, Who waits, even as we cry for immediate satisfaction, for grand fulfilment in the hereafter.

God is just, we say—science craves for justice—justice, that noble preceptor of love. When women emerging from prejudices come to the understanding of justice, then at last and for ever will be established the universal motherhood, the universal sisterhood, bearing for the women who toil in the valleys and for those who tread the mountains the same watchword—a watchword that, in glorious rhythm, will silence the yapping of industrial and class strife.

So moves the world, illuminating, as it becomes diviner, its own problems, divulging its own secrets, till at last on the great tree of life no branches may be stunted, no leaves withered, no flowers decayed.

MILLICENT SUTHERLAND.

THE SITUATION IN SPAIN.

BY SYDNEY BROOKS.

LAST February Doña Maria Christina held her last reception as Queen-Regent of Spain; this month the boy King comes definitely into his own. By the side of the coronation of King Edward VII., the forth-coming accession of Alphonso XIII. has been but little thought of, but then an exact sense of proportion is not humanity's strongest point. The first is a spectacle, and therefore pleasing to the many; the second a political event of interest to the few. The Regency has lasted for sixteen years; and, as is usual with most Regencies, it has not been over-successful. It has, indeed, preserved internal peace. It has also preserved the throne. Such as they are, these are no inconsiderable achievements; there were few who would have thought them possible on the morrow of Alphonso XII.'s death. But during the Regency almost the last, certainly the most precious, parts of the Spanish empire have been lost to the crown by the fortune of war; and beneath a seeming tranquillity ominous forces are at work in the kingdom.

For better or worse Spain lies somewhat outside the activities of "our own correspondent," and the telegrams despatched from Madrid to Europe and America reflect either the views of a severely-censured press, or the frigid circumspection of the Court, or the optimism of officialdom. Madrid is even less representative of Spain than is New York of America, and the journalists who follow the Court from the capital to San Sebastian and back again are hardly nearer to the heart and realities of Spain than is the Fifth Avenue *flâneur* to Kansas. The outside world, indeed, has to be content with such knowledge of the life of the Peninsula from day to day as the Ministers at Madrid think it well to impart. We hear, accordingly, every few months, of Carlist plots and risings, and of the immense activity the Govern-

ment displays in circumventing and suppressing them. The telegraph wires hum with the proofs of official vigilance and resolution; clubs are raided; Carlist noblemen are arrested and their houses honored by "domiciliary visits"; papers are seized and martial law proclaimed. Also, Europe is impressed. But in Spain these periodic disturbances produce no excitement. You will hear it pretty openly hinted that, as often as not, they are engineered by the Government for the purpose of strengthening its position, and that Ministers deliberately exaggerate them for the pleasure of posing afterwards as the strong and patriotic preservers of order. Or they are quietly written down as a speculative manœuvre to depreciate values, and some frankly cynical considerations are offered to the inquirer to explain the connivance of the politicians. But, however flimsy their foundation, the details of these movements and of the heroic energy of officialdom in crushing them are laboriously telegraphed abroad, while of the events that really count little or nothing is said. How many people outside Spain could, for instance, give an accurate account of that extraordinary resistance to the payment of the national taxes which Catalonia has maintained these three years and more? How many know that not once nor twice the wealthiest and most progressive province of Spain has hissed its own national anthem, and greeted the Marseillaise with cheer upon cheer? How many, again, are aware that the much-heralded tour of the young King two summers ago through the northern districts had to be abruptly broken off, so cool and "mixed" was the welcome offered in the first few towns he visited? These are the matters that signify, but of them the outside world is held in ignorance. Instead, we are regaled with full accounts of a police raid on the house of a Carlist Duke and the triumphal arrest of his *concierge*. But though the larger movements of disaffection are left unchronicled, the indefatigable Reuter serves up with some fulness small and localized incidents, and of these, too, there has been enough during the past few years to warrant disquietude. Ever since the Treaty of Paris put an end to the one-sided conflict with the United States, Spain has been in a state of troublous unrest. Barely a week has gone by without its record of riots and random shootings, of violent strikes, of cities in a state of siege, of the constitutional guarantees suspended in province after province. The capital itself has more than once been placed under martial

law. It needed a significant hint from the Military Governor of Madrid to enable the marriage of the Princess of Asturias to pass off quietly. Within the last two years, five towns, including Madrid, have seen their streets overrun with anti-Jesuit mobs, bent on convent-sacking. Catalonia has hardly known a month of industrial peace, and from all over the country come reports of demonstrations against the octroi duties, against the detested but all-powerful priesthood, against the payment of national taxes. Is the gathering ferment of the last twenty years at length about to burst? Will the young King find himself before long on a throne shaken by revolution?

The question is not fantastic, nor is its answer so necessarily and decisively in the negative as one could wish. There are in Spain, as Canovas saw and said, many, if not most, of the signs of impending revolution. Constitutionalism has proved a farce in times of peace and an equally ruinous tragedy in times of war. From the first it was unsuited to the Spanish temperament, which has never yet been satisfied for long with any half-way house between Autocracy and Republicanism. Misgovernment and demoralization are its fruits. "There are no politics in politics," said an American statesman, and the epigram holds as good for Spain as for the United States. Spanish politics begin and end with the question of spoils. The parties that call themselves "Liberals" and "Conservatives" have no principles whatever except the principle of allowing one another a reasonable turn in office. The elections, so far from being a test of public opinion, are the nullification of it. The average Spaniard rarely takes the trouble to vote at all. If a man of education and breeding, he looks on the politicians much as a New York Mugwump regards a Tammany Alderman. If a peasant or small trader, he is apt, like the Italian *contadino*, to think of the suffrage as a trick invented by the police to get him into trouble. Government is a matter of arrangement and contract between the ins and the outs. The Premier decides before an election just how many seats he will require in the new Cortes. The *caciques*, who come nearer to the American Boss than any other product of political Europe, see to it that the required number is always forth-coming. The rest are distributed impartially and according to agreement among the different factions of the Opposition. Negotiations on this momentous point are carried on quite openly, usually

through the medium of the Minister of the Interior, and their results are published from day to day in the Madrid press as a matter of course. The Premier is thus in the happy position of knowing just how he will stand in the new Cortes long before the electors have been approached. It is the function, or one of the functions, of the *caciques* to see that the people do not disturb the Premier's calculations by any inordinate desire to vote. Their methods are the familiar Tammany methods of fraud, repeating, personation and bulldozing. No Spanish government has yet failed in its appeal to the country, and none ever will so long as the wire-pullers stuff ballot-boxes, and marshal "repeaters," and bring dead men up to vote on a hint from headquarters. Constitutionalism, as practised in the Peninsula, is really nothing but an organized assault on the pockets of the people. The country is "run" by a few thousands of professional politicians who are "in politics" for what they can make out of it. Imagine New York as it was under "Boss" Tweed, and apply his system of government to the army and navy and to every detail of national and municipal administration, and one gets no exaggerated picture of Spain's present condition. The country may serve as an extreme instance of the evil which has flowed from England's success in administering the Parliamentary and Constitutional system. From about 1780 to 1870, Europe was possessed with an almost maniacal admiration for the British constitution. The most diverse countries—countries just emerging, like Italy, from political slavery, countries that had never known and never cared to know anything but the direct rulership of a single head,—copied or transplanted the British system, not because it suited their instincts, but simply because it was the mode and stood for "progress," and was supposed to be the last word in the art and science of politics. In no land has this indiscriminate homage had worse results than in Spain.

It is possible to conceive of an ill-fitting national system being neutralized, in part, at any rate, by a healthy development of local self-government, but Spain is denied this loophole. It is curious to note how all the Latin peoples, as we somewhat unscientifically call them, have tried to combine constitutionalism with the highly centralized form of administration—in response, probably, to their instinct for precision and synthetic arrangements and focussed authority. The two are incompatible in

spirit, and in neither France nor Italy has the attempt to work them together proved a success. In Spain, if constitutionalism may fairly be said to have degenerated into a conspiracy against the people, the centralized administrative system may also and with equal fairness be labelled the handmaid to its viciousness. The Premier of the moment controls not only all the great offices of state, but every mayoralty, prefecture, collectorship, in the land. "If a change of Government has been deemed expedient, a clean sweep is made of all existing officials, from the Governor of a Province and the mayor of a city to a messenger in a Government office and the road-mender of a municipality." The country, in consequence, is flooded with carpet-baggers from Madrid, whose notion of their official duties is the making of hay while the sun shines. Their tenure is precarious at best; none of them knows when another "ministerial crisis" may not supervene; their salaries are small and, as a rule, in arrears; they must plunder to live. And plunder they do. It is mainly their depredations that have given point to the cry for home rule first raised in Catalonia. Spain, one must always bear in mind, is little more composite than Austria. It is a congeries of races and provinces that have never wholly fused. There are no Spaniards in the sense in which there are Frenchmen or even Americans. There are Catalans, and Basques, and Aragonese, and Andalusians, and Castilians, and so on, each of them intensely proud of his narrower fatherland, its dialect, its laws, its old traditions. Up to the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, the provinces were virtually autonomous. They held fast to the rights and privileges and customs they had grown used to as independent states; and their cry for home rule to-day takes the form of a demand for the restitution of their ancient *fueros*.

The demand is not merely one of sentiment. Like all the questions that really come home to the Spaniards, it has a very practical and businesslike side to it. Centralization spells carpet-bag government carried on for the benefit of the "aliens" of Madrid, home rule, or regionalism, to give it its Spanish name, implies not only the administration of a province by the natives of that province, but honest and economical administration. No province has suffered more from the harpies that flock from the capital than Catalonia, the wealthiest, most industrious, and most democratic portion of the peninsula. The Catalans are more Pro-

vençal than Castilian in speech and character and instinctive ways of looking at things. Though only one-tenth of the whole population, they are the mainstay of the Spanish treasury, contributing to it nearly a quarter of the taxes raised from the entire country. Yet their interests are wholly neglected by the Central Government, and their province is over-run with needy office-holders who fatten upon their industries, pocket a large percentage of the taxes and give them in return a government which they could conduct far more cheaply and far more efficiently themselves. Plundered by these political spoilers, with seventy per cent. of the colonial trade which was their stand-by swept away by the war with America, the Catalans are strongly disaffected to Madrid rule. For many months in 1899 they were in a state of passive rebellion, refusing to pay taxes unless local autonomy were granted and a real effort made towards retrenchment and reform. A movement has even sprung up amongst them for separation from Spain and annexation to France. But the politicians seem to have learnt nothing from the war. The heedlessness they once showed to the Cubans they now display towards their own countrymen; and they have their reward in the hostility of the trading and commercial classes and the total alienation of the peasantry.

The Carlists are the least of the dangers that threaten the Alphonsist dynasty, though it suits the powers at Madrid to pretend they are still a formidable rival. Carlism, indeed, has ceased to be a cause and sunk into a mere cult. From thirty to fifty years ago, Europe had a semi-Byronic attachment for the fortunes of the Legitimists. The hero of the novels of the period had usually done a little fighting for the Carlists; the heroine was not infrequently a nurse in the Carlist service. Something of romance and aristocratic flavor hung round the banner of the Pretender. It was the gentlemanly and high-bred thing to be a subscriber to the Carlist funds, and whenever the Pretenders took the field they could always rely on the active support of English and Continental free-lances of birth and standing. All this has now vanished; the nobility have outgrown their whim, and Carlism, like everything else, has fallen under the grip of speculators, religious and financial. These, with a muster of Spanish grantees, make up the elements that now compose Don Carlos's "Court," and a very curious sight they offer to one who chances

upon them on the Continent—the dull face and overgrown figure of the Pretender, and, hovering around him, now a soft-footed, obsequious priest, now a courtly Spanish nobleman, now a flashy be-diamonded “financier” of Semitic origin and usually French nationality. It is more interesting to come across than the rowdy *entourage* of the Duc d’Orléans, and outwardly, at any rate, more respectable, but so far as political value goes, there is little to choose between the two. Within the last thirty years, the world has travelled far from Carlism. Compare the strength of the cause now with what it was in 1870, when the last invasion of Spain was being organized, and one sees its hopelessness. In the seventies Carlism was a vigorous fighting force. Its coffers were filled with the offerings of the Mendicant Friars of Manila, and the bulk of the Spanish clergy were warm and active in its support. Spain at the time had practically no regular army to oppose the invaders, while the Carlists had at their disposal European officers of repute and a well-equipped and determined army. France, too, was more than friendly, gave money and arms, and complacently looked another way while Don Carlos made his preparations on French soil; and directly he was over the border, the sturdy peasantry of the Basque provinces and Navarre sprang to a man round the old standard. If he failed then, with all this in his favor, he is hardly likely to succeed now. The Pope, who always recognizes facts, when the unity of Italy is not one of them, has rallied the Church to the Alphonsists, and very few of the higher clergy in Spain now dare to proclaim themselves Carlists. Still less do they venture to proselytize in the Legitimist interests. The day when every priest in the Peninsula mounted sentinel for the Pretender is past. Moreover, the exchequer is empty. The Philippine friars are now mendicants indeed, and cannot spare a peseda. The Government, too, has at least 100,000 veterans at its call, and Bismarck’s efforts to include Spain in the Triple Alliance, as well as the extensive holdings of her people in Spanish securities, have converted France into an upholder of the existing dynasty. The next Carlist revolt, if there ever is another, will not have the same number of jumping-off grounds to choose from. There has also been a change in Spain itself. The mountaineers of the north are still, no doubt, passive sympathizers with the old cause, but of late years the development of their railroads and mines has given them something

else to think of. Don Carlos made frantic efforts during and immediately after the Spanish-American war to turn some of the sentimental interest in Carlism into solid cash. Titles and honors and concessions were promised without stint, and the Pretender practically mortgaged the present and prospective resources of his country up to the hilt. But none of the big capitalists of London or Paris was to be caught, and the Legitimist exchequer is still far from the point where it could hope to finance a revolution. Indeed, if one were to say that Carlism commands the latent but quite inactive sympathies of one-twelfth of Spain—and that twelfth the poorest and most ignorant—one would be putting its prospects in an ultra-favorable light.

Politically, the cause of the Legitimists stands, briefly, for autocracy tempered by a revival of the old Spanish Cortes on the basis of representation by classes. It stands, too, for a very militant and reactionary Catholicism. But neither the divine right of kings nor the temporal power of the Church is a cause for which men will fight nowadays. What, apart from sentiment, gives Carlism such strength as it possesses is its support of the principle of decentralization and provincial home rule. This, however, though a much-desired reform, is one that even Catalonia would not purchase at the price of civil war with Carlism for its aftermath. We are told, but then we are always being told something of the kind, that the Carlists intend to mark the accession of Alphonso XIII. by an explosive *coup*, and that, to give an extra fillip to the enthusiasm of the rank and file, Don Carlos will resign in favor of his son, Don Jaime of Bourbon. Don Jaime is a lieutenant in the Russian army, which thus possesses in its ranks two aspirants to European thrones, Prince Louis Napoleon being the other. Don Jaime took part in the Manchurian expedition of 1900, and is understood to be an ardent soldier. He has so far made only one public utterance on Spanish affairs, in March, 1901. "I shall soon," he said, "leave the Russian army to play the rôle reserved for me by events, but while I wear the Russian uniform I shall have nothing to do with politics. I follow Spanish affairs not as a mere spectator, but as one who at a given moment may be called personally to take part in them." Confident words, but they arouse no echo in Spain. If Carlism could attract to itself the social and industrial discontent of the masses, if it were thought by the merchants

and traders to hold out the promise of better and cheaper government, it might yet have a chance. As it is, I do not think a careful judgment can pronounce it other than a movement impotent in itself and for its own purposes, and yet capable, in the event of a general *émeute*, of doing a certain amount of damage.

Nor, from the point of view of a possible revolution, are the Republicans, as a political party, to be taken much more seriously. They have an organization; and, like all Spaniards, they can and do make speeches of suffocating eloquence. They are also allowed a few seats in the Cortes and from the mouths of some of them are heard occasionally the real sentiments of the silent, toiling, hopeless masses. But even if their leaders were as united as they are discordant and factious, and even if they had command of the necessary funds, there would still remain the question, What chance is there of a *political* revolution in Spain? Is such a thing possible? By a political revolution one means, of course, an agitation conducted peaceably, by constitutional means, through the press, from the platform, at the hustings, gathering support among the electors, and sending to the national Parliament representatives to press and insist upon and finally to carry the programme of reform. Of this, or anything like it, there is no hope in Spain, not only because the professional politicians have turned the whole fabric of constitutionalism into a fraud, but because the people themselves have neither the inclination nor the intelligence for a campaign of that kind. For its successful working, the democratic system asks public spirit, a leisured class, or, as in Germany, a strong and capable bureaucracy, and intelligence. And the first of these prerequisites is intelligence. But in Spain there is no more public spirit than there is in Tammany Hall; Spanish patriotism, like Spanish budgets, is a thing to mouth over, an exercise in oratorical legerdemain, not an impulse that forces men to do something, sacrifice something, for their country; while as for intelligence, the census discloses the dismal fact that seven-tenths of the people of Spain can neither read nor write. Those who know the Peninsula are aware that this astounding fact, hardly to be paralleled in any other civilized country unless it be in Southern Italy or parts of Russia, reveals only half the truth. The education of the three-tenths who can read and write is of the most meagre and scattered description. The whole weight of the Church is brought openly into play for

the repression of knowledge; and to have graduated at a Spanish university carries with it to-day as small an implication of culture, or even of ordinary information, as attached forty years ago to a degree in an Ohio college. The most casual traveller in Spain must have noticed the extraordinary ignorance of modern languages and contemporary history that obtains even among the well-to-do. The Cortes focusses this ignorance, just as it focusses the oratorical phosphorescence, and that curious deficiency in what we know as the virtues of common-sense that goes with it. Politically, the sixteen millions of illiterates are helpless, and being helpless, seeing that their needs and desires are passed over in the Cortes, knowing that their votes, when they vote at all, weigh for nothing against the machinations of the wire-pullers, they have come to lose all individual interest in affairs of state. Their one desire is to be let alone in peace, and to make enough money to keep themselves and their families alive. A profound scepticism of their public men and institutions, such as one notices among the Italian peasants and to some extent among the middle classes of France, pervades and demoralizes them. But the idea of reform by argument and popular agitation is one that bitter experience has driven out of the Peninsula. It is not the Spanish way of doing things; it is never the illiterate way of doing things. When taxation, misgovernment or business stagnation reaches the unendurable, a scapegoat is looked for, there is a blind rising, conflicts with the civil guards, rioting, a little sacking, possibly a murder or two. Illiteracy knows of no weapon but force, and to the Spaniards a revolution is inseparable from the bullet and the knife.

The real danger that threatens the dynasty is less political than economic. The people at best are sullenly disaffected, and under whatever fiction of constitutionalism are, as a matter of fact, kept down by force. They believe, rightly or wrongly, that things have reached such a pass that no Spaniard can honestly become rich, and that is the sort of belief that makes for revolution. The idea of impersonal, even-handed justice between man and man, rich and poor, has vanished from their consciousness. Have they not seen their sons and brothers snatched over-sea to the Cuban and Philippine shambles, while the rich man's son, armed with a medical certificate or by paying a small exemption fee, escaped? Do they not know that, thanks to the complaisance

of the tax-collector towards the well-to-do, the brunt of taxation falls on their small earnings? In Spain, as in Austria, a hundred cumbrous regulations strangle commercial development; and it is the petty trader, the small farmer and artisan, who feels them most. Under businesslike management, the Peninsula, with its rich soil, its great deposits of iron, copper and lead and its magnificent climate, might be made the most prosperous of countries. As things are, the traveller is oppressed, as in Ireland, with a surrounding sense of poverty and sordid struggle. Taxation grows heavier and more obnoxious; and yet the national revenue little more than suffices to cover the annual interest on the debt. The colonial trade, if artificial, was large and gave employment to many thousands. If the loss of it—for in a few years it threatens to be no greater than Russia's trade with Morocco—means that Spain will turn her attention to her internal resources, it may yet prove a blessing in disguise. Meanwhile, it is hurrying on an industrial crisis in the many trades that flourished on their exports to the West Indies and the Philippines. Some 250,000 soldiers have been brought home, the officers to be a charge on the Civil List, the men to swarm into the already over-crowded labor market; and every village in the land has learned from their lips the shameful tale of official corruption and neglect.

Nor has the dynasty managed to win that personal popularity which is one of the best guarantees of security a monarchy can enjoy. The Queen-Regent is an alien and has never caught, never perhaps made much effort to catch, the Spanish note. The Spaniards as a nation suspect foreigners; they like dash and brilliancy in their rulers, and the Queen's tastes run to thrift and a quiet fireside; they look for pageantry and splendor and a brave hospitality in their Court and complain that *la Señora* has presided over it as though it were a model German household of the middle classes. For the Queen's domestic virtues and accomplishments, which are cast in rather an austere mould, they have "respect," but they do not warm to them. Somehow or other, Her Majesty has not been able to win the affections of her impressionable subjects. She has seemed at times even to emphasize her foreign birth by frowning on bull-fights and other national amusements, and by keeping herself and her children deliberately aloof from the common pleasures of the people. No monarch can do

this with impunity, least of all in Spain. Of the boy King his subjects know nothing, except that he is studious and sickly. His father died of consumption, and the ill-health of Alphonso XIII. is, therefore, of sinister moment. To the masses he is a mere symbol, having been reared in a thoroughly un-Spanish, though perhaps necessary, seclusion. But the dynasty has made political as well as personal mistakes. It has allied itself with the Church and allowed priestly power to grow, until the people have been goaded into outbreaks, which even their unquestioning faith in its superhuman attributes could not restrain. Reactionary where it is not revolutionary, the Church in Spain has been equally the foe of progress, order, and intelligence. The immunities it now enjoys, collectively and individually, from the operation of the civil law and from the taxes that fall all the more heavily on the lay majority, its control of education, the rapid multiplication of monasteries, convents, and Jesuit seminaries, its influence at the Court, in politics, and in the domestic life of the people, are beginning to bear the usual fruits of untempered liberty. Were a twentieth-century Luther to arise in Spain, he would find in the corruptions of the Church and in the lives of but too many of the priesthood the storm-signals of a coming crisis. It has been the policy of the Queen-Regent to wean the Church from Carlism by restoring to it most of the powers and privileges it enjoyed under Queen Isabella; and the marriage last year of the Princess of Asturias, the heir presumptive to the throne, to Don Carlos de Bourbon, a son of an avowed and militant Carlist, put the coping-stone on her many efforts to this end. The marriage was bitterly resented by the masses as a token of the reactionary policy which the dynasty thinks essential to its security, and but for the promptitude of General Weyler, who turned Madrid into an armed camp, popular violence would have stopped it. A régime of theoretic Carlism is a prospect which, as they unmistakably showed, does not appeal to the Spaniards of to-day. Were it to become, as by the death of the King without issue it would become, something more than a prospect, the gravest apprehensions could not be resisted. And apart from this, apart from the unlucky fact that Alphonso is the thirteenth of his name, the dynasty has antagonized the thinking and resolute elements in Spain by allying its fortunes with those of the Liberal party, the most discredited of the many discredited factions whose wranglings

fill the columns of the Spanish press. What gives all this its significance, and really puts it in the right focus, is the fact that by Spanish constitutional practice, it is not upon the Ministers but upon the Monarch that revolution converges. The history of the Peninsula during the past hundred years shows that it is always the ruler who is made the scapegoat and not his advisers. "The King can do no wrong," a fiction that is half the basis of true Constitutionalism, has never found acceptance in Spain—one more proof, if proof were needed, that the Spaniards have not the root of the Parliamentary system in them.

The visitor to Spain, then, finds a country where the dynasty is divorced from popular affections, where placemen and windy politicians have turned the whole governmental framework into a means for private plunder, where trade is dwindling, where the inarticulate masses are sullenly antipathetic, and where the captains of commerce and industry are openly and implacably hostile. Hardly one of the signs of an upheaval is wanting. The determination to be relieved at any and every cost from the incubus of corruption and inefficiency and make-believe, is one that has taken firm hold of all that is vigorous and progressive in the Peninsula. On what support can the dynasty count? The easy-going Andalusian gives it his backing for what it is worth; Castile and Madrid, of course, are on its side, as well as the majority of the clergy and the deputies and office-seekers who fatten upon its fruits. The nobility is divided, but where it is not Carlist it is Alphonsist. These, however, are not the vital elements. The fate of Spain at any real crisis lies in the hands of her generals. It is the Army that is the decisive factor. And in this connection one must remember that Spain is the land of the *pronunciamiento*, that a few capable officers have more than once, within recent years, upset dynasties and introduced and imposed upon the people new forms of government. Taking actual stock of the situation as it is to-day, one finds that the Army is for the moment summed up in the person of General Weyler, its real as well as its titular head. It is not too much to say that he is the master of the situation as no man has been in Spain since the days of Marshal Prim. He has wealth and energy; unlike most Spaniards, he talks little and works hard; a wiry, secretive, enigmatic man, of whom more and more people are beginning to speak as the future savior of his country. Many

things more surprising may happen than a whiff of grape-shot in the streets of Madrid, a second flight of the Bourbons, and the appearance of General Weyler as dictator in chief. The man on horseback, it is easily said, is only a temporary solution, but the axiom is not universal. If, as the result of the *pronunciamiento*, there could be evolved a quasi-military Republic, strong enough to enforce order and to stop any such riot of license as followed the proclamation of the Republic of 1875, pledged to provincial autonomy and zealous in the things of material development, it might prove for Spain the beginnings of a real and lasting *risorgimento*. It is, at all events, hard to see through what other channel regeneration is to make headway. Efficiency, to fulfil its mission, must be prepared now and then to play the tyrant. But, whatever happens, it is worth insisting that Spain is and must always remain an essential member of the European family. Europe, in spite of the common phrase, does not end at the Pyrenees; and Spain, with her stake in Morocco, her holdings in and off the coast of Africa, and her command of one side of a mountain range, the neutrality of which is worth an army corps to France, may still have before her a vital part to play in the politics of Europe. Her development has been peculiar, but not hopelessly so. The truth seems to be that in spite of the chronic disorders of the last seventy years, Spain has never been reorganized. Alone among the countries of Europe, she remains practically unaffected by the two greatest movements of modern times, the Reformation and the French Revolution. For three hundred years, she has done little but mark time and live in the past to which she mentally belongs. The upheaval must come sooner or later, and there is much to make one think it will not be long deferred. In whatever form she emerges from the crisis that is closing in upon her—whether under the Carlists, or under the present dynasty, or as a confederation of Republics presided over either by a monarchy or a military dictatorship—really matters less than that she should have to face no crisis at all. The reason is simple. There is some hope in revolution; there is none whatever in stagnation.

SYDNEY BROOKS.

A HYMN TO THE SEA.

BY AMÉLIE RIVES.

O MIGHTY One, thou who art friend of Death,
And yet no enemy to piteous Life
But rather her consoler; thou whose breath,
Brimming the vasty shell of heaven with strife,
Doth take the Pleiads by their golden hair,
Yet o'er a fragile globe of silver-seed
So delicately wingeth, that nowhere
Its symmetry is marred; thou who dost feed
The restless soul with restlessness, the heart
That longs for peace with that hushed spirit of peace
Which, from the birth of time hath moved apart
Over thy moon-ruled waters;—O release
From sorrow's selfishness my aching soul,
And with thy healing chant my broken heart make whole!

Scorner of moderation and control
Save when One draws thee toward her starry throne;
Titan, content with solitude; free soul
Of this bound earth; thou who hast spells alone
To make of grief a thing as fair as night;
What is thy message unto such as me—
Those who by Love are mocked for loving Right?
Hast thou no stilly cave lit solemnly
By the reflected beauty of thy Queen,
Thine unattainable, ideal love?
No grotto of white coral veiled with sheen
Of purple sea-weed, in the calm whereof
I might lie down and take my fill of sleep,
Even as thou dost of loneliness, O godlike deep?

Thou who didst take wild Sappho to thy breast,
And smooth her glorious hair to maiden meekness,
And kiss her cool, pale lids to lovely rest,
Surely unto her handmaids, strong with weakness
To crave of thee surcease, thou wouldst be kind—
Yea, to the least of them, even unto me—
O sure Magician of tired souls and blind?
Lo, I can feel thee drawing me to thee
Even as thyself art by Seléné drawn,
The while fair Tethys, with the certain smile
Of wives and goddesses, reigns calmly on
O'er all but thy vast tides. A weary while,
A weary while have I been caged of fate;
Free now my ready soul, ere freedom be too late!

Yet should I fare to thy green-gloomèd realm,
I pray thee leave me to my loneliness,
Nor her of the violet eyes that overwhelm,
The drenched gold ringlets and the sleek gold dress,
Anadyoméné, thy loveliest child,
Permit to gaze on me in curious wise;
On me, who by dark sorrow am beguiled
From all things lovely. Nor in Nerëid guise
Let thou the passionate Lesbian's flame-white ghost
Vex me with eyes that recollect delight,
Since I am one of those who at the most
Desire no memories, only sleep and night.
Wrap me in quietude as in a shroud,
And lay me where thine organ voice swells not too loud.

Alas! alas! that selfishness of woe,
Against the which I did invoke thy power,
Filleth my heart with longings whereunto
I may not worthily attend. No hour
So brimmed with misery that we may not add
Some drops of wisdom and of courage true;
No tide of thine so full, but that the glad,
Cool-fingered Hersè, bringer of the dew,
May from her starry urn of silver glass

Upon thy bitterest wave sweet moisture pour.
Thy darkest depth hides flowers; thy loftiest mass
Of storm-suspended water to its core
Is by the lightning pierced—radiance too brief,
Like the prophetic fire which springs from noble grief!

My heart, O Sea! my heart too hath its tides,
Its moods of rage, its calms, its storms again;
Its ice-bound regions where no life abides,
Its snow-fields where a rose would seem a stain;
Its caverns deep, more murmurous musical
Than shells that in their dreaming sing of thee;
Its wrecks majestic, and its towers tall
Of moon-white castles built for eecstasy,
But turned by time to echoing tombs forlorn,
Where many a drownèd hope doth lie in state.
Lo! these are mine too; but that jubilant scorn,
That blithe disdain of ever-changing fate,
Which thou by very mutability
Dost manifest to all—that would I learn of thee!

Before thine altar of implacable rock,
O'erhung with foam-flower garlands iridescent,
And jarrèd ever by the clangorous shock
Of votive waves—there, while the mirrored crescent
Of young Sélène's forehead-gem doth rest,
As in a shaken glass of chrysolite,
Upon the love-tossed armour of thy breast;
There, while long, singing lines of breakers white,
Like rows of vestal virgins seen afar,
Come trooping up thy dark sonorous aisles,
And Evening offers up her loveliest star;
There will I proffer thee my vanished smiles,
My joys forsworn, my sorrows yet to be,
So thou but hear my prayer, O well-beloved Sea!

Thou terrible, thou beautiful, thou free!
Soother of woes unsoothèd else! Desire
Of desolate poet-souls! To thee, to thee,
To thee alone I cry! O lift me higher!

O toss me starward as I were thy spray!
Into my empty life, as 'twere a shell,
Breathe thou thy mystic monody, and lay
Upon my heart thy deep, eternal spell!
For lo! thy pain supreme is like to mine!
Heavenward thou yearnest and must yearn for aye,
And even as the Lady Moon divine
Over thy passionate surge holds gentle sway,
O may my soul's tides ever rulèd be,
By the pure golden sphere of Love's high mystery!

AMÉLIE RIVES.

WILL AMERICA PROFIT BY ITS RECENT MILITARY LESSONS?

BY COLONEL WILLIAM H. CARTER, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

WHEN educated men find themselves in possession of some leisure, they not infrequently resort to theorizing with the earnest desire of instilling new ideas into the business or profession which they have selected as their life work. Thus it happened that, for a period of some years immediately preceding the war with Spain, officers of the Army produced a great many valuable essays on subjects directly connected with the organization and equipment of armies. These essays advocated progress along the line of modern development, and their publication made them public property; but, unfortunately, there was no General Staff corps in the Army to utilize such material.

Much good was accomplished, so far as the regular army is concerned, during the period between the cessation of active Indian hostilities—these may be said to have terminated with the close of the Pine Ridge campaign in the winter of 1890 and 1891—and the outbreak of the war with Spain. But as to matured and accepted plans or provisions for the expansion of the regular army in anticipation of war, or for the organization of volunteers, no real progress had been made, or, at least, no system had been adopted which was available when the destruction of the "Maine" aroused a demand for immediate action. After war with Spain became inevitable, an informal board of officers was convened in the War Department, to devise a scheme for expanding the regular army and determining the proportion of volunteers to be furnished by the States and Territories.

Few, if any, of the harbor defences were in a completed state, and it was well known that there was not enough ammunition on

hand for the large guns to resist any serious attack. The Department took every step possible with a view to preparation, anticipating that the measure which would authorize it to begin the work of raising a volunteer army would be passed. But at a time when moments were invaluable, legislation was delayed; and, to the consternation of the War Department officials, it was hinted that the bill was unsatisfactory to the National Guard of some States, because it did not provide for bringing certain officers into the Army with the rank held by them in their respective State organizations.

Several features of legislation, based on the experience obtained in the Civil War, were made as prominent as possible in all the bills proposed by the War Department, because it was felt that success or failure in securing proper legislation on those points meant a full measure of efficiency or the reverse. The two points most strongly urged were, that enlistments should be made for three years or for the period covering the war, and that recruitment in the several States should aim at keeping their regiments in the field at the maximum strength, and not at constantly raising new regiments. The failure to adopt these two principles of organization, at the opening of hostilities in 1861, led to a costly and humiliating experience. The war with Spain began on April 21st, 1898; but the two acts of Congress under which the volunteer and regular armies were organized did not become laws until April 22d and April 26th, respectively.

The Act of April 26th, 1898, provided for a war and a peace organization of the regular army; but as the regulars were, as they always should be, used for the first line, there was no time after the declaration of war to organize the new battalions and squadrons which the act authorized, until after the regiments had nearly all been in battle—a fact which proves the falsity of the theory of “skeleton” organizations. Had Congress considered and acted on the matter during the long and stormy session preceding the declaration of war, the efficiency of the regular army, so far as numbers are concerned, would have been doubled, and perhaps the entire cost of the increase might have been saved through the reduction of the number of volunteers required. As it was, the law was passed too late to accomplish any good, because the volunteer regiments were being raised at the same time to the great disadvantage of recruiting for the

regulars, and it proved an expensive and disorganizing measure, creating in the end much dissatisfaction throughout the regular army. This arose from a demand that all men enlisting in the regulars after the declaration of war should be allowed the same privileges of discharge, extra pay, etc., that were, later, given to volunteers. Under much pressure, this demand was complied with, and the result was a feeling amongst the real veterans in the ranks of the gallant little regular army, which had promptly responded to the call of battle, that they were the victims of marked discrimination and injustice.

Hurried from widely separated posts on the frontier, marched aboard transports in midsummer, disembarked in the surf of a tropical and foreign shore, without supports or reserves, the little army of highly trained men had moved to the assault of an intrenched enemy, and, in the face of all theory and academic teaching, wrested victory from astonished opponents, and not only received the surrender of an enemy larger in numbers, but greatly hastened the complete downfall of Spanish power in the West Indies. The country could ill afford to discriminate against these men, in favor of the recruits who came to fill up the companies to war strength and to complete the skeleton battalions.

The President and his co-workers were advised of the unprepared state of the Army and of the defences for immediate war. The Navy, too, was far from ready, for no one could foretell that the combat with Spain's fleet of splendid cruisers would be staved off until Clark could arrive with the magnificent "Oregon" off the Cuban shore. Everything which could be legitimately done at the time was hastened forward to make up for past neglect; but guns and ammunition, range finders and submarine mines do not appear at the signal from a harlequin's wand.

On the night of February 15th, the destruction of the battleship "Maine" in Havana harbor so horrified the nation that it required all the statesmanship and wisdom of the President to delay the inevitable conflict. On March 8th Congress unanimously voted \$50,000,000 for the national defence, but as the new Spanish Minister, Señor Palo y Bernabe, entered upon his duties at Washington a few days later, the appropriation was not regarded as a war measure.

The brief period intervening before the passage by Con-

gress of the resolutions authorizing intervention in the Island of Cuba was used to advance preparation for war, but the army authorities were greatly embarrassed by the failure of Congress to pass any of the measures for raising an army until war was actually declared. For nearly thirty-five years the nation had not engaged in civilized war; but it had, during this period, gradually put an end to Indian hostilities within its own borders, and turned the whole energies of the people to the upbuilding of new States and the extension of the greatest industrial development known to any like period of the world's history. The nation was unprepared, yet when war was declared every shoulder was put manfully to the wheel. With these preliminary remarks in explanation of the difficulties of the situation, a statement of the work actually accomplished will be better appreciated.

As early as April 15th, 1898, in pursuance of orders sent to Department Commanders to concentrate nearly all of the cavalry and infantry regiments and field batteries of the regular army at Southern camps, the bulk of them were assembled at the famous battle-ground of Chickamauga, and others at Mobile, Tampa and Jacksonville. The veteran chiefs of the various Staff and Supply Departments, who knew so well the horrors of war and its expense, both in blood and treasure, were loath to believe that the movement would prove more than a demonstration.

In our military system, organization and recruitment of armies pertain to the Adjutant-General's Department. Fortunately for the country, the then newly-appointed Adjutant-General was an officer of magnificent physique, indomitable perseverance, a long and varied military experience, and he possessed the confidence of the administration.

The best feeling animated all the staff departments, but, alas, disbursing officers must needs hesitate and ponder at every step as to whether they are protected from their enemy, the Comptroller, by instructions requiring expenditures "by order of the Secretary of War." During the one hundred days when an army of 250,000 men was being enrolled, mustered in, clothed, armed, equipped and prepared for battle, many a heart-sick official wondered if Comptrollers ever knew that war was going on.

On April 23d, 1898, the day following the passage of the act authorizing the volunteer army, the President called for 125,000 men. One of the provisions of that act reads as follows:

" Provided further, That when the members of any company, troop, battery, battalion, or regiment of the organized militia of any State shall enlist in the Volunteer Army in a body, as such company, troop, battery, battalion, or regiment, the regimental, company, troop, battery, and battalion officers in service with the militia organization thus enlisting may be appointed by the governors of the States and Territories, and shall when so appointed be officers of corresponding grades in the same organization when it shall have been received into the service of the United States as a part of the Volunteer Army."

Trouble began at once, for there were thousands of men in militia organizations who were not fitted for the hardships of a campaign, and many others who did not "volunteer;" individual consent is, of course, a prerequisite to taking the oath of enlistment. Much pressure was used to reduce the number of privates required in each company, but there was never a proposition for reducing the number of officers in any organization. Militia organizations habitually have a large percentage of officers, many of them bearing titles unknown in similar organizations in the Regular Army. Only those who had opportunity for actual observation at the War Department during this trying period can comprehend the annoyance and delays which were occasioned by this proviso, which was inserted purely for the purpose of taking care of a large number of persons who, ordinarily, would not have been received into the Army as officers. The best interests of the country demand that Militia or National Guard organizations should conform to those of the Regular Army. This should apply to organization, drill regulations and service equipment, leaving the question of dress uniform to local considerations.

The Adjutant-General insisted upon the proper number of enlisted men for each organization, but he was overruled. The Secretary of War assumed the responsibility of lowering the standard for the Pennsylvania contingent to sixty-three men per company; and, of course, this action became a precedent. It may be remarked here that no Secretary of War has time to pass upon even a small fraction of the business done in his name. As far as possible, the business is classified; and when one case is duly considered by the Secretary and action thereon recorded, subsequent cases of like character are passed upon by subordinate officials, who follow the precedent established, subject always to further appeal to the Secretary.

One of the crying evils during the Civil War was the existence of many regiments of volunteers in which vacancies in the grades of commissioned officers were filled by the Governors, but whose companies were never recruited. The decision which had been secured from the Secretary was about to occasion a repetition of this historical error of organization, so thoroughly exposed by General Sherman during the Civil War, when the President intervened and adjusted the matter by calling for 75,000 more volunteers, requiring the State quotas to be furnished in enlisted men only, for such of the regiments already mustered in as were below the standard. Prompt measures were taken to carry out this plan by requiring regimental recruiting parties to return to their own States and secure recruits to fill up the ranks of their organizations. The experience gained at this time was well worth the expense, and the practicability of keeping up volunteer regiments by home recruiting was established for all time, notwithstanding the fact that one Governor of a Southern State telegraphed to ask if there was any objection to recruiting his quota in Chicago.

The selection and appointment of General and Staff officers went on apace; but the multitude of applicants who appeared in person, often accompanied by Congressional delegations, so crowded the rooms and corridors that it was only after the War Department building was cleared at night that the officers and faithful clerks could make real progress with the work in hand.

The desire for news throughout the country drove the correspondents and reporters to the Department in such numbers that their presence became a serious embarrassment to the transaction of public business. That the consideration shown to some of them was not appreciated by the journals they represented is well established by the unpatriotic, sensational and persistent course of misrepresentation which characterized their publications throughout this period. Conservative officers are of but one opinion as to the urgent necessity of regulating the giving out of news during war, or when war is imminent, and as to the advisability of restricting representatives of the press within such limits as will admit of public business being carried on without the presence of persons interested in making public that concerning which a discreet silence should be preserved.

By dint of persistent and able work, the commissioning of

the Generals and Staff officers was gradually effected and orders issued assigning them to various commands. Brigades, divisions and corps were organized and camps selected, with the best judgment which could then be brought to bear upon the subject. The Administration was subjected to unreasoning criticism because of the appointment of a number of wealthy young men and some others who were sons of prominent or successful men in public or business life. It by no means follows that, because the father has distinguished himself, the son will do the same; but, other things being equal, the son of a distinguished father is very apt to seek service and make a manly effort to establish a reputation which will enhance that of his father. There is no pride akin to that which comes from a knowledge that one's ancestors have done the State some service. American manhood has, at least, lost nothing by the unpretentious services of wealthy volunteers; on the contrary, it argues well for the Republic that such men put patriotism above self.

The work of organization—the mighty task of putting a quarter of a million men under arms and equipping them for actual service in less than ninety days, in face of all the obstacles which confronted the Department—was performed in such a manner as to merit the unqualified approval of the entire country. The 125,000 volunteers summoned by the first call were put in the field in thirty days.

The regiments composing General Merritt's army had been assembled on the Pacific Coast, brigaded and started on their long voyage to Manila. The Porto Rico expedition had been organized with some difficulty, due to the action of Governors of States in insisting that their regiments should have a chance to participate in active service. This difficulty was diplomatically adjusted by arranging the brigades so that that army should have a representation from as many States as possible.

The sudden collapse of the war left the bulk of the volunteers in the great camps thoroughly disappointed at not having had an opportunity to participate in battle. When Santiago fell, it was apparent that there would be no more fighting in Cuba; and the natural result followed in a violent reaction from the bustling, ambitious life which had characterized the volunteer camps a few weeks before, when every man was endeavoring with all his energy to equip himself for his full duty against the Span-

ish foe. A loss of enthusiasm, a desire to quit the service and an era of general carelessness followed in many regiments.

With the signing of the Protocol came the necessity for reducing the forces. This was not as hurried as the muster-in had been, for the reason that the Spanish army in Cuba was still intact, except that which had surrendered at Santiago. Great care was exercised, because the question of pensions for this volunteer army will depend upon the examination made at the time of discharge and the correctness of the muster-out rolls. The muster out of 100,000 volunteers was begun on April 18th.

When the Evacuation Commissions ordered to Cuba and Porto Rico rendered their reports, it became necessary to order 50,000 men to Cuba, to replace the Spanish garrisons until order could be assured. The Adjutant-General's office had a record of every Spanish organization which had been ordered for duty in Cuba, and of the post or camp it had occupied. With a few hours' study of the map and data on hand, the usual printed order governing the movement was issued, and copies of the map showing the stations to be occupied and the ports of disembarkation were supplied to the proper officials. The movement was carried out promptly; and, at the appointed day and hour, the Spanish flag was replaced by the Stars and Stripes on the Palace at Havana, signifying American occupation of the entire Island.

Now that this occupation is about to terminate by the transfer of the Island to the recently organized Cuban government, it should be a source of pride to every American that not a single officer or soldier has, during the four years of custodianship, been accused of any misappropriation of Cuban funds, of offending any woman or of injuring the most humble citizen. History does not record a higher example of discipline and soldierly honor.

During the autumn of 1898, the military situation was carefully studied, and a bill was designed to meet the country's requirements. It was passed by the House, but encountered strenuous opposition in the Senate, because it provided for a regular army of 100,000 men. As the session was drawing to a close and the conditions in the Philippine Archipelago were far from satisfactory, owing to the necessity of withdrawing the volunteers in the face of widespread insurrection, it became apparent that some compromise would have to be accepted or an extra session of Congress called. The President had an unusual load of responsi-

bilities at the time, and an extra session would only have added to the burden. The demand of the opposition was that the regular army should be continued temporarily at 65,000 men and the President be authorized to raise 35,000 volunteers, this force to continue only until July 1st, 1901. A bill containing these provisions was passed with an amendment stipulating that on July 1st, 1901, the army should revert to the exact status it occupied when war with Spain broke out, each officer going back to the place then occupied—an impracticable and visionary scheme. The action of the minority was justified by them upon the plea that any law providing for a large standing army should be resisted, and that their party was opposed to the so-called abandonment of the volunteer system of defence.

The enlistment and transporting of volunteers to a scene of action ten thousand miles from their homes, for a comparatively short tour of duty, involved such an appalling expenditure of public funds that the President hesitated to use the authority conveyed in the act which was approved by him on March 2d, 1899. Action was delayed until it became apparent that the regulars could not possibly garrison Cuba and Porto Rico and fight the insurrection in the Philippines to a finish, without reinforcements. The history of our Indian wars is replete with incidents showing the futility of sending an inadequate force to bring into subjection hostile natives, such as those inhabiting the various Philippine Islands. The army was confronted with many serious problems, the solution of which demanded not only intelligence and wisdom, but a showing of well-organized force in the new possessions.

Once more the Adjutant-General was called upon to organize volunteer regiments. After brief consideration, it was determined to appoint regular officers to command the new regiments. The result was the rapid organization and putting into the field of thoroughly good and efficient regiments. The President determined that, the original vacancies in the lists of commissioned officers having been once filled, all future vacancies should be filled by promotions of the most worthy soldiers from the ranks. This induced the enlistment of numbers of excellent men.

For short terms of service at home, and when large numbers of men are required, the country must always rely, as it has done

in the past, upon the volunteer soldier; but the conditions which actually confronted the Administration condemned as unwise the provision of the act for enlisting volunteers for the Philippine service, because of its perfectly apparent disadvantages. The experiment has been a most costly one, and the regiments raised during the summer of 1899 were mustered out, after a tour of service abroad averaging from fifteen to eighteen months. The excess of cost of this body of volunteers over what the cost would have been had regulars been employed, with the usual three-year enlistments, is estimated by the various supply departments to be \$16,374,009.04—quite an item even in these days of enormous appropriations. It should be remembered that, while these volunteers were still in service under pay, it was necessary to raise other regiments to relieve them, just as they were organized to relieve the first army of volunteers which went to the Philippines. This not only involved a general upheaval of garrisons, but to the public treasury it meant a payment for two armies, during the period of change when neither was in position to render the kind of service required in managing a mixture of Oriental races in insurrection.

There is another feature of expense concerning which theories would be obnoxious, but in relation to which some statistics may be cited without giving offence. Pension attorneys have educated the great body of men who went into the Civil War from patriotism to believe that all are now entitled to pensions, whether they are disabled or not. The younger generations are all familiar with the pension system and its large appropriations. The pension agents found an open field during the War with Spain in the great volunteer camps; and, if the whole truth concerning their operations were known, the country would be shocked to learn how many thousands of well-meaning lads, who had just passed a rigid physical examination to enter the army, made all their arrangements for pensions before performing any duty. Such a practice condemns present methods and in the end will debauch a people.

The regular army has been singularly free from any accusation of pension-grabbing; and, if for no other reason, it deserves credit for this on the score of economy. The annual report of the Commissioner of Pensions shows that invalid pensions have been allowed, since July 1, 1861, to June 30, 1900, under the

general law, to 556,255 volunteers, and under the Act of June 27th, 1890, to 451,531, a total of 1,007,786. During the period from July 1, 1861, to January 1, 1901, pensions have been allowed to 30,266 regulars, including, be it remembered, the wounded and invalided men of more than thirty years of almost constant Indian wars. To make the comparison intelligible, the total number of volunteers who enlisted during the Civil War, reduced to a basis of three years' service, is 2,324,516. The total number of men on the rolls of the regular army during the whole period from 1861 to 1900 is 577,000, including re-enlistments, for which a liberal deduction should be made, to avoid counting the same soldier more than once. The number of volunteers who saw service in battle during the war with Spain is comparatively small, yet 27,047 claims for pensions were filed up to June, 1900. These figures contain much food for thought, as well as an argument in behalf of a well-organized and cared-for body of regulars, to the end that the country may not be subjected to the great expense of calling out small numbers of volunteers for short-service periods. The increase of expense in the case of volunteers also arises from the waste and injury of public property which result from its being placed in the hands of inexperienced officers and men. The first year's allowance of clothing is about double that of the third year, so that the general law, limiting the service of volunteers to two years, will prove expensive, unless the war in which they are engaged is brought to a close well within the period named.

When the President called for volunteers, the Adjutant-General's office was simply overwhelmed—swamped, in fact—with requests for appointments or for authority to raise regiments. If any plan for such a contingency had been previously worked out by a properly organized General Staff, business could have been conducted with much less worry and friction than was inevitable under the circumstances. To any one visiting the Department during the trying period of several months following the destruction of the "Maine," it must have seemed like chaos; and, indeed, this seeming would have been a reality, had it not been for a group of self-sacrificing, accomplished and experienced staff officers, scattered through the various bureaus under the control of the Secretary of War.

The collection of military information is one of the important

functions of the Adjutant-General, whose department constitutes, to a great extent, the General Staff of our Army, with the marked disadvantage that the rush and swirl of official visitors, together with an enormous volume of current, administrative correspondence, leave but little time for that calm and sober planning which is so necessary for the General Staff in organizing and mobilizing troops.

The records of the Adjutant-General's office constitute much of the military history of our country. Their accuracy and value depend upon the promptness and faithfulness with which the reports and blank forms are prepared, and the intelligence with which deductions are made therefrom. As an indication of the extent of this part of the work, four million blanks were distributed to the Army between May and August, 1898, in addition to the permanent record-books required for the use of every organization. This does not take into account the preparation and distribution of the important and extremely valuable maps of every theatre of campaign in which our troops operated in Porto Rico, Cuba and the Philippine Archipelago, and the correction, from time to time, of errors detected by our accomplished young officers, many of whom had received special training in topography at the Service Schools.

There is much in the story of recent events that brings to mind a critical period of American history, just one hundred years prior to the war with Spain. The danger of war with France was regarded as not only imminent, but actual invasion was so much feared that Washington was summoned from his retirement at Mount Vernon to Philadelphia for consultation regarding the organization of the new army. Washington's letters are filled with solicitude regarding the selection of officers, especially those of the General Staff, as he understood the term. The pressure for appointments was so great that Washington became fearful, and thus addressed the Secretary of War (McHenry) on the subject:

"The applications are made *chiefly* through members of Congress. These, oftentimes, to get rid of them, oftener still perhaps for local electioneering purposes, and to please and gratify their party, more than from any real merit in the applicant,"

To those familiar with the inner history of the trying days of the nation's peril—1861 to 1865—and the more recent ex-

periences of the war with Spain, these old letters of Washington and his confrères read like ghosts of living issues. An occasional divulgence of the secret story of some public act or appointment caused conservative citizens, then as now, to doubt the ultimate success of our government. Broader-minded and perhaps more practical men, however, realize that dreams of perfection in government are Utopian. The play for partisan advantage is the rule always in evidence, and nearly all progressive laws for the betterment of government are but compromises, in which the wise, patriotic and strong legislators are compelled to make terms with their opponents, to the end that great public good may not be wholly sacrificed. No class of legislation should be so free from party clamor as that which has for its object the perfection of the organization and administration of the Army. Well-considered laws and regulations governing the Army, administered through the proper military hierarchy, make the regular force the safest, the best and by far the most economical it is possible to have for ordinary occasions, and insure the keeping alive of military knowledge, traditions and customs which are of great moment to the security of the nation, and which will enable it always to mount guard with a bold front, while the great body of patriotic volunteers are organizing for battle.

Amongst the most important acts for the improvement of the Army during the past two years, may be mentioned the adoption of the three battalion system for infantry regiments, to conform to modern ideas of tactics and fire control, and the abolition of the regimental organization for the artillery and the adoption of a corps organization, with a large increase of officers and men almost sufficient to take care of the armament already mounted along our extensive seacoast. Under the corps organization each harbor is placed under the control of the senior artillery officer, who is charged with the operation of all the batteries, submarine mines and torpedoes. Under this system, the defence of each harbor is conducted as a whole with the unity prevailing on board a battleship, whereas under the old system, each post had its own commanding officer, subject only to the orders of the department commander, who might be a thousand miles away.

The most important piece of legislation, and the one which will be more far-reaching in its good effects than any other, is that which provides a fixed number for each organization in the

line of the army and authorizes the President, in time of emergency, to increase the number of men in each organization without further action of Congress, provided the total number does not exceed one hundred thousand men. The value of this legislation can hardly be over-estimated.

The one crying need of the army during the past half century has been the want of a General Staff Corps, or body of officers whose business it is to do the preliminary planning for the army and to make of its various elements a more harmonious working machine. In this connection, a "Chief of Staff" must be substituted for the "Commanding General of the Army," or the General Staff will fall short of its full value. There is no place under our Constitution for a "Commander-in-Chief" and a "Commanding General"; and when this is recognized by appropriate legislation, the unbusinesslike methods and constant friction will disappear, to the great benefit of the country and the army.

A revision of laws relating to the organized militia of the country is an absolute necessity. The result of the war with Spain has been to place the United States in a position where it can no longer afford to neglect questions of such grave import to its future welfare.

Will the country profit by its past experience?

WILLIAM H. CARTER.

THE CHOICE OF ISTHMIAN CANAL ROUTES.

BY JOHN T. MORGAN, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM ALABAMA.

IF a canal on either route were in all respects equally feasible and practicable and equally profitable as a money-earning investment, as a canal on the other, there are certain advantages to the United States in the selection of the Nicaragua route that must decide the choice in its favor. Among the most important of these advantages is the fact that, within the canal belt in Nicaragua and Costa Rica, there are not more than two thousand inhabitants, while there are more than thirty thousand within the canal belt at Panama. At Brito, there is no collection of people; at Greytown, not over 1,500 people; and between these points, a distance of 183 miles, the country is very sparsely inhabited. The occupancy of this belt, and of the towns or cities that will exist there, will be under the immediate control of the United States and we can prohibit the location there of any persons we may consider unworthy, or dangerous to the peace or health of the people in the canal belt, or to the security of the canal property. This situation is so important that its value cannot be estimated in money. It is an indispensable element of safety.

The preservation of a canal with locks, and of vessels navigating it, against malicious interference must require the greatest vigilance, authority and police power to be in constant exercise in the canal belt. This would be extremely difficult and hazardous in a canal belt located in an unfriendly country or among a turbulent and lawless people. The first requirement of security, therefore, to be kept in view in the selection of the route of the canal, is the good-will of the people and the government of the country where it is located. Without this, there would be such constant friction as to increase the cost of protecting the canal and to endanger the peaceful relations of the two countries.

This is the first effort, in the history of the world, of one government owning and controlling a canal or great highway through the heart of the territory of another sovereign power, and there is no experience to guide us in projecting a plan or scheme of control that will meet all the necessities of the future. That we shall find occasion to correct some features in any arrangement that may be made now, is almost certain; and, whether we are engaged in laying the foundations of such a plan or in correcting errors or adjusting difficulties that may hereafter discover themselves, it is necessary that there should be sincere and friendly co-operation between the governments and the people concerned in the enterprise.

In view of these conditions, which are vital features of this new effort of nations to create new advantages to themselves, every fact is important that tends to give greater security to the peaceful and successful accomplishment of this great work and to its permanent maintenance.

If Colombia should concede to the United States such canal rights and privileges as are described in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, an event that is not expected, it would place the police control of the capital of the department of Panama under the superior power of the United States, while it would still maintain the sovereignty of Colombia over that department, under the guaranty of the United States. This situation would greatly aggravate the ill-will which the people of Panama have long felt against the United States of America, and had its origin when we, through our treaty of 1846 with Granada, guaranteed the sovereignty of Colombia over Panama. We made that engagement to secure transit rights across Panama, and Colombia insisted on this guaranty in order to keep Panama subject to her authority.

Panama is an isthmian state with a narrow base connecting her with the other Colombian states. Their communication with Panama is almost exclusively by sea, and there is very little commercial or social intercourse between the people of Panama and the other states of Colombia. The various seditions and insurrections we have been called upon to repress in Panama have been political, and were promoted by factions that disputed the authority of the Colombian government. In these duties, under our treaty engagements with Colombia, we have incurred much

ill-will among certain classes in Panama, which has been increased by recent events. So that it would not be safe to attempt to take over and complete the Panama canal, unless we are given such control over the cities of Panama and Colon, and over a much wider area than a canal belt of ten miles breadth, as would enable us to suppress these unruly elements on the canal line.

In addition to this very unfavorable situation, the population of the region included in a canal belt at Panama is of a low order and very turbulent. They have little agricultural employment, and there are no manufactures there. Nearly all the work they do is for the canal and railroad; the laborers who come from other countries are without permanent homes, and the settled population is but little better. To displace these people is impracticable, and to govern them by force would be a doubtful task involving a dangerous problem. Under such conditions, they would never be our real friends, if they were not found in open hostility to us.

Nicaragua and Costa Rica, with ports on both oceans, nearer to our Gulf ports by 300 miles, and to our Pacific ports by 500 miles, than Colon or Panama, have a valuable and rapidly increasing trade with the United States, which the Nicaragua canal would develop into a great commerce. The narrow and swampy isthmus of Panama has no trade of any importance and never can have.

Our acquaintance with the Nicaragua and Costa Rica people is far more general than with the people of Panama. They welcome our people as immigrants and encourage them in forming settlements in their countries, of which there are several that are very prosperous.

There is no other place where the project of the ownership and control of a canal by one nation, within the sovereign limits of other nations, could be so well secured against international jealousy and interference as on the Nicaragua route. The great artery of the San Juan river flows between Nicaragua and Costa Rica; and, if canalized, it will supply the life blood of commerce to both states, placing them in the centre of the equatorial belt of navigation around the world, by ships that will pass through the gates that connect all oceans and seas into one body, leaving no seaport without an ocean highway to every coast and seaport on the globe.

The very existence of these states would equally depend upon the preservation and innocent use of this canal, and they would defend it, in their seaports and on land, with all their strength, against invasion. They would equally protect it against each other, should occasion require. Neither state could be tempted to make the rash effort to capture the canal and become its exclusive owner, for the great Republic of the United States would stand between them, as the owner of the canal, and would save it against all attack from either, or from any foreign assailant. This balancing of mighty interests, each committed to the preservation of the canal and its prosperity, would be such an ordering of the elements of peace, security and prosperity for Central America and for all the Powers concerned in the canal—indeed for all that navigate the seas—that it is to be hoped that such a providential opportunity shall not be lost through our weakness.

No such results can possibly be realized in Panama. If Colombia is supreme there, and if the department of Panama is subdued or reconciled to our exclusive ownership of the canal, there still remains the contest that will arise on the first serious dispute between the United States and Colombia, over the asserted rights of either party, or between Panama and the United States over a question of canal management or administration. The fifty years of controversy over the Clayton-Bulwer treaty would become a pleasant memory, compared with the irritations of such a quarrel, which only wars could settle. A quarrel in which any of the Latin American states would be involved with us, over a question of jurisdiction, has more of danger in it to the Western Hemisphere than the human mind can conceive, and we should, above all things, avoid such a possible event. In such a quarrel, the Monroe doctrine would disappear as a mist of the morning, and the French people—our revered friends—would be provoked into bitterness towards us for having aided those who have robbed them in this last, fatal act of spoliation. It is better to wait until Colombia and France have asked us to proceed, than to accept this fruitless scheme, while its environment is such as it is now, even as a gift, or to enter into a bargain with the perpetrators of wrong, to the alleged disadvantage of their victims.

If the Panama canal is the route we should adopt, if that route alone is practicable, or is best suited to the interests, welfare and safety of the people of the United States, let Congress muster the

courage so to declare; and, when that has been done, let us wait until Colombia and the people and government of France have offered the canal to the United States on the basis of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Let us dismiss the Nicaragua canal to the possession of those who may choose to construct it, and take the risks of controversy that dealings with Colombia will involve. Sincerity of action is what the people demand of Congress, and the courage to do what is right. Another demand they make, that cannot be mistaken. It is that the good name of the people of the United States shall be saved from the reproach of the Panama scandals that have so deeply grieved the people of France.

No practical question connected with canal construction is so important as that of the healthfulness of the route to be selected. According to the report of the Isthmian Canal Commission,—who did not summon a doctor to assist them in their investigations—and the evidence taken before the Senate Committee, the Panama route passes through a region where yellow fever and Chagres fever have their constant habitat, and where, during the past fifty years, and for long periods before, many thousands of lives have been destroyed, the records of which have not been published, if they were kept, for reasons of a commercial sort. The difficulty of obtaining laborers, had the facts been revealed, would have been so great that it was inexpedient to permit them to be known.

This state of facts is met by some testimony to show that the malignity of these and other diseases has abated to some considerable extent along the Panama route, and by the confident prophecy that, in the future, that country will be healthy. On the other hand, the records and the proof before the Senate Committee show that the Nicaragua route has been absolutely free from yellow fever, and from any form of epidemic disease; although large bodies of men have been working there under every form of exposure in the water and on dry land, and in all sorts of labor, for years together. The record of Nicaragua and Costa Rica for health, at all elevations and under all conditions, compares favorably with any part of the coast country of our Southern States. This established fact is met by a prophecy that Nicaragua will be as trying to health as Panama when canal construction is under full operation. The facts, as to healthfulness, are in favor of Nicaragua, but the prophecy is against it;

whereas the facts are against Panama, while the prophecy is in its favor.

In this situation the Senate Committee could not fail to affirm what the world knows to be true, that there are few places on the earth, if any, that have a worse health record than Panama. The record is so uniform and notorious that no traveller has written about Panama who has not uttered a warning as to the dangers of that climate.

If these actual conditions are to be changed, as to the future, by the mere prophecies of civil engineers, who have no unusual skill in hygienic matters, the undisputed facts remain, that cannot be removed by conjecture or disproved by forecasting the future. The two great facts which have been responsible for the unhealthfulness of the Panama route cannot be overcome by hygienic measures, and will be the same in the future as they have been in the past. The first is that yellow fever and Chagres fever are always found in the city of Panama, that the tide from the Pacific runs in daily to an elevation of twenty feet over a bottom of coral rock and mud, which is so shallow that merchant ships cannot approach the wharves nearer than from three to four miles, and that, when the tide runs out, a vast area of this surface is exposed to the direct rays of a torrid sun, which decompose the animal and vegetable matter brought in by the sea and the Rio Grande and other rivers, at or near the mouth of the canal. The second and fatal fact is, that there is no wind, for long periods, to blow away these poisonous gases, and they settle at night upon the cooler surface of the earth inland. It is beyond the wit or power of man so to change these natural conditions as to make Panama anything else than the nursery of malignant fevers, or to prevent it from infecting those people who have not become immune. Imported laborers cannot work along that canal line and under that tropical sun and escape sickness or death, in a very heavy percentage.

One fact alone would forbid the Panama experiment, if humanity is a factor in the problem. It is the fact that no sanitation is possible in the Bay of Panama, so long as the winds cease to blow there, and the ebbing tides leave thousands of acres of mud exposed to the tropical sun. No such condition is possible in any part of the valley of the San Juan River, or at Greytown, or in the lakes, or at Brito, or at San Juan del Sur. The Isthmian Canal

Commission have either omitted to include the health of the Panama region, as a factor in the unit price of labor, or as a factor in computing the time it will require to complete the work; or else they have done injustice to the Nicaragua route, by giving it no credit for its health record.

It cannot be doubted by practical men, that the same amount of work can be done on the Nicaragua route, at a lower cost for labor than on the Panama route. Every man from the United States who is employed by the Panama Railroad Company is allowed two months furlough, with three-fourths full pay, in each year, to enable him to combat the dangerous effects of that climate.

The descriptions given by the witnesses before the Senate Committee, of the evident cause of sickness at Panama, closely correspond with the personal observations of Humboldt, in describing his travels in the countries of Central America in the early days of the nineteenth century.

The outlook for health in Panama and the adjacent country is unquestionably bad, and must continue to be bad under the conditions that exist and have always existed there, since the earliest times of its occupation by Spanish and other immigrants. By comparison with any other American port, except Porto Bello, it is excessively bad. The causes are permanent and natural. They cannot be overcome by any sanitary expedients.

They are alike at war with human life and the life of commerce. Panama is, at almost all seasons, the dead centre of barometric pressure, where the winds cease and the infected atmosphere is stagnant, and there is no propelling power for sailing ships. A more unfortunate terminal for a ship canal could scarcely be found.

European emigration that is so much needed on our Pacific slope, whether by steam or sailing ships, would be so greatly endangered by a passage through Panama from the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific, that it would be practically cut off. On a sea voyage from a European port to our Pacific coast, in which the emigrant could bring with him his family and household effects on an unbroken journey, the class of people who would seek ocean transportation would be much higher than those who must find their way to the Pacific slope over long lines of railroad, with frequent breaks in the course of the toilsome journey. They could not afford the risk of life in passing through a region infected with

deadly fevers, and they have, in the past, shunned the Panama route. With direct steamship connections between Colon and many European ports, and between Panama and San Francisco, the passage of emigrants through the isthmus has been almost at zero, according to the traffic reports of the Panama Railroad Company.

The conjectures and forecasts of those who base all their calculations, as to the commercial uses of an isthmiian ship canal, upon the supposition that sailing ships will be displaced by steam ships, in ocean transportation, are met by stubborn facts. The present tonnage of enrolled and registered sailing vessels of the United States is 2,603,265 gross tons, and that of steam ships is 2,920,935—the excess of steam tonnage being only 317,670 tons. But the number of sailing ships is 972, while the steam vessels number 355, or nearly three sailing vessels to one steamer. As the Isthmian Canal is for “the people who go down to the sea in ships,” and is not exclusively for corporate or other associations who own great lines of costly steamers, a just provision should be made for the sailing ships we now have, if no other such ship should ever be built.

But the conjecture that sailing ships must pass out of ocean navigation to give place to steamers is pessimistic in a terrible degree, and strikes down the mother industry of all commercial transportation. In the deposition of General Alexander, he states the true relation between steam ships and those propelled by winds, as follows:

“It seems to me that to rule out the sailing vessels forever from this country, in building this canal, is monstrous. The sailing vessel is not only very important in itself, but it is the basis of the rates made by the steamships, and the rates made by the steamships are the basis of the railroad rates in the country, so that practically all the rates in the United States are finally based at the bottom of the sailing vessels.”

The route by way of Panama is practically impossible to a sailing vessel. In fact, as is clearly shown by the testimony before the Senate Committee, the relative growth of steam ships, as compared with sailing ships, in recent years, is changing, as the methods of rigging and handling sailing ships are improved, and their tonnage is increasing. The percentage of increase in sailing ships is growing in America, and in Norway and France it is greater than that of steam ships, in tonnage and numbers. Great Britain has built steam ships for thirty years past, with an eager-

ness that she now regrets, in order to utilize the Suez passage, to sustain her commercial prestige, and to provide new grooves of commerce for her merchants, to new and distant ports; while France and Norway have steadily encouraged sailing craft, and are dangerous competitors in the transportation of the cheap and heavy commodities.

France has no coal to spare from home consumption, and Great Britain is witnessing the sale of American coals in her cities. How much longer she can afford to supply her steamers with coal mined in the United Kingdom is now a grave problem. This is also true as to Germany. When the British and German supply is exhausted, America must bear the brunt of supplying the world's steam marine, and we will, for a time, greatly increase the income of the coal fields by increased prices; but the people and the industries will share the tax with the steam ships; and that best feature of commerce—cheap transportation—will recall the sailing ship to its rightful place, as the mother of ocean transportation. No more frightful condition could be visited upon the world's commerce, than to strip the sails from all ships and put steam machinery in their hulls.

If we are preparing an isthmian canal for the exclusive use of steam ships, on the futile conjecture that sailing ships are doomed to pass away, our task is idle. To doom sailing ships to continue to pass through the dangerous seas around the Horn, and to add 10,000 miles to each voyage made by such vessels from our Atlantic ports to the North Pacific, for the benefit of steam ships, would be the height of injustice; and to turn over the coasting trade to steam ships plying between the oceans would be to rob one industry to enrich another.

If we adopt the Panama route no sailing ships will use it, for the simple reason that nature refuses to supply winds in the calm belt, which reaches from five to eight hundred miles westward and nearly three hundred miles northward in the Pacific Ocean, off the Bay of Panama. The proof is conclusive as to this fact, and is as certain and undeniable as that the Gulf Stream runs between Cuba and Florida.

Turning to the route through Nicaragua, and comparing it with the Panama route, we see from the chart prepared by our Bureau of Hydrography, that the trade winds, which are the steady supply of motive power for sailing ships on the great

oceans, pass through the Nicaraguan depression, with constancy and concentrated force, and across the Pacific to the coast of China. The chart shows that they are perennial and always reliable. They bring healing in their wings, and fan the heated land until it becomes a temperate zone and makes Nicaragua a salubrious region, inviting to industry and rich in its rewards to labor. In this statement there is not the least color of exaggeration.

The hydrographic chart from the Navy Department, the result of actual and long-continued examinations, settles the fact that the trade winds from the Atlantic, which are practically perpetual, pass across the depression that contains the lakes of Nicaragua, in an unbroken sweep from Greytown to Brito, along the valley of the San Juan River. Here is a force of nature that moves across the Pacific to the coast of China to carry our commerce, as we hope, to important markets, through "an open door." Its constancy is shown by the rainfall at Greytown, as is clearly demonstrated in the testimony of Mr. Lyman E. Cooley, who says:

"I know of no reason for the excessive rainfall at Greytown, as compared with Limon and Bluefields, 60 miles away, except the drawing in of the trade winds by this trough across the continent acting like a funnel, by which is brought in double the amount of saturated air, which precipitates double the amount of moisture; so you have across that part of the isthmus double the air circulation, after the moisture is squeezed out of it."

Every test has been applied in Nicaragua and Costa Rica to determine the healthfulness of the climate, that has been applied in Panama, and the result, without exception, is conclusive in favor of Nicaragua.

Our consuls—Donaldson, residing on the lake shore at Managua, and Sorsby, residing on the coast at Greytown, for years together, and raising their children in those localities—give in their depositions a remarkable record of health and comfort. Quite as conclusive is the experience of General Alexander, who, as commissioner to locate the boundary between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, resided for more than three years at Greytown.

It is not stated that any of the foreign-born employees of the Panama canal, or railroad company, reside permanently with their families at Panama or Colon. On the contrary, it has been the rule as to railroad employees, for fifty years, to give them

leave of absence, on pay, for two months in every year and free transportation to the United States to enable them to recover from the effects of the climate, which would otherwise be fatal to them.

The soldiers in Panama, in the present outbreak there, and in all previous service in the field, have been sick with yellow fever and Chagres fever, as is stated by several witnesses, and especially by Mr. Paine, the present superintendent of the Panama Railroad. We have the testimony of Col. Worthington, who was in the field with William Walker in his Nicaraguan campaign, that no sickness of a serious or epidemic character affected the soldiers engaged in that war, in which more than 2,000 men were engaged, for more than two years. Mr. Treat's deposition contains a narrative of actual experience in railroad building, from Greytown to the Divide, a distance of ten miles, through swamps and bodies of stagnant water, that proves the actual healthfulness of that region. He had in his employment 2,000 men for seven months, among whom only two deaths occurred.

When such facts are contrasted with the fearful epidemics that swept off unnumbered and unnamed thousands in Panama, the mind refuses to accept the proposition, that Panama is, or has been, or ever can be made, as healthy a country as Nicaragua, or that it ever can be reclaimed from the fatal fevers that have made it a Golgotha.

Such is, also, Mr. Plume's testimony, who was track-master for six years on the Panama railroad, and Dr. Bransford's testimony, who was surgeon of the Lull and Menocal surveys in Panama and Nicaragua.

The average distance between our Atlantic and Pacific ports is increased by 600 miles, if the voyage is made through Panama instead of Nicaragua. On a round trip, the increase is 1,200 miles. If a steamer can make one round trip each month between our Atlantic and Pacific ports, the distance lost on the Panama route, in a year, as compared with the route through Nicaragua, would be 14,400 miles. If her speed is three hundred miles a day, her lost time in a year would be 48 days. If it costs her \$150 a day, her loss for a year would be \$7,200; in 20 years, the average life of a ship, it would be \$144,000.

Assuming that the income of the canal would be \$8,000,000, at one dollar per gross ton for tolls, and that the ships that pass

through the canal are each of 5,000 tons measurement, the number will be 800 per annum, making round trips. The increase of distance by the Panama route over the Nicaragua route for these 800 ships, for each year, would be 11,520,000 miles.

If it costs each ship \$150 a day, the number of days being 48 for each ship, and 38,400 for 800 ships, the aggregate cost would be \$5,760,000, and this would be the saving for steamships on the Nicaragua route every year. Half of this sum capitalized at five per cent. is \$57,600,000, or nearly half the estimated cost of the Panama Canal.

These calculations are based alone on the transit of steamers through the Panama canal. Sailing ships are dropped from the calculation, by all parties, because they are impracticable on the Panama route.

The Bay of Panama is a neglected feature of the Isthmian Canal Commission's report. They treat it as an open and deep sea, entering from the ocean and furnishing a safe anchorage behind some islands four miles from the shore. It is quite the reverse. The navigation of the canal actually begins 100 miles from the pier at La Boca, where pilots are taken on the ships, and it is tortuous from the sea to the anchorage. The real navigation of the canal begins at the 35-foot curve, which is at least three miles from the canal entrance at Colon, and extends to the Pacific, which is 100 miles from the canal entrance at La Boca.

To ascertain the single fact which is the actual basis of the possibility of a canal at Panama—namely, the safety of a dam at Bohio—the plan of construction of the dam is the indispensable factor. Construction by monolithic masonry—such as in the dam at Conchuda on the San Juan River—is agreed upon as a safe and sure plan by all the engineers of the Isthmian Canal Commission and by all the other engineers who have testified on the subject. This sort of a dam is, therefore, the standard for a canal to be built by the government. The Commission, however, lower the standard of the dam at Bohio from a structure of monolithic masonry to one with a core of concrete, with earth facings on both sides, and a possible rock pavement on the top. This is done to get a cheaper dam at Bohio, and not so good as the dam at Conchuda that costs \$6,062,972 with all wasteways, sluices, machinery and approach channels.

In giving a preference to the Panama route, they provide a structure of less strength at Bohio, which costs, for the dam.....	\$6,369,640
And for the double locks, which are set in an extension of the dam, and are part of that structure.....	11,567,275
	<hr/> \$17,936,915

To which is added:

Gigante Spillway.....	\$1,209,419
Lake Bohio.....	2,952,154
Peña Blanco outlet.....	2,448,076
Chagres diversion.....	1,929,982
Railroad diversion.....	1,267,500
	<hr/> \$9,807,131

In all, the dam, and its necessary adjuncts, would cost \$27,-744,046.

All this vast sum is the direct result of, and is unavoidably connected with, and is, in fact, part of the plan for the dam at Bohio.

This vast sum is to be risked on a plan that has no precedent in engineering experience, and it does not include a temporary dam at Bohio, the cost of which is estimated as being not below \$500,000, and the necessity for which all engineers admit. The difference in the cost of these dams, each of which is a vital factor in the plan of the Isthmian Canal Commission, is \$16,983,120 in favor of the dam at Conchuda, while the dam at Bohio compares with that at Conchuda as a scrap heap compares with a wall of steel.

The recommendations of the Isthmian Canal Commission are simply tentative and not final. They are so stated that they can give way to any plan for a dam that the constructing engineers may adopt, after further examination. This uncertainty is painful. It is disastrous because it affects the vital point in the Panama system of a canal with locks. If the dam at Bohio fails, all is gone and the canal is lost.

Until that canal has withstood the heaviest and most crushing floods that the Chagres River can precipitate upon it, no engineer and no sane man will feel safe against the total and irreparable loss of the entire Panama canal.

Of six engineers on the Commission, two, Morrison and Haupt, declare the dam at Bohio to be hazardous, beyond the extreme line of engineering experience; and the other four differ in the firmness of their convictions as to the certainty of success, and

also as to the manner of overcoming the difficulties that startle their fears. Congress must act on facts that are ascertained by methods entirely satisfactory to the science of engineering. Such facts, confessedly, have not been ascertained at Bohio.

The borings are 50 to 100 feet apart, at irregular intervals, and none of them were made with the diamond drill. Not one of them penetrated the rock to determine whether it was solid, or was only a boulder that had drifted into the geological valley in which it was found. They are admitted to be insufficient in number to justify the final location of the dam. The borings are across a deep geological rut, or gorge, called a valley, which was either cut out with rushing waters that poured through it in former times, or was broken out with uplifting forces of earthquakes or volcanoes. It then filled up, a distance of 127 feet to sea level, with alternating layers of gravel, sand and clay, washed in by the flow of the Chagres and other streams.

The French engineers, to avoid the search for rock foundations in a gulch so uncertain in its shape and depth, at once discarded the idea of a dam of masonry, and adopted that of a clay dam based upon this assorted collection of *detritus*. No dam, probably, ever had such a variety of materials beneath its foundations.

Mr. Morrison follows the French idea, which they derived from Menocal, who first suggested it. If it is safe, it is cheap and easy. If it is not safe, it is utterly disastrous.

Five engineers, including Menocal, say it is not safe for so important a work as is required at Bohio, to resist the extraordinary ravages of floods in the Chagres River, and Cooley concurs with them; while Morrison and Abbott insist that it is as safe as a masonry dam would be at Bohio. Unless safety can be found in the disagreements of great engineers, no safety can be found as to the dam at Bohio.

As it is admitted by all engineers that Bohio is the only point where a dam can be placed on the Chagres River, to impound the waters for the supply of 21 miles of the summit level of the Panama canal, and that without such a dam the canal cannot be supplied and the Chagres River cannot be controlled, the degree of certainty that common-sense and all engineering experience require, certainly beyond a reasonable doubt, cannot be found in the Panama scheme. It is very far from being true that this degree of certainty exists on the ascertained facts in this case, or

that it is even reasonably probable that these basic facts will ever be found to exist.

On the contrary, facts were ascertained by De Lesseps in his great effort, at enormous expense, to construct a sea-level canal which, if they were examined carefully, would go far to show that a dam at Bohio will never be a safe reliance on which to rest the fate of a lock canal across the isthmus of Panama.

It was not the depth of the cut at Culebra that caused the old company to abandon a sea-level canal. It was the danger that the floods of the Chagres River could not be controlled, and that they would rush into the canal and destroy it.

Why do they not dig a sea-level canal and get rid of these doubts as to the Bohio dam? The answer is the same that Admiral Ammen and Mr. Menocal gave to the Paris Conference, and the same that the *Comité d'Études* and the *Comité Technique* gave in their reports, namely, that the Chagres River cannot be kept out of a sea-level canal and will destroy it. A canal filled with sea water, with a tide of 20 feet upon that, cannot afford to take in the waters of the Chagres even at low tide. The Chagres River drives the engineers away from a sea-level canal, as it will drive away their lakes and dams erected for its control.

In the face of such difficulties and doubts on the Panama route, none of which exist on the Nicaragua route, the choice of routes is a simple matter of common-sense which all can understand.

De Lesseps understood the advantages for a canal, with locks, at Nicaragua, and it was only when he failed to obtain a concession that he turned his attention to a sea-level canal at Panama; and that canal he failed to build after spending \$250,000,000 of the money of the French people in the effort. Our Commissioners estimate that it would require \$144,233,358 to complete the canal at Panama and save the \$250,000,000 already expended upon it. But they cannot induce France, or the French people, to furnish that comparatively small sum; the reason being, not that they are poor, but that they are unwilling to spend more money on the doubtful success of a dam at Bohio.

JOHN T. MORGAN.

BRITISH PURCHASES OF WAR SUPPLIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

BY W. L. PENFIELD.

I.

THE Government of the United States has not denied nor granted, either to Great Britain or to the South African republics, any right or privilege which is not equally conceded or refused to the other.

The duty of neutrality implies that the neutral state is equally friendly to and at peace with both belligerents, treating both alike, not conceding or refusing to the one what it does not equally concede or refuse to the other. The neutral state takes no notice of the merits or justice of the cause, nor of whether one or the other is or is not the more powerful on sea or on land. Its attitude is that of a disinterested spectator of the conflict, and its only legal concern and duty is to keep the rules which the law of nations has prescribed to govern the conduct of neutrals and belligerents toward each other.

The moment the neutral government considers the justice of the cause, with a view to action in behalf of the one or the other belligerent, it ceases to be neutral; it intervenes, and itself becomes a belligerent. Its right to act with reference to the conflict, as a neutral state, ends with the offer of mediation.

The accepted principle was stated by John Quincy Adams:

"By the usual principles of international law, the state of *neutrality* recognizes the cause of both parties to the contest as *just*; that is, it avoids all consideration of the merits of the contest. But when, abandoning that neutrality, a nation takes one side in a war of other parties, the first question to be settled is the *justice* of the cause to be assumed."

There appears to be not a little confusion of ideas with regard to the duties actually owing by a neutral state, and the duties

assumed or supposed to be owing by its citizens or subjects to the belligerent states.

The law of nations makes a wide distinction between the right of the state itself to aid either belligerent, by the sale to it of arms and other military supplies, and the right of its citizens to make such sales in the ordinary course of commerce. The latter was not prohibited by the Treaty of Washington, nor is it forbidden by the law of nations. The neutral state is at peace with the belligerents, and its citizens are rightfully engaged in the usual pursuits of peace. They are not to stop their business of planting, producing and selling as often as a war breaks out between foreign states. They rightfully assume that their government is at peace; that they, as citizens of the United States, for example, owe allegiance only to its laws, and these forbid their acceptance and exercise, or delivery of, a commission, within the jurisdiction of the United States, to serve a foreign state in a war against another state with which the United States is at peace; forbid their enlistment, or procuring others to enlist, within the jurisdiction of the United States, to serve abroad under conditions above stated; forbid their fitting out and arming, or attempting or procuring or being knowingly concerned in the furnishing, fitting out or arming of, or serving on or in, any vessel intended for employment in the service of either belligerent; forbid their increasing or augmenting or procuring, or being knowingly concerned in increasing or augmenting the force or increasing the equipment of, any such ship of war, cruiser or armed vessel for the uses above stated; forbid their beginning, setting on foot, providing or preparing the means for, any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against any other government, colony, district or people with whom the United States is at peace. These are duties prescribed by the municipal law of the United States, and the penalty for their violation can not be visited on citizens of the United States by any foreign government.

In short, the citizens or subjects of one state abiding at home owe no duties to any foreign state, in war or peace. If they go abroad, they are subject to the laws of the state wherein they sojourn; if they engage in war against a foreign state, they accept the corresponding risks, according as their service is regular or irregular; they forfeit thereby the protection of

their own government, and are subject to the rules of military warfare.

But the state, as a member of the commonwealth of nations, owes certain duties to other states which vary according to the fact whether those states are at peace or war.

II.

NEUTRAL POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE GENEVA ARBITRATION.

Under the Presidency of Washington, the lines of the national policy of neutrality toward the belligerent states were laid down in May, 1793, by Mr. Jefferson, in instructions to the United States Minister to Great Britain:

“Our citizens have always been free to make, vend, and export arms. It is the constant occupation and livelihood of some of them. To suppress their callings, the only means, perhaps, of their subsistence, because a war exists in foreign and distant countries, in which we have no concern, would scarcely be expected. It would be hard in principle and impossible in practice. The law of nations, therefore, respecting the rights of those at peace, does not require from them such an internal derangement in their occupations. It is satisfied with the external penalty pronounced in the President’s proclamation, that of confiscation of such portion of these arms as shall fall into the hands of the belligerent Powers on their way to the ports of their enemies.”

It was likewise with the President’s approval that Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, issued in August, 1793, a Treasury circular announcing that:

“The purchasing within and exporting from the United States, by way of merchandise, articles commonly called contraband, being generally warlike instruments and military stores, *is free to all the parties at war, and is not to be interfered with.*”

These rules have been many times asserted since then in Presidential Messages and in instructions of Secretaries of State. While always conceding that the citizen thus trading takes the hazard of confiscation of the property sold, it has equally been asserted, both by the United States and Great Britain, that such sale does not involve any violation of the duty of state neutrality. The doctrine was declared in various forms by Pickering, Monroe, Adams, Marcy, Pierce, Seward, Grant and Fish. It was declared by Chancellor Kent; and also by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the “Bermuda,” in an opinion rendered in 1865, by Chief-Justice Chase, at a time when the United

States Government and the Chief Justice were most keenly alive to the mutual rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals. The Court said that:

"Neutrals in their own country may sell to belligerents whatever belligerents choose to buy; . . . neutrals must not sell to one belligerent what they refuse to sell to the other; . . . nor prepare, nor suffer to be prepared, within their territory, armed ships or military or naval expeditions against either."

If the doctrine were otherwise, under the law of nations, the conditions of peace of the neutral state would be almost more burdensome than the state of war between the belligerents; as, in case of war between two great European Powers, like Great Britain and Germany, if it were forbidden to citizens of the United States to sell to either belligerent all articles which might be contraband of war, it would substantially annihilate our commerce; while the burden of policing with ships and soldiers the thousands of miles of our sea-coast, would make the state of peace perhaps even more expensive than the costs of war.

The attitude of the United States Government toward Great Britain during the Civil War and before the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal was not only consistent with, but a reaffirmance of, this doctrine; as it was with the doctrine announced by Jefferson, and approved by Washington,—that the building, equipping and arming of vessels in the ports of a neutral state, to cruise against any belligerent state with which it is at peace, is a breach of neutral duty. This view was also declared by Marshall, Monroe, Clay, Buchanan, Clayton, Pierce, Fish and Evarts.

Both rules were affirmed by General Grant in the neutrality proclamations issued August 22d and October 8th, 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War—by the assertion, on the one hand, that all citizens of the United States "may lawfully, and without restriction by reason of the aforesaid state of war, manufacture and sell within the United States, arms and munitions of war and other articles ordinarily known as 'contraband of war'"; and, on the other hand, by prohibition of the fitting out and arming of any ship or vessel for or in the service of either belligerent, or increasing or augmenting the force or armament of such ship, or setting on foot or preparing the means for any military expedition against either of the belligerents; and forbidding the use of the territorial waters of the United States for the purpose of pre-

paring for hostile operations against either belligerent, and forbidding the use of such waters by the armed vessels of either belligerent for such purpose.

III.

THE GENEVA ARBITRATION.

The complaint of precipitate concession of belligerent rights to the Confederacy made by the United States against the British Government was not made the basis of an independent claim; but it was urged in support of the claims of indemnity which were laid against Great Britain on the ground of negligence (1) in permitting the building, manning, arming and equipment of the Confederate cruisers in British ports; and (2) in the subsequent complicity of the British Government in the furnishing of supplies to the cruisers.

Article VI. of the Treaty of Washington provided that:

“A neutral Government is bound:

“First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction to warlike use.”

Rule 2. “Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.”

Rule 3. “To exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.”

The last clause of the Article binds the high contracting parties “to observe these rules as between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime Powers and to invoke them to accede to them.”

The question has been raised whether the port of New Orleans is being used, in contravention of Rule 2, “as the base of *naval* operations,” or “for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies.” The question is founded in a complete misconception of the meaning and intendment of Rule 2, as expressly declared and interpreted by both governments before the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal. The meaning of the rule is not

to be gathered from garbled extracts. The rule is to be construed in its entirety, in connection with Rule 1, and in the light of the common and contemporaneous interpretation of it by the two governments, defining its meaning and application.

In his learned work on International Arbitrations, Professor Moore points out that, after the treaty was negotiated, Lord Russell suggested that the second rule "might prevent the sale, by a neutral or in a neutral country, of arms and other military supplies in the ordinary course of commerce"; but Mr. Fish replied that "the President understood and insisted that the rule did not prevent the open sale of arms or military supplies in the ordinary course of commerce, as they were sold to the United States in England during the Civil War"; and that "the United States in bringing the rules to the knowledge of other Powers and asking their assent to them, would insist that such was their meaning."

The rule was never intended to involve a departure from the traditional policy of the United States, which, as a manufacturing and producing nation, generally at peace, is most deeply interested in maintaining, as far as is consistent with neutral duty, the ordinary rights of commerce. The neutral state is at peace with both belligerents; and its citizens, subject to the law of blockade and the risks of trade in contraband of war, have a perfect right to continue their ordinary pursuits. This was the declared view of this government in its controversy with Great Britain over the construction, equipment, and supply in British ports of cruisers of the Confederate States. This interpretation of Rule 2 was given by the United States before the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, in clear, precise and unmistakable terms, as follows:

"The second rule provides that a neutral government is bound not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. *A question has been raised whether this rule is understood to apply to the sale of military supplies or arms in the ordinary course of commerce. The United States do not understand that it is intended to apply to such a traffic.* They understand it to apply to the use of a neutral port by a belligerent for the renewal or augmentation of such military supplies or arms, *for the naval operations referred to in the rule.*"

In order to show the violation by Great Britain of her neutral duties, in this particular and within the meaning of the rule, the counsel for the United States put in evidence before the Geneva Arbitration an extract from a speech of Earl Russell, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as follows:

"It has been usual for a Power carrying on war upon the seas to possess ports of its own in which vessels are built, equipped, and fitted, and from which they issue, to which they bring their prizes and in which those prizes, when brought before a court, are either condemned or restored. But it so happens that, in this conflict, the Confederate States have no ports except those of the Mersey and the Clyde, from which they fit out ships to cruise against the Federals."

They also put in evidence the journal of the Confederate steamer, "Florida," and accentuated this extract touching its entry at Nassau: "*We took on board coal and provisions to last us for several months*"—showing that she had made use of a neutral port as a base of naval operations and for the augmentation of the ship's supplies.

The contention of the United States Government was that "British territory was, during the whole struggle, the base of the *naval* operations of the insurgents." In summing up the case for the United States, stress was laid on the fact that:

"During the whole course of the struggle in America, of nearly four years in duration, there has been no appearance of the insurgents as a belligerent on the ocean excepting in the shape of British vessels, constructed, equipped, supplied, manned, and armed in British ports."

The same interpretation of Rule 2 was placed upon it by the British Government. The language used in the argument of its case was:

"The second of the above rules is understood by Her Majesty's Government as prohibiting the use of the ports or waters of the neutral for the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, *only when such supplies or arms are for the service of a vessel cruising or carrying on war, or intended to cruise or carry on war, against either belligerent; and as not prohibiting any sale of arms or other military supplies in the ordinary course of commerce; and Her Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that it is otherwise understood by the Government of the United States.*"

After the statement of both governments had been openly made to the Arbitration Tribunal and freely considered, it ap-

peared that there was great divergence of view as to the scope of the meaning and application of the phrase "due diligence," which was a bone of contention throughout all the stages of the controversy. But as to the meaning and application of Rule 2, there was no difference of opinion between the two governments.

Now, it should be stated parenthetically that the first Article of the Arbitration Treaty formulated the matter which the two governments agreed to submit to arbitration, namely: Differences between the two governments "growing out of the acts committed by the several vessels which have given rise to the claims generically known as the 'Alabama Claims.'"

After full consideration by the United States Government of the interpretation already placed on Rule 2 by the two governments in their respective statements of the case, Mr. Evarts said in reply:

"The three rules of the Treaty furnish the imperative law as to the obligations of Great Britain *in respect of each of the vessels which is brought under review*. The moment that it appears that a vessel is, in itself, *within the description of the first Article of the Treaty*, as being one of the several vessels which have given rise to the claims generically known as the 'Alabama Claims,' it becomes a subject to which the three rules are applicable. . . . Whatever may be the scope and efficacy of the second Rule and of the third Rule, *in future or in general*, for the purposes of the present Arbitration *the subjects to which either of them can be applied, . . . must be embraced* within the limitation of the first Article of the Treaty, and so, connected with some or one of the several vessels which have given rise to the claims generically known as the 'Alabama Claims.' But in regard to any such vessel, the general injunctions of these two Rules furnish, in their violation, a ground for the inculcation of Great Britain, and its condemnation to responsibility and reparation therefor to the United States. . . . The second Rule is as extensive as the general subject, under the law of nations, of the use of ports and waters of the neutral as the base of naval operations, or for the renewal or augmentation of military supplies, or the recruitment of men. . . . What are really commercial transactions in contraband of war are allowed by the practice of the United States and of England equally, and are not prohibited as hostile acts by the law of nations; *and it is agreed between the two countries that the second Rule is not to be extended to embrace by any largeness of construction* mere commercial transactions in contraband of war. . . . Whenever the neutral ports, places, and markets are really used as the bases of *naval* operations, when the circumstances show that relation, and that direct and efficient contribution, and that complicity and that origin and authorship, which exhibit the belligerent himself drawing military supplies for the purpose

of his *naval operations* from neutral ports, *that* is a use by a belligerent of neutral ports and waters as a base of his naval operations, and is prohibited by the second Rule of the Treaty."

Hence, it was said, a war-ship of either belligerent "cannot make an ambush for itself in neutral waters, cannot lie at the mouth of a neutral river to sally out to seize its prey, cannot lie within neutral waters and send its boats to make captures outside their limits."

In support of the contention that British ports were used as a base of naval operations of Confederate cruisers, Mr. Evarts put the case of the "*Shenandoah*," which "illustrates by its career, on a large scale, the project of a belligerent, in *maritime* war, which sets forth a vessel and furnishes it complete for war, plans its naval operations and executes them, and all this from neutral (British) ports and waters as the only base and a sufficient base."

Illustrating the meaning and application of Rule 2, Mr. Evarts quoted from a speech of Mr. Gladstone in 1862, that "Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a *navy*." He also stated the position of our Government in the words of Secretary Fish, September 25, 1869, that "the rebel counsels" have made Great Britain "the arsenal, the navy-yard and the treasury of the insurgent Confederates." And Mr. Evarts said:

"That was the controversy between the two countries, for the solution of which the Rules of this Treaty and the deliberations of this Tribunal were to be called into action; and they were intended to cover and do cover all the forms in which this use of Great Britain for the means and the opportunities for keeping on foot these maritime hostilities was practised. The first Rule covers all questions of the *outfit* of the cruisers; the second Rule covers all the means by which the neutral ports and waters of Great Britain were used as bases for the rebel *maritime operations of these cruisers*, and for the provision, the renewal, or the augmentation of *their* force of armament, munitions, and men. Both nations so agreed."

The two governments were therefore agreed as to the true meaning of the rule. The only query suggested was by Mr. Evarts, touching "the scope and efficacy of the second Rule and of the third Rule, in future or in general." The Arbitration Tribunal accepted the interpretation of Rule 2 adopted by the two governments, without discussion.

IV.

THE FATE OF THE THREE RULES.

As already stated, there was much discussion and divergence of opinion between the two governments, during the Geneva Arbitration, as to the scope of meaning and legal application of the phrase "due diligence," with reference to the duty of the neutral state not to allow in a neutral port the construction, equipment, manning and taking of coal and supplies for a warship of either belligerent. The extent to which this had been done and permitted to be done by the Confederate cruisers, the Confederacy being without available ports of its own and making use of British ports as the base of its naval operation, was the grievance complained of. The whole subject of neutral and belligerent right and duty, as regards the sale by citizens of a neutral state of military supplies in the ordinary course of commerce, on the one hand, and, on the other, the limitations of international law upon the period of permissible stay of a belligerent cruiser in a neutral port, and upon the augmentation of its force, and upon the amount of coal and supplies it might be allowed to take, was exhaustively considered by the ablest body of statesmen and jurists whose attention was ever centred at one time upon that subject, when it involved the momentous issue of war between the two English-speaking nations. During the epoch which ended with the Geneva Arbitration, the Chief of this nation was a man who perfectly understood all the necessities and rights of war, and whose words, "Let us have peace," did not indicate any misunderstanding of the mutual rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents. The discussion was conducted on the part of the United States by such men as Seward, Adams, Fish, Cushing, Evarts, and Waite; and, on the part of Great Britain, by such men as Russell, Gladstone, Harcourt, and Palmer, and on the seat of Arbitration sat Cockburn for Great Britain and Adams for the United States.

It may be said, without the rashness of presumption, that, when such adversaries were especially charged, on either hand, with the vigorous assertion and jealous safeguarding of the rights and duties of neutrals, they "hewed to the line," when they all "agreed" that "the second Rule is not to be extended to embrace by any largeness of construction mere commercial transac-

tions in contraband of war." This statement by Mr. Evarts came after the same interpretation had been given by the British Government of the meaning of the Rule, with the added statement that "Her Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that it is otherwise understood by the Government of the United States."

The course of the discussion had made it evident that the Rules would have to be recast, if they were to become workable "in future and generally," and if they were to receive the acceptance of the two governments and the adhesion "of other maritime Powers."

Professor Lawrence, a publicist of high authority and who is notable for his accuracy of statement, both of law and fact, says:

"The two Powers immediately concerned have never been able to settle the terms of a joint note inviting others to accede to them, and since 1876 have given up the attempt to do so. The governments of Germany and Austria let it be known beforehand that their consent would be withheld; and no state has shown itself eager to adopt the new formulæ."

Wharton says:

"The 'rules' themselves may be regarded as setting forth, in terms studiously general, certain propositions which few publicists would disapprove. But the treaty does not by itself give these rules the authority of a code, and this for the following reasons: (1) The 'rules' were only to be binding as rules of international law if accepted by the leading Powers, which they have not been. (2) They are not binding as permanent and absolute rules on England and the United States, because neither England nor the United States has ever considered them to be so binding; and because by the treaty that proposed them as temporary rules of action for guidance of a special and exceptional court, the permanent adoption is dependent upon their communication to the great European Powers, which communication has never been made. (3) Even if the 'rules' be binding, it must be remembered that, on the topics discussed in the text, they are couched in a vagueness which, no doubt, was intentional, and which leaves open the main points of dispute. It is to be observed, in addition, that, while the weight of authority is that the 'rules' themselves contain propositions which are generally unobjectionable, such is not the case with the decisions of the majority of the Arbitrators, who interpret the 'rules' so as to impose on neutrals duties not only on their face unreasonable, but so oppressive as to make neutrality a burden which no prudent nation, in cases of great maritime wars abroad, would accept. It will be at once seen that these 'rules,' though leading to an award superficially favorable to the United States in the large damages it gave, placed *limitations on the rights of neutrals greater even than those England had endeavored to impose during the Napoleonic wars, and far greater than those which the United States had ever pre-*

viously been willing to concede. If such limitations are to be strictly applied, the position of a neutral . . . will be much more perilous and more onerous, in case of war between maritime Powers, than that of a belligerent. Our Government, to fulfil the obligations cast on it by these rules, would be obliged, not only to have a strong police at all its ports to prevent contraband articles from going out to a belligerent, but to have a powerful navy to scour the seas, to intercept vessels which might elude the home authorities and creep out carrying such contraband aid. Not only our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, but our boundary to the north and to the south contains innumerable points at which belligerents can replenish their contraband stores; and nothing but a standing army or navy greater than those of any European Power would prevent such operations." He adds that "the 'three rules' were temporary and exceptional and were to be only effective in case of ratification by the great Powers, which ratification was never given, as is maintained by Mr. Fish in his letters to Sir E. Thornton, of May 8 and September 18, 1876, communicated by Mr. Hayes in his message to the Senate of January 13, 1879. The same position was taken in the House of Commons in 1873 by Mr. Gladstone, Sir W. Harcourt, Mr. Disraeli, and the Attorney-General."

It is not the mere *fact* that some provisions, horses and mules may have been sold by citizens of the United States to agents of either belligerent and shipped from the port of New Orleans, but it is rather the *extent* of the sales and shipments, which has attracted comment and criticism. But the dimension of such transactions is not, and cannot possibly be made, the criterion of judgment on the question whether there has been a violation of neutral duty. If all the sales and shipments of contraband of war may not be lawfully conducted from one port, may they be distributed and lawfully conducted from a multitude of ports? The result is the same. The duty to prohibit and prevent in the one form would be not less solemn and imperative in the other. And the duty to prevent such sales and shipments or transportation from all points along our national boundary would, in case of war between two great European Powers, lay upon the United States the obligation of policing accordingly, and of preventing such sales and transportation, or the obligation to pay enormous indemnities for damages to either or both of the belligerents occasioned by the failure of the United States to do so. To prohibit the shipment or transportation in effect prohibits and prevents the sale of all the products of our factories and farms which may be destined for the military uses of either belligerent, and, in case of a great European war, would paralyze our com-

merce. No such rule of neutral duty is known to the law of nations.

V.

PRACTICE OF NATIONS SINCE THE GENEVA ARBITRATION.

As already stated, the United States and British Governments were agreed in their interpretation of Rule 2. The position of our government, during the discussions which led up to the arbitration, was indicated by the Proclamation of President Grant, in 1870, that all citizens of the United States "*may lawfully and without restriction*, by reason of the aforesaid state of war, manufacture and sell within the United States arms and munitions of war, and other articles ordinarily known as contraband of war; yet they cannot carry such articles upon the high seas for the use or service of either belligerent, . . . without incurring the risk of hostile capture."

On the outbreak of the late war between the United States and Spain, the British Government issued a proclamation of neutrality, and also instructions to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, which enjoined due observance by British subjects of the rules embodied in Article VI. of the Treaty of Washington. In respect of Rule 2, there was no prohibition of the sale of contraband of war, which had been expressly authorized by President Grant; but in respect of the other features of the rules, British subjects were prohibited from building within her Majesty's dominions, or equipping, or increasing or augmenting the warlike equipment or warlike force of, a ship of either belligerent, or from fitting out any naval or military expedition against any friendly state. The instructions *prohibited the using*, by "*ships of war of either belligerent*," of British ports or waters "*as a station or place of resort for any warlike purpose, or for the purpose of obtaining any facilities for warlike equipment*," or from taking in "*any supplies, except provisions and such other things as may be requisite for the use of the crew, and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her own country or to some nearer destination*"; or "*from carrying prizes made by them into the ports and harbors*" of the United Kingdom or of her possessions. The language of the instructions is in exact harmony with Rule 2.

Germany has issued no proclamations of neutrality during the

last twenty-five years, but the Foreign Office announced that strict neutrality would be observed toward the United States and Spain. The French proclamation announced scrupulous neutrality, and contained the main injunctions of international law with reference to the equipment and armament of belligerent war-ships and their permissible stay in French harbors, but no prohibition of the sale of contraband of war in the ordinary course of commerce.

The proclamation of Italy, a state which gives great attention to international law, contained elaborate injunctions upon the duties of neutrality with reference to the stay, the equipment, and the supply of belligerent war-ships with arms, ammunition, and provisions, in Italian ports; but contained no prohibition against the sale of contraband of war in the ordinary course of commerce.

No such prohibition is found in the carefully drawn proclamation of Japan; but the subjects of Japan were forbidden to supply "arms, ammunition, or other materials of direct use in fighting, to the men of war, or other ships used for warlike purposes or privateers belonging to either of the belligerent powers." The Russian proclamation contained injunctions on the duty of neutrality with respect to belligerent war-ships, but no prohibition on the sale of contraband of war in the ordinary course of commerce. No such prohibition was made by any one of the great civilized states which, with the United States, have created and settled, in the interests of the rights of peace and peaceful commerce, the principles of the law of nations.

Professor Lawrence in his work on the Law of Nations, published in 1895, well says:

"Every belligerent may capture goods of direct and immediate use in war, if he is able to intercept them on their passage to his enemy, in any place where it is lawful to carry on hostilities. But neutral merchants may trade in any ammunition and stores in time of war, as well as in time of peace. . . . Whenever a trade in contraband of war reaches large dimensions, the state whose adversary is supplied by means of it is apt to complain. It reproaches the government of the offending vendors with neglect of the duties of neutrality, and argues that friendship and impartiality alike demand the stoppage of a traffic which supplies its foe with the sinews of war. But it invariably receives in reply a reminder that the practice of nations imposes no such obligation upon neutral Powers. They are bound to prevent the departure of armed expeditions from their shores, and the supply of fighting gear to belligerent vessels in their ports. When this is done, the utmost that can be expected of them in the matter of ordinary business transactions is, that

they shall warn their subjects of the risk run by carriers of contraband merchandise, and give notice that those who incur them will not be protected by the force or the influence of the state."

In 1896, Alfonse Rivier, the celebrated Swiss publicist, published his great work on the Law of Nations. In summing up the principles of neutrality, he states that the neutral state may not permit the arming, equipping, and manning of war-ships on its territory, for employment against one of the belligerents.

"*The government of a neutral state is not allowed to furnish directly to the belligerents arms, munitions, provisions, ships of war.*" (Such a sale of arms was complained of as made by the Government of the United States to France in 1871 under a statute passed July 20, 1868, before the war broke out.) But he adds that, "*the citizens or inhabitants of the neutral state are free to sell all kinds of goods, in time of war as in time of peace, and especially to the belligerents, or either of them.*" He "is at liberty to follow his vocation, to transact business, to make money. This intention is not unlawful, and a war between two states ought to injure as little as possible the industries and commerce of a third state which is not engaged in the quarrel." But, on the other hand, "the belligerent has a right to prevent the commerce exercised to his prejudice by the subjects of neutral states in things useful in war. The neutral individual who sells arms and munitions of war to a belligerent does so at his peril . . . at the risk of confiscation of his merchandise as contraband of war."

As a matter of fact, the Government of the United States bought in Great Britain, during the late Spanish war, over a million dollars' worth of arms and munitions of war. Spain was known to be buying large quantities of munitions of war abroad; and neither belligerent made any complaint of it, or any attempt to prevent it. Bought in the ordinary course of commerce, nobody supposed that there was any violation of neutral duty by the governments who permitted their subjects to sell to any customers who came to their doors.

W. L. PENFIELD.

THE WAY OF THE WORKINGMAN.

BY CY WARMAN.

ONCE there was an artist in an alien land. He liked the place and the people, and so he concluded to build him a shelter and stay among them awhile. The men whom he employed in rearing his new home, though trained to the same tongue as himself, were all strangers to him, from the chief architect to the fair-haired boy who flogged the freckled pony and hauled the hods and hammers for the stone-workers; hauled them for fifty cents a trip—a dollar sometimes,—when any street dray would have performed the same service for a quarter.

Up to the time of signing the contracts, the artist had been a workingman. But that day he went over to the Capitalist column, and labor began to lie in wait for him. So long as he labored and lived in a rented house, where the builders had piped the poisonous sewer-gas in behind the wainscoting, instead of out through the roof, he had been a workingman; but the moment he began to scatter his savings by building himself a home, giving employment to the unemployed, he became the open enemy of the poor, the oppressor of the oppressed, with few rights that labor felt called upon to respect.

All the work was to be done by contract; so the men, of course, worked faithfully, and the new house grew rapidly. Meanwhile, the Capitalist got up with the lark every morning, and painted while the sun was catching and coloring the maples that the frost had nipped the night before. At eight o'clock, when the workmen went by to work, the artist's day was half done. In the afternoon the artist would go over and look into things, and, incidentally, take the temperature of the atmosphere between the contractors and their employees and himself. Each day the air grew grayer and colder. One day, when he caught the carpenters

putting rotten timber into the roof-frame and protested, the head carpenter hinted that he would prefer to take his instructions from the architect. When the artist swore mildly, the carpenter put up his hands, and rolled his eyes skyward in pious horror.

However, on the whole, they were not a bad lot of men; and, at the end of six months, the artist moved into his new house. But he had lost caste. He never got back the respect of the men he had employed.

After a couple of years' work on the canvas, having recovered from his first experience as a Capitalist, the artist decided to enlarge his home. Being in a hurry, he determined to have most of the work done by the day, having in mind the rotten wood used by the contracting carpenters on the previous occasion. Accordingly, he called the architect and instructed him to gather the good people together. Now, when the old gang heard that the lamb had grown a new fleece and was about to lie down again, they all came with sharpened shears for the shearing. They were a fine crew, and, according to the artist's testimony, as loyal a band of Brothers as ever put hands into an employer's pockets. When a question came up between the artist and any one of them, that one could always count on the faithful support of all the others; for, right or wrong, they were with him.

The new carpenter was one of the very best in the place. He was more deeply and earnestly religious, if anything, than the rotten-wood carpenter had been. He gave out the first day that if anybody swore he would leave the job; but nobody swore, and he worked on.

The plasterer was one of the few men who were employed by the piece. The architect had told the Capitalist that fifteen cents a yard was the proper price for plastering; but this fellow, knowing the alien artist for an easy mark, made it eighteen, and the artist, being in a hurry, told him to go ahead.

At the last moment, when all was ready and waiting for him, the plasterer came. The melancholy carpenter met him beneath the artist's window, and they talked together earnestly, for a long time—the carpenter was paid for his time. Presently, the plasterer came into the house, and the carpenter moved as far away as he could go without forfeiting his claim to his pay. The artist went to the plasterer and remonstrated hotly at his tardiness, for he was already a day late, but the hard-finish man

countered. He didn't care for the job, he said, and in any case he would not do it for less than twenty cents a yard.

"But you asked only eighteen," protested the Capitalist, "and now it is too late to look for another man. And see," he went on, "you get paid for three doors and three windows in this room on which you have to do no work at all."

"Twenty cents, or I take my traps away," said the fresco artist, and the alien nodded.

When it was all done and measured, the plasterer claimed only his twenty cents, but there was an extra yard in the next room, which had not been mentioned in the contract. For that yard the man with the white cotton uniform charged one dollar and fifty cents, and he got the money.

Not long after this, a raven flew over from the artist's country, carrying something which enabled the artist to enlarge his holdings and make many improvements. He always employed the same melancholy carpenter, for he was a good carpenter, and, according to his light, a good man; but he didn't use a headlight.

In conversation with the carpenter, the artist always avoided any reference to the plasterer, feeling that the carpenter must allude to the subject sooner or later, as surely as a hunted fox comes back to his starting point, or a murderer returns to the scene of his crime. But when the carpenter related the following incident, the artist exploded. The artist had been complaining about a leak in the summer kitchen which the robbers who had roofed it could not, or would not, repair.

"That reminds me of an awful funny thing that happened last Sunday morning to a friend of mine who is in my trade," said the carpenter, putting his plane down; and he almost smiled as he looked up at the artist. "Father Blank was in his bath, when the whole ceiling gave way and came down, filling the tub and burying the good man under an avalanche of lime, wet paper, and cold rain-water. When they had shovelled him out, the priest called my friend up and he hurried over. Father Blank asked him to go up and try to find what was wrong, before any more damage was done. My friend went above, and saw at a glance that the man who had put on a new roof the day before had left a joint unsoldered. He hunted the tinner up and told him what had happened; and the tinner sent a man over and had the thing fixed.

"Of course," he added, reaching for his plane, "my friend didn't tell Father Blank, for he didn't want to make trouble for the tinner."

"Assuredly not," said the artist, quietly boiling. "Certainly, he could not be expected to do that! To be sure, the tin-roof man is a contractor, like himself—competing with him for work; but he is also a workingman, like yourself, and as such is entitled to your help. Of course, Father Blank had employed your friend as an expert to tell him what was wrong with the roof, but he is a capitalist, and all you people want from him is his capital and his good opinion. His blessing drives no nails with you, for you are of another creed, which makes it easier for you to do him."

The artist was sitting on the edge of a table looking down on the carpenter, who was kneeling in a heap of maple shavings on a hard-wood floor.

"What do you mean?" demanded the meek man with as much severity as he could; "I don't do anybody."

"I mean," said the artist, with his eyes full on the other's upturned face, "that when this poor priest employed your friend as an expert—taking into account, no doubt, the fact that he is a conscientious, Christian man—he had a right to expect from him loyalty to his employer, and not loyalty to the man who, by his criminal carelessness, had imperilled and outraged his reverence. Your friend should have felt himself in honor bound to tell his employer the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, to the end that the man who was responsible for it all might be compelled to pay for his carelessness."

"But no; you must stand together. The tinsmith represents labor, the priest capital; and as between these there can be but one choice. I presume that the very fact of his having a bathtub in his possession, and using it, would work against the priest!"

The carpenter kept his troubled face full upon the artist, and it was now mutely pleading for pity; but the artist was inexorable.

"You are about the best fellow I've had about me here," he went on. "You would not rob me, but you would hold me up while another went through me."

"I can't stand that," said the carpenter; "I want to know what you mean by *that*."

"Listen," said the artist, "for I have suffered to say this for many moons. As often as I have written your name in my check-book have I longed to lay this down to you, and at last my time has come, and as yours goes on I'll say it. Listen! Once there was a hungry pirate of a plasterer who came into this very room, and held me up for three cents a yard for all the wall space and eighteen cents a yard for the doors and windows which he was not to do. When he departed, he was happy and I had been done.

"When he came to do the work, you met him outside, and talked low to him for a long time, glancing over your shoulder for me, but always at the wrong window. When you were through with him, he was dissatisfied, cross, cranky, and I had to add two cents more to each yard of work. For the last yard I paid him a dollar and fifty cents. You are a good, loyal fellow, Jack; but you helped that pirate to pinch me. Now, tell me, do you think that sort of thing square? Is it right or honorable?"

"Well," said the carpenter, with his eyes on the floor, "I had not looked at it in that light before."

"Well, that's the proper light," said the artist, slipping from the table, "and that's the way of the workingman."

"Pick up your plane, Jack, and go on with your work. I must go now, and paint a picture of this business, and I promise you upon the honor of a man—not a workingman, nor a capitalist, but a plain white man—that there shall be no extravagance, no waste of color, but the thing shall be depicted precisely as it occurred."

CY WARMAN.

THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.

BY ALBERTO B. MARTINEZ.

THE funded external debt of the Argentine Republic, for which provision was made in the Budget for 1901, amounts to \$386,004,118 in gold.

Although this is the Public Debt that figures among the nation's liabilities, it is necessary to observe that the entire sum cannot properly be considered as such, for a large proportion represents securities that are held by the nation itself. The aggregate value of such securities is \$31,980,135, gold. There is, besides, another very important item included in that sum, which is for payments made by the National Government for account of individual provinces, with funds provided by the latter. Under this group should be classified \$34,000,000 belonging to the Province of Buenos Aires, \$4,874,688 furnished to the Province of Santa Fé with which to settle all outstanding accounts and claims with the French Railroad Company of that province, \$7,245,315 of Entre Rios province, and \$7,699,998 of the "Banco Nacional" in liquidation, which, although a Government institution, advances the necessary funds itself to meet payment of this and other charges.

Deducting, therefore, these amounts from the \$386,004,118 at which the total debt is figured, it will be seen that the total funded indebtedness weighing upon the national revenues is \$300,203,982 gold.

I will hereafter show in what ratio this debt affects the nation's resources, what is its quota per capita of population, and how it compares with the national debts of other countries.

But first, it would be well to investigate the historical circumstances under which this debt was contracted and the reasons which justified it.

The first loan negotiated abroad by the Republic was made a few years after the declaration of its independence.

In 1822, the Province of Buenos Aires had the good fortune to find a progressive and liberal government in power, which, owing to the many good works and improvements initiated during its administration, looms up as a landmark in Argentine history. The then President was General Martin Rodriguez, and among the members of his cabinet were Bernardino Rivadavia and Manuel José Garcia. That Government cast its penetrating glance across the vast wastes and desert tracts within the Argentine boundaries; considered the immense natural wealth lying undeveloped for lack of requisite resources, and realized that the three most immediate and vital requirements were:

1. The construction of a harbor adequate to the needs of traffic and interchange of produce with foreign markets;

2. A proper sanitary water supply, tending to promote the health of its inhabitants; and

3. The building of towns on the new frontier line to serve as advance posts of civilization, and as barriers to the frequent encroachments of the savage Indian tribes.

In order to carry out these important public works, the Government of 1822 decided to resort to foreign credits, negotiating a loan of £1,000,000 in six per cent. bonds and one per cent. sinking-fund provision through the firm of Baring Brothers of London.

Unfortunately, the Government disposed of the proceeds of this loan to establish a banking institution which was short-lived, and the public works referred to were not undertaken. Half a century elapsed before those improvements were at last carried out. This loan was negotiated in 1824 at seventy per cent., netting the Government \$3,500,000 gold.

For many years, during the tyrannical reign of Rosas, payment of interest on these bonds was suspended. In 1856, after the overthrow of despotism, the Government of Buenos Aires commissioned Señor Norberto de la Riestra to enter into negotiations with the creditors and offer them, not only the pledge of punctual payment on all future interest accruing, but also the payment of arrears in deferred-payment bonds bearing one, and one and a half and two per cent. interest progressively, throughout a certain number of years, with a one half per cent. sinking fund. To-day, after payment of interest for 76 years, during which time the Republic

has repaid many times over the sum received, there is yet outstanding in circulation from this loan the amount of £166,300.

The second loan raised by the nation was for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the war of 1865, provoked without reason by the "Tyrant of Paraguay." It was for \$15,600,000 gold, and was exclusively applied to the use above stated.

The third loan was in 1870 for the sum of \$5,214,888, gold, during the presidency of Señor Sarmiento, all devoted to public works.

Both this and the previous loan were later taken up and exchanged for refunded bonds bearing a lower rate of interest.

In more recent years, other loans have been negotiated by the Republic, which I will enumerate briefly.

The "Railroad" Bond issue, authorized by the legislature on October 2nd, 1880, was for \$12,000,000, with which to extend the lines of the North Central Railroad, and those of the Andes Railway Co., besides building a branch line to Santiago del Estero.

These bonds, which bear interest at six per cent., redeemable through a one per cent. sinking fund, were placed in London in 1881 at 91. The issue was for £2,450,000, but there are only at present in circulation £351,340.

The "National Public Funds" loan was authorized by the laws of October 12th, 1882, and June 28th, 1883, for \$8,571,000 national currency, the proceeds to be applied to the payment, by the Government, of the shares it had taken in the Banco Nacional, (to-day in liquidation). They are five per cent. interest bearing bonds with a one per cent. sinking fund. The original issue was for £1,714,200, of which £31,100 was amortized. The balance was taken by Messrs. Baring Brothers in March, 1884, at 84½. Consequently the actual amount in circulation is £1,683,700.

The bond issue sanctioned by legislature on October 27th, 1882, was for the purpose of undertaking the capital's harbor improvements, as a fresh impetus to foreign trade. The authorized emission was of \$20,000,000 in six per cent. bonds, with a sinking fund of one per cent.; but there are only £1,976,600 in circulation.

The "Public Works" bond issue for \$42,000,000 was authorized on October 21st, 1885, for the purpose of unifying various legislative enactments authorizing loans for different public works. These stocks bear five per cent. interest, redeemable through a

one per cent. sinking fund. The amount issued under the general bond was £8,333,000, of which £4,000,000 were placed on the London market in January, 1886, at 80, and the balance in January, 1887, at 85½. The total amount in circulation is £7,581,200.

The loan known as the "North Central Railroad loan" is divided into two series. The first, authorized by legislature on October 9th, 1886, was for \$20,000,000 gold. Of this sum, £3,968,200 were issued as follows: in London, June, 1887, £1,300,000, at 91½; April, 1888, £1,500,000, at 94; May, 1889, £1,168,200, at 97. The sum in circulation to-day is £3,768,400.

The second series, authorized on October 30th, 1889, October 16th, 1885, and October 9th, 1886, was for £15,000,000, gold, of which £2,976,000 were issued. Both issues were five per cents. with a one per cent. sinking fund, and were for the purpose of extending the lines of the North Central Railroad.

The "Banco Nacional" loan was approved by the law of December 2nd, 1888, authorizing a bond issue of \$10,291,000 gold, with which to pay off the Government's indebtedness to the "Banco Nacional." These securities, which are also five per cents. with a one per cent. sinking fund, were placed at 90.

The "Treasury Notes Refund Loan" was authorized on June 21st, 1887. The total approved issue was to have been \$5,078,330, national currency, but the amount actually issued was £624,000, in five per cent. bonds, with a one per cent. sinking fund. They were issued to replace the old nine per cent. Treasury bonds.

The "Province of Buenos Aires Government Loan" was authorized by legislature on August 15th, 1887. Its purpose was to enable the National Government to liquidate its outstanding indebtedness to the Government and to the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires. The total issue was of \$19,868,500, gold, in four and one half per cent. bonds, amortizable through a one per cent. sinking fund. These bonds were delivered at 90.

"The Six Per Cent. Debts Refund Loan" was authorized on August 2nd, 1888, for the object of calling in and replacing all Government stocks bearing the above rate of interest, by new securities at four and a half per cent. interest and one per cent. amortization. These bonds were negotiated in London in February, 1889. The entire issue of £5,290,000 was placed at 90.

The "Hard Dollars Refund Loan," through legislative enact-

ment of July 2nd, 1889, authorized an issue of \$13,000,000, gold, in three and a half per cent. bonds with a one per cent. sinking fund, to refund all government debts contracted in hard dollars. The total sum issued was £2,659,500; that in circulation £2,443,340.

What is known as the "Consolidation Loan," authorized by an act of legislation on January 24th, 1891, is one of the most important operations of credit ever transacted by the Republic, and is interlinked with the political events of a period in the history of the Argentine, which it is of the greatest interest to investigate.

When, on the 6th of August, 1890, the government of the Republic was assumed by the new President, Señor Pellegrini, the country was suffering, to quote the words of the eminent Minister of Finance of that administration:

"From the effects of a political agitation carried to the highest excess, and was on the verge of the most violent and desperate financial crisis that ever confronted the Argentine Republic, and placed its honor in question.

"The national Treasury had exhausted all its resources in an effort to assist and save the credit of the 'Banco Nacional,' whose indebtedness, to the government, amounted to \$47,491,483, paper currency, and \$12,641,120, gold; in favor of foreign creditors to \$18,540,186, gold, and to local creditors, \$11,644,000, gold.

"Furthermore, if the situation of the Banco Nacional was precarious that in which the 'Banco Hipotecario Nacional' and the Municipality of Buenos Aires found themselves was no less serious. The former institution was unable to collect \$1,690,833, paper currency, and \$556,374, gold, outstanding for unpaid interest on loans, and the Buenos Aires Corporation was burdened with debts amounting to \$34,646,553, in paper currency, and \$461,698, in gold, of internal debt, besides \$9,800,000 of foreign indebtedness."

The new Government at once concentrated all its energies towards rehabilitating the credit of the Banco Nacional, placing the "Banco Hipotecario" in a position to enable it to continue to facilitate real estate transactions and conveyances of property, and reimburse itself for unsecured advances previously made, of regulating the disorders in every department of the municipality of Buenos Aires and placing it on a self-sustaining basis, and finally of either paying off, or coming to some agreement about, the foreign debt.

The fundamental basis of this important transaction was, in the language of the President's message accompanying the pro-

ject, "to give the country a period of economic rest, suspending for a judicious length of time the exportation of the coin or bullion needed for the payment of interest on debts contracted by the nation abroad."

The principal conditions of this financial transaction amounted to a bilateral contract between the Government of the Republic and the banking concerns interested. By virtue of this agreement, the banks undertook to pay the interest on the funded debt and the subventions to the railroad companies, for a period of three years, taking in payment the equivalent in bonds to be issued by themselves at par value. The yearly emission of such bonds would, of course, depend on the sum required for the service of the public debt. The Argentine Republic on its side agreed to guarantee these bonds (which were six per cents.) with the receipts of the custom houses, receiving in payment of duties coupons or certificates maturing within the year. The nation solemnly agreed and bound itself, furthermore, in no wise to increase its external obligations, either in the form of new loans or in subventions, during the three years stipulated in the "Moratorium" agreement.

The total authorized issue was \$75,000,000, gold, in bonds bearing the high rate of six per cent. interest, redeemable after three years and within thirty. The coupons of these bonds were to serve, as before explained, in payment of customs duties.

Fortunately, only \$38,458,627, gold, were issued, leaving an authorized unissued balance of \$36,541,373.

The "Sanitary Measures Loan," authorized by legislative enactment of January 30th, 1891, for \$33,750,000, gold, in five per cent. annuities and one per cent. amortization, had the following origin:

The Juarez Celman administration that immediately preceded that of Señor Pellegrini, carrying to extremes the Spencerian doctrine, that the state is ever a poor administrator, falling into grave financial and political errors that later cost the country very dear, decided to turn over to private parties all the industrial enterprises or franchises that were the nation's property, among which were the water and sewerage systems of the City of Buenos Aires.

Very soon, however, it was evident to all that a serious error had been committed. The company that took charge of those

two important services had no further interest than that of exploiting the public to its own advantage, which gave rise to repeated protests and complaints from the masses and classes alike. The Pellegrini Government, which came into power on August 6th, 1890, realized that it was not only an act of good administration, but at the same time an able political move, to have these monopolies revert to the state's control, and obtained, through an act of legislature, authority to negotiate a loan of \$33,750,000 for this purpose. Under this authorization the sum of \$31,874,976, gold, was issued in five per cent. bonds, with a one per cent. sinking fund.

The loan known as "Rescission of Railroad Subventions" authorized by legal enactments dated January 10th, 1896, and December 31st, 1898, was contracted for the purpose of relieving the state from the onerous burden entailed by the grant to the Railroad Companies of an annuity of six per cent. on the total capital invested in the construction of railways throughout the country. It cost \$58,499,784, gold, to accomplish this end, for which sum four per cent. interest-bearing bonds were issued, with a sinking fund of one half per cent.

The loan for the "Refunding of Provincial Debts," authorized on August 8th, 1896, is justified by the highest considerations of national solidarity, and of the prestige of Argentine credit. The enormous indebtedness contracted by the provinces, due in a great measure to the imprudence of European bankers, to the inflation of values following the heavy importations of borrowed gold, due also to the facility for obtaining credits, followed by the prodigal and thoughtless employment of such moneys, with the attendant consequences of insolvency and bankruptcy, had well-nigh, says ex-Minister Rosas, dealt a death-blow to the nation's credit. The National Government, it must be remembered, had taken no part in the contracting of those debts, had not intervened, in a single one of the loans, and was under no legal obligation whatever to accept such serious responsibilities; but at the same time, the discredit brought about by the state of insolvency of the individual provinces in every market of Europe, could not but affect the nation's credit. The National Government could not, on the other hand, remain indifferent to the perilous situation in which such a state of affairs had plunged the provinces. The national revenues for the most part were all pledged already,

and, as above explained, the Government had acknowledged to the world its inability to pay full interest on its public debt for many years. Under these circumstances, legal action taken by the country's creditors would have seriously interfered with the administration of government, would have blocked the development of the country's natural riches, curtailed agricultural and industrial production, and generally injured Argentine prospects. These powerful considerations were what decided the national authorities to offer to assist the provinces to make fair and reasonable arrangements with their creditors abroad, and as far as possible, to free them from the weight of such appalling responsibilities.

The basis on which the greater part of these arrangements was made, was that of an exchange of four and a half per cent. stocks of the internal debt or provincial securities, for four per cent. bonds of the funded national debt, which the National Government agreed to deliver to the respective creditors of the former.

The grand total of the debts contracted by the provinces was \$151,775,953.35, gold; in full settlement and complete cancellation of which indebtedness, the National Government delivered to the creditors the sum of \$85,999,499.82, gold, in four per cent. bonds.

The interest on these bonds, together with the sinking fund appropriations, amounts to \$3,869,977.49 a year. The National Government acquired, through this transaction, four and a half per cent. bonds of the internal debt of the "Subventioned Banks" law, to an amount of \$45,876,164.82, interest and amortization on which aggregates \$2,523,189.06. Adding to this figure, the \$1,360,000, gold, which Buenos Aires contributes yearly, and the \$256,103 from the Entre Rios province, we have a total of \$4,139,292.06, as against an expenditure of \$3,869,977.49. This exchange of internal for external debt securities produces a momentary profit of \$269,314.57 in favor of the nation.

The Municipal Bonds Refund Loan authorized by legislation September 25th, 1897, and December 15th, 1898, provided for an issue of \$7,700,000, gold, in four per cent. bonds with a one half per cent. sinking fund. The proceeds of this issue were to apply to the payment of claims of the creditors of the "Banco Nacional" in liquidation.

The law of January 5th, 1899, authorized a loan of \$30,000,000,

gold, with which to cancel outstanding debts of the public treasury, guaranteed by the liquor tax, up to \$4,000,000, gold, a year. Fortunately, this loan was never carried into effect, and is not likely to be issued in the future.

Such are, briefly, the antecedents of the various external debts contracted by the nation.

Let us now examine the details of the consolidated internal debt, interest on which figures in the National Budget.

The following table gives the different items of the debt:

	In Circulation December 31, 1900	
	Gold.	National Currency.
Bank Subventions. Law of November 3, 1887.		
Rescission of guarantees.....	\$3,125,000	—
November 3, 1887;		
Bank of the province of Mendoza.....	3,000,000	—
November 3, 1887;		
British Bank	250,000	—
Pensions, War of Independence. Law of September 2, 1881	—	142,083
Pensions, Brazilian War. Law of June 30, 1884.	—	398,100
Refund National Bank Stock. Law of October 16, 1891	—	11,876,000
Consolidated Internal Debt. Law of January 5, 1894	—	17,139,000
National Internal Debt. Law of June 23, 1891.	—	17,299,100
Extinction of the Lobster. Law of August 7, 1897	—	5,312,000
National Board of Education. Law of January 15, 1898	—	5,874,900
Popular Internal Loan. Law of May 17, 1898.	—	41,354,500
Total.....	\$6,375,000	\$99,395,683

From the above sum of \$99,395,683, paper currency, should be deducted \$5,931,700, the amount of the bonds of the loan for the consolidation of the floating debt of 1894, which securities are held by the National Government. This reduces the consolidated or funded internal debt to \$93,463,983, in paper currency.

In the case of several of these loans, as for instance the "Consolidation of the Floating Debt, 1894," the "Extinction of the Lobster," and the "Popular Internal Loan, 1898," provision is made for the rapid reduction of the indebtedness by means of the sinking fund, so that most of these debts will be extinguished at a relatively early date.

The bonds of the "Bank Subventions" loan, bear four and a

half per cent. interest, amortizable at one per cent.; those of the "Pensions" of the War of Independence and Brazilian wars, five per cent. and one per cent.; the "Refund of National Bank Stock" bonds, six per cent. and one per cent.; the "Internal Consolidated Debt," 1894, six per cent. interest with a six per cent. sinking fund; the "National Internal Loan," six per cent. and two per cent.; the Extinction of the Lobster, six per cent. interest and six per cent. amortization; the "National Board of Education" bonds five per cent. and one per cent.; and, finally, the Popular Internal Loan of 1898, with bonds bearing six per cent. interest and a rate of amortization of four per cent.

Returning to the External Debt, it should be noted that, among the nation's liabilities, there are:

- 3 loans aggregating \$41,067,532.80, bearing 6 per cent. interest.
- 8 loans aggregating \$133,176,375, bearing 5 per cent. interest.
- 2 loans aggregating \$43,702,082, bearing $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. interest.
- 12 loans aggregating \$155,743,094, bearing 4 per cent. interest.
- 1 loan amounting to \$12,314,433, bearing $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. interest.

The mere enumeration of the different rates of interest at which the external debt of the Republic is at present taxed, shows the necessity of an attempt tending towards the consolidation or unification of the debt, so as to modify its present irregular aspect and remove that source of danger to the nation's credit.

It is necessary to begin by calling in all the bonds of the Morgan loan of 1891, and all other six per cent. securities, then all five per cent. and four and a half per cent. stocks, until a general and total unification is accomplished at a standard rate of four per cent. as corresponds to the Republic's credit.

A recapitulation of the foregoing figures shows that the total external debt bearing on the National Treasury (after deducting the value of the securities held by the Government itself, and the sums actually provided by the provinces) amounts to \$300,203,982, gold; and that the total internal debt (also after deducting the value of securities held by the Government) reaches \$6,375,000 in gold, and \$93,463,983 in paper currency.

We shall now study the budget and discover what proportion the public debt bears to the total estimate of national expenditures.

According to the Budget for 1901, the nation applies the following sums to payment of interest and amortization on its External and Internal Debts:

	External Debt.	International Debt.	
	Gold.	Gold.	National Currency.
Interest or annuities.....	\$17,746,469.65	\$168,750	\$6,046,666.67
Sinking Fund	4,311,426.28	35,000	6,047,143.45
Commissions	132,132.15	—	—
Total.....	\$22,190,028.08	203,750	\$12,093,810.12

In addition to this, an item of \$2,000,000, gold, figures in the Budget under the Public Debts appropriation, for "expenses connected with the payment of interests on sums advanced, losses and discounts on remittances, stamps on bills of exchange, fees, commissions, brokerage and other expenses incidental to the public debt." Although this amount does not in reality form part of the sums paid over to the creditors in payment of the debt, it nevertheless is directly chargeable to the Public Debt account, as it is indispensable to the service, in permitting the Director of Finance by its means, to make transactions at short notice incidental to the funded debt, which would be otherwise impossible. Therefore, in computing the total expenditures incurred in the service of the Public Debt, that charge must of necessity be taken into account.

The nation, therefore, required in 1901, \$22,190,028, gold, for the service of the External Debt, and \$12,093,810 in national paper currency; and \$203,750, in gold, for the Internal Debt, plus \$2,000,000, in gold, for discounts, interest on sums advanced, brokerage, etc.—or, in other words, a total of \$24,393,778, in gold, and \$12,093,810 in paper currency.*

But out of this sum the government receives \$1,930,379, in gold, for interest accruing on bonds held by itself.

The total Budget of expenditures for all branches and departments of the government for 1901 amounted to \$24,094,796, in gold, (after deducting the \$1,930,379 reverting to the Government for interest on securities), and \$89,940,499, national currency, which at the legal rate is equivalent to \$39,573,819, in gold, making an aggregate total of \$65,598,994, in gold, of which the service of the Public Debt absorbs \$27,744,675, or forty-four per cent. of the total national expenditures.

This ratio is enormous, but in extenuation it should be remarked that in the figures given for the service of the Public Debt,

* The last legislative enactment fixed the value of a dollar currency at forty-four cents gold.

there are included the sums of \$4,311,426, in gold, and \$6,047,143, national currency, destined to the extinction of equal amounts of indebtedness through the operation of the sinking fund, which, instead of being an expense, is economy.

Nevertheless, the figure that still remains is enormous. With a population of 4,500,000, the *per-capita* burden on each and every inhabitant of the Argentine Republic for the payment of the public debt alone is almost \$7, in gold.

With these facts and figures before us, is it permissible or fair to apply to the existing conditions in the Argentine Republic the doctrine held by so many authorities on Political Economy, that, when the obligations of its Public Debt exceed forty per cent. of the total budget, or revenues of a nation, a crisis has been reached in which that nation stands on the brink of ruin and bankruptcy?

Undoubtedly that theory is based on sound principles of financial science and confirmed by the experience of several nations, but it must be remembered that such teachings are mainly applicable to European nations, to the Old World, where the growth of population, the increase of wealth and all the phenomena of social and economic existence, develop in a regular, measured way; but not to a new and unexploited country like the Argentine, of vast natural and undeveloped resources, susceptible of momentary and unforeseen increase in wealth and population, and where events succeed each other with lightning rapidity.

The authors to whom I have reference admit, moreover, that in calculating the ratio, in which the Public Debt can be said to burden or tax a nation's resources, there are many elements to be taken into consideration. This statement renders investigation by comparison along these lines extremely difficult.

The total amount of the Public Debt is not, in itself, sufficient to enable the student to ascertain the financial condition of a nation, for it might well happen, as in the case of Australia, that the proceeds of the debt contracted had been invested in productive works, yielding vast revenues to the National Treasury.

Nor is the *per-capita* quota of a public debt a safe indication of a nation's financial buoyancy. As a dead-weight of 50 kilos., let us say, might overtax the strength of the weakling, while comparatively light to the athlete, it is possible that a public debt that appears exorbitant to one nation can be easily taken care of by another, according to its vitality and resources.

The only way, therefore, to satisfactorily calculate the burden of a public debt is by comparison with the public wealth and with the chances and prospects of its increase and development. Following this line of investigation, it will be found that the Argentine Republic holds out the most promising hopes and gives evidence of the most encouraging results already accomplished, which induce a relative assurance of its ability to meet its future obligations. If the value of a nation's exports can be taken as a sign of its commercial prosperity, a glance at the increase in shipments of produce to foreign markets from Argentine ports in the past decade, should prove most encouraging. In 1890, Argentina's exports amounted to \$100,818,000; in 1899, they reached \$181,917,000, in gold!

Simultaneously with the increase in her export trade, Argentina has developed her revenue-making power with extraordinary elasticity, making it possible for the Government to undertake important public works, to perfect the branches of administration, to build up and equip the foremost navy in South America, and spread the blessings of primary and secondary education by means of public schools throughout its territory.

In 1889 the total revenues amounted to \$72,903,756, and in 1890 to \$73,150,856, national currency; in 1899 they had increased to \$45,676,188.82 in gold, and \$61,419,990.16, national currency; while in 1900 they were \$36,249,351.41 in gold, and \$62,128,968.80 national currency.

A country in which such rapid strides are made in the line of progress is surely in a sufficiently healthy condition to shoulder, without misgivings for the future, the weight and responsibility of its Public Debt, large as it is. But this confidence in its own resources should not blind its people to the fact that its present condition is a very delicate one, that any reverse or setback, such as the loss of its crops, a visitation of the plague, the closing to its produce of international markets, or a sudden decline in the value of its exportable products, is liable to place the nation in a critical position. The most rigid economy and discretion in the management of its finances are the nation's first duty.

But this alone is not sufficient. It is necessary that, on their side, the foreign creditors of the Republic should realize how extremely delicate the situation is, and that, interested as they are in securing their investments, they should be willing to accept

some form of arrangement, whereby a short recuperative rest might be granted to the National Treasury, even to the extent of renouncing temporarily the collection of interest on their capital, on condition that such momentary loss should later be compensated for, by the issuing of new bonds.

They should take into account, that, if out of a total revenue of \$65,598,000, the Republic applies \$27,744,675 to the requirements of the Public Debt, the remaining \$37,854,000 are hardly sufficient to meet current expenses of government, and also to provide the necessary funds for undertaking improvements and public works indispensable to the development of a new country lacking in roads, canals, ports and other necessary instruments of commercial reorganization and prosperity.

The nation's creditors should, furthermore, be well satisfied with the uses to which the money they loaned has been put. It is true that a small proportion of this money was not applied to the purpose for which it was borrowed; but it is no less a fact that the greater part of it has been employed in the carrying-out of works of important national usefulness, which could not otherwise have been accomplished.

ALBERTO B. MARTINEZ.

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AIR-SHIPS AND FLYING-MACHINES.

BY A. SANTOS DUMONT.

ON my journey from France to America, on board the "Deutschland," I occupied my leisure in reading the interesting book by Mr. H. G. Wells entitled "When the Sleeper Awakes: a Story of the Years to Come," and in putting on paper some reflections suggested by the two chapters which principally claimed my attention: "While the Aëroplanes were Coming" and "The Coming of the Aëroplanes."

That which always strikes me in books of this sort is the effort of imagination put forth by the authors in discerning in the distant future things which to-day lie under the very eyes of men more practical or less near-sighted, who know how to look at the things which are close to them.

Mr. H. G. Wells speaks of aërial navigation as men talked of automobile locomotion about ten years ago, believing that they predicted the future without suspecting that they spoke of the present. They were far from thinking that, at the end of the nineteenth century, carriages propelled by petroleum, by steam, by electricity, comfortable and rapid, would be speeding over all the roads of the world.

À propos of "horseless carriages," as automobiles were at first called, being defined by their negative qualities, people said: "Our nephews will perhaps see them, but not we." The reality has transcended the dream, and the practical automobile has come before the nephews have had time to fill their uncles' places.

Again I am astonished to see that, in the field of *aéronautics*, the ideas of dreamers, as opposed to those of scientific men, turn exclusively to what they call *aéroplanes*—that is to say, toward flying-machines, which as yet exist only in the future, and which raise themselves, or to speak more accurately, will raise themselves, without the assistance of any gas lighter than air. They do not perceive that from now on, the air-ship furnishes a solution of the problem of *aërial* navigation, and realizes without difficulty the first condition of every system of *aërial* motion—which is to float in the air, carrying with it its *aéronaut*; although flying-machines without a balloon have been, until now, only toys, not capable of carrying a man or even of supporting their own weight in the air more than a few minutes.

Certainly the time will come when, thanks to the development of light motors, man will be able to travel like the birds, borne without gas by vast *aéroplanes*. But the best means of arriving at this result is by the construction of many air-ships and by frequent tests, made not under cover but in the open air.

People err in continually opposing, as they do without reflection, "*aërostation*," whose principle requires a combination of materials which is lighter than the air displaced by it, to "*aviation*," which involves a combination heavier than the air.

As a matter of fact in the air-ship—such, for instance, as my "No. 6"—both principles are employed. The balloon, in the form of a spindle, measuring thirty-three metres in length and six metres in diameter in the middle, is heavier than the air, since it does not rise of itself when the propeller is stopped. My air-ship is nothing else than a sort of tubular *aéroplane*, into whose construction enters hydrogen gas under pressure, which keeps tense its vast surface, with the least possible weight of materials. I use hydrogen as a constituent part of the tubular *aéroplane* to insure the rigidity of its fabric, in place of a solid frame-work which would not produce for the moment the same effect without the greatest difficulty. For the same reason, for certain pieces of mechanism which do not demand the re-

sistant qualities of steel, I use aluminum, which, next to hydrogen, is the lightest substance known to industry: for the same reason, also, with the constant aim of diminishing the weight of the mechanism, I have adopted, as an essential part of the armored frame-work which supports the car and the *aéronaut*, a combination of pieces of pine-wood bound together by metallic threads so fine that they weigh almost nothing. So I was able to construct, in tubular form, the only *aéroplane* which has ever succeeded in raising itself and its *aéronaut* while remaining heavier than the air, about twenty kilogrammes being supported by the dynamic action of the propeller.

Nature sets us the example of this economy of weight in making hollow the quills of the feathers of birds, which must be at once light and solid—in making even their bones hollow, substituting air for the marrow of the bones of terrestrial animals.

If I were content to affirm the necessity of an apparatus heavier than the air, without at the same time insisting upon replacing by hydrogen, by aluminum and by threads of steel the heavy materials hitherto employed in the construction of flying-machines, I could have produced in a thousand different ways an *aéroplane* heavier than the air—so heavy that, like so many others, I should have remained on the ground, instead of flying around the lightning-rod of the Eiffel Tower.

Persuaded that the principle of *aërostation* and that of *aviation* do not in the least degree exclude each other, I have sought to unite them in the same mechanism, and, so doing, I think I have reconciled the two opposing schools of thought, which have struggled on paper, with no benefit to science, for the last hundred years. During four years of uninterrupted work, I have forced myself to solve practically the two fundamental problems, the equilibrium and the direction of balloons, deriving the ascensional force at the same time from the static action of the hydrogen and from the dynamic action of the screw.

With this end in view, I ballast my machine sufficiently to make it heavier by some pounds than the weight of the volume of air which it displaces. It cannot raise itself by the unaided effort of the hydrogen. From the propeller I demand the complement of necessary force. That is so real a factor, that, when I stop the motion of the propeller, the air-ship descends gently toward the earth by its own weight.

This is the method by which I regulate, at my pleasure, the ascension and the equilibrium of the mechanism. At the bow of the air-ship is attached a guide-rope, weighing a hundred pounds and sixty yards in length. Under these conditions, the contents are distributed from one end to the other of the air-ship, so that the axis of the frame-work, which is also that of the screw, may be perceptibly parallel to the horizon.

Near the middle of the guide-rope, is attached to it the end of a small cord which is under the control of the *aéronaut*, and thus permits him to bring the weight of the guide-rope, more or less, toward the centre of gravity of the mechanism.

At the moment of departure, I pull upon the cord; the guide-rope is thus brought toward the centre, and the bow of the air-ship, relieved of a part of its weight, rises at the same time that the stern lowers itself; for the entire mechanism is rigid owing to the pressure of the hydrogen.

The screw then acts at the extremity of an axis inclined obliquely to the horizon. Its action is diverse. It not only propels the air-ship, but causes it to mount, following the inclined plane which contains its axis in space. To arrest the upward motion and to adjust the air-ship to the altitude which I desire to maintain, I direct its axis toward the horizontal plane by allowing the guide-rope to return, more or less, toward the bow. If I desire to descend, all that is necessary is to let the guide-rope return to its normal position, that which it held before the start. Besides, I have, in the frame-work, bags of ballast, which I can move by means of small cords, for the purpose of lowering the bow of the air-ship and descending more quickly.

In a word, I can move myself in a vertical direction, without getting rid of the ballast and without loss of hydrogen, by simply varying the inclination of my tubular *aéroplane* of hydrogen under pressure.

My air-ship differs, then, essentially from the ordinary balloon, which mounts or descends only by losing either ballast or gas—that is to say, by the rapid exhaustion of its means of *aërial* existence.

The air-ship which I have invented has certainly more resemblance to an *aéroplane*, properly so called, than to a balloon. I hope to make the resemblance closer still, and even to arrive at a complete identification of the air-ship and the flying-machine,

by supplying the future numbers of the series of my air-ships with inclined planes, whose surface, added to that of the envelope of the balloon, will act in union with it, under the propulsive action of the screw, in supporting the weight of the mechanism.

I am beginning even now to perfect my "No. 6," adding to it, for the experiments which I expect to make in London in June, inclined planes which, placed toward the bow of the air-ship, will have the effect not only of lifting the ship but of correcting its pitching motion.

If, as I hope, I obtain good results, the speed will be perceptibly greater than that which I realized between Saint-Cloud and the Eiffel Tower.

Beginning with this year, I shall attempt to apply in the air the principles of aviation properly so called, by subjecting my air-ships to a continual evolution.

In the same proportion that I increase the extent of the inclined planes symmetrically disposed at the right and left, I shall reduce the surface of the envelope of varnished silk, and, consequently, the volume of hydrogen relatively to the power of the motor.

Thus I expect gradually to diminish the rôle of the hydrogen, making secondary its importance which is now primary, and even completely doing away with the use of this gas.

The air-ship will then have become an *aéroplane* in the absolute sense of the word, and I hope that some day we shall see it such. That day is undoubtedly not far distant, but the flying-machine will be achieved only by the way of evolution, by making the air-ship pass through a series of transformations analogous to the metamorphoses by which the chrysalis becomes the winged butterfly.

My air-ship, which raises itself by pushing back the air, has already done better than the chrysalis, whose elongated form it resembles. It may be that very soon nothing will prevent it from freeing itself completely from its cocoon of silk lined with hydrogen, and from being wholly comparable to a butterfly.

The air-ship, then, as it exists to-day, and the *aéroplane* absolutely without gas, to which we shall come, will form the two extremes of a series of *aërial* machines between which the *aéronaut* will have his choice, following his taste or consulting the at-

mospheric conditions or the length of the course, in selecting the machine, more or less sustained by hydrogen or by the propeller, whichever best responds to his wishes.

For myself, ardently devoted as I am to the captivating study of aviation, I am persuaded that the air-ship, thanks to the hydrogen, will always have an advantage over the *aéroplane* in being able to carry a great quantity of combustible material for long journeys, a number of travellers, and a considerable weight of merchandise—an advantage which will give it a practical utility unquestionably superior in commerce or in war. On the other hand, the flying-machine will without doubt attain, for short distances, an incomparable speed, the advantages of which will be in certain cases very appreciable—for instance, in crossing a strait like the Strait of Dover, in the journeys of the wealthy, or in the transmission of despatches at a high rate.

But when I think that an air-ship of the length of the Transatlantic steamer "*Deutschland*," constructed with the proportions of my "*No. 6*," would transport a thousand voyagers of my own weight, with a sufficiently powerful motor and the necessary amount of petroleum, from New York to Havre in two days, I cannot help finding the dirigible balloon more interesting than the *aéroplane* from the economic point of view, which is the dominant one in the world of to-day.

This is not the conception of a romancer. It is an affirmation which I can easily make good by figures; and, what is better, it will, I am firmly convinced, within a few years have become an accomplished fact.

Evidently this condition will not make itself, but it will be achieved because there is no conquest to which the entire human race aspires more ardently than to the empire of the air.

To attain this end, a series of tests in the open air will be necessary—tests not contemplated by inventors who, in their distaste for action, confine themselves to sketching vaguely upon paper projects impossible of realization.

Aërial progression will be achieved not in the mysterious recesses of the laboratory, but in the air itself. As the child learns to walk only by trying to walk, so man will learn to fly only by effectually practising flying.

The problem of aërial locomotion, contrary to the tradition which has so long retarded its solution, has no secrets. It de-

mands only work in full light, in the open air, much perseverance and a little audacity—the audacity of which the swallow sets us an example when it tries its unaccustomed wings for the first time beyond its nest.

One is often astonished that the evolution of the air-ship should have required so many years, when other inventions have been perfected so rapidly. How should the air-ship make progress when in a half-century *aéronauts* have done nothing to aid it?

The balloon—at first a simple bag of inflated paper over a fire of straw,—created by the genius of Montgolfier, transformed into a silken sphere inflated with hydrogen, metamorphosed into an air-ship by the genius of Henry Gifford, who in 1852 gave the first demonstration of the great problem, having the sublime daring to carry a steam engine in his car—demands now for its final evolution the application of the naphtha motor, which already gives us a single horse power under a weight of six pounds.

When modern industry places at our disposal the treasure of energy stored up in petroleum (10,000 calories transformable into force in one kilogramme of this precious fluid), I ask myself what do the “aviators,” torpid with passive waiting for a light motor, demand? And what are the *aéronauts* doing, spending twenty years in the application to *aéronautics* of the electric motor, which it is impossible to conceive of as applied to *aërial* navigation, since, with its generator (battery or accumulator), it is the heaviest of known motors.

More than all I am astonished that empirics, always mired in the ruts of routine, insist obstinately on controlling the spheric balloon only by emptying their sacks of ballast, since it is a buoy as refractory to direction as to equilibrium, over which for more than half a century generations of amateurs and professionals have lost their time.

I think that in the last four years I have demonstrated amply that a petroleum motor does not necessarily set fire to the hydrogen of an air-ship. That is, indeed, among the possibilities; balloons can burn in the air as well as ships in the water. But I maintain that one can, without taking leave of one's senses, raise a balloon with petroleum.

Why in this case not attempt this very simple matter of making a screw revolve in the air by the same motive power which

succeeds so admirably with automobiles, and controlling a rudder analogous to that of a ship?

I wish that in the past I might have seen many builders of air-ships take part in aërial contests. Progress is only achieved at this price: it should be the work of all.

To my knowledge, there are in existence a dozen petroleum balloons, completed months ago, some of them belonging to millionaires, to whom the expense of aërial experiments would be a trifle. I have done all that I could to induce them to compete in the *Grand Prix de Paris*; for nothing is more annoying to me than to be alone in the air during a competition. I hope to have an opportunity of meeting them at the competitions at London or St. Louis and elsewhere. For it is probable that the multiplication of contests will attract a number of competitors, and it is for this reason that I beg for the organization of aërial contests in America, as well as in Europe.

Nothing is easier than to take part in the next experiments; for, in the present conditions of aëronautic industry, scarcely a month's time is needed for the construction of an air-ship. For my own part, at the beginning of this month of May I have in process of construction three new air-ships which will be finished before the first of June. These will be "No. 8," "No. 9," and "No. 10" of the series. In their general construction they resemble "No. 6," which won the *Grand Prix de Paris* in 1901, which made five voyages in the Mediterranean in January and February, 1902, and which I shall ride again at London in June. But they differ from it in their dimensions, in the perfecting of details, which I wish to study in succession.

I am doing this for the sake of example; and if, contrary to my hope, I do not encounter those who wish to compete with me, on either side of the Atlantic, there is left to me, at least, the resource of exhibiting my air-ships in the leading cities of the world, with the object of popularizing, by every means in my power, the idea of aërial navigation.

The essential thing is to create a universal movement in favor of aëronautics.

Until lately, I have thought that to attain this end it was enough to ascend into the air myself, and to multiply my experiments, at the risk of my life. But now I see that this is not enough, and that, before the aërial idea becomes practical, it

will be necessary to popularize it by means of the pen. For this reason I am writing this first article.

For a long time, I have been solicited to express my opinions on the state of the *aéronautic* question, and until now I have refused, thinking that action was more serviceable than writing. But some recent interviews have shown me that there is much prejudice to be destroyed and much scepticism to combat, the existence of which concerns the future of *aërial* navigation and its practical utility, which is denied by some men who have never mounted the car of a spherical balloon, and who, in consequence, are no more competent for the discussion of the question than I should be for the interpretation of Babylonian hieroglyphics.

I believe it to be the duty of those who have made a study of *aéronautics* to destroy the errors implanted in the minds of the public by those who are ignorant of the first word of this branch of science. It is for this reason, I repeat, that I have decided to publish this first article.

And if a single article is not enough, I shall write a series of as many articles as the balloons I construct or the ascensions I make, for I perceive in closing this one that it is shorter and more convenient to pen a system of *aërial* navigation on paper than to set it in motion and make it perform its functions.

And, if it is impossible to set forth the vast and multiple problems of *aéronautics* within the narrow limits of magazine articles, I am resolved to publish in different languages the voluminous manuscript in which, for four years, I have summed up, for my own instruction, in the form of a treatise, the scientific principles and the historic facts of *aërial* navigation, from the more remote times until the present day.

This book will be, I hope, a revelation to readers so often deceived by authors who are ignorant of even the elements of the *aërial* question. In it I shall explain why and how I became an *aéronaut*, and I shall not be content till every person is an *aëro*-naut, either in air-ships or in *aéroplanes*, but in the open air and not "*en chambre*."

A. SANTOS DUMONT.

THE NATURE OF VOLCANOES.

BY N. S. SHALER, PROFESSOR OF GEOLOGY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE history of our understanding as to the conditions of volcanic action shows in a very clear way the steps by which a science is established. Among primitive folk, even when they have attained a considerable literary culture, the accidents of the earth, however striking, are taken as a commonplace manifestation of unseen powers—doings which need not be accounted for, or which may be explained by the will of gods or demons. Thus, in the Bible there is scarcely a trace of scientific curiosity, and none whatever of any enquiring motive such as has led to the rational interpretation of the natural realm. Vast and far-reaching as was the Hebraic spirit, it remained singularly unmoved by the events of the material world, looking upon them all as incidental and essentially unimportant, save as expressions of a Divine will.

The first clear trace of any questioning as to the nature of volcanoes, is found among the Greek philosophers. Between the seventh century, B.C., and the Christian era it is evident that enquirers were concerned with this matter, as they were with most evident problems of the earth. They attained to no success, in part because, though keen enough in guessing possible explanations of events, they never learned to criticise their conjectures, or, in the language of modern science, to verify their hypotheses. They were content with any idea which seemed to account for the facts. In larger part, their failure was due to lack of knowledge as to the nature of heat. By them heat was reckoned as an element, along with earth and water, among the primitive things that went to make up the world; so that when a volcanic explosion occurred it was to be explained as an outpouring of heat, much as a spring is of water.

Although our modern science is the child of Greek learning, it was a child of very slow growth. For more than a thousand years, the people of our Aryan race in Europe, though inclined to the study of phenomena, were so profoundly imbued with the Hebraic motive, and so much under the control of the Roman spirit, which was also completely separated from scientific interests, that no interpretation of Nature was essayed. It was not until the intellectual revolt called the Revival of Learning, in the fifteenth century, that the people of Western Europe began to question the world as to the laws of events, or to see in it more than good from the Creator's hand or evil from the interference of the devil and his imps. The scant knowledge of Nature which served as the foundations of modern science came almost altogether from the Greeks, and as mere fragments of the ancient learning. It provided little in the way of accurate information, and served not at all as a guide in methods of enquiry. The seeking spirit was happily native in our race and sprang swiftly into activity. The research work done by Leonardo da Vinci, fitly renowned as a painter and sculptor, but even more distinguished as an investigator, though unguided by earlier masters in its critical quality, foretold the best of our modern science.

From the Renaissance to near the end of the eighteenth century we find the nature of volcanic action the subject of much un-availing enquiry. The students of the problem were kept far from the truth, by the ancient notion that fire was a distinct element, one which was escaping from the depths. They came no nearer the truth than to suppose that some deep-lying burning material, such as coal, melted the rocks, and thus gave rise to the lava and gases which are poured forth in eruptions. Pictures in geological treatises of two hundred years ago show such fires in vast chambers, of which the roofs are the crust of the earth, through which the flames have forced a way to the surface by a crater. It was only when the part which oxygen plays in combustion was clearly recognized that it was seen that no ordinary process of burning could account for the evident facts, and that the study of volcanic action must proceed on other lines.

The first certain clue as to the cause of volcanoes was found when the outlines of the history of celestial spheres came to be discerned by astronomers—when it was seen that each of these bodies, suns, planets, and satellites alike, is in an early stage

of their development, intensely fluid, from heat, and that, parting with a share of their heat which goes forth into space, they in time come to be cold upon their surfaces though they may remain for ages intensely hot within. Applying this knowledge as to the general history of the spheres to the earth, geologists proceeded to explain volcanic eruptions by the supposition that they were due to the escape to the surface of some part of the ancient store of heated matter which lies below the frozen outer crust. This view, which was suggested in the later part of the eighteenth century, is evidently the basis on which a valid explanation of the complicated problems of volcanology must be founded.

Following the path of enquiry opened by the earth's ancient history given to them by the astronomers, students of geology began to seek the causes which lead to the violent ejections of heated materials from the depths of the earth. Curiously enough, it was only within the last century that observers came to recognize one of the most conspicuous features in all volcanic explosions, viz., the vast quantities of steam which always escape during such outbreaks. It had long been noticed that torrential rains usually attend on these explosions; but this was accounted for on the supposition that the water had gathered in caverns at the roots of the crater, and had been driven high into the air at the moment when the eruption began. Moreover, this stream, being commonly mingled with finely powdered rock, appears in the ejections of the cave as very dark-colored, often nearly black, a quite different hue from the unstained vapor of water. A close study of the matter showed that all lava, as it comes forth from the depths of the earth, is charged with steam. If we watch it near its exit, we see that the surface of the fluid boils furiously from the escaping vapor. Even after flowing for hours, every square inch of the surface shows from moment to moment the escaping bubbles. Next the very hot surface, the steam, being intensely heated, is perfectly transparent; as it rises and cools, it becomes more and more visible; and, at a considerable height, it forms the cloud-like wrap of vapor which hangs over the path of the flowing lava.

Further enquiry has clearly shown that the force which brings about a volcanic eruption is mainly, if not altogether, due to the expansive power of steam at the temperature, it may be, of 2,000° or more, Fahrenheit, and that, in large measure, the physical

condition of the ejected rocky matter, whether ashes, bombs, or flowing lava, depends upon the amount of this steam in the fluid rock and the temperature it attains. This can be most clearly illustrated, perhaps, by certain observations which I had an opportunity to make during a slight eruption of Vesuvius in 1882. At that time, the active cone was small, and the explosions were so limited in energy and so regular that, with a little care, it seemed possible to obtain a very near view of the process. Taking advantage of a strong northwest wind, which inclined the materials thrown out of the crater to one side of the cone, I approached the steep from the windward, unbombarded side.

On my way toward the active cone, I passed the well-known observatory, where there are instruments for measuring the earthquake shocks which such explosions send through the mountain. It did not need the insistent bobbing of the seismometers to indicate these quakings; they were evident enough to the senses miles away from the vent. I was told by the officers of the establishment that the energy of the movements had been for some time increasing, and that the cone would most likely be blown away in the course of a few hours. As there was no evident basis for this conclusion, I was not deterred by it. It was, in fact, years afterward before the change occurred; for then, as now, the conduct of a volcano eludes prediction. In company with my stout porter, who earned his wage by keeping his agreement to beat off his fellows who swarmed about, I gained the edge of the crater, with no other inconvenience than that which came from the violent shaking of the cone in the successive explosions, and from the strong gale which carried the ejected fragments of lava towards Pompeii. Once on the margin of the crater, with my face protected by a paper mask, it was possible for me to look down into the pit and to see, perhaps nearer to the seat of an eruption than any other geologist has had a chance to do. The conditions were not favorable for careful observation. The heat was almost unendurable, and the air at times so charged with steam and sulphurous fumes as to be suffocating. Moreover, at most of the successive explosions I was thrown backwards down the ash-covered slope, before I had a chance to note just what happened; yet the effort was not altogether fruitless, for I beheld certain features which threw light on the processes of an eruption. These features I will now describe.

The pit of the crater was several hundred feet in diameter and one or two hundred feet deep: there being nothing in view that would serve as a scale for measurement, its size could not be well determined. The inner slopes of the cavity led down, in the manner of a funnel, to a well-like shaft, about sixty feet in diameter, which descended nearly vertically. The upper part of the funnel was not hot enough to glow, but about the lower third it was of a dull red heat, and thence downward of a brighter hue, until, in the vertical shaft, it glowed like the eye of a furnace. About four or five times a minute, this shaft, usually empty, was partly filled with white, very fluid, hot lava, apparently as fluid as water, which rushed swiftly upward until it occupied the lower part of the crater to the depth of forty feet or more. Then the whirling pool swelled like a huge bubble which burst open, so that the broken masses of lava were driven upwards as if shot from the mouth of a cannon. The action was very swift, so that from the time the lava came in sight in the shaft, perhaps fifty feet below the base of the funnel, to the instant of the explosion was not more than three seconds. As soon as the discharge occurred, the lava not blown out fell back out of sight into the depths of the shaft.

Although, as before remarked, it was not possible narrowly to observe just what occurred at the moment of the successive explosions, for the reason that the shocks generally threw me away from the edge, some of them being less intense than others I managed to get a sufficiently clear view of the process. It was evident that the explosion was due to the escape of gas or vapor at a very high tension. At the moment of explosion, the cavity below the rent surface was apparent. The impelling vapor was at first perfectly transparent; in a moment, however, it took on a steel-gray hue, and in a second or two had the whitish color of steam. As the cloud swept about me, it was perfectly evident that it was the vapor of water with some sulphurous gas, and probably some chlorine and other gases. In four or five seconds, the strong air currents due to the heat and the gale of wind drove the steam out of the pit, so that all parts of it were clearly visible. I reckoned the speed of ascent of the fragments that were cast upward as at least four hundred feet a second. The time that elapsed between the bursting of the bubble and the crash of the falling masses on the further side of the cone, indi-

cated that they rose to the height of more than fifteen hundred feet above the point of discharge. My observations at the crater were suddenly interrupted by a lull in the gale which had made them possible. Masses of the lava, some of them as large as nail kegs, began to fall near me so that I had to retreat, and that speedily. My valiant porter objected to my haste, saying that there was no grave danger, for the chunks of lava were *soft*!

All that was visible in the crater whence this slight but instructive eruption came bore out the supposition that the motive power of volcanic outbursts is steam. Much else that could be seen was to the same effect. Thus, as the fragments of lava, whirled up at each explosion, swept through the air, their surfaces cooled, so that when they came back to the ground they had a darkened crust. As they burst open at the moment of contact with the earth, they visibly ejected steam. A small stream of lava flowing from the cone poured forth steam from every part of its surface. As the fragments sent up by the explosion rose in the air, they were enveloped in a cloud of steam, which, as it drifted away, yielded a little rain.

After I left the cone, the explosions—at first, as above noted, not more frequent than four or five per minute—came at shorter intervals, until, for a time, the discharge seemed as continuous as that from a locomotive moving at high speed,—where we know that, for all the seeming continuity of the action, the outrush of vapor takes place by successive jets, the intervals being too brief for ear or eye to note them. This, like much other evidence, goes to show that the eruptions of a volcano are essentially like boiler explosions, where steam at high temperatures rends the walls which restrain it. The tumult of the greater outbreaks arises from innumerable rupturings such as occurred at distinct intervals in the very small instance above described. It is furthermore evident that the water which impels the ejection is in most, if not all, instances very intimately mingled with the rock which, when melted, forms the lava. When the eruption is so violent that the lava is brought suddenly from the depths of the earth, as is the case in all considerable outbreaks, the lava is blown into a dust finer than can be produced by any process of grinding rock. Thus, in the explosion of Krakatoa in 1883, the dust was in such minute particles that much of it floated for three years, all the earth about, before it came to rest; and some

part of it appears to have gathered into what were called "shining clouds," which gradually rose higher and higher until they seemed to escape from our atmosphere. Such dust has been known to bring midnight darkness at mid-day more than a thousand miles from the volcano that poured it forth. This measure of comminution from exploding steam indicates that the water was very completely mingled with the rocky matter before it was heated.

Where the ascent of the lava to the surface is more gradual than it is when the material is rent into dust, the water appears to gather into aggregates, so that the explosion produces larger fragments looking like grains of sand or having a pebbly form and size. As the violence of the movement is still further reduced, the steam has a chance to boil out of the lava, which then accumulates in the crater, or in the pipes below its level, until it breaks its way through the heap of cinders of which the cone is composed, and flows away as a stream. When, as in the great volcanoes which remain permanently in eruption, the boiling lava remains long in the cup, it may part with nearly all its steam; but in all cases it is evident that this vapor is the mainspring of volcanic action.

Taking it as proved that volcanic explosions are essentially due to the expansive force of steam at a very high temperature, the next question which geologists have to face concerns the method by which the water obtains access to the rocks, and becomes intimately mingled with the materials of which they are composed. On this point there is as yet no agreement; some students of the matter hold that the water in question passes downward from the surface to the heated depths, and there coming in contact with the molten rock is converted into steam. This view is clearly untenable, for the reason that, as we have seen, the water is perfectly mingled with the lava; a condition which could not be brought about by a mere contact with heated rock on its way to become lava. The least generation of steam under these conditions would tend to expel the descending water through the passages by which it entered the earth. It is true that surface water accumulating in the fissures beneath a long silent cone may be suddenly vaporized by an ascent of lava when the activity of the volcano is resumed. Many eruptions begin by the ejection of large quantities of water, which may be thus accounted for.

But this in no wise helps us to explain the mingling of water with the molten rock, which is the key to the problem of its ejections, and is, as we shall see, the clue to many other important questions in volcanology.

To determine the steps by which the water of lavas finds its way into the fluid rock, we need to set about the task in the manner of the modern naturalist, as Leonardo did his work and thereby showed how such work should be done. We should note, in the first place, how volcanoes are distributed over the earth. This distribution is evidently peculiar; as is shown by the fact that, until our acquisition of Alaska, there was not a single cone in the United States which had been distinctly active in recorded time. The records clearly show that of the many hundreds, if not thousands, of volcanic cones which have been seen to discharge, all are in the sea or near thereto, not one of them being as much as three hundred miles inland. Furthermore, the geological history of the multitude of now extinct volcanoes in the heart of the continents, shows that, in general, the cessation of their activity was coincident with the disappearance of broad waters from their neighborhood. It is, in a word, evident that there is some casual relation between what takes place beneath the seas and the existence of volcanic activity.

The fact that active volcanoes are limited to the ocean floors and to the parts of the great lands lying near thereto, has been taken by some enquirers to be evidence that it is to the downward penetration of water that we are to attribute, in the manner above noted, the presence of the fluid in lavas. The fact is, however, that water must enter the under-earth more readily on the land than beneath the sea-floor; for on the land area we have an extensive river surface, especially in mountainous districts, while on ocean bottoms there is practically everywhere an essentially impervious sheet of recent and unbroken deposits through which water cannot pass. The true basis of the relation is to be found in quite another series of actions, which may be briefly set forth as follows:

Let us first note that, from the depths of the earth, heat in large quantities is constantly and everywhere passing forth into the cold spaces that wrap in the sphere. Each year, enough heat thus creeps upward through the blanket of rocks, if it could be held in the crust, to raise the temperature of a layer of any

ordinary stone a foot in thickness by some degrees of temperature. Now, beneath the sea-floor, strata are normally accumulating at a geologically rapid rate; and every layer, because it is a non-conductor, serves to retain this heat, as does the mineral wool covering in a boiler or the "cosset" on a tea-pot. The result is, that a layer of rock laid down many geological periods ago on the cool surface of the ancient ocean floor, say at 40° Fahrenheit, if covered by successive strata to the depth of 100,000 feet, will acquire a very high temperature, probably somewhere near 2,000°, Fahrenheit. We see by the remnants of strata which are exhibited on the land that even much greater thicknesses of deposits may be heaped up over wide areas. Now, let us remember that, as beds of any kind are laid down in water, they are always made up of fragments; and between these bits are spaces which are filled by the fluid; and, furthermore, that the bits themselves are water-soaked. This water, as I have found by extended enquiry, amounts in different kinds of strapped rocks to from one-twentieth to one-fifth of their mass. Given this water, and the heat which must come to it with deep burial, and we have the fundamental conditions of a volcanic explosion—conditions which do not exist beneath the lands where the blanket of strata is always wearing away (with the result that the temperature of the underlying rocks is ever lowering), and which exist only beneath the great water areas, where strata are accumulating and, as a consequence, the deep-buried water is ever becoming hotter and ever straining more vigorously on the rocks that case it in.

As for the ways in which volcanic vents are opened, and the details of the process by which the imprisoned water finds its way to the surface, driving with it the melted rock in which it is contained, our knowledge is yet limited. It is clear, however, that many if not most volcanoes are situated along those lines of fracture of the earth's crust termed "faults,"—breaks which may extend from the surface downward for many miles of depth. These fractures often are so placed that they traverse coast lines, so that the volcanic materials produced beneath the sea floors may find their way to the air on neighboring continents. This arrangement of volcanoes along great breaks in the strata, accounts also for the fact that, when a volcano on one part of the rift becomes active, others on the same line are likely to erupt, as has been the case in the vents on Martinique and St. Vincent.

It is from many such instances evident that the movements of the heated rocks which feed one crater—movements of much violence—are likely, by the resulting shocks, to awaken a train of convulsions which may propagate the action far from its original source.

It is to be borne in mind that, when extremely heated rocks containing water are penetrated by a fault, the expanding steam will force the whole mass in movement towards the place of escape—as in the instance of dough, where the yeast fermentation produces gas, the material creeps in the direction of least resistance. When the rocks start on their enforced journey they are probably solid, kept in that state by the vast pressure of the beds above them, but as they arrive near the surface, they become softened and finally, it may be, as liquid as molten glass. The evidence goes to show that the lavas and ashes which are poured from the greater volcanoes are often derived from locations hundreds of miles away from the vent by which they escape. Thus, while the materials thrown out by Aetna have probably amounted to a bulk of more than a thousand cubic miles, the foundations of the cone have gradually risen since ejections began, until now its base is some hundred feet higher than at the beginning. This clearly indicates the remote derivation of the erupted matter.

The foregoing account of the steps by which our knowledge of volcanic action has been won is but a sketch. It takes no account of sundry hypotheses and conjectures, which have had their place in the procession of ideas, but have not helped the progress of geology. It neglects the problem of the moon's so-called volcanoes, for the reason that those remarkable structures, though vents of ejection, are clearly not really comparable to those now existing on the earth. Even this inadequate story shows how, step by step, by the interaction of the several physical sciences, the enquiries of geologists have slowly won a share of truth—truth as yet incomplete in this as in other fields, but sufficient to make the earth rational to our understanding.

Turning now to the recent calamitous eruptions of Martinique and St. Vincent, let us see what light our knowledge of volcanic action turns upon these events. It is, in the first place, evident that these eruptions, frightful as they have been in their effect on human interests, are of relatively slight physical importance. The intensity of a volcanic outbreak may be approximately

measured by the distance at which the sounds produced are heard. In the greater eruptions, such as that of Krakatoa, the most violent explosions were audible two thousand miles or more away from their source. In the Martinique eruption, they appear to have been heard at a distance of no more than two hundred miles. As the energy of the shock to air and earth is roughly proportional to the areas affected, it appears that the former disturbance was at least a hundred times as violent as the latter. The measure of energy expended in the outbreak of Mt. Pelée and the amount of the materials thrown out, or the distance to which they were hurled, do not, from the information now at hand, appear to have been anything like as great as in the case of many Vesuvian eruptions, and are not to be compared to the cataclysms of the Javanese archipelago and those of Iceland, or even with the explosions of Aetna. To what, then, may we attribute the unexampled magnitude of this calamity; for in no other well-attested eruption has the loss of life been so great?

A glance at the position of St. Pierre in relation to the volcano which destroyed it shows that the city lay within four or five miles of the cone, and on the side whereto the prevailing winds would be likely to drive the vapor and ashes from the crater. The ash ejected appears to have been mainly of a coarse nature, and the quantity of volcanic bombs—that is, masses of lava, which, whirling, take on a rudely spherical form—more than usually great in quantity. The falling ash apparently served to force the heated air and steam down upon the surface, so that it flowed over the town, while the bombs, molten lava within, though hard crusted without, were as effective as hot shot in carrying heat and setting fire. It is probable that, in this as in other eruptions from long-dormant volcanoes, much carbonic-acid gas, which had gathered in the caverns at the base of the cone, was mingled with the steam and sulphurous fumes, the whole forming an irrespirable air which quickly and mercifully suffocated the stricken folk. In some instances, this tide of mephitic vapors has been known to destroy all life for a radius of many miles about the point of discharge. Thus, while the accident appears to have been in a geological sense relatively unimportant, the position of the town in relation to the cone, the neighborhood of sea which barred flight, and the somewhat unusual swiftness in the development of the outbreak, combined to make it a very great calamity.

There are certain lessons to be drawn from the disasters of Martinique and St. Vincent. The first of these is that the neighborhood of a volcano that has been so recently in eruption as to retain its shape in a well-preserved state, is not a fit place for a city or other important seat of man's endeavors. The second concerns the importance of systematic and extended observations of volcanoes, with a view to an effective foretelling of approaching eruptions. So far, observations of this nature have been limited and imperfect. There is reason to believe that it will neither be difficult nor costly to obtain data such as would have spared the thousands who died in the recent disasters. It is clearly not in the power of man to prevent the activity of volcanoes, as he well may the vastly more destructive plagues of war and disease; but he may by his understanding lessen the evils they inflict, as he does those of the hurricane or the earthquake. It is well to note, however, that the calamities which may thus be avoided, though in their nature appalling, constitute but an insignificant part of the sum of death and destruction that comes to man. Though this earth beneath our feet is the seat of titanic forces, it deals gently with its living tenants—far more gently than they with one another. That life is here as the result of at least a hundred million years of uninterrupted progress, shows that the interference of the powers of the under-earth with the course of life has not been serious.

N. S. SHALER.

THE NEW INFLUENCE ON THE BRITISH THRONE.

BY LADY JEUNE.

PROVIDENCE, which often seems capricious in guiding the fate of nations, decreed, at three important epochs in English history, that the reigning Sovereign should be a Queen, and not a King. The reigns of Elizabeth and Anne were times of momentous issues, and the reign of Victoria was one great social revolution from beginning to end.

It would be very difficult to compare the rule of any of these three Queens with those of the other two, and yet, in some respects, they were all similar. Elizabeth ruled a country just emerging from the throes of the Reformation, while she had to reckon with a powerful party at home, which was alien in religion, aided by the greatest Catholic power of the world, and animated by fervent devotion to the loveliest and most unfortunate of rivals, who was the mother of a son, while she herself was unmarried and without an heir. A woman of strong will and passions, imperious and brave, she chose her advisers well, and, with the growing Protestant feeling of the country to support her, she destroyed the power of Spain. Her time was one of great statesmen, philosophers, soldiers, sailors, explorers, and men of letters, and she gave her name to an era which is one of the most glorious in English history. The reign of Queen Anne was again a period of external development; but she, like Elizabeth, found her strength in the Protestant feeling of Europe, and in the genius of the greatest soldier of the day. She also was childless, but, though the Roman Catholic party were open and avowed sympathizers with the Stuarts, the question of the succession was no longer in doubt. The reign of Anne, also, was rich in distinguished men—soldiers, sailors, poets, historians. Though Anne

was inferior in every way to her great predecessor, she was a woman of unblemished character, and she was a fitting Queen for her time; and the halo which surrounds her reign is in many ways no less brilliant than that which was imparted to her epoch by Queen Elizabeth. Queen Elizabeth and Queen Anne, however, both reigned at times when rulers of inferior abilities could not have occupied the throne of England. The great wars of both reigns were waged to uphold the supremacy of the Catholic power in Europe, and to crush the young Protestant feeling of the day. England, the champion of the new faith, was sorely pressed in the time of Elizabeth by Philip of Spain, and by Louis XIV. in the later reign. To England the struggle was of vital importance, as defeat meant her complete annihilation: any hesitation, any faltering, any mistake on her part would have altered the fate of the world. But the struggle was won, and it was won in great measure because the government of the English nation was in the hands of women, under the guidance of statesmen and soldiers of the highest ability.

The accession of Queen Victoria saw England again at the beginning of another period of trial and danger, but, this time, of an internal and social nature. The country was suffering from the effects of the costly Napoleonic wars; there was great distress and poverty. The dynasty to which she belonged was unpopular, not only because of the stupidity and immorality of its representatives, but because it presented no sentiment, no ideal, to a people chivalrous and romantic in many respects. The social and political changes of the last sixty years were just beginning. The discovery of steam power, and its adaptation to the service of modern life; the awaking of the interest of the working classes in the questions which so closely affected their welfare; and the passing of the Reform Bill, which entirely changed the centre of political power, were all creating a feeling of unrest and discontent. The aristocratic governing class had just been divested of political power, and that power had been handed over to the democracy, who were ignorant and impatient at the conditions under which they lived, and eager to show their strength. The effect of Free Trade was just giving birth to great industrial changes, the Manchester school had sprung into existence, and with all the zeal of those who, for the first time, possess power, the working classes were making their voice heard in the

councils of the nation. The poverty in many parts of the country, the wretched plight of the workers in factories and in all industrial enterprises, had aroused a sentiment of revolt; while the Chartist riots showed how keenly a large number of the citizens were resolved that there should be gigantic improvements in every condition of life.

The situation was full of grave menace to the future of England, and it required the wisdom of ministers, the forbearance of the aristocracy and the patience of the working classes to deal successfully with the problems to which it gave rise. Above all, it was necessary, at such a juncture, that the occupant of the throne should scrupulously observe the limitations which the constitution had set to the powers and privileges of the Crown. The very seriousness of the situation, perhaps, made that moment appropriate, in a unique sense, for the accession of a queen; and the presence of a girl on the throne, surrounded by wise and experienced advisers, may well have afforded the best security conceivable for the peaceful solution of the national problem. At any rate, as one reviews the events of Victoria's reign, with its marvellous developments, its complete social revolution, its increase of colonial and imperial power, its domestic peace, its growth of wealth and prosperity, its spread of education, together with the improvement in the condition of life of every class, and the profound popular devotion to the Queen, one asks whether, or in what measure, the Victorian age was the great epoch it undoubtedly proved to be because the ruler of England was a woman.

The questions which the country had to decide during the early years of Queen Victoria's reign concerned themselves with subjects which appealed to the heart of a woman—the deplorable situation of the laboring classes, the disgraceful position of women and children working in factories and mines, the much neglected state of education, the depression in trade and the intolerable conditions of life from which thousands of the people were groaning for deliverance. These were fitted to arouse the womanly interest and sympathy of the Queen, so that she could naturally and easily associate herself with nearly all the reforms required, even if she were not able to put herself at the head of the movement. The sight of the Queen, her excessive youth, her generous, responsive answer to all that was asked of her, awoke

the sentimental and romantic feeling that a woman under such circumstances must always call forth. It was accorded to her by an affectionate and warm-hearted people. Her youth and isolation appealed to every one, while her early marriage and happy married life, and her devotion to her husband, completed an ideal picture of home, graced by the qualities which a people like the English understand and appreciate. This feeling was, it is true, from time to time, rudely shaken, and there were occasions, even during the early part of the reign, when the Queen, as representing Royalty, was unpopular. There were times when she drove in London and not a hat was raised nor a cheer given, and when her path was full of difficulties, which it needed the wisest and calmest judgment to surmount. There are many still alive who remember the long silent drives which she took through London, and contrast them with the passionate and fervent enthusiasm which her later appearances always evoked, when thousands and thousands of her subjects waited for many hours to catch a glimpse of their Queen as she paid one of her rare visits to the metropolis. That she found the sagest of counsellors in her husband there can be no doubt, and, misjudged and unpopular as the Prince Consort once was, he lived to be appreciated by a people who learned too late, alas! what a debt they owed him.

The great principle of government impressed on the Queen by Lord Melbourne, her first Prime Minister, was the importance of her being a thoroughly constitutional sovereign, and so deeply did she take his teaching to heart, that during her reign she placed the Monarchy, as an institution, on a position of permanent strength.

We are now on the threshold of a new reign, and of an altogether different sentiment. King Edward has succeeded after a long apprenticeship, which he has served conscientiously and well; and he comes to the throne of his ancestors with the enthusiastic affection of his people. It is not from a personal point of view that we discuss the new position, or judge it in contrast with the reign just ended. It is a question of much interest, and one not easy to decide, whether a country prospers best under a male or a female sovereign; for though in England, where a monarch must needs be constitutional, the powers of a male and

female monarch are exactly alike, there are circumstances which may render the character of the reign of the one essentially different from the rule of the other. The power of the early kings of England lay in their military position, and their absolute authority. If we think of the kings of England before Henry VIII., it is as soldiers only, wielding the power which in those stormy times appertained to the king. The revolutions through which England passed in order to establish her right to govern herself, deprived the kings of their military power and curtailed their rights. Since the early Plantagenets, no King of England has appeared on the stage of history as a great soldier, such as was Frederick the Great and other royal heroes. The tendency of constitutional government has been steadily to diminish the personal power of the King, so that he has become merely the exponent of the views of his people, as expressed through Parliament.

The English people have not much reason to be proud of their later kings. The members of the Hanoverian house were meddling, stupid, narrow-minded Germans; and when they did interfere in questions of importance, their action was always disastrous. The separation of America from Great Britain was the result of the obstinacy of George III., and the gradual strengthening of Parliament was the logical outcome of a succession of incompetent rulers. Had the transition period of modern English history, from the passing of the Reform Bill until to-day, come during the reign of another George III., it would not have been the bloodless revolution it was. A man with any character, any spirit, any belief in the rights of kings, must have been forced into opposition to the new ideas, the ultimate effect of which was to put almost unlimited power into the hands of a then ignorant democracy; and he would have had support and encouragement from the aristocratic classes of both political parties, who equally hated and dreaded the changes. All the political events of the century have diminished the power of the Crown, and have broken down the tradition of the personal importance of the Sovereign, so that the position of a man on the throne during this period would have been one of exceeding difficulty and danger. It was a most fortunate accident that gave England a young and adaptive girl as ruler at that moment, and allowed her long and marvellous reign to bridge over the period

during which the old customs were passing away, and the new order of things adapting itself to the new conditions under which the Kingdom was to exist—which, while destroying the personal autocracy of the Monarchy, has in reality had the effect of strengthening the Monarchy to an extent difficult to describe.

The nineteenth century was a humanitarian age, and its quality as such could be best fostered and developed during the reign of a queen. If Queen Victoria had no other claim to the gratitude of the Empire than that she endeavored to carry out the highest ideals for the welfare of her people and the general amelioration of their social and political condition, we should yet owe her much. We have, however, perhaps, overdone our humanitarianism a little, and are passing in a measure through an emotional and somewhat hysterical stage. The self-control which has been one of the most cherished of English characteristics, has disappeared to some extent, and we stand in need of a sterner and more bracing influence, which the new rule may perhaps inaugurate. A king can be stern and strong: a queen cannot. It is possible to speak plainly, to discuss matters, nay, even to argue, with a man; with a woman we all know the result. No woman is logical; and, however unemotional and masculine, she will act from impulse and not reason. A woman's impulse is to be gentle, sweet, gracious; and the whole course of her life and her impulses moves in that direction, while the age in which she lives becomes impregnated by the same spirit. Therefore, it follows, especially where we have a strong personality, as in the case of Queen Victoria, that, though the standard does not fall or even become relaxed, questions are regarded from a less robust point of view. The very womanliness of the Queen, which gave her the power she possessed and the affection she won, caused all her influence to be thrown on the side of leniency; and the isolation in which she lived (the outcome of the great sorrow of her life) prevented her from judging of the true proportion of things, and added to the sentiment with which her people regarded her, so that the womanliness of the Queen had the effect of diminishing the hardihood of the national character, and of encouraging a spirit of "gush," which, though the last quality with which she would have had sympathy, has unconsciously become a strongly marked characteristic of to-day. The tenderness of the Queen and her sympathy with those in sorrow—as always shown, on the

occasion of any public calamity, by her messages to the widows of colliers, sailors, soldiers, or any class of the community on whom some terrible disaster had fallen—and her hatred of capital punishment, were strongly marked features of her character: and though with many of the fads and fashions of her time she had no sympathy, it was difficult for her, as a woman, though a Queen, to proclaim publicly that she disapproved of them. There must have been occasions when the Queen would have perhaps astonished the country, could it have been realized how she regarded many of the questions and developments of her time, but her kindness, and her desire not to wound, kept her silent. A man would probably be less tolerant; at any rate, no one would expect such reserve or consideration from him. A woman shrinks from any action which might have the effect of crushing a movement which, while she did not sympathize with it, she yet believed to be a genuine attempt to do good, and which might possibly be of some efficacy in that direction. A woman understands the enthusiasm and can throw herself into the position of those who preach crusades against the abuses they see around them, feeling that the woes and sufferings of life are beyond endurance. In fact, there is no humanitarian movement, wise or foolish, which the heart of a good woman does not go out to, and the sixty years of Queen Victoria's reign proved how thoroughly in that respect she was like her sex.

There is a great opportunity now for stimulating and bracing the national life and character. There is no need for sternness or hardness, but a true perception of the proportion and importance of events will produce a manlier sentiment. We are all inclined to judge conduct leniently, to make allowances, to justify actions in private life, just as, until the war in South Africa forced us into an opposite course, we have shrunk from taking up an aggressive position in public matters. It is not good for a country or a people to shirk the responsibilities which from time to time confront them, and which ought to be faced. It was no secret that the Queen, like many women, dreaded war; her feelings, her influence, were always on the side of peace. When war had to be undertaken, however, no one met it more courageously than she; and, though the smoke of battle was the cloud on the last months of her life, she never wavered in her belief in the righteousness of the cause we are upholding in South Africa.

For many years of her reign, the Queen's advisers were "Peace at any price" men, and, constitutional as she ever was, she followed their advice—often, however, warning and protesting against the policy. In the position of monarch, a man could be less easily advised or persuaded to adopt such a policy; it would be more difficult for his advisers to convince him that he must acquiesce. In all the questions of life and of government he would take a broader view than a woman, and he could do so with perfect security, knowing that the country would expect him to be less yielding. In fact, the composition of a man's character, as well as his bearing and education, must necessarily create a totally different atmosphere of life and attitude of mind with regard to affairs, and the country would be prepared to see, and willing to recognize, any indication that it was under the sway of a strong personal influence, such as that of a sensible man of the world, who lived in touch with his people.

The late Queen's power lay, in a great measure, in the strong moral hold she exercised over the country; she came to the throne at a moment when an example of high conduct was needed; her whole life and reign was one of absolute and blameless purity, and the power of a woman in these days must always be embodied in that fact. She raised the moral tone of life, gave higher aspirations and a higher standard of conduct to the world. To her people she was the unselfish devoted Queen, the good wife and mother—in fact, the representative of the virtue we admire and prize. The great women of the world have not set the same example to their people—Catherine of Russia and Queen Elizabeth were great Queens, but in another sense. Purity of life, tenderness of heart, were not their rôle: they governed by right of birth, and they governed almost with the strength, the power and the passions, of a man. They suited the times in which they lived, when the world was not ready for the influences we look for to-day. They were cruel, hard, rapacious, sensual; but they had courage, ability and the instinct of government, as well as real personal power, and the times over which they reigned required the rougher, coarser, methods of control. There are certain faults and weaknesses in a man which are ignored, and not judged too harshly—even to-day, when we demand a high code of conduct—which in a woman would be impossible, for in her case no standard is too high, and any descent from the highest would

be fatal to her power. The purest life, the keenest consciousness of responsibility, and the noblest sense of duty made Queen Victoria's reign an epoch quite apart from any other in history; and, even when the cold eye of criticism scans her history, that stainless life, on which the fierce light which beats upon a throne found never a shadow, will shine on as a precious example. We owe much to her great constitutional sense, to her generous and unselfish nature, but we owe her the deepest gratitude of all for the pattern she set us of what the life of a good and pure woman could be, and for the effect of that example all over her Empire.

Regard for self-interest and the instinct of self-preservation are as deep in the life of an Empire as in that of an individual; and though those feelings have been strong elements in the birth of Imperial life in England and throughout her Colonies, the golden chain which held them all together in the tightest of bonds was the common love and respect for the "Great White Queen." If, as we said before, the sentiment of attachment to her, and the softening influence of a woman, gave a somewhat undue impetus to the spirit of humanitarianism, which many affirm has weakened our national character, one can hardly regret it when we look on the other side of the picture, and realize what the effect of any other influence might have been. It has not injured us permanently, and, standing now on the threshold of a century in which the most powerful influence is a masculine one, we may look for changes in endless directions which must be the result of the reign of a King. There is no doubt that there will be a more masculine atmosphere, a more hardy tone of thought and mind. The position of women, we believe, will be affected very distinctly by the substitution of a Queen Consort for a reigning Queen. The ruling monarch must give the tone to character, thought, occupation, amusements, and must, indeed, be the prominent figure; the tenderness, the softness, the humanitarianism, the latitude of the past will gradually disappear, and the influence of a new order will evolve characteristics of a more vigorous sort.

Those who deplore the disappearance of the harder and stronger characteristics of Englishmen may take heart again, and await with the keenest interest the development of the new spirit.

M. JEUNE.

AMERICA AND FRANCE.

BY GASTON DESCHAMPS.

I.

ON the 27th of March, 1777, a swift and beautiful vessel called "La Victoire," commanded by Captain Le Boursier, sailed southward from the harbor of Bordeaux. After stopping near Saint Sebastian, in the little port of Pasajes, "La Victoire" reached South Inlet, in South Carolina, on Friday, June 13th, 1777.

Among the passengers of "La Victoire" was a gentleman nineteen years old, Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de La Fayette. These are the words in which Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane announced, to Congress, the approaching arrival of the young traveller:

"The Marquis de La Fayette, a young gentleman of distinguished family connections and large fortune, has started for America, accompanied by some officers of distinction, with the intention of serving in our army. He is greatly beloved, and the good wishes of every one follow him. We can only hope that he will meet with a reception calculated to make the country and his undertaking agreeable to him. We shall be fortunate if the respect and attention shown him are of use in our affairs here, in giving pleasure, not only to his powerful relations and to the court, but to the whole French nation. He leaves behind him a pretty young wife, and for her sake, especially, we hope that his bravery and his ardent desire to distinguish himself may be somewhat restrained by the wisdom of the general, to the extent, at least, of not allowing him to incur danger when the occasion does not exact it."

Nothing could be more kindly, more solicitous than this letter. America adopted as a son this young hero, who put at the service of liberty a virgin and resplendent sword.

Twenty months after this glorious landing, La Fayette returned to France for a season, upon a ship called "L'Alliance," and succeeded in persuading the French government to despatch

the auxiliary force which, under the command of Count Rochambeau, reached America in the summer of 1780.

"La Victoire," "L'Alliance"! These two symbolic words haunted my imagination as the steamer "L'Aquitaine" was bearing me over the surges of the Atlantic, toward the hospitable shores of the United States. I had re-copied in my notebook this beautiful letter of La Fayette to the illustrious Washington:

"Farewell, my dear General; I hope that your French friend will always be dear to you. I trust that I shall see you again shortly that I may tell you in person with what emotion I leave, for the present, the country where you dwell, and with what affection, with what veneration, I shall always be your respectful and sincere friend."

While I sojourned in the immense territory of the Union, among the populous towns of Massachusetts and Connecticut, on the verdant heights of California, in the midst of the pasture lands of Texas or the plains of Arizona, under the perfumed magnolias of Louisiana, I thought of the tradition, already more than a hundred years old, which unites the French and the Americans.

This tradition must not be menaced; it must be defended against the machinations of those who have, apparently, an interest in setting it aside.

To maintain this treaty of alliance, concluded in the smoke of battle, it is enough that France and America should learn to know each other better.

II.

Despite all the books which French travellers have written about America, Americans are but little understood by Parisians. We think of them too much as resembling those noisy individuals who find a certain grotesque pleasure in throwing a shower of gold around the restaurants of the boulevards, and a shower of dust in the eyes of the loungers. The papers are full of the doings of some "high roller" or other, who, by his foolish extravagance, dazed the waiters in the Hotel Ritz, the Grand Hotel, or the Hotel Continental; and the derisive public regards, with a slightly distrustful irony, these florid accounts of wealth and the pranks of these millionaires.

"What?" the good Parisian *bourgeois*, accustomed to observe and to criticise, says to himself. "What? Is this the great people who, we are told, are so industrious, so grave, so earnest?" And

little by little he is confirmed in the opinion, assuredly false, according to which Americans were created and put into the world for just two purposes—to make dollars and to spend them in folly. We may well say: “Undeceive yourself, good Parisian *bourgeois*. Do not trust only to the evidence of your own eyes and ears.” The Parisian *bourgeois* replies: “I know what I see, and I remember what I hear,” and the Parisian *bourgeois* is as obstinate as a mule. When he has once acquired an idea, nothing will make him give it up.

This mischievous prejudice is to be attributed, in great measure, to the Americans who come to Paris. They deliver themselves, bound hand and foot, to the hotel waiters and the cabmen who, naturally, in Paris as in all possible or imaginable capitals, show them only the most trivial things, such as the second-rate theatres and the café concerts.

There are, of course, notable exceptions; for instance, my good friend Mr. R—— of Philadelphia, who follows an intelligently prepared programme in his French travels, and who will retain ineffaceable recollections of them.

In Paris, instead of visiting the pot-houses of Montmartre or exploring the sewers, Mr. R—— goes to the Institute, to the College of France, to the Sorbonne. He sees our savants, our writers, the men of brains and of heart who are truly representative of our nation. I am sure that, returning to Philadelphia, Mr. R—— can give account of the virtues and the traits which commend to universal esteem a country where Victor Hugo has left brilliant disciples, where Pasteur survives in the brilliant group of the *Pasteuriens*, where Rostand makes the sonorous French alexandrine resound triumphantly, where philological science can count among its adepts a Gaston Paris and a Michel Bréal, where the science of Lavoisier and de Fourcroy has been added to by the discoveries of Berthelot.

These are the things to be seen in Paris, and not the capers of this or that buffoon, famous in the two worlds, yet of whose very names most intelligent Parisians are ignorant.

American literature, already so rich, is lacking in good and comprehensive books about France and the French. This is a department of literature which should be attractive to the youthful talent with which the universities in America are teeming. Each year a certain number of young Americans cross the

Atlantic, perhaps to study at the College of France, perhaps to learn, in our national *École des Beaux-Arts*, the principles of the arts of design, notably of that charmingly pastoral architecture which directs the construction of the cottages in which the workers of the United States rest after the labors of the day. I wish that one of these young men might take up his pen with the object of offering to his compatriots an exact and complete picture of contemporary France.

If Americans were better informed as to French affairs, one would not be met, on first touching the soil of the New World, with the question, always the same:

“Do you often go to the *Moulin-Rouge*?”

The *Moulin-Rouge*, my dear friends, is a place where one encounters only provincials and foreigners. Parisians do not go there. Many excellent men in Paris do not even know where it is. Cease, then, once for all, to consider Montmartre the Acropolis of Paris. On our side, we long with all our hearts to know the truth about America.

III.

The truth is that the Americans are not mere money-makers, as they have been represented to us by recent books, solely occupied in amassing dollars. Certainly, they have a great deal of money, and I congratulate them. They proclaim, on all occasions, with a praiseworthy frankness, that money is, for the industrious, the surest means of making modern civilization, with its great and delightful advantages, flourish upon the earth. They understand the judicious use of money.

To begin with, the American women—who, I may say without flattery, are marvels of good-humor, of good health, and often of exquisite beauty—like fairies with a magic wand, transform money into an exquisite ornamentation of domestic life, by which the art of furnishing, aided by the enchanting illumination of electric chandeliers, metamorphoses the house into a habitation of happiness, which delights the eye and fills the heart with repose. The American home, arranged and decorated by feminine hands, is altogether delightful. It is good to live in it.

This is not all. I have remarked that everywhere America is a country of small houses and of huge buildings. Side by side with the pretty dwellings, in which furnaces keep up in the raw

months of winter the temperature of spring, I have been amazed at the enormous structures whose multiplied stories are constantly linked together by the coming and going of the elevators. But what most astonished me, in my recent journey, were the magnificent universities which rise from the soil of the United States.

I saw, in succession, Harvard University and Radcliffe College at Cambridge; Yale University at New Haven; Trinity College at Hartford; Williams College at Williamstown; Brown University at Providence; Wellesley College; Mount Holyoke College; Columbia University at New York; Vassar College at Poughkeepsie; Adelphi College and Packer Collegiate Institute at Brooklyn; the University of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia; Princeton University; Cornell University at Ithaca; Wells College at Aurora, New York; the University of Chicago; Purdue University at La Fayette, Indiana; the University of California at Berkeley; and Tulane University at New Orleans.

Everywhere I admired the generous instinct which has caused these temples of learning to rise from the earth. The Americans have understood that material force is as nothing without moral power. They have desired to be as great through the impalpable prestige of the intellect as through the terrestrial royalty of silver and gold. For this reason men and women have rivalled each other in zeal and liberality in endowing these universities, most of which are young, and all strong and already mature. What an enthusiasm of generosity! With one accord millions have been poured out to form the endowments which are destined to support these laboratories, these libraries, these gymnasia, all this scholastic equipment, which tends to assure at the same time the mental and physical development of the new America. What is more significant than the emulation of the richest men of Chicago in creating, out of many fragments, the University of Chicago, the republic of learning of which Doctor Harper is president? Nor is that an undertaking more generous than that of Mrs. Phoebe Hearst, in gathering, at her own expense, a vast international assembly, so that in flower-clad California a university city might arise, whose marbles would glorify the sovereignty of the human intellect. Thanks to these memorable endowments, gold, in America, has become a fluid and ductile medium interchangeable with science and art. Certainly idealism is making progress, and the power of money will be ennobled. The Americans, inven-

tive in everything, have made a new invention — the idealized dollar.

I am glad to see that in this enterprise of human culture the citizens of the United States are mindful of the ties which unite them to France, the dean of European nations.

The founders of the American universities, in forming the generous purpose of elevating the minds and hearts of their countrymen, have rendered homage to methods long since adopted by the French universities. In reading the courses of American institutions of higher learning, I see that a large space is reserved for the study of the literature of my own country. May one be permitted to wish that the list of authors drawn up by the professors and lecturers might be revised, and not limited to the most distinguished names only? While waiting for this indispensable amendment, I am pleased to see that the authorities of the American universities neglect no opportunity of manifesting their friendly feeling toward the French writers who visit the New World. The University of Chicago, in particular, through the combined efforts of President Harper and M. Mérou, the French consul at Chicago, concluded a treaty of friendship with the local section of *L'Alliance Française*. This event was celebrated by great festivities, at which M. Cambon, the French Minister to the United States, was present.

I am persuaded that the better France and America know each other, the better they will love each other.

GASTON DESCHAMPS.

STRIKES IN THE UNITED STATES.

BY CARROLL D. WRIGHT, UNITED STATES COMMISSIONER OF LABOR.

THE statistical history of strikes in the United States covers the period of twenty years which closed with December, 1900. No attempt was made before then to collect data relative to labor controversies; yet, in the United States, as elsewhere, strikes in some form had been resorted to as a means of enforcing demands and obtaining redress of real or fancied grievances, although the method was not a general one. It was during the period designated that the strike assumed importance.

The first recourse to this method occurred in 1740 or 1741, when a combination of the journeymen bakers in the city of New York, formed for the purpose of demanding an increase in wages, resulted in a strike. The instigators were tried and convicted of conspiracy, on account of their agreement not to bake bread until their wages were raised. There is no account, however, of any sentence having been passed upon them. In 1796, the journey-men shoemakers in Philadelphia indulged in a strike or "turn-out," as it was then called, the action being ordered by the organization representing the shoemakers, for the purpose of securing an increase of wages. This strike was successful. The same trade ordered another strike in 1798, for the same purpose and with the same result. The next year, the shoemakers of Philadelphia resisted, through a strike, a threatened reduction of wages; and after being idle about ten weeks made a compromise, so that the result was only partially successful. These were the only occasions on which strikes occurred in the United States before the nineteenth century. Industrial conditions were not particularly conducive to such controversies. Relations between masters and men were individual, so that concerted action among the men was seldom practicable.

The first strike of any importance that occurred in the nineteenth century took place in the city of New York in 1803, and was known as the "sailors' strike." At the time of their demands, sailors had been receiving \$10 per month. They sought an increase to \$14. They organized a procession, compelling other seamen than those who organized the movement to join them, and thus the strike grew in proportions. The constables pursued the strikers and arrested their leader, who was lodged in jail. This terminated the difficulty.

The Journeymen Shoemakers' Association of Philadelphia, which originated the difficulties in 1796, 1798, and 1799, again sought through a strike in 1805 to secure an increase of wages. Their demands were somewhat exorbitant, ranging from 25 to 75 cents increase on each pair of shoes. After six or seven weeks of controversy the difficulty was closed, but without success to the strikers. They were, however, tried for conspiracy.

The cordwainers of New York organized a strike in November, 1809. It was at this time that a stoppage of work in a shop by the journeymen was called a strike. A general stoppage in all shops in a particular trade was known as a general "turnout," and a member of an association who did not keep his obligations to his organization was denominated a "scab." Other difficulties occurred in 1815 among the cordwainers in Pittsburg, the instigators being tried for conspiracy and convicted.

A very interesting strike occurred in Medford, Massachusetts, in 1817. Medford was a shipbuilding place, and a leading ship-builder of that town determined to abolish the grog privilege customary at the time. So he gave notice to his people that no liquor should be used in his shipyard, and the words, "*No rum!* NO RUM!" were written on the clapboards of the workshop and on the timbers in the yard. Some of the men refused to work, but finally they gave up their contention.

From 1821 to 1834 there were several strikes, but not more than one or two in each year. They occurred among the compositors, hatters, ship-carpenters and calkers, journeymen tailors, canal laborers, the building trades, factory workers, shoemakers, and others. One of the most notable of these occurred in 1834 in the shoe-manufacturing city of Lynn, Massachusetts. The women shoebinders began to agitate the question of an increase of wages. They usually carried on their work in their homes.

The employers were unwilling to increase the prices paid, and at a meeting of more than one thousand binders it was resolved that no more work should be taken home until the increase was granted. The employers refused to comply with the demands, and after four weeks of struggle the strike terminated unsuccessfully. The same year the female factory operatives at Lowell engaged in a disturbance to prevent a reduction of wages.

The "New York Daily Advertiser," in 1835, declared that "strikes are all the fashion," and, further, that "it is an excellent time for the journeymen of the country to come to this city." From that period strikes have been fairly common, often expensive, and destructive. There were no very notable strikes, however, until 1877, those which occurred prior thereto not being very important as to the number of persons engaged or losses or otherwise, although some of them were severe in the conditions accompanying them. After the year 1877, the greatest labor wars of the century occurred. There were strikes having a wide and far-reaching influence, which was felt in many directions, and involved the interests of parties not engaged. The first of what may be called historic strikes took place in 1877 on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, at Martinsburg, in West Virginia, on account of a threatened reduction in wages. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company was the victim of a most extraordinary strike, accompanied by riots and violence and the destruction of property, at Pittsburg, in 1877. The story of the difficulty is a very long one, and the strike itself was severe in every respect. Troops were called out, gatling guns were used, and the incident took on the form of war. The county in which the strike occurred was declared by the courts to be liable for all the losses sustained through riots accompanying the strike. The amount was over \$3,500,000. The next great strike was that of the telegraphers, which occurred in the year 1883. This was followed by another memorable controversy which took place on the Southwestern or Gould system of railways in the years 1885-1886.

Without doubt, the most expensive and far-reaching of historic strikes was the strike of June and July, 1894, at Chicago. But the most interesting, thrilling, and dramatic incident or event in the labor movement of the country must be considered the Homestead affair of July 4th, 1892. The trouble grew out of a disagreement in the previous month regarding wages. On July

4th, the officers of the Carnegie Steel Company asked the sheriff of the county to appoint deputies to protect the works, while they carried out their intention to make repairs. The employees, on their part, banded themselves together to defend the works against what they called encroachments or demands to enter; in other words, the workmen took possession of the Homestead steel works. When the sheriff's men approached, the workmen, who were assembled in force, notified them to leave the place. They offered, however, to act as deputies, which offer was promptly declined. On July 5th, a force of detectives, brought to the scene in barges, was met by a heavy volley of shots from the strikers, who were entrenched behind steel billets. The detectives were armed with Winchester rifles, but on landing they were obliged to ascend an embankment in single file, and so they were forced to retire, suffering from the opposing fire. Many efforts were made to reach the strikers, but without success, so strong was the position of the men behind their breastworks of steel. The battle continued throughout the day, and by the following morning the strikers had secured a ten-pound cannon, and planted it in such a way as to command the barges. About nine o'clock a regular bombardment commenced. The barges were protected by heavy steel plates; so the strikers made efforts to destroy them by floating burning oil to them, and by spraying the boats with oil at the same time by means of hose. The combined movements against the detectives obliged them to throw out a flag of truce. Seven men had been killed and twenty or thirty wounded in the battle. The arrival of troops on the 12th of July restored the town to order.

July, 1894, witnessed another severe labor war. This was what is commonly known as the Pullman strike at Chicago, which began with a private difficulty at the works of Pullman's Palace Car Company, and ended with a practical insurrection of the labor employed on the principal railroads radiating from Chicago and some of the affiliated lines, paralyzing internal commerce, putting the general public to great inconvenience, delaying the mails, and in general demoralizing business. The effects of this great strike were felt all over the country, for the contest was not limited to the parties with whom it originated. The strike was brought to a close not so much through the action of local police, State Militia, or the Federal troops, as by the action

of the courts through the power of the writ of injunction. There were riots, intimidations, assaults, murder, arson, burglary, and lesser crimes. All the attending circumstances of the strike pointed to the one conclusion, that a share of responsibility for bringing it on belonged in some degree to each and every party involved in it. A great deal of very bitter feeling was generated. It was, however, one of the most suggestive strikes that have ever occurred, for it taught the public its rights in such matters.

The year 1894 may be called the high-water mark of labor controversies, so far as magnitude is concerned, although the statistics of other years show a larger number of establishments involved. The Lehigh Valley Railroad strike, which occurred in December, 1893, extending into 1894, the American Railway Union strike on the Great Northern Railroad in April of the latter year, and some others, emphasize the statement.

The latest of what may be called historic strikes are those of the anthracite coal regions and the bituminous coal strikes of 1894, 1897, 1900, and the so-called "steel strike" of the year 1901. The latter was a contest between the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers and the United States Steel Corporation. It began on the first day of July, 1901, and lasted until September 15th, when work was resumed in accordance with an adjustment agreed to on the 13th of the latter month. The difficulty grew out of an attempt to adjust a sliding scale of wages with some of the constituent companies of the United States Steel Corporation, a new company having \$1,404,000,000 capitalization which was perfected after the difficulty really began. The real nut of the difficulty was not a question of wages, hours of labor, or rules or conditions of work, but a contest for recognition of the right of the Association to demand the unionizing of mills, a demand, of course, which was positively refused by the United States Steel Corporation. It was the first great struggle in the United States that was conducted solely on this issue, which, indeed, has been contested many times, but usually in conjunction with some grievance or complicated with some demand as to wages or other economic conditions. The result was that the Amalgamated Association did not secure the terms demanded; and it lost further, because some of the mills which were subject to the union's rules were taken out and made non-union

mills. It was a disastrous experience. In many respects, this steel strike is one of the most remarkable strikes of our time, yet it was conducted without any of the dramatic and tragic circumstances which attended the Homestead affair in 1892, in which the Amalgamated Association was one of the parties. In the difficulty of 1901, the Association did not have the hearty indorsement of a large number of workmen, as it was not a movement to redress any grievance.

The cost of the steel strike cannot be accurately gauged, but officers of the Amalgamated Association estimate that the number of men out of employment during the strike averaged 30,000 per day. There were at times very many more than this number out of work. The wages of the 30,000 men on strike averaged \$3 per day, it is estimated. These are fairly conservative estimates; and, taking them for a basis, there must have been a loss of more than \$4,000,000 in wages during the strike. The steel company, through its officers, has claimed that it experienced no great loss as the result of the strike.

With this statement relative to the past and concerning some of the more prominent and destructive labor wars of the past twenty years, it will be interesting to know the statistical history covering practically the strike period of the country. There are no statistics prior to 1880; in fact, the number of strikes which occurred annually before that time was so small that the statistical method could hardly be applied. From all accounts, gathered from various sources, the total number of strikes and lockouts in the United States from 1741 to 1880, inclusive, was 1,491, of which 813 occurred in the year 1880, and of those occurring in 1880, 618 were strikes, clearly defined as such. In 1879, there were only 51 conflicts, and this was the largest number for any year prior to 1880. From this statement it is seen that the real strike period of the United States begins with 1880, but the classified statistics begin with the year 1881; for the facts for 1880, collected at the time of the census of that year, were not classified as to losses, number of persons involved, etc., as they have been for the twenty years beginning with 1881.

From the Sixteenth Annual Report of the United States Commissioner of Labor the following tables, showing the main facts accompanying the strikes and lockouts for the period from 1881 to 1900, inclusive, have been constructed:

STRIKES.

Year.	Number of strikes.	Establishments involved.	Employees thrown out of employ- ment.	Average duration (days).	Wage loss of employees.	Assistance to employees by labor or- ganizations.	Loss of employers.	Per cent. of establishments in which strikes—		
								Suc- ceeded.	Succeeded partly.	Failed.
1881	471	2,928	129,521	12.8	\$3,372,578	\$287,999	\$1,919,483	61.37	7.00	31.63
1882	434	2,105	154,671	21.9	9,864,228	734,389	4,269,094	53.59	8.17	38.24
1883	478	2,759	149,763	20.6	6,274,480	461,293	4,696,027	58.17	16.09	25.74
1884	443	2,367	147,054	30.5	7,666,717	407,871	3,393,073	51.50	3.89	44.61
1885	645	2,284	242,705	30.1	10,663,248	465,827	4,388,893	52.80	9.50	37.70
1886	1,432	10,053	508,044	23.4	14,992,453	1,122,130	12,357,898	34.50	18.85	46.65
1887	1,436	6,589	379,676	20.9	16,560,534	1,121,564	6,698,495	45.64	7.19	47.17
1888	906	3,506	147,704	20.3	6,377,749	1,752,668	6,509,017	52.22	5.48	42.30
1889	1,075	3,786	249,559	26.2	10,409,686	592,017	2,936,752	46.49	18.91	34.60
1890	1,833	9,424	351,944	24.2	13,875,338	910,285	5,135,404	52.65	10.01	37.34
1891	1,717	8,116	298,939	34.9	14,801,505	1,132,557	6,176,988	37.88	8.29	53.83
1892	1,298	5,540	206,671	23.4	10,772,622	833,874	5,145,691	39.31	8.70	51.99
1893	1,305	4,555	265,914	20.6	9,938,048	563,183	3,406,195	50.86	10.32	38.82
1894	1,349	8,196	660,425	32.4	37,145,532	931,052	18,982,129	38.09	13.50	48.41
1895	1,215	6,973	392,403	20.5	13,044,830	559,165	5,072,282	55.24	9.94	34.82
1896	1,026	5,462	241,170	22.0	11,098,207	462,165	5,304,235	59.19	7.47	33.34
1897	1,078	8,492	408,391	27.4	17,468,904	721,164	4,868,687	57.31	28.12	14.57
1898	1,056	3,809	*249,002	22.5	10,037,284	585,228	4,596,462	64.19	6.38	29.43
1899	1,797	11,317	417,072	15.2	15,157,965	1,096,030	7,443,407	73.24	14.25	12.51
1900	1,779	9,248	505,066	23.1	18,341,570	1,434,452	9,431,299	46.43	20.62	32.95
Total	22,793	117,509	*6,105,694	23.8	\$257,863,478	\$16,174,793	\$122,731,121	50.77	13.04	36.19

* Not including the number in 33 establishments for which these data were not obtainable.

LOCKOUTS.

Year.	Number of lockouts.	Establishments involved.	Employees thrown out of employment.	Average duration (days).	Wage loss of employees.	Assistance to employees by labor organizations.	Loss of employers.	Per cent. of establishments in which lockouts—		
								Succeeded.	Succeeded partly.	Failed.
1881	6	9	655	32.2	\$18,519	\$3,150	\$6,960	88.89	11.11	—
1882	22	42	4,131	105.0	466,345	47,668	112,382	64.29	—	35.71
1883	28	117	20,512	57.5	1,069,212	102,253	297,097	56.41	—	43.59
1884	42	354	18,121	41.4	1,421,410	314,027	640,847	27.97	.28	71.75
1885	50	183	15,424	27.1	901,173	89,488	455,477	38.25	3.28	58.47
1886	140	1,509	101,980	39.1	4,281,058	549,452	1,949,498	21.18	13.11	65.71
1887	67	1,281	59,630	49.8	4,233,700	155,846	2,819,736	34.19	1.25	64.56
1888	40	180	15,176	74.9	1,100,057	85,931	1,217,199	74.44	3.89	21.67
1889	36	132	10,731	57.5	1,379,722	115,389	307,125	40.91	25.76	33.33
1890	64	324	21,555	73.9	957,966	77,210	486,258	65.74	5.56	28.70
1891	69	546	31,014	37.8	883,709	50,195	616,888	63.92	14.29	21.79
1892	61	716	32,014	72.0	2,856,013	537,684	1,695,080	69.13	25.28	5.59
1893	70	305	21,842	34.7	6,659,401	364,268	1,034,420	41.90	18.31	39.79
1894	55	875	29,619	39.7	2,022,769	160,244	982,584	11.31	2.40	86.29
1895	40	370	14,785	31.6	791,703	67,701	584,155	13.24	.27	86.49
1896	40	51	7,668	65.1	690,945	61,355	357,535	80.39	1.96	17.65
1897	32	171	7,763	38.6	583,606	47,326	298,044	60.82	3.51	35.67
1898	42	164	14,217	48.8	880,461	47,098	239,403	63.41	.61	35.98
1899	41	323	14,817	37.5	1,485,174	126,957	379,365	18.01	.62	81.37
1900	60	2,281	62,653	265.1	16,136,802	448,219	5,447,930	94.30	.31	5.39
Total	1,005	9,933	504,307	97.1	\$48,819,745	\$3,451,461	\$19,927,953	50.79	6.28	42.93

From the foregoing table relative to strikes—an analysis of the lockout table need not be attempted, as the lockouts constitute but a comparatively small proportion of industrial disturbances—it will be seen that the largest number of establishments involved in any one year was in 1899, being 11,317, and the next largest number was in 1886, being 10,053. The losses to employers and employees under all the conflicts, both strikes and lockouts, occurring in the period amounted to the enormous sum of \$468,968,581, more than 6,000,000 persons having been thrown out of employment for an average of 23.8 days. It is often supposed that most strikes fail; but the foregoing record shows that 50.77 per cent. of the strikes succeeded, that 13.04 per cent. succeeded partly, and that 36.19 per cent. failed.

The figures in the tables do not represent the actual number of different individual employees who were involved in strikes or lockouts in a given year, because, in many cases, there have been two or more strikes or lockouts in one concern in the same year.

Of the whole number of strikes, 14,457 were ordered by labor organizations; these represented 103,455 establishments out of a total of 117,509. Of the strikes ordered by organizations, 52.86 per cent. were successful, 13.60 per cent. partly successful, and 33.54 per cent. unsuccessful. These percentages coincide very closely with those relating to the total number of successful, partly successful, and unsuccessful strikes.

The distribution of strikes offers occasion for some very serious reflections. During the twenty years included in the report, New York shows the largest number of strikes as well as the largest number of establishments affected, that State having 28.34 per cent. of the total number of strikes in the country during the whole period, and 32.20 per cent. of the total number of establishments involved. Pennsylvania follows, with 12.48 per cent. of the total number of strikes and 15.69 per cent. of the total number of establishments involved. Illinois had 11.58 per cent. of the strikes and 17.68 per cent. of the establishments affected.

In a group of States consisting of Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, there were 87,878 establishments under strike during the period, out of a total of 117,509 in the whole country; that is, in this group of States the establishments involved were 74.78 per cent. of all involved. These States contained 45.02 per cent. of all the manufacturing establishments

and employed 55.15 per cent. of the capital invested in the mechanical industries of the United States.

As regards the employees involved in strikes, almost the same percentages are shown; but the industries most affected by strikes during the twenty years were the building trades, with 4,440 strikes, involving 41,910 establishments and 665,946 employees; coal and coke, with 2,515 strikes, involving 14,575 establishments and 1,892,435 employees; metals and metallic goods, with 2,080 strikes, involving 4,652 establishments and 511,336 employees; clothing, with 1,638 strikes, involving 19,695 establishments and 563,772 employees; tobacco, with 1,509 strikes, involving 6,153 establishments and 251,096 employees; and transportation, with 1,265 strikes, involving 3,436 establishments and 484,454 employees. It is thus seen that of the 22,793 strikes which occurred during the period, 59 per cent. were in the six industries just mentioned, while of the 117,509 establishments involved, 76.95 per cent. were so engaged. As regards the employees thrown out of employment by strikes, 71.60 per cent. of the total number were connected with establishments engaged in these six industries.

The leading causes or objects for which strikes were undertaken, together with the number and percentage of establishments falling under each general cause, are shown as follows:

Cause or object.	Establishments.	Per cent.
For increase of wages.....	33,731	28.70
For increase of wages and reduction of hours.....	13,201	11.23
For reduction of hours.....	13,116	11.16
Against reduction of wages.....	8,423	7.17
In sympathy with strike elsewhere.....	4,078	3.47
Against employment of non-union men.....	2,751	2.34
For adoption of new scale.....	2,742	2.33
For recognition of union.....	1,649	1.40
For increase of wages and recognition of union.....	1,111	.95
For enforcement of union rules.....	1,068	.91
For adoption of union scale.....	928	.79
For reduction of hours and against being compelled to board with employer.....	927	.79
Against task system.....	917	.78
For reduction of hours and against task system.....	901	.77
For adoption of union rules and union scale.....	880	.75
For reinstatement of discharged employees.....	868	.74
For increase of wages, Saturday half-holiday, and privilege of working for employers not members of masters' association.....	800	.68
Against reduction of wages and working overtime.....	750	.64
For increase of wages and against use of material from non-union establishment.....	750	.64
For increase of wages and Saturday half-holiday.....	729	.62
Total of twenty leading causes.....	90,320	76.86
All other causes (1,383).....	27,189	23.14
Total for the United States.....	117,509	100.00

It is interesting to note that the causes, grouped and classified, include 76.86 per cent. of all the establishments, leaving 1,383 causes, variously classified, active in only 23.14 per cent. of the establishments subject to strikes during the period. Three causes, involving increase of wages, reduction of hours, and reduction of wages, included 58.26 per cent. of all the establishments.

The success attending strikes, in relation to their causes, is very varied. Such results are shown in the following table:

Cause or object.	Per cent. of establishments in which strikes—		
	Succeeded.	Succeeded partly.	Failed.
For increase of wages.....	52.77	17.38	29.85
For increase of wages and reduction of hours...	62.49	21.08	16.43
For reduction of hours.....	49.43	8.66	41.91
Against reduction of hours.....	32.54	13.14	54.32
In sympathy with strike elsewhere.....	25.03	2.33	72.64
Against employment of non-union men.....	67.21	1.38	31.41
For adoption of new scale.....	35.34	30.09	34.57
For recognition of union.....	12.37	—	87.63
For increase of wages and recognition of union..	13.41	17.46	69.13
For enforcement of union rules.....	89.79	—	10.21
For adoption of union scale.....	46.23	.43	53.34
For reduction of hours and against being com- pelled to board with employer.....	32.47	—	67.53
Against task system.....	50.93	—	49.07
For reduction of hours and against task system..	100.00	—	—
For adoption of union rules and union scale....	64.20	5.23	30.57
For reinstatement of discharged employees.....	40.67	1.96	57.37
For increase of wages, Saturday half-holiday, and privilege of working for employers not members of masters' association.....	100.00	—	—
Against reduction of wages and working overtime..	100.00	—	—
For increase of wages and against use of material from non-union establishment.....	—	—	100.00
For increase of wages and Saturday half- holiday	77.64	15.09	7.27
Total.....	50.44	13.53	36.03

Strikes to secure an increase of wages included 28.70 per cent. of all establishments involved, and of this number success resulted in 52.77 per cent. In strikes undertaken for both increase of wages and reduction of hours, 62.49 per cent. succeeded.

In considering all the data relative to strikes, it should be remembered that it is difficult always to state the facts with complete accuracy. This is especially true when dealing with losses. Taking strikes only, while the average duration of the strikes does not appear great in the aggregate, the number of days involved amounts to the enormous sum of 2,789,160—which, reduced, equals 7,641.5 years. The days so lost do not represent an absolute loss, as cessation of work or production often does away

with the necessity of stoppage at some other time for restricting the output to the demands of trade or making repairs.

The figures relative to losses have been collected with the greatest possible care; and although in many cases only an estimate could be secured, the results given are believed to be a very close approximation to exact losses; but the figures are for the immediate, and in many instances only temporary, losses of employees and employers. The wage loss of the employees is the most exact statement as to losses. The employer may in some instances be subjected to an ultimate loss, by reason of his inability to fill contracts already made; so it is more difficult to ascertain his exact loss. The entire loss, as estimated, including the loss through assistance and all other facts relating to losses, it is believed, is much less than the real amount.

Whatever the exact truth, the approximate statements are sufficient to convince any right-minded person that every effort that can be made to adjust differences and deal with grievances in such a way as to prevent an open outbreak should be encouraged. Such attempts, where honestly and faithfully made, are leading everywhere, whether in the United States or in other countries devoted to manufacturing industries, to satisfactory results. The organization of private boards of arbitration now being resorted to in this country, following the long-successful example in the industries of Great Britain, is meeting with success. It is recognized now that labor conflicts grow out of increasing intelligence. The avoidance or adjustment of such conflicts must be the result of increased intelligence. Fools do not strike; it is only men who have intelligence enough to recognize their condition that make use of this last resort. With increased intelligence, they will look back upon the strike period as one of development; and when they shall have accommodated themselves to the new conditions, and when employers shall have recognized the increased intelligence of their employees, these matters will be handled in such a way as to prevent in the future a repetition of incidents like those which are chronicled in the statistical history of the strikes of the last twenty years.

CARROLL D. WRIGHT.

MUNICIPAL SUPPRESSION OF INFECTION AND CONTAGION.

BY ERNST J. LEDERLE, PH.D., COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH,
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MODERN conditions of life, more especially in great cities, have brought to the medical scientist and sanitarian a multitude of new problems in hygiene. Many of these problems have already been solved, in great measure as a result of progress in bacteriological study. The knowledge of hygienic principles gained by the scientific world in recent years has made of an empiric study an exact one, has lengthened the span of existence for every civilized being, and has saved the state in human lives the equivalent of millions of dollars annually. Yet men are only beginning to comprehend the great possibilities for the promotion of the health of the world which lie in the study of preventive medicine. The city of Havana is a striking example of what can be done in a short time. Since the American occupation, its death-rate has been reduced to that of New York. The twentieth century is likely to see the "ounce of prevention" system displace more and more the "pound of cure" plan which has burdened previous centuries. Preventive measures seem to be progressing faster, in almost every direction, than disease can spread; and, as a result of knowledge in these matters, a number of once formidable ailments have quite lost their terrors for the physician. New discoveries in preventive medicine are constantly coming to light, and the world may one day have at hand a remedy for most, if not all, of the diseases which now afflict humanity.

No branch of medical learning has progressed faster than the study of the infectious diseases. Many diseases long suspected to resemble in their origin those known to be infectious and communicable, have been definitely determined to be such. Others,

which, within the lifetime of physicians still in active practice, were by none believed to be communicable, have been definitely established as belonging to the infectious class. In all research of this character, the bacteriologist has been the discoverer. The isolation of certain bacteria, each the cause of some disease, has by degrees established one after another disease as communicable. The next step was to note that patients who recover from many of the infectious diseases rarely contract them again. Upon this observation was based the theory that the human body itself acquires some antitoxin which not only kills the bacteria of the disease, but provides immunity against future attacks. When this theory was established beyond question for a number of the communicable diseases, the leaders in bacteriological study at once set about the artificial production of these mysterious immunizing agents. Success has rewarded their efforts in a sufficient number of instances to warrant the belief that all communicable diseases may one day be prevented in this way.

With all the facts which might be adduced to show the efficacy of preventive medicine, it seems strange that there are still persons who object to the use of serums in disease. A hundred years ago, it was regarded as only normal if smallpox, every year, was responsible for 150 out of every thousand deaths. Nowadays, however, under compulsory vaccination, smallpox claims only 5 or 10 in each thousand. What was begun with smallpox serum has been extended to other diseases. Between the epoch-making discoveries of Jenner and those of Pasteur and Koch, there was a lapse of eighty years, during which it may have seemed to the layman that no progress was made; but knowledge of various antitoxins is growing rapidly, and the successful use of three or four, in common employ now for several years, may be followed very soon by the production of other immunizing serums. At all events, the theory is established. Of the common forms of disease, it is true that the only complete success recently attained has been in the treatment of diphtheria; but in the last five years, the death-rate in cities using the serum has been reduced to less than one-half of the lowest death-rate recorded before the discovery of the diphtheria antitoxin. Partial success has been attained in inoculation against cholera and the plague; but for the two or three most fatal communicable diseases no satisfactory serum has yet been found.

In default of specific aid from the bacteriologist, the sanitarian turns to hygienic principles in order to prevent the spread of diseases. Especially is this true in the treatment of contagious diseases in the great cities. In the rural districts, where there is room for every man to move about without jostling his neighbor, where there is pure air for all, and where the standard of living is high enough to embrace some, at least, of the cardinal principles of sanitation, infectious diseases have less opportunity to gain a foothold. But in the cities, the public medical adviser has to care, among others, for a great tenement population—ill-housed, ill-nourished, bred in the foul air of the slums; above all, ignorant of the laws of cleanliness and of right living, and willing to go to any lengths to hide the evidences of disease from the municipal physicians. Such people know nothing of the causes of contagion and feel no responsibility if they spread disease; in fact, the very ones who from their situation should be most careful of the health of their neighbors, are really least so.

But the poor in tenements are more sinned against than sinning, for the greed of landlords often stands in the way of better housing for the people. In New York, the devoted labors of sanitarians interested in improving tenement conditions resulted last year in the passage of a law governing the construction of tenements, and requiring that they be built with more attention to the sanitary needs of their occupants. But, at the following session, the Legislature was besieged by greedy landlords, and it required all the efforts of the Tenement House Commission, seconded by the Board of Health, to prevent the passage of amendments which would have quite emasculated the law, and led to the construction, in the newer sections of the city, of a form of tenements calculated to perpetuate all the evils now existing in the older slums. While it is not generally known, it may be stated here that, in some of the older wards in New York city, there are acres of land which hold between 700 and 800 people each; the most thickly populated acre in the Old World, by way of comparison, is said to be one in Prague, which "accommodates" 485 people. The average density of population in the whole of Manhattan Island is greater than in any other city of the civilized world; that is because three-fourths of the population live in tenements, piled tier on tier to the skies.

It is an accepted fact that an increased death-rate is an almost

inevitable concomitant of increased density of population. The Registrar-General of England, some years ago, showed that, whereas the mean death-rate per 1000 in a district with only 166 persons per square mile was 16.75 per 1000, it was 38.62 per 1000 in a district where there were 65,000 persons per square mile. For the former section, the mortality of children under five years was 37 per 1000, while for the latter it was 139 per 1000—pitiful evidence, indeed, as to the expectation of life for the children of the tenements in our cities.

Extremely important in the suppression of contagion is a proper municipal supervision of the meat, milk, and water supply of the people. The extent to which this can be carried is shown by the fact that about ten million pounds of foodstuffs are annually seized and destroyed by the New York Board of Health. It is unnecessary to cite here the shocking disclosures of recent years with regard to the prevalence of tuberculosis in cattle, and the possible identification of human and bovine tuberculosis. Efforts to secure the destruction of tuberculous beef in the New York market, as well as to prevent the spread of the disease through the milk of infected animals, have resulted in a fairly satisfactory measure of co-operation between the New York Health Board and those of neighboring States; otherwise, it would have been impossible for the New York Board to exercise any control over sources of possible contagion outside its own jurisdiction. As it is, there is a careful inspection of all meat sent into the city, and carcasses found to be tuberculous are immediately destroyed.

Milk inspection, in the interest of a pure supply, plays an important part in efforts to check communicable disease. This inspection should be begun at the dairies and stables, where the bacteria found in milk first have an opportunity to breed. The milk ducts of a cow often give off thousands of bacteria to each cubic centimetre of milk; thousands of others are added in the process of milking, especially if the cow's udder and the attendant's hands are not clean. It is true that few of these bacteria are directly productive of communicable disease, but a number of kinds so modify the milk in their development as to render it injurious to the consumer. It is impossible to secure raw milk in any amount which is absolutely free from bacteria. The specifications for milk supplied to the contagious-disease

hospitals under the control of the New York Board of Health call for a milk which contains not more than 60,000 bacteria per cubic centimetre, except in the months of May, June, July, and August, when the limit is 100,000 bacteria per cubic centimetre; milk of this standard is of recognized high quality. All milk dealers in New York city carry on business under permits revocable at the pleasure of the Health Board. Infectious diseases, not only tuberculosis, diphtheria, scarlet fever and typhoid, are not infrequently transmitted in milk which has been contaminated either at the dairy or in the stores of retailers where disease has occurred. It is important that the vender shall not keep or store milk in any room used for sleeping or domestic purposes, or opening on such rooms. Stringent rules must also be enforced regarding the transfer of milk from cans to bottles on streets or at ferries or depots, and for the protection of milk receptacles from the dust and impurities of streets.

Contamination of milk with typhoid germs results from the use of infected water in washing the cans or other utensils. But typhoid fever is more commonly transmitted by the direct contamination of water supplies. The health authorities of New York city long since stopped the use of all shallow wells on Manhattan Island, but typhoid outbreaks still occur in localities where the water used by the inhabitants is subject to sewage contamination. Notable in this respect was the outbreak in Philadelphia four years ago; about three times the usual number of cases of typhoid were recorded during the epidemic, and of these some 65 per cent. were found in a section of the city containing only one-fifth of the total population. On tracing the sources of infection, it was found that all these cases were due to the accidental overflow of a sewer into the Schuylkill River at a point just above the intake of one of the reservoirs. The lesson is obvious, especially when sanitarians recall that in cities like Munich or Vienna, which draw their waters from pure mountain springs, the deaths from typhoid number only four in each 100,000 of population, while in cities like Philadelphia, Washington, Albany, Pittsburg, Cincinnati, and Louisville, which still use water from wells in populous districts, and from rivers known to be polluted with sewage, the death-rate from typhoid averages sixty per 100,000 inhabitants.

Perhaps the greatest opportunity which is offered to the mu-

nicipal sanitarian to promote the health and happiness of mankind, lies in measures to prevent the spread of tuberculosis; but, unhappily, there is no opportunity to which cities have been so blind. Municipal governments in the United States which have thus far adopted effective prophylactic systems may be numbered on the fingers of one hand, and this in spite of the fact that the medical profession is already well aware of the wonderful results which follow radical preventive measures.

Tuberculosis takes away from a quarter to a third of the persons who sicken and die during the best and most productive period of life; and yet it has been shown in New York city, to go no further afield, that the spread of this disease is readily preventable, if proper hygienic measures are taken. The hygienic measures, when fitly practised, should cover all the places where consumptive persons may have been—the home, the public conveyance, the factory, the store, and even the public streets. The plan of safeguarding the general public against tuberculosis, as it is now in operation in New York city, has already produced such remarkably good results that it is difficult to see how any important city in the land can fail to adopt similar, or even more rigorous, measures. The ordinance which brought pulmonary tuberculosis under the control of the New York Board of Health was not adopted until 1897, although recommended nearly ten years prior to that time. The disease was then declared infectious and communicable, and every physician in the city was required to report in writing the name, address, occupation, etc., of every person suffering from tuberculosis, who had come under the observation of the physician. Furthermore, every person suffering from the disease, and every person in attendance upon any one so suffering, was by this ordinance required to observe and enforce all the rules of the Board of Health which aim to prevent the spread of tuberculosis. The adoption of the compulsory notification requirement raised a storm of protest from the various medical bodies in New York city, but without avail; and the results have already shown the wisdom of the procedure, while all the leading physicians are now heartily in accord with the plan.

Compulsory notification is the keynote of the system. It gives opportunity at once for the necessary sanitary measures. Inspectors from the Board of Health are enabled thus to visit tene-

ment houses, lodging-houses, hotels, etc., and instruct the consumptives as to the necessary precautions to be taken for their own good, as well as for the safety of persons about them. Disinfection, and what is still more efficacious, complete renovation of all premises where a death from tuberculosis has occurred, are, when necessary, ordered by the Board of Health; and advanced cases are moved to hospitals (with their own consent) so far as it is possible to provide hospital accommodations. Many opportunities also arise for the removal to rural sanitariums of persons who have recently contracted the disease. In this way the Board of Health is able to follow up each tuberculous case at the home, or the workshop, factory, or office, and protect the patient's neighbors from infection. Registration facilitates satisfactory supervision over the disease, and helps the Board of Health to discern where the chief efforts should be put forth. For example, it has thus been shown that, in several separate blocks in the lower part of the city, more than one hundred cases of tuberculosis have occurred within five years; and there are certain houses in New York which have had between twenty and thirty cases in that time. One of the blocks in the Chinese quarter, with a population of 2100 persons, had more than 200 cases of tuberculosis in five years; and it is likely that the number reported would have been larger had the system of registration then been as complete as it is now.

In addition to the inspection and renovation of houses where tuberculosis cases have occurred, much is being done to restrain people who spread infection by constant expectoration. It has been shown conclusively that a spitter who is suffering from a disease of the respiratory tract may, if allowed to continue his operations without control, provide infective material for hundreds, if not thousands, of persons during the slow progress of his disease. It seems probable that a number of diseases besides consumption are transmitted in this way. It is for this reason, even more than on the score of public decency, that drastic measures are taken to restrain the man who spits in public places. In New York, the practice is to send out police officers dressed in citizens' clothes to arrest all persons found spitting in public conveyances. The spitter, as a rule, evinces violent opposition to arrest, and seems to think that it is an infringement on his personal liberty. Especially is this true of the large foreign-born

element in New York's population. All are treated alike, however, when they are brought before the magistrate; and it is customary to fine them between one and ten dollars when they are taken in the act. In the long run, this system of arrest and fine will probably accomplish the objects sought, as no violator of the law can tell when he may be caught and arrested. It is noticeable that, so far as is known at this time, no spitter has ever been taken in a second offence, so that in all probability the lesson of arrest and punishment is an effective one.

The mortality from tuberculosis in New York city has been reduced about 35 per cent. in the last fifteen years, chiefly as a result of preventive measures, though these are as yet in their infancy. A satisfactory system of caring for tuberculous patients would include municipal sanitariums in favorable locations outside the city; but this enterprise seems to need the aid of a Carnegie or a Rockefeller, for city authorities are not yet willing to undertake the expense involved. The disease now costs New York city annually from nine to ten thousand lives, the value of which, according to the statisticians, is fully ten million dollars. It has been said by the best authorities that an extension of prophylactic measures—to include suitable hospitals and complete enforcement of the existing regulations—would result in the saving of from 2000 to 3000 lives annually in New York city. The cost of this work would be extremely small, probably not a hundredth part of what New York is spending on rapid transit, bridges, schools, and similar public improvements.

Of prime importance in the suppression of contagion in all its forms is an efficient system of medical inspection in schools. As practised in New York city, this work is under the care of a special corps of physicians, detailed to visit the schools, and examine all children who have been isolated by the teachers as not appearing entirely well. The scope of this work may be imagined when it is said that a total of nearly 100,000 visits are made annually to the public schools, in the course of which upwards of 125,000 children are examined, and from 10,000 to 15,000 excluded as having contagious disease in one form or another. A large proportion of the contagious-disease cases occurring in New York, however, are reported by private practitioners, who are visited with censure and sometimes with fines for failure to make such reports. Diagnosis of each individual case follows, and the

patient is either removed to a contagious-disease hospital, or placed in charge of a district inspector, whose duty it is to watch the progress of the case, and take measures to prevent the spread of the disease to other persons in the neighborhood. The results of the preventive system in recent years have been profoundly important. The death-rate in the diseases to which children are especially subject shows a remarkable shrinkage. Especially is this true in diphtheria and croup, the mortality from which had been quite steadily increasing in New York up to the year 1895. At that time began the treatment with diphtheria antitoxin, and since then the mortality from diphtheria has been reduced fully one-half—a saving of several thousand lives every year.

Any review, however cursory, of measures for the suppression of contagion would be incomplete without a word about the checking of smallpox, which has been so prevalent in the United States in the last two years as to be almost epidemic. Its spread has been unquestionably due to laxity in vaccination work in various sections of the country. Contagion was brought here from Europe in considerable amount in 1900, and the disease has since been spreading, in the winter months, to a large number of the unvaccinated. Federal control of preventive measures is needed to secure a uniform enforcement of them; at present, the work of any particular city in checking smallpox is in great measure nullified by the laxity of other cities. The prevalence of the disease has revived discussion of plans for compulsory vaccination. There is no doubt of the efficacy of that system; an example of it is found in the course of smallpox in a state like Prussia, where, since compulsory vaccination was put into practice twenty-five years ago, the death-rate from smallpox has fallen from 36 per 100,000 to 0.49 per 100,000 inhabitants. At the same time, there has been so little opposition to vaccination in New York city that compulsion by State enactment has been deemed unwise. It seems probable that in the last two years fully one-third, if not one-half, of the population of New York has submitted to vaccination, and the good results of this are likely to be seen next winter, if they are not already apparent.

ERNST J. LEDERLE.

HOW TO CURB THE TRUSTS.

BY HENRY MICHELSEN.

ON November 18th, 1601, the Commons of England resolved that:

“Whereas, numerous commodities, among which are several of universal consumption and the first necessity, have of late years been advanced to double the usual price, and the representatives of most counties and boroughs have been instructed by their constituents to demand abolition of so oppressive a grievance, the Commons appeal to the Queen’s Highness for redress.”

On November 25th, Elizabeth assured the Speaker, in the presence of her Council, that she never signed a patent of monopoly till she had been told it would prove beneficial to the nation; she thanked the members who had brought the abuse to her knowledge; she promised him that she would, by proclamation, revoke every patent prejudicial to the liberties of the subject, and that she would suspend all others till their validity should be ascertained in the courts of law. This action of the great queen ended the reign of monopolies in her own time, and has stood for three hundred years as a model of governmental tact.

The commercial conditions existing in 1902 within the fiscal borders of the American Republic are curiously similar to those of which the Commons complained to Elizabeth. The necessities of life are in the control of monopolies. Whatever is required by the consumers is subject to the dictum of irresponsible combinations. So great has the evil grown that, in some instances, the people have not waited for the action of their servants in Congress, but have taken the initiative by declining to purchase the articles offered under a system of boycotting. If this practice should spread, it would mean, on the part of the law-making authorities, the abdication of their proper functions,

and a confession of their impotence to cope with an evil the prevalence of which is acknowledged.

Forty years ago, the party at present in power inaugurated the American System. Its financial policy has been based upon high import duties, professedly enacted because of its solicitude for the protection of the American working-man. The party referred to won the last election by promising "a full dinner-pail for four years more." It rode into power upon this issue; it will be held responsible for its fulfilment. The success of the American System is predicated upon the well-being of the laborer. An abundance of cheap, wholesome food, of suitable clothing, of comfortable dwellings, of all the requirements for a decent life, has made it possible for the operatives of our manufactories to produce better and cheaper articles for distribution in the world's trade, within fewer daily hours of labor, than the workmen in any other nation. The markets of the world are ours because hitherto our operatives have been prosperous. A system of taxation which must prove destructive to this prosperity would be wrong, even if it were enacted to meet the necessities of the body politic; it is criminal, when it is imposed for the advancement of private interests and uncontrolled by those to whom the people have intrusted the management of their affairs.

Combinations of industrial enterprises for the undue enhancement of the value of their products, are made possible by the state of the transportation system of the country. The reports of the Interstate Railroad Commission, the official authority upon this subject, abound with admissions to this effect. Were railroad rates equal, as they ought to be under the expressed designs of the statute, and were it possible under existing circumstances to adjust them in such a manner as to serve the purposes of the nation at large, a method of distribution of commodities might be secured which would enable the people to obtain the legitimate reduction in prices that ought to result from the facilities of production. Under the present methods, this cannot be achieved. The advent of cheaper power, increased outputs, more economical handling of raw materials, has been accompanied by a rise in the prices of all the articles of daily consumption.

The price of meat, the article of consumption which forms, next to bread, the most important food for the eighty millions of our citizens, is fixed by half a dozen monopolists. Their business

is one which prohibits any kind of competition, and they exploit the nation. It is reported that the net earnings of the Meat Trust during the year 1901 amounted to one hundred millions of dollars more than in 1900. Each pound of meat has risen in price by from three to five cents. It is not the lack of cattle which has caused this rise in values; for this country supplies a great part of the civilized world with flesh foods, and a rational management of existing ranches would readily yield a still greater increase of stock-cattle than is obtained at present. Nor is the expense of administration of packing-houses excessive; for in these plants the scientific disposition of all material tends to utilize all of the substances handled, and to minimize waste. The grower of cattle does not derive any advantage from the gain of the packer; the Trust dictates prices both for the raw material purchased and for the product sold by it. By its "route" cars, which are perambulating butcher-shops, it has destroyed the retail business of the dealers in small towns. Its business transactions amount to six hundred millions of dollars annually, and they are growing with the natural increase of the population. While prices within the United States have been advanced continually, those charged European consumers have been adapted to the local state of each market. Thus American meats are cheaper in London or Liverpool than in New York or Chicago—the frozen meats of Australia and free trade necessitating the reduction. During the year 1901, about a hundred millions of dollars' worth of meats were distributed by American packers in European markets, a fact which indicates no lack of range cattle. The existence of this Trust has become possible by reason of its relations to the transportation companies. Cold storage on cars and steamboats, reduced freight rates, and the preferences given to these large concerns in railroad car service, have made it impossible for individuals to attempt competition.

The Millers' Trust has so depressed the price of wheat and other cereals as to compel their exportation to foreign mills for grinding. To clinch their control upon the whole cereal output of the country, the members of this Trust now urge the railway companies to give them such transportation rates as will compel the American farmer to have his grain converted into flour within the borders of this country. If ever this demand is complied with, the production of our staple grains will shrink, because

the Trust does not allow the producer a margin sufficient to live upon. At the same time the average domestic price of flour has been enormously advanced.

The Wool Trust has depressed the values of the Western staple, until it is doubtful whether the flocks can be maintained upon the free range of the desert and leave a profit to their owners. And at the same time the transportation rates have been made much higher than they were when wool commanded a price double that paid to the producer now.

California complains that her orange crop must rot upon the ground, because the facilities offered by the transportation companies are inadequate to take this harvest to the markets. Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana assert that the long-haul system keeps their territories from being developed, it being the maxim of railroad companies that it is better to bring manufactured goods into undeveloped countries from afar at high rates than to permit the building up of industries which would only yield local rates. Thus, the lumber industry of the Pacific Coast is being confined to the procurement of raw material, because it pays the roads better to haul the manufactured articles three thousand miles across the continent than to permit the establishment of pulp mills, or wagon and agricultural implement factories, at the places where the lumber required for these industries is most easily obtained. The mining States of the West complain bitterly about the curtailment of the output of their minerals, brought about by the combination between the railroads and the American Smelting and Refining Company. Granger legislation is imminent in the States of the Middle West, to cope with advanced rates upon the products of their corn-fields caused by the co-operation of railways with the Elevator Trust. In fact, the productive and commercial forces of the country are suffering vexatious annoyances from the anarchic transportation conditions, conditions wasteful, cumbersome, unscientific, unworthy of the genius of the American people.

The existing state of affairs, however undesirable it may appear, has been brought about in a perfectly legitimate manner. A fertile continent had to be opened to civilization. The available means of communication were inadequate. Enormous investments were necessary to build the lines of railways required,

to equip them, to handle the administrative organizations needed in the employment and control of a million of operatives. Of financial aid, such as has been lavishly supplied by other governments, our railroads obtained little. The establishment of the business of the nation upon its present large scale is due to the genius and administrative ability of the men who handle its railways. The rates of freight and passenger traffic are low, compared with those exacted abroad. The service is being improved year after year. What the public complains of is, not that the transportation lines are wilfully and arbitrarily exacting, by means of excessive rates, undue advantages for themselves, but that they discriminate in favor of trusts and corporations, thus destroying the chances of individual citizens, retarding the establishment of new enterprises and placing the control of the markets in the keeping of the favored few, who in turn coerce the railroads into a continuance of these discriminations.

To develop the resources, now dormant, of agriculture, of the metalliferous and carboniferous mines, of the oil lands, of the forests; to cause the arid territories of the western half of the country to attain their full productive values; to manufacture out of our abundant raw materials the commodities required in the commerce of the world; to obtain control of foreign markets; it is necessary to have recourse to the enactment of the one great measure here proposed—the nationalization of the railways.

That the framing of so great a law will require statesmanship of the highest order, is admitted. That constructive legislation more comprehensive than has ever been effected will have to be placed upon the statute book, is granted. That this legislation will be difficult to achieve, that it may be tentative at its inception, liable afterwards to revision, as requirements may arise, is readily allowed. But the time has come for it, and the obstacles will vanish as its scope and effects shall become apparent.

The railway system of the country has lately passed into the possession of a small number of people. As consolidation progresses, it is unavoidable that a degree of mutual understanding between the holders of these properties must be established. Not designedly, but by reason of the inherent conditions of the business, these combinations of capital must progress in ever-increasing proportion, until it may become a question whether the real power of the nation is lodged in the government created

by the Constitution, or within the keeping of an irresponsible coalition of accumulated wealth. For the dignity of the government, it will be requisite to substitute for the crude and archaic legislation now in force, a comprehensive statute which will guard and promote the welfare of the whole people.

The principal arguments against the nationalization of the railroads are:

- (1) The cost of the scheme;
- (2) The great accumulation of wealth into few hands consequent upon the purchase of the lines by the government;
- (3) The effect upon the electorate, by the creation of a large office-holding class dependent on the party in power.

As to the cost of the scheme, it is not proposed that the government shall pay more than is warranted by the intrinsic value of the property. In the appraisalment of public property, the government has always been served quite as well as individuals. The transfer would, of course, have to be effected under proper safeguards, very much after the manner in which European governments have proceeded. The making of an investment of this magnitude would not frighten the American people in the prevailing state of financial enterprises, more especially since the effect would be felt to be beneficial almost at once after its consummation. Absolutely equal and open rates would control the industrial combinations, multiply the means of exchange, stimulate agriculture equally with manufactures, and enhance the growth of rural and civic communities in a uniform and progressive measure. The country would, by the development of its natural resources, which should be made the principal task of the department having charge of the transportation system, become the workshop of the nations; and a general prosperity must ensue of which it is difficult to form a conception.

As to the accumulation of wealth in a few large holdings, the present system has a tendency to bring about this result by the increment in the value of proprietary railway investments. Stocks which were considered of little value a few years ago have become worth many times the prices demanded for them during the period of depression; while debentures have sunk in capital value and interest paid. A purchase of the titles to the railways would, very likely, be effected by means of bonds, bearing a very low rate of interest, redeemable after a reasonable length

of time at the option of the government. Since the interest earned by these bonds would not prove attractive to great financiers, who are accustomed to much larger profits, the consequence must be that these securities would be employed as bases for other investments. When it is considered that one-half of the territory of the United States is quite undeveloped, owing to lack of capital; that a rich soil merely awaits the distribution of water by means of irrigation canals; that thus vast areas now barren may be made to sustain a population as dense as that of other civilized countries; that the mines of this continent are only in the very first stage of their development; that the manufacturing interests of the trans-Missouri country have not been evolved, while the factories of the Eastern States are unable to accept orders unless they are allowed months in which to fill them; we may feel assured that the money to be distributed in the purchase of railway properties will find many and abundant channels for investment. It is certain that no inconvenience has arisen from the nationalization of the German railroads to the people of that empire, and there is no reason why the same measure should affect our people in a different way.

As regards the creation of an office-holding class, it may be said that in the railway service this class exists already. As it has not been deemed requisite to disfranchise the employees of the postal establishment nor any of the other servants of the government's civil organization, it does not appear that a necessity for such a measure will arise, concerning the railway men. Numerous attempts have been made, time and again, by railway officials to control the vote of their employees, always to the discomfiture of those who made the effort. The electorate will be swayed by political and economical considerations, and parties will achieve success or failure at the hustings exactly as heretofore, according to the records presented by them, as long as the Republic lasts.

Taxation is a function of government. It must not be delegated by those responsible for its proper enactment to any other authority. If existing institutions are not adapted to the protection of the general welfare, then it becomes the duty of the law-making powers to create others which will bring about the results required.

HENRY MICHELSEN.

RICHARD STRAUSS AND HIS MUSIC.

BY GUSTAV KOBBE.

RICHARD STRAUSS—a new name to conjure with in music! His banner is borne by a band of enthusiasts like those who, many years ago, carried the flag of Wagner to the front. “Did not Wagner put a full stop after the word music?” some will ask in surprise. “Did he not strike the final note? Are the ‘Ring,’ ‘Tristan’ and ‘Parsifal’ not to be succeeded by an eternal pause? Is there something still to be achieved in music as in other arts and sciences?”

Something new certainly has been achieved by Richard Strauss. It forms neither a continuation of Wagner nor an opposition to Wagner. It has nothing to do with Wagner, beyond that Strauss appropriates whatever in the progression of his art the latest master has a right to take from his predecessors. Strauss is, in fact, one of the most original and individual of composers.

He has been a student, not a copyist, of Wagner. Thus, where others who have sat at the feet of the Bayreuth master have written poor imitations of Wagner, and have therefore failed even to continue the school, giving only feeble echoes of its great master, Strauss has struck out for himself. With a mastery of every technical resource, acquired by deep and patient study, he has given wholly new value and importance to a form of art entirely different from the music drama. The music of the average, modern Wagner disciple sounds not like Wagner, but like Wagner and water. Richard Strauss sounds like Richard Strauss.

One reason for this is that his art work, like Wagner's, has an independent intellectual reason for being. Let me not for one moment be understood as belittling Wagner, in order to magnify Strauss. Wagner is the one creator of an art-form, who also seems

destined to remain its greatest exponent. Other creators of art-forms have been mere pioneers, leaving to those who have come after them the development and rounding out of what with them were experiments. The story of the symphony may be said to have begun with Philipp Emanuel Bach and to have been "continued in our next" to Beethoven, with "supplements" ever since. The music drama had its tentative beginnings in "The Flying Dutchman," its consummation in "Parsifal." The years from 1843 to 1882 lay between, but the music drama was guided ever by the same hand, the master hand of Richard Wagner. No, it would be self-defeating folly to make Wagner appear less in order to have Strauss appear more.

Nor does Richard Strauss require such tactics. He has made two excursions into music drama and he may make others. But his fame rests mainly upon what he has accomplished as an instrumental composer, and in the self-created realm of the "Tone Poem." Tone poem is a new term in music. It stands for something that outstrips the symphonic poem of Liszt, something larger both in its boundaries and in its intellectual and musical scope. Strauss did not limit himself by the word symphonic. He leaves himself free to give full range to his ideas. A composer of "programme music," his works are so stupendous in scope that the word symphonic would have hampered him. His "*Also Sprach Zarathustra*" ("Thus Spake Zarathustra") and "*Ein Heldenleben*" ("A Hero's Life") are not symphonic poems, but tone poems of enormous proportions.

These, his last two instrumental productions, together with the growing familiarity of the musical public with his beautiful and eloquent songs, established his reputation in this country. To-day, a Strauss work on a programme means as much to the musically elect as a Wagner work meant a quarter of a century ago. In fact, to advanced musicians, to those who are not content to rest upon what has been achieved, but are ready to welcome further serious effort, Strauss's works form the latest great utterance in music. Let me repeat *verbatim* a conversation that occurred on a recent rainy night, the date of an important concert.

HE: "Are you going to the concert to-night?"

SHE: (*Looking out and seeing that it still is raining hard*)
"Do they play anything by Richard Strauss?"

HE: "Not to-night."

SHE: "Then I'm not going."

This woman could meet the most enthusiastic admirer of Beethoven or Wagner on his own ground. But when she heard "*Ein Heldenleben*" under Emil Paur's bâton at a concert of the New York Philharmonic Society, she heard what she had been waiting twenty years for—something new in music, that also was something great; something that was not merely an imitation of what she had heard a hundred times before, but something which pointed the way to untravelled paths. It always is woman who throws the first rose at the feet of genius.

One first looks at Richard Strauss in mere amazement at the size of what he has produced. "Thus Spake Zarathustra" lasts thirty-three minutes, "A Hero's Life" forty-five. This initial sense of "bigness," as such, having worn off, one becomes aware of marvellous tone combinations in orchestral effect. Listening again, one discovers that these daring instrumental combinations have not been entered into merely for the sake of juggling with the orchestra, but because the composer, being a modern of moderns, has the most modern message in music to deliver, and, in order to deliver it, has developed the modern orchestra to a state of efficiency and versatility of tonal expression beyond any of his predecessors. Richard Strauss scores, in the most casual manner, an octave higher than Beethoven dared go with the violins. When Beethoven had carried the violins as high as the F above the staff, he stopped. What should have been higher he wrote an octave lower. All the strings in the Richard Strauss orchestra are scored correspondingly high. But this is not done as a mere fad. What Richard Strauss accomplishes with the strings is not merely queer or bizarre. What he seeks and obtains is genuine, original musical effects. Often the highest register is used by him in a few of the strings, because, for certain polyphonic effects—the weaving and interweaving of various themes—he divides and sub-divides all the strings into numerous groups. For the same reason, he has regularly added four or five hitherto rarely used instruments to the woodwind and scores, regularly, for eight horns, besides employing from four to five trumpets.

While he has increased the technical difficulties of every instrument, what he requires of them is not impossible. He does, indeed, call for first-rate artists in his orchestra; but so did Wag-

ner as compared with Beethoven. He knows every instrument thoroughly, for he has taken lessons on all; and, therefore, when he is striving for new instrumental effects he is not putting problems which cannot be legitimately solved. His "Till Eulenspiegel's Merry Pranks" makes, possibly, the greatest demand of all his works on an orchestra. But, if properly played, it is one of the most bizarre and amusing *scherzos* in the répertoire. In his "Don Quixote," he has gone outside the list of orchestral instruments; and in the scene where Don Quixote has his tilt with the windmill, he has introduced a regular, theatrical wind-machine. And why not? The effect to be produced justifies the means. There is an *a capella* chorus by Strauss for sixteen voices. These are not divided into two double quartettes, or into four quartettes, but the composition actually is scored in sixteen parts. He shrinks from no musical problem.

When Mr. Paur produced "A Hero's Life" in New York, he had an orchestra of 125. Given at a public rehearsal and concert of the Philharmonic, it made such a profound impression—it was recognized as music, not as mere bulk and noise—that it had to be repeated at a following public rehearsal and concert, thus having the honor of four consecutive performances by the same society in one season. Previous performances of Strauss's works, mainly by the Chicago Orchestra, under Thomas, and the Boston Symphony Orchestra, had begun to direct public attention to this composer. But the "*Heldenleben*" performances by the Philharmonic created something of a sensation. They made the "hit" which the public unconsciously had been working up to for several seasons. Large as are the dimensions of "A Hero's Life," Richard Strauss had chosen a subject that made a very direct appeal. Despite its wealth of polyphony and theme combination, the score told, without a word of synopsis, a clear intelligible story of a hero's material victory, followed by a greater moral one. It placed the public on a human, familiar footing with a composer, whom previously they had regarded with more awe than interest. Here was music interesting as mere music, but all the more interesting because it had an intellectual message to convey.

What is the difference between classical and modern music? Write a chapter or a book on it, and the difference still remains just this: Classical music is the expression of beauty; modern

music the expression of truth. Modern music seems entering upon a new era with Strauss. It is beginning to illustrate itself, so to speak, like the author-artist who can both write and draw. To-day, music not only expresses truth, but represents it pictorially. How long will the time be in coming when a composer will wave his bâton, the orchestra strike a chord—and we be not only listeners but also beholders, hearing the chord, and seeing at the same time its image floating above the orchestra?

In his "Melomaniacs," the most remarkable collection of musical stories I have read, Mr. Huneker has a tale called "A Piper of Dreams," the most advanced piece of musical fiction I know of. This piper of dreams produces music which is *seen*. "Do you know why you like it?" Mr. Huneker asked me, when I told him how intensely I admired the story. "Because," he continued, "the hero of the story is Richard Strauss."

Of course, this brilliantly written story was a daring incursion into a seemingly impossible future. Yet it points a tendency. When shall we have music that can be seen? Considering how closely related are the laws of acoustics and optics, is a "Piper of Dreams" so visionary? Who knows but that the music of the future may be visible sound—the work of a piper of dreams? Sometimes, when listening to Strauss, I think Mr. Huneker's "Piper" is tuning up.

Richard Strauss's tone poems are large in plan. In fact, they are colossal. They show him to be a man of great intellectual activity, as well as an inspired composer. The latter, of course, is the test by which a musical work stands or falls. No matter how intellectually it is planned, if it is inadequate musically it fails. But if it is musically inspired, it gains vastly in effect when it rests on a brain basis.

That Richard Strauss is the most significant figure in the musical world to-day seems to me too patent to admit of discussion. The only question to be considered is, how has he become so? The question is best answered by showing what a Richard Strauss tone poem is. Take the two latest, those which mark the climax of his achievement—"Thus Spake Zarathustra" and "A Hero's Life." Without going into an elaborate discussion I must insist that, to consider Richard Strauss as in any way a development from Berlioz or Liszt, shows a deplorable unfamiliarity with his works. Berlioz wrote programme music.

Liszt wrote programme music. Richard Strauss writes programme music. But this point of resemblance is wholly superficial. Berlioz admittedly strove to adhere to the orthodox symphonic poem. Liszt aptly named his own productions "symphonic" poems. They are much freer in form than Berlioz, and possibly pointed the way to the Richard Strauss tone poem. But when we examine the musical kernel, the difference at once is apparent. Polyphony, that is, the simultaneous interweaving of many themes, was foreign to Berlioz and Liszt. Their style is homophonic. Richard Strauss is a polyphonic composer second not even to Wagner, whose system of leading motives in his music dramas made his scores marvellous polyphonic structures. Such, too, are the scores of Richard Strauss's tone poems. None but a master of polyphony could have attempted to express in music what Richard Strauss has expressed. For are not his tone poems literally tone dramas?

It was like a man of great intellectual activity, such as Richard Strauss is, to select for musical illustration the Faust of modern literature—Nietzke's "Zarathustra." The composer became interested in Nietzke's works in 1892, when he was writing his music drama, "Guntram." The full fruition of his study of this philosopher's works is "Thus Spake Zarathustra." But this is not an attempt to set Nietzke to music, not an effort to express a system of philosophy through sound. It is rather the musical portrayal of a quest—a being longing to solve the problems of life, finding at the end of his varied pilgrimage that which he had left at the beginning, Nature deep and inscrutable.

Musically, the great *fortissimo* outburst in C major, which, at the beginning of the work, greets the seeker on the mountain top with the glories of the sunrise, is the symbol of Nature. The seeker descends the mountain. He pursues the quest amid many surroundings, among all sorts and conditions of men. He experiences joy, passion, remorse. In wisdom, perchance, lies the final solution of the problem of life. But the emptiness of "wisdom" is depicted by the composer with the keenest satire in a learned, yet dry, five-part fugue. The seeker's varied experiences form as many divisions of the tone poem. There even is a waltz theme. Unending Joy! Therein he may reach the end of his quest.

But hark! a sombre strophe, followed twelve times by the even

fainter stroke of a bell! Then a theme winging its flight on the highest register of modern instrumentation, until it seems to rise over the orchestra and vanish into thin air. It is the soul of the seeker, his earthly quest ended; while the theme which greeted him at sunrise on the mountain top resounds in the orchestral depths, the symbol of Nature, still mysterious, still inscrutable.

Even this brief synopsis suggests that "*Zarathustra*" is planned on a large scale. It presupposes an intellectual grasp of the subject on the composer's part. In its choice, in the selection and rejection of details and in outlining his scheme, Richard Strauss shows that he has thoroughly assimilated Nietzsche. But, at a certain point, the musician in Richard Strauss asserts himself above the *littérateur*. "*Thus Spake Zarathustra*" was not intended for a preachment, save indirectly. From what occurs during that vain quest, from the last deep mysterious chord of the Nature theme, let the listener draw his own conclusion. In the last analysis, "*Thus Spake Zarathustra*" is not a philosophical treatise but a tone poem. In the last analysis, Richard Strauss is not a philosopher but a musician.

"*A Hero's Life*" is another work of large plan. Like "*Zarathustra*," it derives its importance as an art work from its eloquence as a musical composition. With a musical work, no matter how intellectual or dramatic its foundation, its test ever will be its value as pure music. Richard Wagner's theories would have fallen like a house of cards, had not his music been eloquent and beautiful. But as his music gained wonderfully in added eloquence and beauty by induction from its intellectual content, so does Strauss's. The fact is, music is music, while philosophies come and go. Yesterday it was Schopenhauer; to-day it is Nietzsche; to-morrow it will be another. Doubtless, Wagner thought his "*Ring*" was Schopenhauer's "*Negation of the Will to Live*" set to music. Possibly, Richard Strauss thought Nietzsche looked out between the bars of "*Thus Spake Zarathustra*." In point of fact, neither Wagner nor Richard Strauss incorporated their favorite philosophers in their music. Wagner may have derived his inspiration from his reading of Schopenhauer and Richard Strauss from Nietzsche, for one mind inspires another. But the real result, both in Wagner and Strauss, was great music.

This is made clear by Strauss's latest tone poem, "*A Hero's Life*." Like "*Zarathustra*," it would be effective as music with-

out a line of programmatic explanation. The latter simply adds to its effectiveness by giving it the further interest of "action" and ethical import. In "A Hero's Life" we hear (and *see*, if you like) the hero himself, his jealous adversaries, the woman whose love consoles him, the battle in which he wins his greatest worldly triumph, his mission of peace, the world's indifference and the final flight of his soul toward the Empyrean. All this is depicted musically with the greatest eloquence. The battlefield scene is a stupendous massing of orchestral forces. On the other hand, the amorous episode, entitled "The Hero's Helpmate," is impassioned and charming.

In the world's indifference to the hero's mission of peace, there is little doubt that Strauss was indulging in a retrospect of his own struggles for recognition. For here are heard numerous reminiscences of his earlier works—his tone poems "Don Juan," "Death and Transfiguration," "Macbeth," "Till Eulenspiegel's Merry Pranks," "Thus Spake Zarathustra"; "Don Quixote"; his music drama, "Guntram"; and his song, "Dream during Twilight." These reminiscences give "A Hero's Life" the same autobiographical interest that attaches to Wagner's "Meistersinger."

Strauss pays a tribute to Wagner in his latest work, the one-act opera, "*Feuersnot*" ("Fire Famine"). According to the old legend on which this *Sing-gedicht* (song-poem) is founded, a young maiden has offended her lover. But the lover being a magician, casts a spell over the town, causing the extinction of all fire, bringing cold and darkness upon the entire place, until the maiden relents and smiles again upon him, when the spell is lifted and the fires once more burn brightly. The young lover, Kunrad, in rebuking the people of the city, says:

"In this house which to-day I destroy,
Once lodged Richard the Master,
Disgracefully did ye expel him
In envy and baseness," etc., etc.

Accompanying these lines, Strauss introduces themes from Wagner's "Ring of the Nibelung." Undoubtedly "Richard, the Master," in the above lines, is Richard Wagner. When Mr. Paur saw Richard Strauss in Berlin last summer, the composer called his attention to the symphonic movement or tone poem which forms the climax of "*Feuersnot*," when the maiden and her lover

are re-united and the fires burn brightly again, as a suitable fragment for a concert performance.

While Mr. Paur is not the first orchestral leader who has played Strauss's music in this country, he may justly be regarded as Strauss's prophet here. Not only do we owe to him the performances of "A Hero's Life," which definitely "created" Strauss here, but it was he who brought forward "Thus Spake Zarathustra," when he was conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra. As long ago as 1889, when Mr. Paur was conductor at Mannheim, he invited Strauss to direct his symphony in F minor there. Strauss accepted and also brought with him his just completed "Macbeth," asking to be allowed to try it over with the orchestra as he wanted to hear it—a request which was readily granted. Afterwards, at Mr. Paur's house, Strauss's piano quartette was played, with the composer himself at the piano and Mr. Paur at the violin. It is not surprising that when Mr. Paur came over here as the conductor of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, he championed Richard Strauss's work, and continued to do so after he became conductor of the New York Philharmonic Society.

Strauss has become such an important figure in the world of music that it is interesting to note what has been done to bring his work before the American public. Theodore Thomas, with the artistic liberality which he has always displayed toward every serious effort in music, produced Strauss's Symphony in F minor, which bears date 1883, as early as December 13th, 1884, with the New York Philharmonic Society. It was the first performance of this work anywhere. Strauss was not, however, heard again at the concerts of this organization until January, 1892, when Seidl brought out "Death and Transfiguration." Under Mr. Paur's leadership have been given the famous performances of "A Hero's Life" and selections from "Guntram" and the "*Feuersnot*" fragment.

Since he became conductor of the Chicago Orchestra, Mr. Thomas has given many performances of Richard Strauss's works—in 1895, the prelude to "Guntram," "Death and Transfiguration" and "Till Eulenspiegel's Merry Pranks"; in 1897, "Don Juan" and "Thus Spake Zarathustra"; in 1899, "Don Quixote" and the symphonic fantasia, "Italy"; in 1900, "A Hero's Life" (the first performance in this country) and the

"Serenade" for wind instruments; in 1902, "Macbeth" (first performance in this country) and the "*Feuersnot*" fragment. Several of these works, besides those noted, had their first performance in this country by the Chicago Orchestra, and several have had repeated performances. "Eulenspiegel," for instance, has been given by the Chicago Orchestra as often as five times.

The Boston Symphony Orchestra also has a fine record as regards the performance of Richard Strauss's works. It has played the symphonic fantasia, "Italy" (1888), "Don Juan" (1891), Symphony in F minor (1893), Preludes to Acts I. and II. of "Guntram" (1895), "Eulenspiegel" (1896), "Death and Transfiguration" (1897), "Thus Spake Zarathustra" (1897) and "A Hero's Life" (1901). Nikisch, Paur, and Gericke are the conductors under whom these performances have been given. Several of the works have been played repeatedly not only in Boston, but in other cities where this famous orchestra gives concerts. Recitals of Richard Strauss's songs, which are among the most beautiful compositions of their kind, have been given in various cities by George Hamlin, a tenor singer, of Chicago.

As data regarding Strauss's life at the disposal of English readers are both scant and scattered, it may not be amiss to tell here something of his career. He was born on June 11th, 1864, in Munich, where his father, Franz Strauss, played the French horn in the Royal Orchestra, and was noted for his remarkable proficiency on the instrument. The elder Strauss has lived to watch with pride his son's growing fame and recently has celebrated his eightieth birthday. Richard began to play the piano when he was four years old. At the age of six he heard some children singing around a Christmas tree. "I can compose something like that," he said, and he produced unaided a three-part song. When he went to school, his mother by chance put covers of music paper on his books. As a result, he occupied much of his time composing on this paper, and during a French lesson sketched out the *scherzo* of a string quartette which has been published as his Opus 2. While he was still at school, he composed a symphony in D minor. This was played by the Royal Orchestra under Levi. When, in response to calls for the composer, Richard came out, some one in the audience asked: "What has that boy to do with the symphony?" "Oh, he's only the composer," was the reply. The year before (1880), the Royal

Opera prima donna, Meysenheim, had publicly sung three of his songs.

During his advanced school years, his piano lessons continued, he received lessons in the violin, and went through a severe course in composition with the Royal Kapellmeister Meyer. In 1882, he attended the University of Munich. His "Serenade" for wind instruments, composed at this time, attracted the attention of Hans von Bülow, under whom he studied for a while at Raff's Conservatory in Frankfort. Bülow invited him to Meiningen as co-director of the orchestra, and when in November, 1885, Bülow resigned as conductor, Strauss became his successor, remaining there, however, only till April, 1886. His symphonic fantasia, "Italy," had its origin through a trip to Rome and Naples during this year. In August, 1886, he was appointed assistant conductor to Levi and Fischer at the Munich Opera, where he remained until July, 1889, when he became conductor at Weimar. In 1892, he almost died from an attack of pneumonia, and on his recovery took a long trip through Greece, Egypt and Sicily. It was on this tour that he wrote and composed "Guntram," which was brought out at Weimar in May, 1894. After the first performance, he announced his engagement to the singer of Freihild in "Guntram," Pauline de Ahna, the daughter of a Bavarian general. The same year he returned to Munich as conductor, remaining there until 1899, when he became one of the conductors at the Berlin Opera, which position he still holds. He is one of the "star" conductors of Europe, receiving invitations to conduct concerts in many cities, including Brussels, Moscow, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Madrid, London and Paris. He is a man of untiring industry. It is said that he worked less than half a year on "Thus Spake Zarathustra," and that the writing of his scores is a model of beauty.

At the age of thirty-eight, Strauss occupies a commanding position in the world of music. He has achieved it through a remarkable combination of musical technique and inspiration coupled with rare industry. His ideals are of the highest. His intellectual activity is great. He seems a man of calm and noble poise, of broad horizon. It would be presumption to speak of "expectations" as to one who has accomplished so much. For the great achievements already to his credit are the best promise for the future.

GUSTAV KOBBE.

AMERICAN CONTROL OF ENGLAND'S FOOD SUPPLY.

BY J. D. WHELPLEY.

MR. CARNEGIE recently expressed the opinion that no power could long wage war against the United States, because the United States controls the food supply of the world. This statement may be considered as somewhat too sweeping, for an undoubted exception would be Russia, which is a food-exporting country. France and Germany, while heavy importers of food stuffs, also possess great agricultural resources, which, in an emergency, would develop corresponding power of resistance to famine. As applied to England, however, Mr. Carnegie's statement is absolutely true. If the United States were suddenly to stop all present regular exportations of meat and breadstuffs to the United Kingdom, the first effect would be an enormous rise in prices throughout Europe, and it would be but a few weeks before the English people would be threatened by dire famine, with no possible relief in sight so long as commercial relations with the United States were suspended. This is not a matter of conjecture. It is susceptible of mathematical demonstration.

England's total importations amount annually to over two billion dollars in value. Of this vast aggregate, nearly forty per cent., or about 900 million dollars, is food for the people of the United Kingdom. Meat and other animal products are purchased to the amount of 600 million dollars, and breadstuffs and other vegetable food products to the amount of 300 million dollars. Of the total importation of food staples by the United Kingdom, the United States furnishes about 540 million dollars, or sixty per cent. Of the great national meat bill, twenty-seven per cent., or about 160 million dollars, is paid to the United States; and of the trade in breadstuffs, this country receives about 150 mill-

ion dollars, or over fifty per cent. These figures are startling in their magnitude; but their full significance is realized only when the conditions which govern the distribution of the food supply of the English people are fully understood.

The British statisticians inform us that the average citizen of the United Kingdom, ten years ago, consumed annually 120 pounds of meat, and that his consumption now is 132 pounds. Ten years ago, he produced eighty-one pounds of this supply and imported thirty-nine pounds. Now he produces but seventy-eight pounds and imports fifty-four pounds. In brief, the English citizen has largely increased the portion of meat required for his annual ration, and at the same time has become more dependent upon foreigners for the supply.

From the same source we learn that, ten years ago, an average citizen of the United Kingdom consumed annually 362 pounds of wheat. Of this he grew 88 pounds, and he bought 274 pounds abroad. At the present time, this same consumer is using about 338 pounds of wheat, of which he grows 77 pounds and imports 261 pounds. The decrease in the percentage consumption of wheat is said to be due to the greater variety in the component parts of the ration, other vegetable foods having taken its place. The amount produced at home, however, has decreased in greater ratio than the amount imported; hence the statement holds good, that the people of the United Kingdom produce less bread and meat *per capita* than ever before, notwithstanding the increased demand of a larger and better-fed population. If it were true that the home production and the imports were distributed evenly throughout the United Kingdom, so that every individual actually bore his or her *per capita* share of each, the effects of a sudden stoppage of a large percentage of the imports could be endured with more or less equanimity for a considerable time, and with the minimum disturbance to the economics of the country as a whole. This condition does not prevail anywhere, however, and to a marked degree it is not the case in the United Kingdom.

The British country dweller lives almost entirely upon what he or his neighbors produce from British soil. Well-to-do suburbanites and those of comfortable incomes in cities consume British products by preference, for reasons of taste, custom and local pride. The bulk of the population in large cities live almost

entirely upon imported breadstuffs and meats; and upon these people would fall the burden of any war which resulted in hampering trade with the granaries and the slaughter-houses of the export trade of the world. Nearly one-fifth of the entire population of the United Kingdom is centred in and about London. We need make but a superficial examination of the great markets of that city to become thoroughly satisfied as to the important relation held by the United States to the household economies of the British people. American bread and meat constitute the bulk of the supply of those staples; and the only serious competition the American purveyor encounters in most lines of the trade in food stuffs is from his own countrymen.

The significance of the fact that the congested centres of population are dependent upon foreign food supply, cannot be overestimated in considering the strategy of the situation. It is there the shortage would be felt first and almost immediately. Thence would come the cry for food; there would spring up the panic and the bread riot. The war party in power would find itself embroiled in a controversy between patriotism and hunger. There can be little question as to which would prevail, for the hunger would continually increase. There would be no relief but through compromise with offended national pride.

For many years, thoughtful British statesmen have recognized the possible disastrous consequences of a war with the food-exporting nations. There has been talk of great warehouses, in which the Government should store grain enough to last through a siege of several months' duration. Nothing has been done in this direction, however; and the country lives from hand to mouth, a few days' delay in the arrival of expected shipments of breadstuffs or meat sending the prices skyward in the home markets. It has undoubtedly been reasoned by British Government officials that, with the greatest navy in the world at their disposal, supplies could be safely conveyed to the people at home from any foreign ports, no matter which country might be belligerent. It was probably never realized that the recalcitrant American colonies of one hundred years ago would in time absorb a majority of the food-stuff trade of the world, and by virtue of this fact, if no other, hold the balance of power among the peoples who to live must eat of civilized provender.

Looking back upon the history of England and her colonies, to

find, if possible, some neglected avenue of escape from the startling dependence of the mother country upon strangers and aliens, we discover that the children have been left to shift for themselves. They have been given a flag and allowed autonomous government, but no concessions have been made to the products of their soil. They have been forced to develop their own resources, to find their own markets and to compete on equal terms with foreigners for the trade of their natural market at home. Some of these children have adopted a policy of protection through import duties, and have even given heavy preferential rates to English goods for no other reason, apparently, than that of kinship. Canada is one of these. Her concessions were made freely, in the hope that in return she might possibly secure a larger share of English patronage.

When Canada joined with the other self-governing colonies and asked England to establish a five per cent. preferential in favor of colonial products, the rulers of England refused to give the matter serious consideration. Australia, with her vast grazing grounds, could have produced a large proportion of the meat needed by the United Kingdom; and Canada, with her great grain areas, could have undoubtedly produced the bulk of the bread-stuffs, had England had the forethought, a quarter of a century ago, to give momentum to the development and growth of her dependencies, by buying what they had to sell before she turned elsewhere. It is too late now to do much in that direction. Australia sells the English people mutton, frozen and canned. Canada trails in upon the British market with a portion of her surplus; but the American meat-packer and the American grain-dealer have secured the great bulk of the trade, and have developed the supply at the ratio necessary to keep pace with the demand. Should England now decide to favor her colonial products by preferential tariffs, it would be at such a cost to the consumers of the United Kingdom that no political party would dare stand responsible for the measure.

A more detailed examination of England's food importations will but serve to emphasize her absolute dependence upon the United States for her daily bread. In treating of the grand totals, the percentages furnished by the United States are startling; but, in dealing with some of the single items upon which great communities in England are almost entirely dependent for

food, the percentage furnished by the United States is even sensational. The percentage of the grand total is reduced by being made the average of many articles of trade. Some of these articles, which go to England largely from nearby countries of Europe, do not cut much of a figure in the food bill of the poorer classes. The hordes of people who populate the densely crowded sections of London care not whether fine butter comes from Denmark or the United States, or whether it comes at all; but if the penny loaf of bread should rise to a sixpence, or the scraggy bit of meat to which they are accustomed should no longer be obtainable, then things would happen in London which have been hinted at in the past and dreaded for the future. If that metropolis of all the world should ever disgorge a bread-hungry mob, it will be as though the denizens of the jungle had been let in.

The people of the United States might well hesitate, in some future crisis, before they made these things possible, even should England's rulers ever be so blind and desperate as to ignore them. The American people, by their control of the English food supply, hold in leash the furies of famine, riot and disaster, which wait but the opportunity to spring at the throat of a country hopelessly weak at her base of supplies. In event of controversy with England, it would be incumbent upon the United States in the cause of humanity to forbear to the utmost, for, once war was declared, there could be no mercy. While the great armed fleets of the present Mistress of the Seas were threatening bombardment of American cities, the lack of American bread and meat at home would soon avail to turn their prows away from American shores. Foreign manufactures can be shut out of a country and the nation still live, but the people cannot live without food.

To no other country could England turn to make good the deficiency. All western Europe is an importer of food stuffs. The surplus of Russia is now exhausted before it reaches the United Kingdom; and, should the European supply be decreased by interference with the commerce of the United States, there would be a dangerous deficiency in the supply of nearly every large country of the Old World. The necessity of providing for the people of the European continent would not only send prices up, but would prevent England from securing even the small amount she now gets from that direction. A blockade of Amer-

ican ports, whether brought about by the armed force of an enemy or by a decree of the people of the United States themselves, would so disorganize and unbalance the trade of the whole world as to bring about a food panic, which, while felt most acutely in England, would bring disaster to many other countries as well.

Mr. Frank H. Hitchcock, Chief of the Bureau of Foreign Markets in the Department of Agriculture, has been engaged for some time in securing data as to the percentage of the food stuffs imported into the United Kingdom which were furnished by the United States. Mr. Hitchcock's figures are recent, accurate, and compiled with great care and labor. They present an even more remarkable condition of affairs than is conveyed to the mind by any statement dealing merely with totals. While it is true that the United States furnishes only twenty-seven per cent. of the total value of the meat and other animal products imported by the United Kingdom, the actual percentage of the bulk of the staples upon which the people depend for food from day to day is very much greater. The following table shows within a fraction of one per cent. the strength of the United States in the English markets in the principal items of animal food:

Articles.	Total Imports of the United Kingdom.	Percentage Furnished by the U. S.
Cattle, live	495,645 head	71
Sheep, live	382,833 head	38
Beef, fresh	462,350,560 lbs.	70
Beef, salt	21,608,608 lbs.	96
Beef, cured	58,019,248 lbs.	56
Bacon	631,818,656 lbs.	89
Hams	201,899,040 lbs.	89
Lard	215,854,688 lbs.	93
Pork, fresh	77,884,240 lbs.	35
Pork, salt	27,857,536 lbs.	52

All the percentages furnished by the United States of the above-mentioned articles of food are greatly in excess of the twenty-seven per cent. of the grand total. The articles in which the American trade lags are, mutton, which comes largely from Australia, and dairy products, which are largely furnished by Denmark, Canada, and the Netherlands. The weak points in the American trade in the principal items are shown as follows:

Articles.	Total Imports of the United Kingdom.	Percentage Furnished by the U. S.
Mutton, fresh	379,999,000 lbs.	0.09
Mutton, cured	7,219,744 lbs.	4
Tallow	243,934,992 lbs.	26
Oleomargarine	103,086,144 lbs.	0.07
Butter	378,393,792 lbs.	2
Cheese	303,058,336 lbs.	25
Milk, condensed	10,544,336 lbs.	4
Milk, other	1,751,456 lbs.	0.01
Eggs	168,820,780 doz.	3

It will be noted that, with the exception of mutton, practically all of the items in which the United States has a small percentage of the trade could be entirely dispensed with in England without actually starving the people into submission; but the items which are furnished by the United States in the largest proportion are those which are absolutely necessary to a continuance of life. The estimate of twenty-seven per cent. as the amount of the imported animal foods furnished by the United States is based upon values, and this accounts for the fact that it is not as large as might be expected after examining the figures of the meat importations. The dairy products run into money much faster than the meat products, and add largely to the total values. These dairy products, being furnished from western Europe, offset in value the amount of food sold to the United Kingdom by the United States, but the aggregate of their value is very much less significant than the aggregate values of the meat products. The enormous amount of mutton furnished by Australia is the only feature of the vital supply which is not controlled by the United States; but beef and pork are consumed in such greater quantities that the item of mutton, though large, does not save England from her absolute and startling dependence upon foreigners for her meat supplies.

The principal grains imported for food are, wheat, of which the United States furnishes forty-seven per cent.; wheat flour, of which the United States furnishes eighty-three per cent.; and oatmeal, of which the United States furnishes eighty-five per cent. All of these percentages are much higher than that of the grand total, which, as stated, is fifty-three per cent. This total percentage is influenced, in figuring the total values, by the large amount of sago imported, practically all of which comes from India, and also by the fact that some grains are included

among the breadstuffs which are not all used for food. Oats is a notable example. Of this, the United States furnishes but twenty-eight per cent., the balance coming from Russia. If the English food situation were considered solely in relation to the amount of actual meat and flour consumed, the United States would be shown to be unquestionably in absolute control of the supply, for these, after all, are the products really at issue.

In thirty years, Great Britain has decreased the amount of land under the plough from about eighteen million acres to about fifteen million acres, three million acres having been added to the area of permanent pasture. The area devoted to the growing of breadstuffs has decreased correspondingly; and, owing to greater pasture room, the number of cattle has slightly increased during the past thirty years, although there has recently been a sharp decline in the visible supply, amounting to about fifty thousand head during the past twelve months. In the matter of sheep, however, there has been a loss of two and one-half per cent., which, considering the widespread use of mutton in the United Kingdom, is an indication of the increasing cost of food for live stock and the success of foreign competitors. Australia is crowding the sheep industry of the mother country to the wall. During the past year, the United Kingdom lost sixteen thousand head of horses, fifty thousand head of cattle and 647 thousand head of sheep from the visible supply of live stock. In no direction at home or in the colonies is any effort being made by England to increase her food resources, or to secure to herself any preference in the distribution of the existing supply.

It has been suggested by practical American cattlemen who have personally investigated the matter, that the United Kingdom possessed an opportunity to largely increase the home supply of meat, by converting her pasture lands into great feeding grounds for young and lean cattle brought from abroad. In ordinary times, food for cattle can be imported at prices not so much greater than prevail in the producing areas. By bringing young cattle and the class of live stock known in the United States as "feeders" to the English pastures, and there finishing them for market by putting on the weight which now brings such good prices in the English markets, a British farmer could find an excellent outlet for his energies and a profitable use for his plant. Even here, however, the British Government steps in and makes

this plan impossible by requiring that all imported cattle should be slaughtered within a few days after their arrival on British soil. This is done for alleged sanitary reasons, and in response to a demand for so-called protection to British-grown live stock. The course of reasoning from which this results is not entirely clear to an American, to whom the opportunity seems so apparent, the local need being unquestionably great. This plan has all the more value in that the *per capita* supply of live stock is decreasing throughout the world, and a permanently higher level for meat prices has been universally predicted.

The *per capita* exports of the United States are \$18.81, and the *per capita* imports \$10.58. The *per capita* exports of the United Kingdom are \$31.54, and the *per capita* imports \$58.03. These figures form the basis for the time-worn controversy over the so called "balance of trade," its real meaning, its significance, and its value as an indication of the industrial condition of a country. In considering the food supply it is sufficient to state, however, that a large proportion of the exports from the United States consists of bread and meat, while comparatively none is imported. In the case of the United Kingdom, a large proportion of the imports is bread and meat, and comparatively none of the exports. In these facts lies the gist of the situation, so far as the food resources of both countries are concerned. England's exports could be refused by a belligerent without serious damage, except to the exporting country; whereas the exports of the United States must find their way to the foreign consumer or the latter starves.

With a suspension of trade relations between the United States and the United Kingdom would come disaster to the latter country, other than that resulting from a shortage of food. England buys annually nearly 18 hundred million pounds of raw cotton. About 150 million pounds of this comes from the United States. A stoppage of these shipments would close down the mills, throwing thousands of operators out of work, and bringing about all the evils usually resulting from such an industrial situation. Leather, lumber, iron, steel, oil, and a number of other important staples of commerce are also secured largely from the United States; and a cessation of shipments of these articles would not only inconvenience those in the habit of using them, but would have immediate and disastrous effect upon many trades and in-

dustries. Even with trade unhampered, a distinct rise in prices of all foods and of the great items of supply from abroad has been a feature of the English markets during the past year. A threat of war would send these prices to such a point as to cause distress and disaster. War itself against the United States, the English base of supplies, could only result in speedy capitulation or inevitable ruin.

Many interesting and important deductions might be made by the people of the United States from this striking situation. In this brief and very general survey of the situation, England has been the only country considered. In a more or less direct manner every one of the Powers, with the possible exception of Russia, is dependent upon the United States in the matter of food supply. If not large importers, they are deeply concerned with the welfare of the consumers; and the avalanche of food staples poured into the markets of the world by the United States keeps a wholesome, strengthening and economical diet within the reach of the masses of people everywhere. Yet this avalanche is not so great, under normal conditions, as to deprive the producers of all profit.

Americans are apt to refer rather disparagingly to the United States as a raw-material producing country, and to note with pride and satisfaction the increasing percentage of manufactured goods in the total exports. It is evident, however, that the strong grasp of this country upon the affairs of the world is due largely to these raw-material exports, and not so much to the manufactured goods. The latter enter into competition with the labor of countries whose entire energies are concentrated upon similar production, but which cannot produce enough food to keep their industrial population alive. To expand and strengthen in every way the productive power of American soil, to encourage the building of homes upon the agricultural lands, to prevent the absorption of those lands by those whose purpose is other than that of tillage, is manifestly a wise national policy. To enable production to keep pace with the growing appetite of the world, and to prevent the United States from losing its control of the great food supply necessary to satisfy this appetite, is even a more statesmanlike policy than to devote all time and energy to the building of great cities and the creation of industrial armies to be fed from abroad, to be perhaps dependent at intervals upon an enemy for daily bread.

Mr. Carnegie said: "It is indeed a great matter for this country to feed the whole world, as it will soon be doing. It renders us unassailable. No power can take a step against us, even should it declare war. Let our exports of food stuffs be reduced by only ten per cent., and prices in Europe would double; while reduce them fifty per cent., and the starving people of the nation that had made war with the United States would quickly force peace upon their Government."

With his wide comprehension of the industrial forces at work in the world, Mr. Carnegie has thus briefly indicated a condition which will do more for international peace than all the treaties which could be negotiated. Treaties and alliances can be set aside, but the people of all nations must eat to live. By virtue of her great agricultural possibilities, realized upon through the industry and enterprise of her people, the United States is the food purveyor for the world. In this simple fact lies greater strategic strength than in formidable armies and navies.

J. D. WHELPLEY.

DEFECTS AND ABUSES IN OUR POSTAL SYSTEM—I.

BY HENRY A. CASTLE, AUDITOR FOR THE POST-OFFICE
DEPARTMENT.

ALL public men and patriotic citizens should know more about the postal service, take a more lively interest in it, watch its development carefully, and guard its integrity with jealous zeal. It is an exceedingly vital part of our government polity—all the more vital because it is, strictly speaking, not a public function at all, but is more properly a private or corporate enterprise engrafted on the government's mechanism, under pressure of an imperious necessity.

The "general welfare" clause of our Constitution has permitted many useful undertakings in the line of national paternalism. We stamp the people's coin and we print their bills. We have the life-saving service; the light-house system; the marine hospital corps, to protect people's lives and health; a signal service, to warn them of coming changes in the weather; a fish commission, to preserve our sea-food from extinction. For the diffusion of popular information in various channels—almost purely educational work—we have the vast Agricultural Department, the bureaus of Ethnology, Geological Survey, Statistics, Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Naval Observatory, the Smithsonian Institution and its museum, the Congressional Library, the Botanical Gardens, and other institutes of applied science, each with its learned faculty and its munificent outlay. The annual expenditures for all these educational enterprises, if capitalized, would form an endowment aggregating hundreds of millions of dollars.

These provisions for the protection and enlightenment of the people are all gratuitous. They are paid for by general taxation,

and no one would dream of exacting remuneration for their benefits, or securing from them any appreciable revenue.

But that other educational enterprise, grander and vaster than any or all of them, the United States Postal Service, stands solitary and conspicuous on a basis of its own. It has receipts as well as disbursements, earnings almost equal to its expenditures; and it alone, organized after the manner of an individual or corporate business, brings into the governmental problem an equation that well merits both philosophical analysis and most solicitous practical consideration. It was a political after-thought in our national scheme, not recognized in the beginning as one of the great departments, its head not called into cabinet councils, its operations little considered among the important features of statecraft and financiering.

It long ago leaped to unchallenged primacy. In volume of financial transactions, diversity of ramifications and number of employees, the Post-Office Department surpasses all the others combined. Aside from its regular operations, it furnishes through its money-order division a national bank of issue and deposit, used by thousands who fear to trust any other custodian of their treasured earnings, and doing a larger business in foreign and domestic exchange than all competitors.

Accomplished results have royally justified its establishment and maintenance. It has been a potent instrument of advancing civilization. Incredible as its advancement has been, marvellous as its efficiency now is, there are still opportunities for improvement within its legitimate sphere.

Publicists and philanthropists may properly stimulate an enlightened public opinion, that shall cordially sustain efforts for betterment along lines of recognized propriety, and as resolutely discourage wild excursions into boundless fields of adventure lying beyond the boundaries of needful prudence and common sense. This sustaining and restraining public opinion can only be effectively promoted by directing attention both to the beneficent achievements of the American postal system, and to its inherent defects, the manifest abuses to which it is subject and the evils, curable and incurable, incident to its colossal proportions and enormous growth.

Its benefits and achievements need little exploitation. They speak, trumpet-tongued, from each of its innumerable instru-

mentalities, as they come into daily, hourly touch with the industrial activities and domestic life of our entire population. A few of its defects are equally palpable, complacently recognized and amiably regretted. Most of them, and those by far the most serious, are obscure or hidden, revealed in their worst form only to close observers or practical adepts in postal affairs.

In the March and April numbers of this REVIEW, last year, the writer presented some considerations relating to the perils involved in proposed extensions of the postal function, that would enfold telegraphs, savings-banks, and other enterprises within its already too-capacious embrace. The wide attention given to those suggestions and the valuable discussions they stimulated, have disclosed a prevalent desire for fuller information as to minor, but nevertheless pregnant, details of the operations connected with this greatest of modern (or ancient) incursions into the domains of state socialism.

As has been intimated, the most noteworthy characteristics of the United States mail service have been its tremendous extension and expansion. The entire list of post-offices in 1790, seventy-five in all, contained none located west of Winchester, Virginia; the Auditor's report for 1901 enumerates sixty-six offices in Alaska, ninety in Hawaii, and seventy-five in Porto Rico,—all as fully naturalized and incorporated and domesticated as any of their 76,000 colleagues within the limits of the old "Union as it was" four short years ago!

The annual mileage of mail-transportation by railroads in 1875 was 75,154,910 miles; in 1901, it was 302,613,325 miles. There have been no important changes in rates of postage since 1885, but the revenues of the Department, which were seventy-five cents *per capita* in that year, had risen to \$1.03 in 1891, and to \$1.44 in 1901.

While the aggregate financial transactions of the Department in 1790 were \$130,000, for the current fiscal year they will reach \$900,000,000, and next year a round billion. Whereas, even as late as 1860, the sole function of the service was slowly, painfully, and not very carefully to convey letters, papers, and small packages from one office to another for leisurely delivery at the windows thereof, we already have railway mail distribution, money orders, carriers for city and country, registry, special delivery messengers, pneumatic tubes, postal cards, stamp books,

cancelling machines, Bundy clocks, street boxes, and other extensions, amplifications and devices to accelerate the work.

It is too much to expect that this unprecedented increment—little of it the result of logical growth, but most of it due to the hasty engraftment of popular excrescences—could be accomplished without developing numerous faults and blemishes, often slow to be discerned, and always hard to be eradicated. Some of them are inherent in the system, inevitable, incurable, only to be minimized, in the danger or actual injury they involve, by sleepless vigilance and inflexible honesty of administration. Others are unnecessary, avoidable, inexcusable, yet so firmly entrenched that they live through decades and generations, ebbing and flowing from feebleness to vigor and back again.

This inquiry relates especially to what are deemed the unnecessary evils and defects of the postal service, avoidable and curable through executive action or legislative enactment.

Our ubiquitous, long-enduring national government is now collecting, transmitting, and delivering at the doors of remote farm-houses, as well as of city residences, various classes of mail matter at prices substantially uniform for all distances or circumstances, which may be roughly stated in the following terms: Letter mail at two cents per ounce (practically more than four cents per ounce, since single-rate letters average less than half an ounce each in weight) yields a large profit. Merchandise mail at one cent per ounce, postal cards and circulars at one cent each, yield a smaller but sufficient margin. Books and printed matter at one-half cent per ounce barely pay the cost of transportation and delivery. Transient papers and periodicals at one-fourth cent per ounce cause a loss, but the loss is not large in the aggregate, because the volume of the business is relatively insignificant. Second-class mail—that is to say, newspapers and periodicals mailed by the publishers at the office of publication—paying one cent per pound involves a very heavy loss, unquestionably aggregating many millions of dollars a year.

Investigation has shown that the service costs, on an average, eight cents per pound for all classes of mail; hence, matter paying a lower rate is carried at a loss to the postal revenues, and at a corresponding profit to the patrons who furnish it. Conversely, the patrons who send the profitable mail contribute precisely the amount of the profit for the benefit of those whose mail is carried

at a loss. An inevitable struggle arises between those who seek to moderate the inequalities, on the one hand, and those who seek to retain lucrative advantages, on the other.

The rate of one cent a pound, justified only by the educational feature of the service, was intended solely for newspapers and other periodicals devoted to the dissemination of news or public intelligence. Enormous use has been made of this exceptional privilege for sending novels, "serial" literary works, advertising sheets and nondescript publications issued only for private emolument, having no public function and none of the characteristics of a genuine periodical. The mails are overloaded with this illegitimate matter, to the extent of one-fourth its entire bulk and weight; but it pays only one-fifty-sixth of the revenue. Postmaster-General Smith estimated the actual loss last year on this service at \$12,340,612. It is a gross and manifest abuse that limited groups of private interests, using the mails solely for personal ends, with no public object or benefit in view, should succeed in eluding the plain purpose of the law, and carry on their illicit transactions at the expense of others.

Heroic efforts are being made to remedy this evil, but private interests which would be adversely affected by the success of these efforts will fight to the bitter end, in the Department, in the courts and in Congress, to prevent the abrogation of their vested right to raid the Treasury. Congress should sustain the Department and not thwart it in this righteous crusade. When private firms or corporations can send through the mails at pound rates the trashiest of literature, and when manufacturing chemists can circulate their advertising sheets everywhere under the guise of legitimate publications, the time for reform has come.

There is a characteristic anomaly connected with the delivery of second-class mail-matter in cities, which often excites public speculation. The law excludes a publication from the benefit of second-class rates in its own city, in order that the mails may be saved the necessity of delivering daily newspapers to their patrons. A daily paper or a monthly magazine can now be sent, for instance, from Boston to New Orleans, and delivered by carrier at the residence of a subscriber in the remotest suburb, for the ridiculously inadequate fee of one cent per pound. But if it is mailed from the office of publication to a subscriber in Boston, a two-cent stamp must be affixed on it, or a one-cent stamp if it

weighs less than two ounces. The necessity for this provision impressed itself upon the authorities at an early date, and the principle of practical prohibition of second-class mail delivery has been consistently maintained from the beginning, although subject to the periodical assaults of interests adversely affected thereby. It is, probably, not conceivable that any of the great dailies of our leading cities would unload the delivery of their entire local edition on the postal service if this barrier were removed. But they would have the legal right to do so, and the only method of preventing that action is the wholly illogical enactment referred to.

All the avoidable abuses are not actually existent. Many are only in embryo, but with well-matured aspirations, already menacing. The irrepressible enthusiast who declaims against government by injunction is loudest in advocating further innovations that would soon lead to government in the hands of a receiver. There is loud and influential demand for the postal telegraph, postal savings-bank, and a postal life-insurance bureau. There are wild, vague cries for the absorption of all railways under government ownership and Post-Office Department management.

It may be true that the government could send out telegrams at reduced rates and pay expenses; but little, compact England has lost \$3,500,000 a year trying to do it, and is very weary of the experiment. It may be that we could pay three per cent. interest on savings deposits, fund them in two-per-cent. bonds at a premium, and earn profits after paying an army of employees to keep the accounts; but it is hard to convince an unbiased intellect that this is feasible.

Some problems would be solved and certain inconveniences minimized if Uncle Sam would undertake to grind wheat into flour, or saw logs into lumber, and sell the products below cost; it would manifestly be pleasant, for a time at least, to live in a nation which would protect us against losses by bad investments, guarantee liberal returns from all enterprises, and regularly pay fat dividends to all citizens.

An influential *clientèle* now clamors for the parcels-post. These desire to have the limit of weight on packages of merchandise transmissible through the mails extended from four pounds, as at present, to eleven pounds or more. It is further proposed to establish a rate on such packages of six cents for

the first pound, and two cents for each additional pound up to eleven; thus eleven pounds would cost twenty-six cents from New York to Seattle, Honolulu, or Manila, or just sixty-two cents less than experience shows, is the actual cost of service for average distances. National associations of commercial men have passed strong resolutions favoring this innovation, and other resolutions demanding the negotiation of additional postal treaties with other nations. Great emphasis is placed upon the advantage to be derived from these measures by consumers, who are urged to co-operate in seeking by this indirect means to reduce the charges of railroads and express companies.

It is argued that this concession would greatly increase business and accommodate the people. No account is taken of the loss that would necessarily result to the postal revenues, that being a consideration of little weight with those who would greatly profit by this new departure.

On the other hand, retail merchants' associations in different sections energetically protest against the scheme. They warn retailers that their business may receive a most serious blow, unless they bring to bear on national law-makers the pressure necessary to defeat such legislation. They demonstrate that this system would permit mail-order houses in the larger cities ultimately to control the retail business of the entire country, the expense of carrying merchandise for these establishments, at a cost much in excess of the postage received, being paid for by public taxation.

The controversy thus going on between conflicting interests, one seeking advantage, and the other fearing injury from an innovation in postal methods, shows how distinctively the postal service is a part of the business machinery of the country, and how susceptible it is to abuse from unconsidered legislation for the special behoof of those who originate and promote it. It is difficult to see what argument can be adduced in favor of carrying parcels of merchandise at rates far below the cost of such carriage, that will not equally apply to conducting our entire transportation or manufacturing business by the general government for the benefit of favored classes of its citizens. It is the belief of thinking persons that the use of the mails for transporting merchandise goes far enough under existing laws. A further extension will involve serious loss, and work an injury to the service as well as an injustice to those who make up the deficit.

The inequalities of the present system are made more glaring by an inspection of our parcels-post treaties. The existence of those treaties is a menace to the postal service, and affords occasion for insisting on more generous domestic concessions in the same line. We now have treaties with Germany, Mexico, and several of the republics of Central and South America, whose provisions involve the curious anomaly that we can send eleven-pound parcels by mail to these countries, and their people can send such parcels to us, while we, in the United States, cannot send parcels of more than four pounds weight by mail to one another. And a package less than four pounds in weight can be sent, under these treaties, from the interior of America to the interior of Germany at a less rate of postage than would be charged from one city to another in the United States. There is merit in the suggestion that one or the other of these conditions is wrong. The arrangements with foreign countries have been entered into by the executive under the treaty-making power, and, possibly, without due consideration of their inconsistency with our own methods. But to extend this abuse by treaty with all other countries, and to domesticate it in our own, as is strongly advocated by many persons directly interested in doing so, would be a stretch of paternalism never dreamed of by the founders of our postal service. It is probable that we have blundered in reciprocating the parcels-post system of foreign countries, and that it would be better to revoke those treaties than to open all our mails to the eleven-pound package at proposed rates of postage.

The contemplation of the success which various private enterprises have achieved in securing benefits from having postal rates adjusted to suit their convenience, has inspired a demand on the part of patrons of letter mail for a reduction of letter postage to the uniform rate of one cent per ounce. The argument made in favor of this reduction is a strong one. That class of mail pays the profits which render the present service possible.

No one clamorously demands the reduction, however, except firms and corporations which annually expend amounts ranging from hundreds to thousands of dollars each on their letter mail. These naturally feel that, if they could reduce that disbursement one-half, they would effect a material saving, and they do not understand why they should contribute that money to help carry other losing elements of the service.

Their demand has been organized by promoters, who have contracts providing for the payment to them of a proportion of the savings that would result from the reduction. There does not seem to be any immediate prospect of the success of this proposition. Its adoption would result in an immediate loss of at least \$30,000,000 a year to the postal revenues, entailing a deficit which the general public would not consent to. Those who demand it have little care for public interests, and they forget that the service would be fatally crippled by this wholesale reduction of revenues without any compensating advantage or increase of business. The bulk of the letter mail would undoubtedly increase after lower postage was inaugurated, but all the elements entering into the expense of handling it would increase in equal ratio, with the single exception of the cost of transportation by rail. More clerks, carriers, route agents, inspectors, more bags, satchels, locks, and keys, would be required, as the number of letters multiplied. But the multiplication would be slow; years would elapse before the lost revenue would be regained.

It is argued that the saving on second-class matter to be effected by reforms recently inaugurated, will compensate for the loss of revenue by reason of reduced letter postage. But that saving is still in abeyance, and is a purely speculative benefit to be realized, if at all, in the distant future. If the publishers who are ruled out of second-class privileges withdraw their thousands of tons of books, etc., and forward them by express, the weight of mails transmitted will necessarily be reduced. But as the mails are weighed only once in four years, in alternating sections of the Union, the full effect of any reduced burden of second-class matter will only be felt at the end of a quadrennial period.

During this interim, the regular increase in circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc., still going forward at one cent a pound, will partially neutralize the expected gain, and possible modifications of the present stringent rules, made either by executive or Congressional action, may be expected to complicate the situation still farther. In other words, we cannot depend on any such gain to the revenues or reduction in expenditures in the near future, by reason of the sweeping reforms in second-class abuses now being attempted, as would compensate for the reduction of letter-postage by fifty per cent. No official prominently connected with the system expects an early realization of the "one-cent"

rate; few persons ask for it, except those who have a large pecuniary stake involved.

Theoretically, there is an admitted injustice in requiring the patrons of the letter mail to make good a deficiency caused by favoritism to other interests. But, practically, as above demonstrated, they must endure the burden until relieved by the correction of other abuses. To lift it from them now would entail a shock fatal to the efficiency of the whole service.

The leading defect and abuse of the service under present conditions are found by many investigators in the excessive amount paid to railroads for carrying the mails. Exhaustive reports have been made to Congress by committees and commissions on this subject, some of them claiming that the principal cause of the deficiency in the revenues is the cost of transportation by railroad companies, under existing laws. One report says that, whereas we pay on an average eight cents a pound for this service, the best estimate to be made from the proofs at hearings before the committee is that the actual expense to the transportation companies is about one cent per pound, and that express companies, which are said to pay about forty per cent. of their earnings to railroads for hauling their cars, underbid the government on second-class mail matter, carrying it at less than one cent a pound on hauls of less than five hundred miles, and still make a profit.

The "Statistical Abstract" published by the Treasury Department contains a table giving, among other things, the average cost per mile of railroad mail transportation, for a long series of years. According to this table, the average annual cost per mile was less than ten and a half cents in 1878, and 12.73 cents in 1901—and this in face of the fact that all other railroad charges have been greatly reduced. Reports of Congressional committees allege that, since the last reduction in rates of mail transportation in 1878, railroad freights have decreased thirty-five per cent. and passenger fares seventeen per cent.; and that, if the Department could have legally required a reduction of even twenty-five per cent., the saving would now be more than \$9,000,000 a year. Of course, these statements are controverted by representatives of the railroads, but there is enough merit in the contention that the railroads are grossly overpaid to explain the agitation for a readjustment of compensation on equitable terms. Every effort,

however, is met and thwarted by an energetic lobby, which watches over the interests of the corporations with sleepless vigilance.

Many citizens find a possible menace to the ultimate integrity of our postal affairs in the organizations which have been formed among the various classes of its employees, avowedly for the advancement of their own interests, as well as for the public benefit. Unquestionably, the merit system, as now applied in our national Civil Service, is absolutely indispensable to the efficient working of our governmental machinery, and nowhere are its benefits more visible and pronounced than among the vast army of employees under the jurisdiction of the Post-Office Department. Very little of the present marvellous speed and accuracy of our mail service would be possible if the old practice of appointing and removing carriers, clerks, route agents, etc., for purely political reasons, still prevailed. Certainly, more than double the number now employed in all branches would be required, if their positions were again made dependent on the will of Congressmen or political committees, as was formerly the case.

But the independence and permanence of their present tenure have a peculiar effect in encouraging the formation of associations of the various classes for mutual benefit. Formerly, the clerks and carriers of a city post-office were under obligations to their Congressman, as they were his appointees and the creatures of his will. The tables are turned; clerks and carriers, organized into effective societies, seem to feel that the Congressman is of their creation and subject to their dictation, or, at least, to very strong pressure in the direction their interests lead. Every branch of the service has its local and national organization, each persistently working for an increase of pay. The president of the National Letter-Carriers' Association recently said:

"Fortunately, this organization is not a body created merely to secure legislation, but is fraternal and protective as well. Men band together for mutual protection. It was this coming together of people for the purpose of protecting themselves against the encroachments upon their rights and liberties that gave us this country of ours. It is for the purpose of protecting themselves, and, at the same time, to better serve the public, that this National Letter-Carriers' Association was called into existence."

The desire to serve the public better is a laudable one; but, if we accept the general spirit of this proclamation, we shall un-

questionably be impressed with the idea that the ability of letter-carriers to serve the public would be greatly advanced by the increase of their salaries from \$1000 to \$1200 a year, which, after all, is practically avowed to be the principal object for which they are "banded together."

A high grade of soldierly heroism and civic virtue is constantly displayed by the servants of this matchless system. Every night, in five thousand rushing, roaring mail trains, weary toilers are caged, continually perilling life and limb, swaying and shaking, trembling and lurching, as they handle with nimble fingers the precious messages, any one of which "mishthrown," may break a heart or wreck a bank in some far-off State. Every day, in dark, cramped, crowded floors of city post-offices, fifteen thousand faithful clerks work, unseen, unnoted, straining every nerve and faculty in accurately dispatching the inconceivable multitude of missives and publications that are sending the life-throbs of commerce or intelligence or affection through the land, quickening the mind and energizing the spirit of our people.

Many of the demands of the employees represented by these organizations are neither ill-timed nor unjust. It cannot be denied that most officials and employees of the postal service are overworked and underpaid. The question, however, is, whether, after their present reasonable demands are met, the agitation will cease, or whether that success will merely be an incentive to still further demands. This is the result that those who are looking far ahead greatly fear. We have built up a gigantic business enterprise, employing thousands of intelligent, energetic, ambitious men in its different branches, and we see them solidly organized for the purpose of influencing legislation in their own interest. How far this movement will be carried beyond reasonable and just demands is one of the problems of the future—a problem so serious that President Roosevelt has felt constrained to issue an order forbidding attempts of public officials or employees to secure legislation for the increase of salaries.

Organization for more liberal pay is not confined to persons within the classified service. Twenty thousand of the lowest-grade postmasters, those receiving a compensation of less than fifty dollars a year, are entitled to retain the entire amount of their earnings. Yet even they are associated with their colleagues in an earnest effort to secure allowances for rent, light,

and other perquisites! They have a weekly newspaper organ at Washington, and this extract from a postmaster's letter published therein shows that I do not misrepresent their demand: "It takes the same time to attend a small office as a large one. The bill we want is the one which favors the poor man. If some one will get up a bill that will put the little office that pays \$25 a year on a footing with the one that pays \$300 or \$400, I am ready to support it." One strongly advocated proposition is to make the minimum compensation \$100 per annum. As forty thousand post-offices in the country pay less than that sum, this number of postmasters would, under that law, each receive a gratuity of from ten to eighty dollars a year more than the total earnings of their offices, as reimbursement for sustaining the dignity of United States postmaster in a farm-house or blacksmith shop.

The problem of handling a prospective combination of carriers in the new rural free-delivery service is already becoming serious. During a recent debate in Congress one Representative said: "I shall insist that the rural free-delivery carrier is entitled to just as good a salary as the carrier who delivers mail in cities; the people who are the beneficiaries of this service will be satisfied with nothing less." As the rural carriers now receive \$600 per annum, while mounted city carriers receive \$1,300, and are organized to agitate for \$200 additional, we may predict the result. Another Congressman attempts to formulate such a prediction:

"It is the problem of serving, in the near future, 30,000,000 people, by 60,000 rural carriers, at an annual cost of more than \$100,000,000. You will have salaries equivalent to city carriers, *plus* the Government horse and wagon; *plus* the hours of service by law; *plus* the annual leave and sick-leave; *plus* a substitute scheme—matters that will make my estimate of \$100,000,000 a year grossly inadequate. In that estimate alone have I belittled the system."

These serious, but manifestly avoidable or curable, evils are certainly worth the careful, solicitous examination of all who seek the public welfare. Other defects more numerous and, possibly, more dangerous, because apparently inherent in the system, are reserved for future consideration.

HENRY A. CASTLE.

(*To be concluded.*)

THE TOBACCO WAR IN GREAT BRITAIN.

BY LINCOLN SPRINGFIELD.

THE formation of the Imperial Tobacco Co. (of Great Britain and Ireland), Limited, with a capital of fifteen millions, sterling, in some respects marks an entirely new development of British industrial business. It is true that in recent years large amalgamations of manufacturers have been carried through in the United Kingdom, which are now in more or less flourishing circumstances; but they owe their existence to causes differing widely from those which operated in drawing together the leading firms of English and Scotch tobacco manufacturers, and were prompted by a desire to effect economies in administration.

For many years, a number of the most important and best-known English tobacco manufacturers,—that is to say, those firms whose productions are retailed to the consumer in packets bearing their names and registered brands and trade-marks, and therefore known in the trade as proprietary goods,—have had a working agreement or understanding amongst themselves, for the purpose of regulating the minimum prices at which their goods should be sold to the public by the shopkeepers, and thus preventing the ruinous cutting of prices which was formerly very common and much on the increase, especially in the large towns. At the same time, each of these firms competed keenly for the custom of the retail trade and for the patronage of the public for their manufactures, with very satisfactory results.

When, therefore, it became known that representatives of the American Tobacco Co. had actually secured the controlling interest in an English tobacco manufacturing company, and that the President of the American Trust had declared his intention of obtaining control of the entire tobacco trade of the United Kingdom, it was only natural that those firms which had pre-

viously worked in friendly and honorable rivalry, but with a common understanding, should consult one another as to what steps should be taken to oppose a common foe. Not that Mr. Duke's arrival in this country was unexpected; it had been threatened for years, and various more or less authoritative statements regarding the American invasion had been in circulation for a long time. But when the report that a British company had succumbed to the attractions of American dollars was confirmed, representatives of the leading British manufacturers held a meeting at which it was resolved that they should unite their interests to resist the invader, and protect their valuable businesses. Having agreed amongst themselves as to a common course of action, they invited others to join them; and, on October 14th, 1901, a circular was issued to the trade and to the public announcing that the great amalgamation was an accomplished fact, and that thirteen firms, whose names were as well known throughout the British Empire as household words, had resolved to put an end to competition amongst themselves and to unite in the defence of the great industry which the ambitious American Trust magnate had declared his determination to capture.

Amongst these firms, the most important is W. D. & H. O. Wills, Limited, of Bristol and London, whose business was established nearly two hundred years ago. They were the first firm of tobacco manufacturers to send out their wares in packets bearing their name. This system, however, was quickly adopted by others, although Wills's Birds' Eye for many a decade enjoyed an enormous and almost exclusive sale in all parts of the British Empire. This business was formed into a private, limited company in 1893, with a capital of about £2,000,000; but the whole of the shares and debenture stock were retained by the partners, and therefore the undertaking remained, for all practical purposes, a private firm. During recent years, the business of W. D. & H. O. Wills has increased greatly; the company have three large factories in Bristol, employing about 5,000 men and women, and one in London; and it is reported that last year they paid about £1,500,000 to the government for duty, while their profits are supposed to have nearly approached seven figures. Many years ago, Messrs. Wills introduced a profit-sharing scheme amongst their clerical staff and the work-people, based on the net earnings of the company, and this has advanced continuously, until last year each

participant,—and the arrangement includes all employees, from the general manager to the youngest child,—received a bonus of more than forty per cent. on the wages received during the year. Messrs. Wills are credited with producing two-thirds of the total quantity of cigarettes sold in the United Kingdom, and they are also the most important manufacturers of British cigars. Their export factory gives employment to about 1,500 hands, and the manufactures of the company are known on every market in the world, including the United States, in spite of almost prohibitive tariffs. Messrs. Wills's enormous export trade is largely owing to the well-known air-tight tin, of which they hold the patent rights, and in which their manufactures can be sent to distant parts without being affected by climate or age.

We have dealt thus fully with this firm, because, by their indisputable position in the tobacco trade of the United Kingdom, Messrs. Wills are probably more widely known than any other manufacturing firm in the world; while the excellence and reliability of their manufactures, and the high character of those responsible for the conduct of their business, have entitled the firm to exceptional distinction, even in a nation of business men. Two of the present members of the firm have been honored by baronetcies, and on a third the order of Knight Commander of the Bath has been conferred, as acknowledgments of public services rendered by them.

Bristol has long been an important tobacco centre, and Messrs. Wills show, with some pardonable pride, a letter to some of their predecessors from the Father of the American nation, advising a shipment of his tobacco in the following terms:

“VIRGINIA, 25th Nov., 1759.

“GENTLEMEN,

“Some time this week I expect to get on board the ‘Cary’ for your house, 50 hhds. tobacco of my own and Jno. Parke Custis’s, which please to insure in the usual manner. I shall also by same ship send you ten or 12 hhds. more if I can get them on board in time, but this I believe will be impracticable if Captn. Salman uses that dispatch in loading which he now has in his power to do.

“I am, Gentlemen,

“Your most obedient and humble servant,

“G. WASHINGTON.

“P.S.—My goods per Capt. Yates are arrived in James River, and I thank you for your diligence in sending them.”

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that other important tobacco manufacturing concerns are located in a city so long connected with the trade. The oldest business now carried on under the original name is that of Franklyn, Davey & Co., who, with Edwards Ringer & Co., control a great portion of the Superfine Shag trade of South Wales, drawing their supplies from the Richmond district of Virginia, and producing the same smoking-tobacco which was consumed by the earliest votaries of the weed—a strong, full-flavored article, which the modern cigarette-smoker would find ill adapted to his more delicate palate, yet containing the genuine features of the *Nicotiana Tabacum* which first attracted the early settlers of Virginia, and which Sir Walter Raleigh introduced to his fellow-subjects of Queen Elizabeth. Both of these firms are included in the Imperial Company.

Passing from Bristol to London, we find in the Imperial Tobacco Co. the important firm of Lambert & Butler, whose manufactures have for many years retained a strong hold upon the British public, and whose name is a synonym for excellence of quality, inferior to that of no other house in the trade. Another London house in the combine is the very old established firm of Adkin & Sons, one of the partners of which has been Vice-Chairman of the Tobacco Trade Section of the London Chamber of Commerce for some years, and whose cheaper manufactures enjoy an enormous sale in the eastern counties of England.

At Nottingham, one of the most important industrial centres of the midland counties, the Imperial Tobacco Co. are represented by John Player & Sons, Limited,—a business established half a century ago, which in recent years has developed into one of the best known and most prosperous tobacco manufacturing undertakings in the kingdom.

At Liverpool, the British port to which most of the American-grown tobacco is now shipped, the Imperial Company have secured three businesses,—Hignett Bros. & Co., Ltd.; William Clarke & Son, Ltd.; and the Richmond Cavendish Co., Ltd. These three important undertakings are widely different in the class of manufactures they produce. The name of Hignett has for a long time been known in connection with a number of the leading packet-tobaccoes sold throughout the United Kingdom, while Messrs. Clarke's business has been chiefly in what are known in the trade as "heavy goods," a term which includes such articles as Irish

Roll, Pigtail, Cavendish, and similar manufactures. The amount of tobacco used in this factory being exceptionally large, Messrs. Clarke have long ranked as one of the most important supporters of the British revenue, owing to their very large payments of duty on the raw material. The Richmond Cavendish Co.'s business is conducted in a bonded factory, and consists entirely of tobacco manufactured on the principle which obtains chiefly in the United States and known in England as "sweetened."

Having made their arrangements with the above-named English houses, the men responsible for the formation of the Imperial Tobacco Co. turned their attention to the Scotch manufacturers, with whom business had long been known to be in a very flourishing condition. The proverbial preference of Scotchmen for their own countrymen, even in business affairs, had enabled the Glasgow manufacturers to avoid undue competition in prices, with very beneficial results to those interested. The oldest and largest of these firms is that of Stephen Mitchell & Son, reported to be the oldest firm of tobacco manufacturers in Scotland and possibly in the United Kingdom. For seven generations, there has always been a Stephen Mitchell in this firm, and Messrs. Mitchell are understood to rank third in the trade of the United Kingdom as to the amount of duty paid to government. The other Glasgow houses now absorbed in the Imperial Tobacco Co. are F. & J. Smith and D. & J. Macdonald, both of which are furnished with new, up-to-date, splendidly equipped factories, fitted with the most modern machinery.

It is understood that arrangements have been completed with several other manufacturers for their inclusion in the Imperial Company at an early date; but of these thirteen firms already mentioned, it may be confidently stated that they practically held in their hands the cream of the British tobacco trade. The businesses were all in a flourishing condition, realizing handsome profits; their wares were household words, and literally in the mouths of the great majority of smokers in the United Kingdom, as well as in more distant countries. These businesses, too, were firmly established, and did not depend for their continuance on extravagant advertising. The English public are inclined to regard profuse expenditure in advertising with suspicion, realizing that money thus disbursed has to be repaid in some form by the consumer. If, therefore, the price is low enough to compete with

manufacturers who adopt other methods, it follows, so the British public argue, that the quality is inferior. This, however, is a matter which may well be left to the discrimination of the smoker, who is not slow to decide the question for himself.

When Mr. Duke commenced operations at Liverpool last October, he adopted a course similar to that which made him famous in the United States. He at once reduced the price of some articles made in his English factory, and offered certain goods which the public were prepared to buy at low prices, conditionally on orders being given for articles which they did not want. Next, he cut down the price to the trade of some of the cigarettes for which his English firm was best known, and later reduced the prices of nearly all his American manufactures—by as much as forty per cent. in some cases. But the British shopkeeper and the British smoker were blind to this generous treatment, and did not respond in the way Mr. Duke expected. The sale of the cheapened articles decreased rapidly, and other action became necessary. So Mr. Duke resorted to still further and even more extravagant advertising, and has patronized the newspapers and bill-posters of the United Kingdom in such a way as to make them believe that their fortunes are now permanently assured.

All this time, the Imperial Co. declined to be drawn, and refused to be frightened by Mr. Duke's prodigal expenditure of the funds of the American Tobacco Co. They maintained an oyster-like silence as to their intentions, and could not be prevailed upon to follow Mr. Duke's example in slaughtering their profits by reducing their prices, and we are informed that they have not lowered the price of any of their manufactures, such a course of action having been quite unnecessary. Experience has taught the directors of the Imperial Co. that the smoking public are willing to pay a fair price for a good article, and that when the price of any proprietary brand is cut down the public believe that the quality of the tobacco is inferior, and the sale at once drops in response to the lowering of the price. A certain section may think and act on different lines, but these are not the mainstay of any business, and need not be seriously reckoned with. In England, more than in any other country, perhaps, it is quality that tells, and no amount of puffing will secure a large sale for an inferior article. Englishmen may, from an American standpoint, be slow, but, at any rate, they are sure. Another point

which the President of the American Tobacco Co. had not reckoned with was the strong feeling of patriotism pervading all classes in Great Britain, and which was never so pronounced as at present. The objection to anything in the way of a Trust or a business "corner" has had a great deal to do with Mr. Duke's lack of success in his present campaign; and this feeling will undoubtedly become more deeply rooted and more effectively shown in the near future, owing to the operations of the Beef Trust, which have obliged English butchers to raise their prices; the purchase of several English match manufacturing businesses; the depressed state of the boot trade, in consequence of large imports of cheap American boots and shoes; and the sensation which has just been occasioned by the announcement of the Ocean Steamship Trust. Unless such methods of trading are curtailed in some way, the effects on the sales of American manufactures in the United Kingdom will be very serious, and it is not impossible that a practical boycott of everything produced in the United States may follow, in retaliation for what is considered unfair competition by Syndicate combinations, which seek to control important English industries.

At any rate, the effect of the American Tobacco Co.'s invasion of the United Kingdom, and of the boastful announcement of their determination to capture the entire trade of the world, has been distinctly favorable to British manufacturers, and particularly to the members of the Imperial Tobacco Co. In spite of the new competition, its business has increased enormously, and in some of the factories overtime work has been the rule recently instead of the exception it is supposed to be. At Bristol, one of Messrs. Wills's huge factories, employing nearly 3,000 work-people, is now being enlarged so as to accommodate 1,200 more. At Nottingham, an additional factory has just been secured to meet the needs of Messrs. Player's growing trade; and at Glasgow, Messrs. Macdonald have had to move into larger premises.

Up to the present, therefore, the American attack has not resulted in the closing of any of the Imperial Co.'s factories, and the directors are able to regard the future with equanimity. The American Tobacco Co. have had a branch in London for more than twenty years, and have spent scores of thousands of pounds in advertising their wares; but they have not been successful in establishing a trade of any importance for their manufactures.

It is understood that one part of the American Tobacco Co.'s plans was to secure all the bright Virginia and North Carolina tobacco offered on the markets in the fall of 1901. The order was a large one, and it failed to come off. Tobacco is not an article which can be handled in the same way as coal, wheat, or petroleum, which, having been brought to market, may be stored indefinitely. It requires to be handled and cured quickly, and the excellent arrangements which regulate the markets in the tobacco-producing districts of the United States are quite sufficient to protect the farmer on the one hand and the independent manufacturer on the other from the disastrous consequences of a corner in leaf tobacco. If such a thing were possible, the shrewd men of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Kentucky are too much alive to their own interests to allow themselves to be left with only one customer to buy their produce, at whatever price that one purchaser chooses to pay for it. They realize the advantages derivable from a free and open market, and may safely be left to retain this as their strongest safeguard against the operations of any monopolist.

But, in every business where the material used is a natural product, the result of cultivation and dependent on weather or climate, exceptional years will occur, and 1901 was one of such special seasons. When the last crop came to market in the South, it was found that it was below the average in quantity and above the average in quality; or, rather, that the cheapest grades of tobacco were scarce. Thanks to the large stocks they held in the King's warehouses, the Imperial Company were, to an exceptional degree, independent of the tobacco crop of last year, and could afford to wait until one more abundant and more suitable for their purpose should be harvested. At the same time, everything offered at reasonable prices was readily bought by the English manufacturers; but, owing to the action of the American Tobacco Co., prices were put up early in the season to a figure which practically closed the English markets and prevented sales to manufacturers, under the circumstances already referred to. The Imperial Tobacco Co. were not slow to realize the position and, after due consideration, decided that old methods must give place to new necessities.

The English tobacco manufacturers have hitherto obtained their supplies of American leaf chiefly through importing mer-

chants or commission houses, who, having received consignments from their agents in the United States or from independent shippers, have sold the tobacco thus placed in their hands to the manufacturers. Some manufacturers have, on the other hand, been in the habit, for many years, of making purchases direct from their own agents in Virginia and Kentucky. Naturally, the Imperial Tobacco Co. were reluctant to break through business methods which had worked satisfactorily for generations; but they felt that in future they must be on an absolute equality with their strongest competitor in a matter of such importance, and that they were compelled to go to the source of supply and get as near the producer as possible, without the intervention of any middleman. They therefore determined to transfer their market for purchasing leaf to the United States, and with this object in view they have established a branch in Richmond, Virginia, under the control of a resident director, assisted by some of the most capable and experienced men in the tobacco district, and have arranged to have their own stemmeries and factories with specially retained buyers on all the principal markets. Such a course will enable the Imperial Tobacco Co. to obtain supplies at first hand and at market price. They can face the possibility of severe competition from the American Trust with composure; for they realize that, if the Trust puts up the market price, the effect will be the same to both: but with an important difference. Being undoubtedly larger purchasers of bright Virginia tobacco than the Imperial Tobacco Co. are at present, the Trust will suffer more by having to pay more dearly for their large purchases than the Imperial Tobacco Co. will for their smaller requirements. At the same time, the excessive competition which has prevailed, owing to a very large number of factors and shippers bidding against each other on the Virginia markets, in order to send supplies to their agents in Great Britain, will to some extent be removed; although it is not anticipated that the Imperial Co. will be altogether independent of the London and Liverpool merchants and brokers, but that they will supplement their own purchases in Virginia by whatever may be sent to the United Kingdom on consignment. It is, however, probable that this new line of action on the part of the Imperial Co., which represents a purchasing power of many thousands of hogsheads of tobacco annually, may have the effect of leading a number of shippers and fac-

tory owners in America to retire from the tobacco business altogether, as in future they will not be able to rely upon as ready sales at remunerative prices for their shipments as heretofore, seeing that most of the largest buyers, who were formerly in active competition against each other, are now joined in one business concern, and that they intend to buy as near the tobacco-fields as possible.

At the outset of the campaign, the Imperial Co. promised their customers a bonus on their purchases of the company's proprietary goods. No details of the amount to be distributed could be given at the time; but as soon as the prospectus of the company had been issued, and the capital subscribed several times over by the public, the bonus scheme was published to the trade. One of the conditions imposed upon those who desired to share in the amount to be distributed was to the effect, that those who participated should, if required, discontinue the sale of any of the goods of the American Tobacco Co., Ogdens Limited, and of any other manufacturer to whom the Imperial Co. might take exception. This clause was, to some extent, misunderstood by the traders, who thought they saw in it an attempt to establish a monopoly, which in a free country like England would always be most unpopular. It is, however, probable that the Imperial's stringent condition was directed only against the two above-named undertakings,—now practically one business concern; and the mention of other manufacturers is understood to have been made only in case any additional tobacco-manufacturing businesses were purchased or controlled by Mr. Duke's company. This was afterwards made clear by the Imperial directors, who, in response to the representations of some of their customers, modified the terms of their bonus agreement, with the effect that a very large number of wholesale and retail tobacconists throughout the United Kingdom readily availed themselves of the opportunity of securing the benefits offered them in the Imperial's profit-sharing scheme. The offer of the Imperial Co. was a distribution of one-fifth of the total net profits of the company, and, in addition, the sum of £50,000 was to be paid to those customers accepting the company's terms, on their trading during the first six months' business,—this latter amount being, it is understood, the personal gift of the directors. It is, of course, impossible to say at present what sum will represent one-fifth of the Imperial

profit; but, as the average profits for three years ending June, 1901, were given in the prospectus at over £1,000,000, sterling, and as it is known not only that very considerable economies will be effected by the amalgamation, but that all the combining firms have been exceptionally busy, and that their profits have greatly increased throughout the period for which the average profits were certified, it may be taken for granted that the profits for 1902 would approximate one million and a quarter pounds, sterling. This would provide a very handsome sum for distribution, and the company's customers were not slow to appreciate the fact. But Mr. Duke, in his feverish anxiety to part with the American Trust's earnings, promptly capped the Imperial Co.'s offer by one which not only excited astonishment but furnished a great deal of amusement in the tobacco trade. The sum of two hundred thousand pounds is to be distributed by him amongst the purchasers of the American-Ogden manufactures, and, in an uncontrollable outburst of generosity, Mr. Duke, not satisfied with bleeding the holders of the stock of the American Consolidated Co., gave away by a stroke of the pen the whole of the profits earned by Ogden, Limited. Not that this will in the least affect the amount to be received by Mr. Duke's customers; for, while the last balance sheet issued by Ogden, Limited, before its capture, revealed an available profit of something less than £40,000, it may be taken as certain that a very much larger sum than this has been lost by Mr. Duke in his benevolent desire to supply the retailer with tobacco at less than cost price, and in the extravagant advertising of five-a-penny cigarettes with which he opened his British campaign, and which has since been maintained, to the wonder of the wholesale and retail trade and the delight of bill-posters and newspaper proprietors. Probably, therefore, the shareholders in Mr. Duke's American Co. will be called upon to foot a much heavier bill than would be represented by his offer of £800,000 in four years.

The recklessness of such an offer may be estimated by the fact that many leading retailers have never sold Ogden's manufactures, as not being sufficiently in demand to make it necessary for them to do so; and, as we have already remarked, mere cheapness in price affects the sale of tobacco in England only slightly, while reductions in prices at once arouse suspicion as to quality.

The London *Times* remarked in a recent article:

"Whether by design or accident, the offer of the Imperial Tobacco Co. has been a huge success. It has drawn the American Trust, and developed the comedy of the situation. The Trust is evidently overjoyed at the smallness of the offer, and has hastened to show what it can do in the same line. It offers to pay to the retailers, by way of bonus, the whole of its profits upon sales in this country, and to add to that a further sum of £200,000 per annum. This splendid evidence of friendship is guaranteed to last four years. For all that time this generous and large-souled combination is going to work for nothing, simply to benefit the British retailer. Nay, more, it is going to pay £200,000 a year for the privilege of showering wealth upon him. There is no parallel to this magnanimity, except perhaps in the case of that friend of country yokels who sells sovereigns for sixpences. But the nobility of the American Trust does not stop even here. It calls attention in language of sonorous indignation to the unworthy attempt of its rival to boycott other people's goods. No design so repugnant to the cherished principles of free and independent Britons has ever been harbored by the American Trust. No degrading conditions are attached to its splendid generosity. All it asks is that its goods shall be fairly displayed and sold alongside of any others that the retailer may be so blind to his best interests as to admit into his shop. This sort of thing invigorates one's faith in human nature. Goods at cost price for four years, and a bonus of £800,000, to the struggling British traders! We are almost ashamed to speculate upon what is to happen at the end of the four years. To doubt the persistence of such noble disinterestedness seems almost infidelity. Can any one be guilty of the turpitude of asking whether the £800,000 is in the hands of trustees? Can any one entertain a doubt about the auditing of the manufacturing accounts, or the inclusion of the £200,000 in manufacturing expenses? For our part we prefer to believe that, when the four years expire, yet greater boons will be offered to us. By that time, no doubt, a scheme will be elaborated for adding to the enrichment of the British retailer the provision of the British consumer with the finest cigarettes in the world at twenty for a penny!"

Thus the bonus scheme of the Imperial Co. brought Mr. Duke into the open in his true colors, and such a revelation is probably, of itself, worth to the Imperial all they will have to distribute under their agreement with their customers.

One of the smartest moves on the part of the Imperial directors was the securing the control of the business of Salmon & Gluckstein, Limited, the largest retailers of tobacco in the world, who own about one hundred and fifty of the principal shops in London and provincial cities. This firm had for some years adopted a policy of cutting prices, and selling at small profits to the injury of other retailers. Under Imperial control this will not be possible, and they will have to sell at the same prices as other re-

tailers, who will readily appreciate the improvement in their lot which must result from such a course of action.

What the next move on the part of the Imperial Tobacco Co. may be has not yet been divulged by the officials responsible for its control. Probably a good deal depends upon the action of the American Trust. The Imperial Co. have so strong a hold upon the British public that they can regard Mr. Duke's offers to the trade without undue alarm, whilst acting on the wise injunction that a state of preparedness for war is the surest way to insure peace; and they may be trusted to secure themselves in a strong position, having a far more intimate knowledge of the requirements and desires of both the wholesale and retail traders than their opponents can possibly possess.

It is rumored that, in all probability, the Imperial Co. may carry the war into Mr. Duke's own country and fight him on his own freehold, as, it is understood, he considers the United States to be. Such a development is by no means unlikely; for, although a great deal of amusement may occasionally be obtained by "twisting the lion's tail," the noble beast has a way of retaliating in a forcible manner when once he is aroused. It is believed that not a few engaged in the tobacco business in the United States would welcome the starting of a factory under the auspices of a powerful company, possessing ample resources and conducting its business on fair and equitable lines, and opposed to the methods employed by the Consolidated Tobacco Trust. Other reports have been current that an arrangement exists, or is under consideration, with some of the most important manufacturing concerns in America and Canada who still are outside the Trust. Whether there is any foundation for these statements we cannot at present say definitely; but we may feel sure that a good deal more will be heard of the Imperial Tobacco Co., not only in Great Britain, but also in that great country whose ambitious representative called the Imperial Company into existence.

LINCOLN SPRINGFIELD.

METEOROLOGY AND THE POSITION OF SCIENCE IN AMERICA.

BY PROFESSOR CLEVELAND ABBE.

A RECENT number of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW contains an article, entitled "America's Inferior Position in the Scientific World" that has attracted considerable attention. We notice that the author has said nothing with regard to the very high position that America holds in several branches of science; and, therefore, I may be allowed to say a few words about one of these—namely, meteorology.

Before entering upon that specific subject, however, it may be well to observe that we must avoid confounding two distinct ideas, viz., "America's position in the scientific world" and "the position of science in America." The former is secure, the latter is still unsatisfactory; and it is the latter that we may seek to improve by practical means. It is not denied that America has thus far honored her inventors more than her men of research. In popular esteem the practical is often put higher than the theoretical, because it comes nearer to the popular heart. The investigator is liable to be neglected in comparison with the teacher or the lecturer; and the latter, in turn, are rewarded and supported less liberally than the inventor or manufacturer. Even in Europe the great engineers generally receive more attention than the investigating physicists, although the latter lay the foundation for the work of the former. The same holds true in astronomy, chemistry, mechanics, and every other branch of science. The knowledge gained by investigation always has formed, and always will form, the only firm foundation on which to build up invention and all the arts of civilization. But it is folly to speak of one class of men as greater than the other; each is equally essential to the complete whole.

Those who wish to help American science must do so by encouraging and stimulating that spirit of patient research which is the very soul of science. We want young men of intelligence who are willing to spend years in the search for knowledge—not merely those who have attained a collegiate degree for learning, but those who have a post-graduate or doctor's degree for research. Research has a reflex educational value to a young man; it is the practical application of his knowledge and talents; it stimulates his intellectual growth, just as the raising of a weight strengthens the muscles.

I.

The outstanding problems in science are difficult, as they have ever been. The very simplest ideas that are commonplace to us cost years of thought before they were first clearly perceived, and centuries of teaching before they were accepted by mankind at large. The atmosphere offers problems so complex that twenty years ago one of the ablest of Englishmen assured me that "they are too difficult to make it worth while for us to attack them at present." Their exact solution must wait until pure mathematics is able to cope with them. In so far as America has even approximately resolved any of these difficulties, she should receive full credit.

The older branch of meteorology, named climatology, considered purely as a study of statistics, began in America about 1817, under the inspiration of Mansfield and Lawton; it was especially fostered by Henry in the Smithsonian, by Lovell as Surgeon-General, by Schott in the Coast Survey, by Watts the Commissioner of Agriculture, and it is now developed by the Weather Bureau. Maury's "Winds and Currents of the Ocean," Coffin's "Winds of the Globe," Schott's "Tables of Temperature and Rainfall," were superior to any similar works published in Europe at corresponding dates. American citizens have also done great work in foreign countries—such, for example, as that of B. A. Gould and W. G. Davis on the climatology of the Argentine Republic. Many colleges and schools teach climatology; Harvard has an admirable school; Johns Hopkins and other universities have excellent courses on this subject.

In the younger branch of dynamic and physical meteorology, our countrymen and our Weather Bureau have been very conspicuous. James Pollard Espy of Philadelphia devoted his life

to this subject, and it is impossible to speak of the progress of modern meteorology without mentioning him who is recognized everywhere as its founder. We owe to him the discovery and demonstration of the part played by the latent heat of aqueous vapor in affecting the temperature and motions of the atmosphere. He was able to show that radiation and conduction, which had hitherto alone been thought of, were insignificant factors as compared with mechanical cooling—that is, the consumption by expanding air of its own internal heat when it has to do external work. This principle was demonstrated experimentally by Espy long before our modern thermodynamics was thought of. His writings on this subject, his experiments with his two forms of nepheloscope and his public addresses, both in this country and Europe, were so convincing that they form the starting-point for the study of the thermodynamics of the atmosphere. Although Thomson and Joule greatly developed thermodynamics, mathematically and experimentally, its bearing on meteorology was neglected by Europeans until about 1874, when Julius Hann wrote: “We must return to Espy and Ferrel.” Since that date, Germans have done much, but they have not surpassed the work done by recent American meteorologists.

To Espy we owe the invention of the whirled or sling psychrometer, and a method of determining the moisture in the air which is now recognized as the only competitor of the ventilated psychrometer, recently improved by Assmann.

Espy’s study of the ascending and descending currents of air led him to the true explanation of the formation of warm foehn winds, cumulus clouds, thunderstorms and tornadoes, and the regular recurrence of strong winds in the daytime and feeble winds at night. It is a significant proof of European ignorance of America, that Espy’s conclusions on the latter subject were independently deduced thirty years later by Koeppen, so that Germans are now willing to speak of the Espy-Koeppen explanation, although, according to the established rules of ethics, the credit belongs to Espy alone.

Closely connected with Espy’s theory of the formation of clouds, is the work done by Carl Barus at Washington and Providence on the phenomena of cloudy condensation. If he is allowed to prosecute his work further, he will eventually tell us how rain and lightning are formed.

The winds and storms of the atmosphere can be best studied by the use of graphic charts, showing what is going on over wide regions, both at the surface of the earth and above it. In this branch of study Espy was indefatigable, and his popular nickname "The Storm King" was well deserved. Beginning with local thunder-storms in Pennsylvania, he organized, in 1831, a special committee of the Franklin Institute, and in 1836 a joint committee of the Institute and the American Philosophical Society. He secured hundreds of observers, and compiled many storm maps as the basis of his work "On the Philosophy of Storms." In 1842, he came to Washington as meteorologist to the Government, and was assigned to duty, first under the Surgeon-General of the Army, afterwards under the Secretary of the Navy, but eventually, after 1848, under Professor Joseph Henry. In these positions he compiled a continuous series of daily weather maps of the United States, many of which were published in his four successive reports. He established numerous generalizations relating to the storms and some rules by which weather predictions could be made and were made. As Europe boasts of Cuvier, Agassiz and Humboldt as the founders of comparative anatomy, biology and climatology, so must America claim Espy, Redfield, Loomis and Ferrel as founders of the comparative study of daily weather conditions.

William C. Redfield studied the mechanism of storms on the ocean, as Espy did those on land. From the hurricane of September 3, 1821, onward, numerous great storms on the Atlantic and Pacific were examined by him. Redfield's work consisted in most diligently collecting and charting marine reports; and his deductions gave us the first fairly correct insight into the mechanism of a hurricane. This was an advance in marine meteorology superior to anything that had occurred up to his time, and assured us that storms in all parts of the world were analogous and were controlled by a few simple laws.

The study of the atmosphere on a grand scale has been the special field of American meteorologists. The beginnings made by Espy and Redfield were developed by the Smithsonian Institution so as to cover the whole continent, and by Maury so as to cover all oceans. Eventually, in 1873, General A. J. Myer, as Chief Signal Officer of the Army, was able to organize a general international, simultaneous service for the globe, and for many

years he published a daily weather map of the whole Northern Hemisphere. For the first time in the history of the world, this international bulletin and map made possible the study of the atmosphere on a proper scale.

America has a pre-eminent right to the glory reflected by the name of William Ferrel, whose innate genius, developed by persistent study under most adverse circumstances, enabled him to do for dynamic meteorology what Espy did for the physics of the atmosphere. The publication, in 1856, of Ferrel's short popular paper on winds and currents, and, in 1858-60, of his mathematical paper on the motions of fluids and solids on the surface of the rotating earth, is, we believe, everywhere recognized as the starting-point of modern dynamic meteorology. Of course, his papers, which were published in journals unknown in Europe, suffered the neglect usually experienced by utterances which are too far ahead of the time. Although a few separate prints of his memoir of 1860 were sent both by Ferrel and myself to European students, and although Ferrel's work was the basis of my "Probabilities" in Cincinnati and Washington, he was not recognized in Europe until 1875, when, for the benefit of the readers of the "Journal of the Austrian Meteorological Society" Professor Hann gave an appreciative review of one feature of Ferrel's work, namely, the demonstration that every movement of the atmosphere is accompanied by a deflection to the right in the Northern Hemisphere, by reason of the daily rotation of the earth on its axis.

Ferrel's explanation of the cause of the rotation of storms; his general theory of atmospheric circulation; his explanation of the origin of the low pressures in the Arctic and Antarctic zones and in the Equatorial belt, and of the high pressures under the Tropics; his determination of the frictional resistances of the land and water to the wind; his explanations of the phenomena of waterspouts, tornadoes, hail, monsoons and other matters too numerous to mention, are all to-day accepted with various modifications due to the recent progress of mathematics and physics. Ferrel placed the mechanics of the atmosphere on the right foundation, removing errors entertained by Europeans who had not properly studied the laws of fluid motion. More elegant mathematical solutions of some of his problems have been given by later European students, and the best general view of the sub-

ject has lately been published by Professor Bigelow, of the United States Weather Bureau, so that American science still remains at the head, so far as concerns this branch of meteorology.

Ferrel also knew how to make practical applications of his knowledge. We have from him the best explanation of the action of the sling psychrometer, and tables for computing atmospheric moisture; a system of reduction of barometric pressure to sea level; the proper method of using the bright and black bulb thermometers *in vacuo*, and many other improvements bearing on astronomy, meteorology and mathematics. His machine for predicting the tides is still used in the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey as a labor-saving contrivance. He was the first to demonstrate the influence of tidal friction in retarding the rotation of the earth on its axis.

At the present time, there are among meteorologists in America two men whose names are as well known in Europe as here—namely, Professor Marvin, skilful in the laboratory, and Professor Bigelow, accomplished in mathematical analysis. The same may be said of the meteorologists at the Blue Hill Observatory, where special attention has been given by Messrs. Rotch and Clayton to the study of the upper air. American work is worthy of the highest praise and has stimulated similar work in Europe. As regards organization and practical results, the United States Weather Bureau, under Professor Willis L. Moore, is doing the greatest and best work that has ever been done in any applied science; in its way, this Bureau is equal to the Pasteur Institute or anything else that Europe has to show. No European would deny that, in this respect, America is easily the first in the world.

II.

After all, however, it is less important to defend American science from criticism than to seek out methods by which future progress may be stimulated. I do not expect great benefits from large central institutes, clubs or societies; the present desideratum is the production of a large number of able investigators. So far as research is concerned, I think its best interests would be conserved by encouraging young men to attain the degree of Ph.D. by doing at least one good piece of original investigation. When we have thousands of such young men, we shall easily find the men of promise through whom science will be advanced.

A collegiate education in the ordinary sense of the word does

not make men of research, but men of learning. The degrees of A.B., A.M., B.S., M.D., C.E., etc., are given for excellent knowledge of the subject only. College courses and laboratory practice teach the youth what has been done; they prepare him to begin original work for the increase of knowledge. When it comes to this point in their courses of education, however, many excellent students display a certain sluggishness, or, as Tyndall would say, "a lack of the scientific imagination." Our problem is to stimulate and cultivate the intense mental energy needed by the investigator. Those who have a special genius for research are so desirable as leaders for younger men that a first-class university does not hesitate to seek them out and attach them to itself. A beautiful illustration of this fact is found in the following quotation from the report of President Eliot, of Harvard, for the year ending September 26th, 1901:

"Last summer, the Prussian Government offered our Assistant Professor, Theodore W. Richards, a full professorship of chemistry in the University of Göttingen, and described the professorship 'as offering ample opportunities for chemical research.' . . . The desire of the Corporation to retain the services of Professor Richards caused that body to consider the conditions under which it was reasonable to expect professors engaged in instruction to be also successful original investigators. To determine the just relation between instruction and research is one of the most difficult of modern university problems . . . To provide a laboratory, or a library, or a salary derived from endowments, is not the whole of proper university action aimed at the production of competent investigators. The university service for such men must be wisely planned, and those plans must be executed with far-seeing skill. The endowment of research is becoming an attractive object for private benevolence, but the world has little experience of wise schemes for this purpose. The Corporation endeavored to make with Professor Richards an arrangement of his work which will leave him a teacher, and yet give him time and facilities for chemical research and for creating a school of chemical investigators . . . It is a pleasant feature of this unique negotiation that it holds out a hope that America may before long begin to repay to Germany some of the immense educational benefits which the German universities have conferred on the American."

I am told that Prof. Richards's work in inorganic chemistry, and especially the determination of the atomic weights, had placed him in the front in a field that had once almost wholly belonged to Germany.

Although some American universities thus appoint men of research to their professorships, many appoint their professors under the influence of other ideas. Of course, minor considerations inevitably come into play in the ultimate decision as to the filling of a given vacancy; yet, if the first and major consideration is simply, "What has this man done that demonstrates his intellectual energy, his productiveness, his enthusiasm, his intimate knowledge of the subject, his fitness to lead those who must be taught?" then we shall certainly rule out all undesirable candidates. This principle has been clearly apprehended in Europe, and has been systematically developed to a remarkable extent in Germany. Her prominent position in the scientific world results primarily from this, namely, that her universities have recognized the value of the rule that "the men of the highest and deepest knowledge are shown by their researches, therefore no one shall be appointed *Lehrer* or *Privat Docent* who has not already, in one or more ways, contributed something original and important to the increase of knowledge regarding his special subject; and no one shall retain these humble places, or be advanced to the higher professorships, who does not continue to contribute original works that add still more to our knowledge."

Youths who enter German universities and technical schools see that successful research is properly rewarded, and they shape their lives accordingly. The friends of education in America must not labor exclusively for the diffusion of knowledge and ignore the increase of knowledge. The truths of nature, be they material or spiritual, are worth the great labor that it costs to get at them, and we are well repaid for disseminating them. Whether we study history or philosophy, physical science or religion, politics or sociology, still investigation and research, experimentation, observation and logic will always be in order. These alone can lead to the increase of knowledge. Every candidate for the degree of Ph.D. should know that a brilliant thesis in research will bring him substantial encouragement. Under this stimulus, the German universities have, for the past five generations, been turning the best national thought toward the development of the genius for investigation in every possible field of knowledge. Tens of thousands have received some recognition for research, and ten per cent. of these have become eminent by their discoveries. Not only the university but the whole country profits

by scientific progress. Her manufacturers, her ship-builders, her railroad, telegraph and mining engineers, and even her ruling aristocracy, have gone through her universities or technical schools, and are thoroughly imbued with the truth of the principle that "knowledge is wealth, power and pleasure."

We must increase our national activity in this respect. Our universities send forth annually perhaps one-tenth as many young men devoted to research as does Germany. It is a matter that needs no demonstration that there is about an equal proportion of youths of innate intellectual ability in America and in Europe, but these die like the wasted seeds unless circumstances contribute to their proper growth. I look upon the development of a genius among men as the florist looks upon a so-called "sport" among flowers; the latter grows wherever a seed of abnormal proclivities accidentally falls into a favorable soil and develops into a new variety of plant. Such were Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Galileo, Kepler, Newton and many other famous men. It is the province of our universities to nourish a host of post-graduate research students, in the confident expectation that here and there there will develop a genius that shall be a tower of strength.

As the prospect of congenial employment encourages young men to do good work in hope of recognition, so the endowment of research, and a little assistance from trust funds administered in the interest of research, encourage the older men, and often decide whether a given study shall be undertaken or not. The past history of funds for the endowment of research will, I think, show that applications for assistance, as compared with the actual grants of aid, have been in the ratio of ten to one. The total number of applications, rather than of the grants, indicates the intellectual aspirations of our countrymen. It shows what our men wish to do, but are only able to accomplish when they have financial help. The administrators of these funds sometimes allow them to be expended on apparatus, at other times on incidental expenses, the hire of assistants, office rent, etc.; but they rarely authorize the responsible chief of the investigation to apply the money to his own living expenses. They proceed on the assumption that he has an income from his own fortune or from other daily work, and that the proposed research is a minor undertaking, additional to current duties. This policy results in withholding help from the young scientist, and forces the older ones

to be very cautious in applying for help. The most important investigations demand much time, and the student should be free from all other cares and completely devoted to the work in hand. It is certain that science has only received bountiful returns when her investigators have been supported steadily and with generosity, straight through the years of toil that their work required.

The problem of stimulating research is not a new one in the United States. A small percentage of Smithsonian and Hodgkins funds has always been available, and similar smaller funds are in other hands. Several millions have also been invested in institutions intended for research and instruction, such as astronomical observatories, chemical and physical laboratories, geological, zoological and botanical museums or gardens, and scientific libraries. But the endowment of research results in important additions to our knowledge only when the right men are thereby set to work. Undoubtedly, America has several such men.

The law of supply and demand applies to science as well as to commercial matters. If there be no demand for improvement, the improvements and the inventors retire alike into the background, or are altogether eliminated. The Patent Office has been organized to secure the rights of inventors and stimulate that side of our national progress. No analogous organization has as yet been established for the defence of the rights of the original discoverers. We have no national or federal recognition of the general principle that original research, the discovery of new laws or new elements, new stars or new truths of any kind in nature, is of any importance whatever to the individual or to the nation. However, our governmental departments do make appointments on the basis of work done in history, biology or physics, and this policy is bringing about good results.

III.

As regards the future of the science of meteorology, we have to build up from the bottom. I have elsewhere pointed out that our educational institutions have as yet confined themselves to climatology, and offered too little encouragement to the study of the fundamental dynamics. The Weather Bureau has found it necessary to rely entirely upon its own courses of instruction in preparing and promoting its observers and forecasters. Can it be true that the study of this subject is not fully

appreciated in America? Such neglect should be remedied by the establishment of schools of meteorology on an equality with other schools of science. Do we need hundreds of astronomical schools and not one meteorological? There may be a hundred young men in the country studying elementary science who are sufficiently interested in meteorology to think of devoting their whole energies to that subject if they but knew of a teacher, and had any assurance that they could earn a livelihood and make a career in this profession. They should not be told that there are no opportunities for them. There should be at least one school of highest character for meteorological research. The admirable papers published by the students of Professor R. S. Woodward, especially those of Cottier, Ling and Davis, on problems of hydrodynamics and the atmosphere, show that under such a master an important school of meteorology would rapidly develop. The works of Mendenhall, Trowbridge, Marvin, Barus and other experimental physicists show what they could do for our science if they were able to devote their whole time to it.

It is not to be denied that, at present, the progress of meteorology in this country depends very largely upon the encouragement given by the United States Weather Bureau to the highest class of scientific research. This Bureau centralizes the entire Government patronage in this respect. There is scarcely an observing station in the country that does not report to it. Its telegraphic organization for reports and daily forecasts reaches every point on the continent. Its forty or fifty sections publish monthly, in great detail, the climatic data of each State and Territory. The whole service is recognized the world over as a model in respect to thoroughness, accuracy and promptness. Moreover, every one is stimulated by its Chief to special study and work under the assurance that his personal ability will be recognized in some agreeable way. The Bureau is a purely Civil Service organization, but that does not mean that it does not need the spirit of progress. It needs to utilize men of research and men of progressive ideas in every branch of its work. Its daily routine of observing and forecasting is not in itself research. The experience of the Weather Bureau is like that of every other organization in the whole long history of science, to the effect that ability and success in research do not result from organization. The gift for research is a style of intellectual energy that refuses to be bound

by regulations. An energetic investigator immured in the walls of a great organization may be as much out of place as a wild bird in a cage. He must have intellectual freedom. He can utilize, but must not be dominated by, his surroundings. His mind sees something better than is seen by others, something that is scarcely dreamed of by them. Nature gives him a glimpse of some one of her hidden possibilities, and he has the genius to follow the trail and convert his glimpse into a glorious reality for the rest of us. He studies nature, not policy. It is likely that there are many such men outside, as well as inside, the service. In order to give this latent talent a chance to reveal itself, the Secretary of Agriculture has taken two important steps. As to the outside talent, he has established a corps of student assistants in all the varied branches of his great department. If these student assistants are chosen preferably from among the holders of the university degree of Ph.D., the greatest possible stimulus will be given to post-graduate work in the scientific schools throughout the land. In order to encourage the talent within the Meteorological Service, Secretary Wilson has encouraged Prof. Willis L. Moore to give the broadest development to a modest periodical entitled "The Monthly Weather Review." This opens its columns to all who are teaching, observing or investigating along the lines of Weather Bureau work, and, thereby, does something to stimulate research and progress. As to those employees of the service who have already shown ability in research, but are much encumbered with executive and routine work, we can only hope that times will change for the better, so that they may have opportunity to show what they can do.

In general, the present development of science in America is highly encouraging. Future progress will depend, not so much on the formation of influential scientific clubs as on our laboratories, our periodicals, our local societies and the policy adopted, as to patronage, by the government and our universities. Meteorology will especially advance whenever some one establishes a meteorological laboratory in connection with some first-class university, giving it conveniences for experimentation on a large scale, furnishing it with an experimental physicist, a mathematical physicist, and several student fellowships, and allowing these abundant time to work out completely the first few problems that they may see fit to undertake.

CLEVELAND ABBE.

THE NATIONAL DEBT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

BY DR. ADOLPH WAGNER, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN
BERLIN UNIVERSITY.

THE present German Empire was formed, as we know, by the Union in 1871 of the South German states with the North German Confederation and the addition, after the peace of Frankfurt in 1871, of Alsace-Lorraine, territory which had been wrested by France from the old German Empire.

Till the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in the summer of 1870, the North German Confederation, itself only in existence since 1866-67, had made but modest demands upon the State credit—grants amounting to 17 million thalers (51 million marks) only having been obtained for naval and coast defence purposes. This sum, however, was never entirely placed, nor was it strictly speaking a loan; but it was raised by the issue of Treasury Bonds to the amount of 13.45 million thalers (40.35 million marks). A considerable quantity of these bonds were several times repaid and re-issued for small amounts, but they were finally paid off in 1872.

The expenses of the war of 1870 were borne by the North German Confederation and each of the South German States on its own separate account. The new loans raised for this purpose by the North German Confederation were partly in the form of a five per cent. Consolidated Loan of 120 million thalers (360 million marks) in July 1870, of which, however, only 113.37 million thalers were issued; partly by the issue, from time to time, of Treasury Bonds at short dates, which were soon called in; and partly by the issue of Treasury Bonds, running for five years. Thus, by the end of 1871, there was a new North German Confederation Debt of 220,020,801 thalers.

However, the successful issue of the war and France's war indemnity of five milliard francs enabled the Confederation to repay these loans in full in 1872, so that only a few unredeemed bonds still exist. A small portion of the debt (17,000 marks) is still outstanding.

For the relief of the economic disturbances consequent on the war of 1870, the North German Confederation started the so-called "Advance Banks" (*Darlehnskassen*), empowered, by means of specially issued State paper money, to give loans at fixed interest to trades-people, and so forth. This paper money was issued in amounts of 5, 10, and 25 thalers; and though it was not legal tender nor convertible into coin on demand, it was taken in payment at all public offices and, owing to the favorable issue of the war, never fell below par. Of the 30,000,000 thalers granted for this purpose, 29,651,000 thalers were issued, but in 1871-72 the issue was almost entirely redeemed, and the Banks themselves closed. By 1873, therefore, the German Empire, in its character of legal successor to the North German Confederation, actually had no State Debt.

The debt came into existence again in 1875, when the French War Indemnity had been absorbed in the costs of the war, the repayment of loans, joint Imperial expenditure, the creation of Imperial Funds, and in distribution among the separate States. Including such sums as the 200 million francs contributed by the city of Paris, the surplus from the taxes raised in France, etc. (55.93 million marks), and the value, with its accumulated interest, of the Alsace-Lorraine Railway (assessed at 260 million marks), the Indemnity had amounted to 4,467,096,402 marks.

The new debts since 1875 had been contracted partly in the form of loans, partly in the issue of Treasury Bonds. The loans were chiefly employed on extra outlay for army and navy, for fortifications, for the construction of so-called strategical railways, with subsidies to the separate States for a similar purpose. The fact that Germany's present position among the Continental Powers is, in great part, due to her having applied so much of the War Indemnity and of the fresh loans she raised since 1875 to the use of the Army, fully justifies such employment of those funds, just as the founding and expanding of her naval power afford a similar justification for the sums used and loans raised for this purpose.

The legislation upon the subject of the new increase of the navy and the "East Asiatic Expedition" (as it is called) to China has produced an augmentation of the national debt, and the former measure will continue to do so for some years to come. Additions to the debt have also taken place upon account of the army, etc., and will do so also in the future. This may be seen from the following figures:

Year.	Total of the Imperial Debt in Millions of Marks.	Imperial Loan in Millions of Marks.	Cost of the Debt according to the Budget, in Thousands of Marks.
1898	2302	2182	72,288
1899	2343	2223	75,519
1900	2419	2299	77,701
1901	2500	2380	88,543
1902	c. 2750	c. 2630	—

Of the Imperial Loan upon April 1st, 1900, there were 1,240 millions at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., 1058.5 at 3 per cent.; 80 millions of 4 per cent. Treasury bills were added to this on April 1st, 1901, and, later still, 300 millions more of 3 per cent. loan.

By the Act of April 10th, 1898, a considerable increase of the navy had been resolved upon. As this increase was not regarded as sufficient, the Imperial Government introduced a new bill, which passed in the Reichstag after violent political and Parliamentary conflicts, although not exactly in the form originally proposed. According to this scheme, a sum of 1367.5 million marks was voted for the construction of new ships, and was to be employed during the years 1901-1916. Inclusive of other special expenditure for shipbuilding, armaments, harbors, and dockyards, an additional amount of 1861 million marks was to be expended upon the navy during the sixteen years from 1901 to 1916: this expenditure was to be distributed as equally as possible between the different years. Only 761.13 millions were to be raised by means of loans, and the balance of 1099 millions was to be placed on the list of ordinary charges upon an annually increasing scale. In the Act of June 14th, 1900, which repealed the former Navy Act of April 10th, 1898, this new scheme came into force in a somewhat modified form. According to this Act, "the raising of the amounts necessary to the carrying out of this law is subject to an annual estimate in the list of the national expenditure." A part of the amount will be raised by the in-

clusion of the sums in question in the General Supply List, while another part will be raised by means of loans. An increase in the Imperial Debt is accordingly to be anticipated for several years to come; the recent increase of the interest of the Debt is also traceable to the same cause. The Navy List, which is becoming such an important item of the national expenditure, shows the following development during the last 4 years (Budget figures) :

NAVY LIST IN THOUSANDS OF MARKS.

	1898.	1899.	1900.	1901.
General expenses	62,751	69,045	73,863	79,878
Special expenditure in ordinary List	29,368	30,037	38,278	61,615
Special expenditure in extraordinary List	29,636	33,879	40,621	55,523
Total.....	121,755	132,961	152,762	197,016

These figures do not include the grants for disabled sailors. The grants in the Navy Estimates for the Chinese province of Kiautschau, which is subject to Admiralty administration, are likewise not included in the above figures.

The expenses of the East Asiatic Expedition were estimated at 152,770,000 marks in a supplement to the Navy Estimates for 1900, *i. e.*, for the period between the summer of 1900 and March 31st, 1901; in the Estimates for 1901, they were fixed at 123,322,000 marks, in view of the probable conclusion of the expedition. The whole forms a total of 276,092,000 marks. These sums are raised entirely by means of loans.

It thus appears that, during the last few years, both the navy and the foreign policy have contributed towards the augmentation of the German Debt in a considerable degree; for some time past the loans raised have been principally for military and naval expenses. In the Budget Act of 1900, a sum of 80,477,000 marks was devoted to paying off loans; together with the loan for the China Expedition, it amounted to 233,247,000 marks. In 1901, the corresponding sum was 203,304,000 marks, making altogether 436.5 millions. Moreover, the grants allowed by law in the Budget towards the diminution of the national debt were reduced in 1900 to 2,291,000 marks, and altogether cancelled in 1901, in order that they should be employed to meet special expenses, and so lessen the amount of new loans to be raised. But

the revenues of the Empire, which have been hitherto steadily increasing, especially of late years, have on the other hand contributed to the maintenance of prosperous financial conditions. Only quite recently have signs of a decrease in the revenues appeared, in consequence of the general financial crisis.

Under the influence of the absorption of capital through the great impetus given of late years to industry and trade, the rate of interest in Germany rose slightly, while the price of Imperial and State papers sank. This was probably due in some measure also to the political events in Asia and South Africa. The average price of the $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Imperial Loans stood only at 95.82 in 1900, in comparison with 99.77 in 1899, 102.64 in 1898, 103.51 in 1897, and 104.57 in 1896: the lowest price was 92.75, at the end of September, 1900. The 3 per cent. Imperial Loans showed an average price of 86.74 in 1900, against 90.71 in 1899, 95.51 in 1898, 97.65 in 1897, and 99.12 in 1896. The lowest figure was 84.90 in October, 1900. Since that time, however, and especially since the spring of 1901, these prices have risen considerably: at the beginning of August, 1901, the $3\frac{1}{2}$ Per Cents stood at 101-101.5, and the 3 Per Cents at over 92. The financial and industrial crisis, which depreciated the value of so many investments, has brought a great deal of capital back to Government securities.

In order to defray the expenses of the Chinese Expedition, a loan in the form of Treasury Bonds for 80 million marks was raised by arrangement with German banks in New York: this loan, for the first time for many years, was rated at 4 per cent. and stood at par. The negotiation of this loan abroad met with great opposition in Germany, but was justified by the prevailing tightness of the German money market. The loan has since partially returned into German hands.

It is important to note that a small portion of the Loans raised for military and naval purposes have been employed for other things; for instance, for the Post and Telegraph, the Imperial State Railways in Alsace-Lorraine, the North Sea Canal, subsidies to Hamburg and Bremen to enable them to enter the Zollverein, the currency reforms and so forth. The interest, etc., on these sums is partially covered by the receipts of the post and telegraph, State Railway and other departments; so that these debts are to a certain extent productive, a point not to be over-

looked when examining the Imperial State Debt, as the net receipts of these departments have then to be taken into account.

The net profits of the Alsace-Lorraine Railway supply not only the interest on the sum at which the French railway was assessed as part of the War Indemnity, but also the interest on the capital expended by the Empire on the equipment and extension of the railway system; for neither working capital nor rolling stock was included in the cession of the line to Germany, and had to be provided at the expense of the Empire.

In the Budget of 1900, for instance, a surplus of 26.58 million marks was put down to the Imperial Railways, whereby more than one-third of the interest on the Imperial Debt is covered. Other net receipts—for instance, 1.87 million marks from the Imperial Printing Office taken over from Prussia and enlarged, and 47.07 million marks from the Imperial Post and Telegraph—amply suffice to cover the rest of the annual charges on the Imperial Debt, without counting the revenue from other sources, such as the share in the net profits of the Imperial Bank of Germany, which appeared in the Budget of 1900 as 9.70 million marks and was actually more.

It is thus clear that there is no necessity to tax the people in order to cover the interest on the Imperial Debt, an infinitely more favorable condition of things than in other countries.

This is without regard to the condition of the finances of the separate States, which happens, however, to be so favorable that even a very considerable increase in the Imperial Debt for military and naval purposes may be contemplated without the least apprehension.

The Imperial State Loans are all in the form of *Rentes* whereby the debtor, the Government, promises only the interest not definite repayment, but reserves the right to give notice of the repayment of the capital. The first loans which were placed between 1877 and 1884, according to the Laws of 1875 and 1884, were bearing 4 per cent. interest, and were issued at first a little below par, giving a return of 4.21 per cent., and gradually falling to 4.077; since 1880, owing to the improvement in State credit, higher quotations and lower interest on landed property, they rose steadily above par, while the return fell to 3.819 per cent. The continued low rate of interest in the money market enabled the Government in 1897 to give notice of the conversion of these

loans and to lower the rate of interest to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. from October 1st, 1897—a measure which has proved entirely successful.

The subsequent Imperial Loans were placed at $3\frac{1}{2}$ and 3 per cent., the former at or a little above par, the latter at first considerably below par (1886-87) but rising later almost to par (1897-98), thus giving a return of a little more than 3 per cent. The average price of issue of the 4 per cent. loans was 99.06, with 4.038 interest; of the $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. loans, 101.10, with 3.462 interest; of the 3 per cent. loans, 95.53, with 3.140 interest.

Since then, that is since 1898 and especially since the summer of 1899, as everywhere else in Europe, the quotations for the German Imperial Loans and German State Loans generally have fallen considerably, owing to the tightness of the money markets, the South African War, and, in Germany especially, on account of the rapid expansion of industry and commerce and the consequent demands on capital and credit. The price of the German $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Imperial and State Loans, which had already reached 104 to $105\frac{1}{2}$ (maximum 105.70 in 1896), has fallen to 95-96 (March, 1900), that of the 3 per cent. loans which had been above par (maximum 100.80 in 1894) to 86-87. The Empire and the States will therefore probably have to pay at least $3\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. for fresh loans.

The increase in the debt, particularly since 1887, and the fact—irrespective of the principle involved—that the greater part of the loans were applied to non-productive objects, have led of late years to provisions for the systematic amortization of the capital of the debt. Till then, no legal enactments existed for a sinking fund, nor was any portion of the Budget applied to this purpose. By a series of laws, provision has been made since 1896 whereby a portion of the Imperial Revenue derived from the customs and certain indirect home taxes shall be devoted—under certain conditions and to an amount specified in the regulation—to the amortization of the debt, or, if advisable, the credits voted by Parliament are reduced by the amount in question and thus some check put upon the increase of the debt. These enactments, which are closely connected with the somewhat intricate financial dealings between the Empire and the separate States, cannot be more fully entered into here. They appear somewhat too complicated as yet, but have nevertheless proved themselves useful in so far that they have retarded the increase of the Debt.

Like most German State Loans, the Imperial Loan obligations are to bearer; they are issued in various amounts (mostly for 200, 500, 1,000, 2,000, 5,000 marks) and have half yearly coupons attached to them. In 1891, however, following Prussia's initiative, an "Imperial Book of the Debt" was instituted, to some extent, though not altogether, on the same lines as that of England. Entries are made there in favor of State creditors, the owners of Imperial Government Bonds handing them in for this purpose. The Bonds are thus converted into such entries and then destroyed; or *vice-versa*, entries can be re-converted into Bonds. A small charge is made for such transactions.

Treasury Bills have been issued periodically since 1876 to furnish the working capital of the Imperial Exchequer, and at times to a considerable amount for the purchase of the necessary gold for carrying out the currency reforms. They are invariably of short date (about 3 to 4 months), they are for large amounts, and, of late years, are without coupons, being negotiated like Bills at the current discount rates. It is now customary in the annual Budget to assign to the Imperial Chancellor a maximum credit in Treasury Bills. These Bills may be issued repeatedly during a certain period, but must be paid off by a specified date. The necessity for this operation explains itself, from the fact that State revenue and State outlay do not always correspond within the exact period of the year.

The "*Reichscassenscheine*" are an institution peculiar to Germany and a few other countries. They are an Imperial Paper Money, having their origin in the paper money issued, before 1871, almost universally by the separate States, the smaller States issuing it in relatively high amounts, considering their area and population. In this way, a loan was raised on which there was no interest; for, though the paper money was for the most part exchangeable for coin on demand, this was seldom done, as it was taken in payment in every public office in every State, hence there was no call for large redemption funds, and in the old days of the silver currency it was a convenient form of circulation besides the coin. The great drawback, however, to this paper money, was its confusing multiplicity.

Conformably with the Constitution of the North German Confederation and of the German Empire, the Imperial Legislature had now become the only authority competent to deal with this

as with all other questions pertaining to currency or banking. This was settled in the law of April 30th, 1874. All paper money of the various States was recalled, the total slightly reduced in value and converted into the new Imperial paper money, the "*Reichscassenscheine*."

At first there remained over, of the 180.30 million marks of State paper money, a sum of 174.89 million marks in "*Reichscassenscheine*," which, however, was to be reduced by yearly withdrawals down to 1890 to a definite limit of 120 million marks. To this amount the Imperial paper money is still in circulation, consisting of 20 million marks in amounts of 5 marks, 30 millions in amounts of 20 marks, and 70 millions in amounts of 50 marks. The Imperial paper money need not be accepted by private persons in lieu of coin and is not legal tender, but is received in payment by public offices throughout the Empire where they are also cashed at the request of the holder. The weak point in the scheme is that there is no special cash reserve for their redemption, nor any other liquid assets for this purpose, and, though in ordinary times their exchange for ready money is seldom asked for, it might easily be different at critical times. It would have been wiser to have boldly abolished the State paper money at the time when the French War Indemnity offered ample means for so doing, or at least to have allowed the Imperial Bank to issue 50 mark notes, its lowest being now 100 marks, especially as with the present gold currency there is no real necessity for amounts of five or twenty marks.

The Imperial Bank of Germany, which was developed out of the former Bank of Prussia, is not a State Bank, as its capital (formerly 120 million marks, but now being increased) belongs exclusively to private individuals. Nevertheless, as in the case of the old Bank of Prussia, the management is entirely in the hands of the State, the bank notes are issued under State control, the Empire has a share in the net profits of the Bank, and has the right, on the lapse of the concession, to take over the Bank.

The management of the Imperial Debt is undertaken by the Administrative Committee of the Prussian State Debt, for which Prussia receives re-imbursement. The charges of administration of the Imperial Debt for 1899 were 280,000 marks. "The Imperial Debt Commission," in which the Reichstag has representatives, acts as a Board of Control.

Pensions, whether military (army and navy) or civil, are not reckoned in the actual State Debt, either of the Empire or the separate States, as is the case, for instance, in France. Broadly speaking, however, they may be regarded in the light of a debt. The sum total for 1899 came to 93.23 million marks, 91.78 million of which go to the army and navy, the remainder to the pensions for Government officials. The greater part of the military pensions, however, does not fall on the Imperial Budget, but is supported by a special institution, the "Imperial Fund for Disabled Soldiers."

This Fund, with a few others, was formed out of the French War Indemnity, with a capital of 561 million marks, in order to insure pensions for the soldiers disabled in the war of 1870, though later on pension funds from former wars were incorporated in it. The Fund is invested in German Government and other loans, and, besides the interest, part of the capital itself is used, if necessary, to meet the yearly liabilities of the Fund. In this way, the capital has shrunk considerably in the course of years. The Fund is larger than it actually need be, for the payment of the pensions for which it is responsible, and therefore represents, in a manner, a free asset of the Empire. All other pensions are paid out of the general resources of the Budget. The possession by the Empire of a free asset in the shape of the War Pensions Fund is a fact to be noted in an appreciation of the German National Debt.

Other Funds were constituted at that time out of the French War Indemnity—for instance a Fortifications Fund of 216 million marks—long since absorbed, and one of 24 million marks for the Reichstag buildings, of which only 0.57 million marks remained in 1898. On the other hand, very considerable assets still remain to the Empire out of the French War Indemnity, in the value of the Alsace-Lorraine Railway, which at present yields an annual net profit of 26 to 27 million marks, representing a capital sum of 500 million marks or more.

Then there is the "War Chest," the National War Fund of 120 million marks in gold, also raised from the French Indemnity, an institution almost exclusively peculiar to Germany, and a development of the former Prussian State Reserve which dated from the time of Frederick William the First in the earlier part of the eighteenth century. This Prussian State Reserve had

last done service in the wars of 1866 and 1870, especially for the rapid mobilization of the troops, Prince Bismarck himself stating in the Reichstag in 1871 that without this source of ready money the mobilization of the army, in the summer of 1870, must necessarily have been delayed, and the war, instead of being carried at once into the enemy's country, might have easily begun on the Rhine.

As a result of this opinion, the old Prussian State Reserve was transferred to the Empire in 1871. It had last been officially regulated in 1866, when a maximum limit of 30 million thalers (90 million marks) was fixed, which sum was obtained out of the war contribution from Austria and the South German States. These 30 million thalers were now refunded to Prussia, she abolished her State Reserve, and the Empire founded the present "War Chest" of 120 million marks, which is stored in gold coins in the Julius Tower of the Fortress of Spandau. As its sole purpose is for the mobilization and arming of the troops in time of war, it has never been touched since its creation in 1871-72. The Empire, of course, loses the interest on this dead capital, but enjoys in return the inestimable advantage of being able to command an immediate supply of ready money on the outbreak of a war. Only, the Fund should be larger to satisfy latter-day requirements.

The 120 million marks of the "War Chest" is the same sum as that issued in Imperial paper money, so that hereby the Empire gains the interest it loses on the dead capital. Beyond this, however, the correspondence in the two sums is purely accidental. Nor is the "War Chest," as is often erroneously supposed, a security for the *Reichscassenscheine*. That, as we know, is not its mission at all, which is exclusively to cover the expenses entailed in mobilizing the army. Nevertheless, in war time it may be used to increase the cash of the Imperial Bank of Germany and thus place a corresponding amount in bank notes at the disposal of the army. In this way the War Chest may be accounted an additional security for the public credit.

In discussing the National Debt or any other financial question of the German Empire as now constituted, the Empire itself must be kept distinct from its separate component States. Nevertheless, the debts and finances of the Empire and those of the separate States are so closely interwoven that, to treat of the

Empire by itself, would necessarily create a false impression, especially when instituting comparisons with countries like France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, where no such division obtains.

Thus, in the German Imperial Budget, the chief outlay is for army and navy, while only a small portion falls to the Civil List, because the civil administration has remained for the most part in the hands of the separate States. Post and telegraph belong to the Empire, excepting in Bavaria and Wurtemberg, which have retained their own. Most of the railways, certainly all the important lines, are Government property; but of these only a small proportion—the Alsace-Lorraine line—belongs to the Empire, the rest falling to Prussia and the other States.

Hence, while in the National Debt of the German Empire can only be reckoned such loans as were and still are raised for defraying the expenses of army, navy, Imperial Post, and the above mentioned railway, those dating from 1866 (in North Germany) and 1871 (South Germany), as also the debts incurred for the construction of State railways and the purchase of private lines, must be reckoned in the State debt of each separate State concerned. In the Budget of the various States the gross receipts of the railways come under State Revenue, their working expenses under State Outlay, the net profits furnishing not only the interest, and eventually the means for the repayment of the loans originally raised for this purpose, but, particularly in Prussia, a surplus over and above which goes to cover other public expenditure.

Only by taking these circumstances into consideration, differing, as they do, so essentially from those of France and England, is it possible for a foreigner to understand the German National Debt and Finances, and to compare them with those of other countries. In the present review, it will suffice to consider Prussia in contradistinction to the Empire, and a separate paper will be devoted to that purpose.

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